Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
Heterolecithal [Gr. eteroV,
other, + lekiqoV, yolk]: Ger. heterolekithal;
Fr. hétérolécithe (rare -- Y.D.);
Ital. eterolecito. Of the ovum: having unequally distributed yolk. A
term proposed by Mark (1892) to include both telolecithal and centrolecithal
ova. Cf. HOMOLECITHAL, and CLEAVAGE. (C.LL.M.)
Heteromorphosis [Gr. eteroV, other, + morfh, shape]: Ger. Heteromorphose; Fr. hétéromorphose; Ital. eteromorfosi. The production by some organisms, under the stimulus of external forces, of organs or parts where such do not occur normally.
REGENERATION (q.v.) is the reproduction of parts which have been lost; whereas heteromorphosis is the production of parts unlike those which have been lost, as the replacing of eye-stalks by antennary structures.
If, for example, Tubularia mesembryanthemum, a hydroid polyp with stalk, head, and base, have its base and head removed and be then placed in the sand inverted (i.e. with the head end buried), the other end produces a head in a position which is abnormal.
Literature: the term was proposed by LOEB, Untersuchungen zur physiologischen
Morphologie der Thiere, Organbildung u. Wachsthum, Heft 122 (1892-3); C. HERBST,
Ueber die Regeneration von antennenähnlichen Organen, Arch. f. Entwicklungsmech.,
ii (1896). (C.LL.M.)
Heteronomy: Ger. Heteronomie; hétéronomie;
Ital. eteronomia. See AUTONOMY. (W.R.S.)
Hetero-psychological Ethics: Ger.
hetero-psychologische Ethik (suggested -- K.G.);
Fr. morale hétéro-psychologique (suggested -- TH.F.);
Ital. morale eteropsicologica (suggested -- E.M.).
See IDIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS. (W.R.S.)
Heterotelic: see AUTOTELIC, where a recommendation
is made (which has been seen and adopted by Hirn, The Origins of Art,
Heuristic Method (in education) [Gr. enriskein,
to find out]: Ger. heuristische Methode; Fr. méthode heuristique;
Ital. metodo euristico. A method that stimulates to invention or discovery.
See METHOD (in education). (C.DE.G.)
Hibernation [Lat. hibernare, from hiems, winter]: Ger. Winterschlaf; Fr. sommeil hibernal; Ital. ibernazione. The state of torpor in which some animals which inhabit cold or temperate latitudes pass the winter.
Long looked upon as a specially created provision, this peculiar state is now regarded as an adaptation fostered by natural selection.
Literature: art. Hibernation, in Todd's Cyc. of Anat. and Physiol.;
WESLEY MILLS, Hibernation and Allied States in Animals, Trans. Roy. Soc. of
Canada (1892). (C.LL.M.)
Hickok, Laurens Perseus. (1798-1888.) An
American theologian and philosopher, born in Bethel, Conn., educated at
Union College. After twelve years of pastoral labour, he became professor
of theology in Western Reserve College, 1836, and in Auburn Theological
Seminary, 1844. In 1852 he became vice-president, and professor of mental
and moral philosophy, in Union College. In 1866 he became president, and
retained the position until 1874.
Petit treason, on the contrary, is a violation by a subject of his allegiance to his liege lord, or of the duty of subjection to one to whom services are legally due. In the United States there is no treason but high treason, and it is called simply treason; the nature of the offence being defined by the Constitution. See WAR. The term haute trahison is one of English origin (Dict. de l'Acad. Franç., 'Trahison'). It is also found in early English law books in the Latinized form of alta proditio (Cowell's Interpreter, Treason).
High treason in English law extends to grave offences against the family or official representatives of the king, e.g. killing one of the justices of his courts.
Literature: LIEBER, On Civil Liberty, chap. viii; BLACKSTONE, Commentaries
on the Laws of England, iv. chap. vi. (S.E.B.)
The term is frequently used to signify the ideal of human conduct. Cf. GOOD,
and GOODNESS. (W.R.S.)
Hilary of Poitiers, Saint. Born near the
beginning of the 4th century, died 368 A.D. in Poitiers. Converted about
350, he was made bishop of Poitiers about 353. In 356, for not sanctioning
the condemnation of Athanasius, he was banished into Phrygia, but permitted
to return in 359. He reached Poitiers in 362. He opposed Arianism constantly
and with great vigour.
Hippolytus, Romanus. Born about the
middle of the 2nd century A.D., in Italy. A pupil of Irenaeus. Banished
by the Emperor Severus, he was martyred, probably by drowning. He wrote
a work called Philosophumena, a refutation of all heresies, in eight
books, part of which have been lost.
Historism: not in use in Fr. and Ital. Used,
mainly in the German Historismus, to denote a spiritual as opposed to a mechanical
or naturalistic (sense 2 under NATURALISM) world-view; and more particularly
applied to the Hegelian philosophy. Cf. HEGEL'S TERMINOLOGY (especially II).
History [Gr. istoria, information, narrative]: Ger. Geschichte; Fr. histoire; Ital. storia. (1) The succession of events through which anything passes; (2) the knowledge of that succession of events; (3) the interpretation and explanation of events in their succession in accordance with general principles of science and philosophy. These are distinguished as (1) the actual history or the facts of history; (2) recorded history, the complete statement of events; and (3) the science or philosophy of history.
Under the second definition, what is historic or recorded in some form of narrative
is contrasted with what is prehistoric (Sir D. Wilson) or antecedent to the
use of records, though on the first definition the prehistoric still belongs
to real history. The so-called traditional or orally transmitted statement of
real facts occupies a sort of midway position, and is the subject of much discussion.
The question of tradition, however, raises what is really the question of the
canons of construction of records out of real history; seeing that an element
of tradition or oral reporting is involved in all recording of that which is
not the historian's personal experience. An exact science of history would include
the application to all testimony of a calculus of probability worked out for
'first-hand' (eye-witness), 'second-hand,' and more remote stages of evidence.
The relative absence of the requirement of a precise criterion of the reliability
of evidence leaves room for what may be called the historian's equation of credulity;
and when combined with the demand for literary treatment, it creates variations
which forbid the use of the term science in any exact sense. Cf. the topic immediately
History (philosophy of): Ger. Philosophie der Geschichte, Geschichtsphilosophie (-wissenschaft); Fr. philosophie (science) de l'histoire; Ital. filosofia della storia. The term philosophy of history is used in several different senses: (1) To denote the principiant consideration of the meaning, the methods, and the canons of historical science in general. (2) To denote inquiry into certain highly complex phases and products of historical development -- as the history of institutions or of civilization (cf. Guizot, Hist. de la Civilisation en Europe), the history of intellectual development (cf. Draper, The Intellectual Devel. of Europe), &c. (3) In its stricter meaning, to denote the explanation, from philosophical principles, of historical phenomena at large or the entire course of historical development. See HISTORY (3), and cf. STATE (philosophy of).
The principles of explanation adopted in this last endeavour may be empirical or speculative. Commonly, they include members of both these classes, the emphasis varying with the personal equation of the individual historian and the tenets of the school to which he belongs. The nature of the conclusions reached is also variable, in dependence upon similar causes: illustrations are F. Schlegel, Philos. d. Gesch.; Hegel, Philos. d. Gesch.; Comte, Cours de philos. positive, iv-vi. 51-7; Buckle, Hist. of Civilization in England; Lotze, Mikrokosmos, iii. 7. On account of this divergence of opinion, and in view of the inevitable incompleteness, in the present state of knowledge, of the best attempts to give a philosophical view of history, it is maintained by many writers that a tenable philosophy of history must remain for a long time to come, if not for ever, an unattainable ideal.
It is evident that these different meanings of 'philosophy of history' are intimately related; in particular, (2) and (3) are distinguishable rather than fully separable. It is further to be remarked that 'philosophy' is used here in its broader significance; a philosophy of history conceived entirely from the metaphysical point of view would be out of harmony with the tendencies of most modern thinkers. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Literature: in addition to the works cited above, DROYSEN, Grundriss d. Historik; ROCHOLL, Philos. d. Gesch., i; FLINT, Hist. of the Philos. of Hist., I. France (1897).
The two principal and metaphysically opposed points of view in the philosophical treatment of history, the Hegelian and the Positivistic, rest alike on certain presuppositions: the continuity of the material of history, and the theory of evolution, which affords ground for a genetic method. These two presuppositions go together, and it is their acceptance which distinguishes the modern from the earlier treatment of the subject. Possibly Herder alone of the earlier pre-evolution writers realized both these points (cf. Barth, as cited below, 203).
Hitherto history had been empirical in its method no less than in its data; for instance, Lewes, Biographical History of Philosophy, belongs to the earlier class. But such works as Caird, Evolution of Religion, and Crozier, History of Intellectual Development, though opposed in point of view, still have these two presuppositions in common. This common ground may be said to be the real gain of the 19th century in history, as it is also in the sociological sciences in general. Extremes in the treatment of history arise from the pressing of particular theories of evolution: as in the attempts of the Hegelians to deduce historical movements, or to treat them as illustrating phases of an idealistic dialectic; and in those of the Positivistic evolutionists, who, with Comte and the 'descriptive' sociologists, construe history by preconceived formulas of progress, or account for historical and general social movements strictly in the naturalistic terms of biological analogy or of geographical, climatic, and other external environmental conditions (Spencer, Buckle). Other, less important, views are the so-called Great Man theory of history (M. Lehmann, James), which is hardly a philosophy (cf. GENIUS); the Social Environment theory, which eliminates the great man (Taine); and the theory of Special Providence, which is opposed, as in biology, to all forms of evolution.
What we may call the 'autonomic' or sociological view of history (cf. especially Barth, as cited below) maintains the essential irreducibility of the factors essential to human evolution, considers them psychological in their nature and subject to their own laws of development, and identifies the historical problem with that of the science of sociology. This programme may be carried out strictly as science; or it may be taken in connection either with an idealistic monistic philosophy. (Hegel's 'historism,' Lotze's 'spiritualistic monism'), which makes the essential factor thought, or with a voluntarism (Schopenhauer, Wundt, Barth, Paulsen) to which the essential factor is will broadly defined.
Barth gives the following classification of theories or 'interpretations' of history (Geschichtsauffassungen), all of which he calls 'one-sided,' as opposed to the sociological view called above autonomic.
Interpretations of History:
I. Individualistic (Lehmann): Great Man theory.
II. Anthropo-geographical (Ritter, Ratzel, Mougeolle): Environment.
III. Ethnological (Comte, Taine, Gumplowicz): Struggle of Races.
IV. Culture History (Morgan, Tylor, Waitz): Conquest of nature, Invention, &c.
V. Political (Lorenz, Schäfer, G. B. Vico): the State.
VI. Ideological (Hegel, W. v. Humboldt, Buckle, Lazarus): Ideas (logical, religious, &c.).
VII. Economic (Durkheim, Marx, Engels, Loria): Division of labour, Production, Class-rivalry.
Literature: besides the titles cited above see HERDER, Ideen z. Philos.
d. Gesch. d. Menschheit; BOURDEAU, L'Hist. et les Historiens; LAMPRECHT, Alte
u. neue Richtungen in d. Geschichtswiss. (1896); RATZEL, Anthropogeographie;
ROCHOLL, Die Philos. d. Gesch.; MOUGEOLLE, Les Problèmes de l'Hist. (1886);
TAINE, Hist. of Eng. Lit.; GUMPLOWICZ, Der Rassenkampf (1883), and Sociol. u.
Politik (1892); VIERKANDT, Naturvölker u. Kulturvölker (1896); TYLOR,
Introd. to the Study of Anthropol. and Civilization; WAITZ, Anthropol. d. Naturvölker;
LORENZ, Die Geschichtswiss. (1886); SCHÄFER, Das eigentl. Arbeitsgebiet
d. Gesch. (1888); LAZARUS and STEINTHAL, Zeitsch. f. Völkerpsychol., i;
LAZARUS, ibid. iii; STEINTHAL, ibid. xvii; DURKHEIM, La Division du Travail
social (1893); MARX, Zur Krit. d. polit. Oekonomie (1859), and Das Kapital (3rd
ed., 1883); LORIA, Die wirtschaftl. Grundlagen d. herrschenden Gesellschaftsordnung;
LACOMBE, Hist. considérée comme Science; LECKY, Hist. of European
Mor.; JAMES, The Will to Believe, 216-62; MÜNSTERBERG, Psychol. and Life,
179-228; BARTH, Die Geschichtsphilos. als Sociol., i. See also many of the titles
given under SOCIOLOGY and under RIGHT (philosophy of). (J.M.B.)
It is difficult to give any definite meaning to the term history. Usually,
however, when we employ the term without any qualifying epithet, we mean the
history of states or political communities. Such a history will be more or less
comprehensive according to the received conception of history. In most communities
which have reached any appreciable degree of civilization, a record has been
kept of matters of public interest, such as the succession of kings and magistrates
or priests, and wars and treaties. These records have usually been very meagre.
When private persons first began to write history, they had for the basis of
their narrative little more than these records supplemented by tradition or
rumour. They had no conscious purpose either of tracing the development of political
institutions or of inculcating political lessons. They did not confine themselves
to political events, but chronicled all occurrences which affected the life
of the community, or were thought to possess a religious significance, or seemed
likely to interest or instruct, such as remarkable instances of individual goodness
or wickedness, strange reverses of fortune affecting eminent persons, romantic
adventures, curious natural phenomena, plagues, famines, and earthquakes. But
as knowledge increased, and other forms of prose literature were elaborated,
the field of history was narrowed. It became more and more the record of political
and military affairs. This change is well illustrated by a comparison of the
histories of Herodotus and Thucydides. Hardly anything of human interest is
excluded from the narrative of Herodotus. Thucydides adheres, with rigorous
self-restraint, to the story of the Peloponnesian War. In this restriction of
the field of history there was not yet any definite scientific purpose. The
object of the historian was partly literary, partly didactic. He wished to give
a noble and beautiful narrative of great events. He wished to record the experience
of the past for the benefit of the future, to supply statesmen with a store
of precedents, to enforce lessons of wisdom and virtue, by setting forth the
deeds and sufferings of great personages. These were the aims of such writers
as Thucydides and Tacitus, and indeed of most of the eminent historians who
flourished between the revival of letters and the new critical movement which
began in Germany. In the course of the last hundred years this movement has
transformed the conception of history and historical methods. (1) It is now
fully admitted that historical knowledge is desirable for its own sake -- not
merely for the morals which it may afford -- and must be sought without reference
to edification. (2) Whilst political history is more stringently defined than
formerly, it is seen that the state is not co-extensive with society, and that
war and politics do not exhaust the activity of mankind. Therefore, whilst literature,
art, science, religion, economics, and social life are reserved for separate
treatment by historians who have made one or other of these subjects their special
study, the writer of political history is expected to study the general life
of society, and show how religious, or economic, or literary, or other influences
have affected its political development. (3) The closer attention now paid to
the manifold life of society, and to the development of ideas and institutions,
has enabled us to realize more vividly the conditions under which great men
work, and the limits to individual action and influence. History has therefore
become less biographical, less exclusively concerned with great men, and also
less epical, less exclusively concerned with great deeds. More pains are bestowed
on explaining the structure of society and the prevailing tendencies of thought
at any given period. Dull ages and dull countries are thought deserving of study
because they contribute, if not to our list of heroes, at least to our knowledge
of political evolution. (F.C.M.)
History of Philosophy (main divisions and schools): Ger. Geschichte der Philosophie; Fr. histoire de la philosophie; Ital. storia della filosofia. The history of PHILOSOPHY (q.v.), as a whole, may be divided into two great portions, that which treats of ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (q.v.), and that which has to do with Occidental or European and American philosophy.
European philosophy is first of all the ancient, and especially the Greek philosophy (see GREEK TERMINOLOGY, PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY, SCHOOLS OF GREECE, and the names of special movements below); secondly, the philosophy which attended the development of Christian theology, the period of the Church Fathers (see PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY) down to and including the philosophy of the scholastic period (see LATIN AND SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY, and ST. THOMAS, philosophy of); and, thirdly, the philosophy since, and including, the period of the RENAISSANCE (q.v.). The more general philosophical tendencies and movements of modern philosophy are treated in separate articles sub verbis. The purpose of the present sketch is simply to indicate the general historical position which the various schools of philosophy most prominent in the course of development have occupied.
Oriental (Hindoo) Philosophy. Confining attention here to the part of oriental philosophy represented by Hindoo thought, a word may be said as to its origin and most general tendencies. Hindoo philosophy was an outgrowth of Hindoo religion. At the close of the Vedic period of Indian literature, an elaborate ritualistic development, on the one side, came to be accompanied with an equally vigorous development of reflection, upon the fundamental meaning of the religious ideas of the Hindoo people of the age in question. This reflection was from the outset determined by practical motives, but was left singularly free from any violent dogmatic interference; and was soon able to develop great theoretical skill. In the works known as the Upanishads sages and thinkers interested in a reform of life and, in part as well, of faith, set on record cosmological speculations, as well as discussions, of the ultimate nature of being, the plan of salvation, and the fundamental problems of self-consciousness. Theories appear which are well described by the customary word PANTHEISM (q.v.). It would be fairer to call these early thinkers extreme idealists, and in some respects it would be still better to call them mystics, using that term in a sense which the theology of the Christian middle ages came to understand. Out of the philosophy of the Upanishads developed a number of different schools, whose names appear in the special article on ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (India, q.v.). Of these schools, however, the principal, namely, the Sankhya Vedanta, were divided upon the question of realism and idealism. The Sankhya were rationalistic realists, who rejected the authority of the Hindoo sacred scriptures, broke away from the tradition of the Upanishads, maintained a sharp dualism between matter and mind, and sought for salvation by means of an utter abstraction of mind from all dependence upon bodily conditions. On the other hand, the Vedanta, following closely the tradition of the Upanishads, developed in the end a highly technical, but still mystical, theology, with an absolute idealism as their theory of the universe, an ascetic life as their practical plan of existence, and a mystic absorption in the absolute as their goal. Upon the basis of the controversies with these schools, and in opposition to them, developed the ethical philosophy of Buddhism (see ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY). After the downfall of Buddhism a revival of the ancient philosophical schools led to developments which were not original in fundamental conceptions, and which found expression in elaborate scholastic commentaries upon older treatises. While dualistic and pluralistic forms of theology have never been unknown in India, the extreme rationalism of the Sankhya became gradually modified, or passed away altogether; and the Vedanta has remained in modern India, in spite of the very complex development of religious sects, the most important and representative tendency of philosophical thought.
Occidental (European and American) Philosophy, in its ancient phase, began in Greece about 600 B.C., and continued as the Graeco-Roman philosophy, until the edict of the Emperor Justinian in A.D. 529 closed the philosophical schools still existing at Athens. The principal periods of Greek philosophy are as follows: --
(1) The early cosmological or Pre-Socratic period (see PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY). To this belongs first of all the development of the Ionic speculation regarding nature. There then follow the Eleatic and Pythagorean schools, and the later members of the cosmological period, including the Atomists. A transition to the second great period of Greek philosophy is made by the age of the Sophists, who were already contemporaries of Socrates.
(2) The second period of Greek philosophy opens with Socrates, who was born in 469 B.C., and died in the year 399 B.C. It is the period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. It contains by far the greatest developments of ancient thought. The death of Aristotle occurred in 322 B.C. See SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY, and GREEK TERMINOLOGY.
(3) The ethical period, including the development of the Stoical, Epicurean, and Sceptical schools, and extending from the death of Aristotle to a period not far from the Christian era, is usually united in historical treatment with the more theological period into which it passed, and to which later Stoicism also belongs. See SCHOOLS OF GREECE (Academy, Cynic, Cyrenaic, Epicurean, and Stoic schools), and SCEPTICISM (Greek). In this sense, what is sometimes called the Hellenistic and Roman philosophy may be considered as extending until the close of the whole movement of ancient thought. To this third period of ancient thought may belong then, in addition to the before-mentioned schools, the Alexandrian philosophy and the Neo-Platonic schools. See ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL, and NEO-PLATONISM. Cf. SOCRATICS (Plato).
Christian philosophy, which forms the second great division in the history of European thought, begins already in the 2nd century A.D. as the early PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY (q.v.). The Patristic period extends to St. Augustine, who himself may be said to stand on the border-land between the Patristics and SCHOLASTICISM (q.v.). St. Augustine died in A.D. 430. The first division of the scholastic philosophy extends to the beginning of the 13th century, and is closed by the reappearance of the writings of Aristotle in Western Europe. It is followed by the great period of scholastic philosophy, that of the 13th century itself, in which the doctrine of Aristotle was laid at the basis of an elaborate and, as the event has proved, definitive statement of the theoretical theology of the Roman Catholic Church. See ST. THOMAS (philosophy of). From the beginning of the 14th century dates the gradual downfall of scholasticism.
The philosophy of the RENAISSANCE (q.v.) period belongs to the 15th and 16th centuries, and is characterized by the revival of Platonic influences, by the general breaking-up of the scholastic movement, and by the appearance of numerous tendencies due to the revived study of nature.
Modern philosophy begins with the 17th century, and extends to the present time. Its principal periods are: first, that of the 17th century, characterized by RATIONALISM (q.v.), by a marked dualism between matter and mind (see PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY, and OCCASIONALISM), and by the beginnings of English empiricism (see NATIVISM AND EMPIRICISM).
Secondly, the philosophy of the 18th century up to the appearance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in 1781. This period is characterized by a continuation and development of the conflict between rationalism and empiricism, by the rapid development of ethics, by the French materialism of the middle of the 18th century, and by the philosophical scepticism which, in a measure, formed a prelude to the revolutionary period. The philosophy of Kant opens a new epoch in the history of thought, and more recent philosophy may be in general styled post-Kantian philosophy (see KANT'S TERMINOLOGY, and NEO-KANTIANISM). Of the post-Kantian philosophy, the principal sub-periods are, the idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (see HEGEL'S TERMINOLOGY and philosophy); second, the period of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, the reappearance of MATERIALISM (q.v.), and the rise of POSITIVISM (q.v.) in France, and of a revived empiricism in Great Britain. The important movement called the Scottish philosophy (see NATURAL REALISM) is contemporaneous both with the development of the post-Kantian philosophy, and with the post-Kantian period, down to the time of the appearance of the new empiricism in Great Britain. The year 1860 may be said to begin in the last sub-period in the history of European thought. This is the age of what may be called the philosophy of evolution, the revived idealism of recent times, and the new logical and cosmological, as well as historical, speculations, which mark the present era of discussion. It was not possible in the foregoing sketch to name all the schools, whether of scholastic or modern thought, which are important enough to deserve separate articles. One may add the names of the Thomistic school in scholastic thought (see ST. THOMAS, philosophy of); the Cartesian school (see OCCASIONALISM, and PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY) in modern thought, under which name the rationalistic movement from Descartes to Leibnitz is frequently comprised; the English empiricism from Locke to Berkeley, the school of Herbart (see HERBARTIANISM) in modern German philosophy, and the various tendencies of so-called real-idealism or ideal-realism (see REALISM) in post-Hegelian German thought.
Hobbes, Thomas. (1588-1679.) An eminent
English thinker, born at Malmesbury, Wiltshire. Sent to Oxford, he studied
Aristotle and scholastic philosophy especially. As tutor to the earl of
Devonshire, he travelled through France, Italy, and Savoy. Later, he became
intimate with the leading thinkers of his day, Bacon, Ben Jonson, Herbert
of Cherbury, Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, Harvey, &c. He early became
interested in questions of state, and continued to devote attention to
them as long as he lived. He moved to Paris in 1640, and in 1647 became
mathematical instructor to Charles, prince of Wales. To escape persecution
he fled from Paris to England in 1653. After the Restoration he was pensioned
by Charles II.
Hodge, Archibald Alexander. (1823-86.) An
American clergyman and theologian, born, educated, and died at Princeton,
N. J. He graduated from both Princeton College (1841) and Seminary (1847).
In 1877 he was chosen associate professor of didactic and polemic theology
at Princeton, to assist his father, Charles Hodge, whom he succeeded (1878).
Hodge, Charles. (1797-1878.) An American
theologian of Scotch-Irish descent, educated and died at Princeton, N.
J. Graduated from Princeton College (1815) and Seminary (1819). In 1820
he became assistant in oriental languages in the seminary; 1822, professor
of oriental and Biblical literature. In 1840 he became professor of exegetical
and didactic theology, and in 1852 polemical theology was added to his
Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d'. (1723-89.)
One of the ENCYCLOPEDISTS (q.v.). The heir of a large fortune, he moved
to Paris in early life, and remained there until his death. He was a prolific
writer. Le Système de la Nature, 'the Bible of atheism,'
being perhaps best known.
Holiness (of God) [AS. halig, holy]: Ger. Heiligkeit (Gottes); Fr. sainteté (de Dieu); Ital. santità (di Dio). One of the attributes of Deity. God is absolutely intolerant of sin, being himself free from any taint of impurity.
In the Old Testament, the holiness of God indicates partly that Israel can rely on his fidelity, and partly that holiness is itself the essence of his being. With regard to the latter, the implication is that holiness is something more than moral purity. In the New Testament, God alone is holy, in the sense that his will is completely at one with his ethical purposes. Here, too, the idea of God as active in his holiness -- revealing himself as holy -- receives expression. As a result, conformity to holiness becomes the human ideal. See ATTRIBUTES (of God), and GOD.
Literature: articles in Herzog's Encyc., Schenkel's Lexicon, Hastings'
Bible Dict.; ISSEL, Der Begriff d. Heiligkeit im N. T.; BAUDISSIUS, Stud. z.
semit. Religionsgesch., ii. (R.M.W.)
Holoblastic [Gr. oloV,
whole, + blastoV, a bud]: Ger. holoblastisch;
Fr. holoblastique; Ital. oloblasto. Of ova: those which undergo
complete as contrasted with partial cleavage. The term is due to Remak. See
MEROBLASTIC, CLEAVAGE, and EMBRYO. (C.LL.M.)
Holy Spirit: Ger. heiliger Geist; Fr. Saint-Esprit; Ital. Spirito santo. The name given to the third Person in the Trinity of Christian dogma. In dealing with such a subject, it is exceedingly important to bear in mind the complete distinction between the rational standpoint of philosophy and the views which are primarily dogmatic or fiducial.
The conception of the Holy Spirit, in its definitely authoritative and so far completed form, dates so late as the Constantinople revision of the Nicene Creed (381). It was afterwards rendered even more definite dogmatically in the paradoxical propositions of the so-called Athanasian Creed, which grew up in the 8th century under the influence of AUGUSTINIANISM (q.v.). Prior to the middle of the 4th century, the dogmatic conception of the Holy Spirit is to a large extent inchoate; and although a triad was recognized as early as Novantian (250), it was still possible for Gregory Nazianzen to make the following statement, which shows the status of the question so far as dogma is concerned: 'As the Old Testament declared the Father clearly, but the Son more vaguely, so that New Testament has revealed the Son, but only suggested the divinity of the Spirit. Now, however, the Spirit reigns among us, and makes himself more clearly known to us; for it was not advisable to proclaim the divinity of the Son, so long as that of the Father was not recognized, or to impose upon the former -- if we may use so bold an expression -- that of the Spirit, while it (viz. the divinity of the Son) was not accepted' (after 360).
As great misconception exists on this subject, especially in view of the fact that there is no ontological speculation in the Old or New Testaments, and that the formulated dogma of the Holy Spirit is almost exclusively ontological, it may be said that philosophy of religion is confronted with the following questions. Does the Old Testament contain any reference to such a Spirit as is defined in the creeds? Here the problem might be suggested: Is not Heraclitus much more truly the forerunner of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit than any Old Testament writer? Did Jesus (except in the passage John xiv. 16) go much beyond Old Testament conceptions? What value is to be attached to this passage in St. John? What is St. Paul's teaching as to the Holy Spirit? Did it undergo any transformations of significance? How far is it traceable to rabbinical angelology? What is the historical value of the story of Pentecost? Is the Holy Spirit, recognized early (150) by the Christian community, more than an expression (1) for the unity which Christians experienced among themselves? -- or (2) for the 'change of heart' that individuals felt they had undergone? What is the history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Roman Church (i.e. the primitive Christian community at Rome from St. Paul to the Council of Nice)? What in the other churches (e.g. Eastern, Alexandrian)? How was it related to and affected by Platonic, Gnostic, Sabellian (modalist) teachings? Why did the Synod of Constantinople extend the Nicene profession of the Holy Spirit? What is the history and value of the so-called Athanasian Creed? Only when, by a genetic treatment of the development of the religious consciousness, these questions are answered, and the problems they suggest solved, can a rational estimate be made of the precise import of the phrase Holy Spirit. Philosophically viewed, it is obviously, without authority.
Literature: this is extensive. It is enumerated in the various Encyclopedias
-- Herzog's, Lichtenberger's, Hastings'; PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion (Eng.
trans.), iv. 60 f.; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), i, ii, iii; HAUSRATH,
Hist. of N. T. Times, Times of the Apostles (Eng. trans.), iii. 82 f.; MOZLEY,
The Word; BUCHANAN, Office and Work of the Holy Spirit; KAHNIS, Lehre v. h.
Geist, i; HEBER, Bampton Lectures. A late work is CLARK, The Paraclete (1900).
Home, Henry (Lord Kames). (1696-1782.) A Scottish
judge, called to the Edinburgh bar (1724), and appointed a judge of the
Court of Sessions (1752), when he became Lord Kames. He published, besides
a number of works on ethical and religious themes, The Elements of Criticism.
Homogamy [Gr. omoV,
like, + gamoV, marriage]: Ger. Homogamie (suggested);
Fr. homogamie (not commonly used -- Y.D.);
Ital. omogamia. that 'discriminate' mode of isolation which gives rise
to segregate breeding. The term was suggested by Romanes (Darwin and after
Darwin, iii, 1897). Cf. APOGAMY, and ISOLATION. (C.LL.M.)
Homogeneity and Heterogeneity [Gr. omoV and eteroV, same and other, + genoV, kind]: Ger. Homo- (Hetero-) genität; Fr. homo- (hétéro-) généité; Ital. omo- (etero-) geneità. Absence and presence respectively of differences.
Applied commonly to the structure and properties of bodies; as 'homogeneous
medium,' 'homogeneous mass.' The terms are used by Spencer (First Principles)
to characterize the lack and subsequent presence of more or less differentiation
in the cosmic material. (J.M.B.)
Homoiomeriae [Gr.]. Applied by Aristotle
(De Coel., iii. 3) to the atoms of Anaxagoras. Cf. PRE-SOCRATIC
PHILOSOPHY (Atomists). (J.M.B.)
Homoiousia [Gr. omoiousion, of similar substance; contrasted with omoousion, of the same substance]. These two Greek words were the technical terms used by the parties to the Christological controversy associated with the name of Arius in the 3rd and 4th centuries. The former term expressed the doctrine of the semi-Arians; the latter that of the Athanasians, which became the orthodox deliverance of the Church. Heteroousia was the term used by the full Arians; it means of different substance. The entire verbal framework of this controversy as to the real relation between God and Christ is derived from Platonic and Gnostic sources. See HOMOOUSIA, and cf. ARIANISM, GNOSTICISM, and CHRISTOLOGY.
Literature: HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iv. (R.M.W.)
Homolecithal [Gr. omoV,
like, + lekiqoV, yolk]: Ger. homolekithal;
Fr. homolécithe (not commonly used -- Y.D.);
Ital. omolecito. Of the ovum: having little food-yolk, and that equally
distributed. Proposed by Mark (1892). Balfour used Alecithal in this sense.
See CLEAVAGE. (C.LL.M.)
Homologous Organs: Ger. homologe Organe; Fr. organes homologues; Ital. organi omologhi. Those parts or organs of animals or plants which are of similar origin in development and phylogenetic history. Similar and homologous organs may, in the course of evolution, come to differ entirely in structure and function. Cf. ANALOGOUS ORGANS.
The term in its present biological use, as contrasted with analogous, was introduced by Richard Owen (1848). E. Ray Lankester has since suggested the terms homogenetic, for similarity of origin due to inheritance, and homoplastic, where the close agreement in form is due to similar moulding conditions of the environment without genetic connection. Homoplastic organs are therefore merely analogous.
Homonymous [Gr. omoV,
like, + onoma, a name]: Ger. homonym; Fr.
homonyme; Ital. omonimo. Homonymous terms are defined by Aristotle
as those which are identical in name, but of which the definitions (the essential
natures) relative to that common name are different. Thus castle would be homonymous
when it is applied to a picture and to a building, while the natures of the
objects named and the definitions of the names would be wholly different. The
distinction is grammatical rather than logical. See Aristotle, Categ.,
chap. i. (R.A.)
Homoousia [Gr. omoousion, from omoV, same, + ousia, essence]: Ger. Homoosia; Fr. hamoousie; Ital. omousia. The term used by early Church writers, and in the Nicene Creed, to express the oneness of Christ's nature with that of God, the term signifying not simply essential, but also numerical, identity with the divine substance. Cf. HOMOIOUSIA.
The term homoosia was employed to express the respect in all the persons of the Trinity are one and the same being. The separate personal natures as distinguished from this unitary essence are expressed by the terms proswpon, triproswpon, or upostasiV. The latter term is the one generally used since the Nicene Council as a name for the separate personal subsistences which inhere in the unitary divine nature.
Literature: SUICER, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, tom. ii, 'Omoousion
'YpostasiV; STANLEY, Hist. of the Eastern
Church, 'The Homoousion,' lect. ix. (A.T.O.)
Homotaxis [Gr. omoV, like, + taxiV, order]: Ger. Homotaxie; Fr. homotaxie (not in use -- Y.D.); Ital. omotassi. Similarity of succession in organic types in different religions.
A term introduced by Huxley (Collected Essays, viii. 276, 1862) to express
the fact that strata containing a similar succession of organic forms are in
the same relative position to the general sequence, though not necessarily contemporaneous.
The former or more general meaning of the term is the original meaning. Cicero distinguishes the honestum, or morally good, from that which is merely rectum, or in accordance with the rule, and examines cases of supposed conflict between the honestum and the utile (De Officiis). St. Augustine distinguishes the honestum, or that which is to be desired on its own account, from the utile, which is desired because it leads to something else (cf. Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. Q. 145).
This more general usage of the term honesty is now almost obsolete, though
it is still sometimes used with other implications than that of regard for proprietary
rights, as opposed to deception of any kind, especially interested deception.
Honour [Lat. honor or honos]: Ger. Ehre; Fr. honneur; Ital. onore. (1) RESPECT (q.v.) for excellence of any sort; applied also to any sign or mark of such respect. (2) Respect or reputation enjoyed by persons in certain -- more or less elevated -- social stations, conditionally on the observance of certain rules of conduct. (3) Recognition of personal obligations which are conditioned upon one's social relationships; honour is thus contrasted with ethical right.
The concept of honour in the third meaning seems to involve both a certain system of reciprocal rights and obligations belonging to a social station or relation, and also the individiual's recognition of these. The 'honour among thieves,' the 'soldier's honour,' the 'husband's honour,' the 'honour of a gentleman,' the 'honour of a citizen,' &c., have in common a certain recognition of self as a member of this or that class, organization, or society; and the requirements of honour vary in different cases. Such requirements are usually supplementary to ethical rules.
The instances cited above show the existence of the second meaning, as well as of the third; e.g. a 'husband's honour' is impaired by a breach of conjugal duty on the part of his wife, even though he is in no way to blame; similarly, the honour of a family is impaired by the cowardice or fraud of one of its members. In both these cases it is not the recognition of personal obligations, but the reputation conditional on such recognition, which seems to be meant.
The relation of honour and right has not been fully cleared up. Simmel (Année Sociol., i, trans. in Amer. J. of Sociol., iii, 1897-8) makes honour a function of social organization, which plays a most important conservative rôle in securing 'the persistence of social groups.' To those who hold that ethical right is absolute and genetically independent of social progress, honour is an unethical reflex of custom or convention. On theories of right which allow a large social ingredient, or which make the ethical genetically a function of social organization, honour is ethical, and may be viewed either as right in the making, or as the sort of right which attaches to a lower or less developed social whole, in contrast with that which attaches to the relatively higher or more developed. In either case the conflicts arising between honour and right are equally well explained. For whether there is or is not an objective standard of right and wrong, there can be no doubt that men have commonly believed in the existence of such a standard; and the distinction in mediaeval and modern times between the code of honour and the moral code -- no such objectivity being attributed to the former so far as it diverges from or conflicts with the latter -- may be regarded as a purely sociological distinction quite independent of ethical theory. This distinction, however, is not found in all stages of society. Indeed, it seems characteristic of Hellenic civilization that the distinction is not found there: in the idea of kalokagaqia the code of honour and the moral code are not differentiated.
Some of the finest points of casuistry, however, arise here, as in the case
of the freemason who betrays his country rather than another member of his chapter
(honour versus honour), or that of the witness who perjures himself rather
than give evidence against a comrade (honour versus right). The solution
of these positions waits upon the theory of the morally right. (J.M.B.-
Hope (1) and (2) Despair [AS. hopian, to hope; Lat. de + sperare, to hope]: Ger. Hoffnung und Verzweiflung; Fr. espérance et désespoir; Ital. speranza e disperazione. Modes of EXPECTATION (q.v.) which excite respectively pleasure and pain, and in which the chain of ideas necessary to the realization of a desired event is considered (1) in some degree, and (2) in no degree, likely of fulfilment. They represent respectively positive and negative modes of assurance as to future occurrences.
Hopkins, Mark. (1802-87.) An eminent American
divine, author, and educator. Educated at Williams College, he became professor
of moral philosophy there (1830), and president (1836). In 1872 he resumed
his former position as professor. He wrote in Christian apologetics and
The horde is the lowest and most nearly primitive social organization of human
beings. Examples: Veddahs of Ceylon; Mincopis of the Andaman Islands; Bushmen
of South Africa; the Fuegians of Tierra del Fuego; and some the Inunit of the
northern coasts of North American. The horde has no governmental organization.
It is never identical with a CLAN (q.v.). Hordes by combination may form a TRIBE
Horopter [Gr. oroV, a boundary, + opthr, one who looks]: Ger. Horopter; Fr. horoptère; Ital. oroptero. The sum total of the luminous points that find representations upon corresponding points of the retinas, i.e. that are seen single by the two eyes. (E.B.T.)
It is capable of geometrical representation; in the primary positions of convergence it consists of MÜLLER'S CIRCLE (q.v.) and a line through the fixation-point, and directed towards the feet of the observer. For a distant fixation-point, the horopter is the ground; in walking, therefore, obstacles are seen single, and this furnishes the reason for the convergence of the vertical meridians of the eye. Helmholtz has given an exhaustive mathematical treatment of the horopter. This has been much simplified by Hering; he applies to it the methods of projective geometry, which are peculiarly well fitted for dealing with it. (C.L.F.)
The term was coined by Aguilonius (Opticorum libri, vi, 1613). Vieth, J. Müller, and Prévost occupied themselves with the problem; but the modern theory begins with Meissner (Beitr. z. Physiol. des Sehorgans, 1854).
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 860; SANFORD, Course
in Exper. Psychol., expt. 210, App. II; HERING, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol.,
III. i. 375 ff., 401; Beitr. z. Physiol., iii, iv (1863-4); WUNDT, Physiol.
Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 189 ff.; LE CONTE, Sight (1881), 192 ff.; HILLEBRAND,
Zeitsch. f. Psychol., v. (1893), 1 ff.; AUBERT, Physiol. Optik, 610 ff.; HANKEL,
Pogg. Ann. (1863), cxxii. 575. (E.B.T.)
Hotho, Heinrich Gustav. (1802-73.) A German
Hegelian; born, educated, and died in Berlin, where he became professor.
Originally a jurist, his attention was turned to philosophy through the
influence of Hegel.
To the individual workman so far as he exercises his judgment, it seems desirable
to prolong the hours of labour as long as the utility of the earnings outweighs
the pain of production. But experience proves that the length of working day
thus determined will not always prove advantageous to the public. Some labourers
do not determine it for themselves (e.g. child-labour); some sacrifice the future
to the present in the determination. Therefore efforts are everywhere made,
wisely and unwisely, both by combination and by legislation, to restrict the
hours of employment. (A.T.H.)
Hugo of St. Victor. (1096-1141.) Count of
Blankenburg, born in his ancestral castle in the Hartz mountains, and educated
in German schools, until in 1114 he entered the Augustinian cloister of
St. Victor, where he remained until his death.
Humanism [Lat. humanus, human]: Ger. Humanismus; Fr. humanisme; Ital. umanesimo, umanismo. (1) Any system of thought, belief, or action which centres about human or mundane things to the exclusion of the divine (cf. the New English Dict., sub verbo).
(2) The spirit, ideals, and doctrines of the Humanists -- the scholars who, in the age of the RENAISSANCE (q.v.), devoted themselves to the study of the classical literatures and the culture of the ancient world.
The home of the earlier humanism was Italy, whose historical connection with classical antiquity was more direct than that of the other nations of Western Europe; where, in spite of the destruction of the Dark Ages, there remained remnants of ancient, especially Roman, literature and art; and which in the 15th century came into closer relations with the scholarship and the literary treasures of the Eastern empire. The growth of the individualism, consequent upon political decentralization, and its aesthetic development had, furthermore, prepared the Italian mind for an active, as well as receptive, interest in ancient literature and life. From Italy the humanistic movement passed northward and westward to Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, France, and England. The distinctive notes of the movement were, on the negative side, its opposition to the mediaeval type of thought and culture, and, positively, its accentuation of the worth and meaning of human nature and mundane life. To the men of the later middle age it revealed a classical world which had been forgotten or concealed, one, moreover, whose civilization had been superior to their own in political and intellectual freedom, in literary and speculative development, in artistic and social culture. With the Aristotelianism of ecclesiastical orthodoxy it contrasted new interpretations of Aristotle, gathered from a study of the sources, as well as the system of Aristotle's master, Plato. As philology, it aided in the birth of criticism; in history, it extended the horizon beyond the narrow limits of mediaeval Christendom; in religion, it initiated the comparative study of religious systems, often, however, with a disintegrating effect upon positive faith. Humanism came into connection, sometimes into alliance, with the Reformation through its opposition to scholasticism, its impatience of authority, and its linguistic and literary tendencies. In particular, the philological investigations of the humanists, which in the south had centred about the classical writings, were in the north often utilized to secure a new and better understanding of the Bible. For the most part, however, the humanists lacked the uncompromising spiritual determination of the leaders of the religious reform, and therefore in many cases parted company with the latter, as the reforming movement entered upon its more militant phases.
Literature: VOIGT, Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums; BURCKHARDT,
Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien, iii; GEIGER, Renaissance und Humanismus
in Italien und Deutschland; SYMONDS, Renaissance in Italy, ii, The Revival of
Learning; art. Renaissance, Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.), xx. 380-94. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Hume, David. (1711-76.) Born and educated
at Edinburgh, he spent a brief period in commercial life; took charge of
the Advocates' Library in Edinburgh for five years; accompanied General
St. Clair on an embassy to Vienna and Turin, also the earl of Hertford
on an embassy to Paris; was appointed under secretary of state by General
Conway, and took charge of Scottish affairs, including the patronage of
the churches. He died at Edinburgh. Cf. Huxley's Hume, and (for
a detailed criticism) Green and Grose's ed. of the Treatise on Human
Nature, Introd. See SCEPTICISM, SENSATIONALISM, EPISTEMOLOGY, and NATIVISM
Humiliation of Christ [Lat. humus, the ground]: Ger. Erniedrigung Christi; Fr. humiliation de Christ; Ital. umiliazione di Cristo. The technical name given in dogmatic theology to one of the two states of conditions in which Christ is known to man. These are the state of humiliation (exinanition), and the state of exaltation.
The former embraces all that belongs to Christ in his earthly career: the miraculous conception, birth, circumcision, education and other vicissitudes of daily life, passion, death, burial. The latter has particular reference to the resurrection, ascension, and glorification at the right hand of God. See CHRISTOLOGY.
Literature: POWELL, The Principle of the Incarnation. (R.M.W.)
Humility [Lat. humilis, low, from humus, the ground]: Ger. Demuth; Fr. humilité; Ital. umiltà. Disposition to rank oneself low in character and achievements, especially in reference to the essential requirements of morality, religion, &c.
Humility is an emotional disposition, mood, or habit of mind. It seems to be
more independent of reasons than is modesty, also to have less reference to
other persons; and in both respects it is more deep-seated and rooted in temperament.
Possibly for this reason it is a religious virtue, which in the Christian conception
of righteous character is not only consistent with manliness, but is an element
of it. (J.M.B.)
Humour and Humorous [Lat. humor, moisture]: Ger. Stimmung, Laune (1), Fröhlichkeit (2), Humor (3); Fr. humeur (1) (3), bonne humeur (2); Ital. umore (1), buon umore (2), (3) umorismo. (1) Any disposition of mind, as in good or bad humour. (2) That special disposition which has the feeling of mirth. (3) A complex feeling (or corresponding quality) composed of an element of the comic and an element of sympathy. According to the varying degrees in which these elements are present, it shades from the COMIC (q.v.), on the one hand, to the PATHETIC (q.v.) on the other.
The humorous was treated as equivalent to the ludicrous (Shaftesbury, to whom it was equivalent to ridicule), or as a species of it (Richter, Vorschule d. Aesthetik, 1804). Its complex character was pointed out by Solger (1815), who regarded it as a union of comic and tragic. It was given special treatment by Trahndorf, Schopenhauer, Vischer, Lazarus, Zeising, Carriere, and Kirchmann. It seems desirable to use the term in the sense (3) , although this is not perfectly established.
Literature: LAZARUS, Leben d. Seele (3rd ed., 1883); LIPPS, Komik u.
Humor (1898); HARTMANN, Aesthetik, 451 ff.; SANTAYANA, Sense of Beauty, 253
ff. See also under COMIC. (J.H.T.)
Hutcheson, Francis. (1694-1746.) Of Scottish
descent, he was born at Drumalig, Ulster, Ireland, and died at Dublin.
Educated in theology at Glasgow; was a public teacher in Dublin for twelve
years; appointed professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, 1729. He holds
a prominent place in the history of Scottish philosophy. See NATURAL REALISM.
Huxley, Thomas Henry. (1825-95.) Born at
Ealing, Middlesex, and educated there and at the University of London.
He was assistant surgeon of the royal navy (1846-53); a member of the party
which sailed round the world in H. M. S. Rattlesnake; F. R. S. (1851);
professor of natural history at the School of Mines, and Fullerian professor
of physiology (1854); Hunterian professor at the Royal College of Surgeons
(1863-9); president of the Geological and Ethnological Societies (1869-70);
royal commissioner (1870); member of the London School Board (1870-2);
secretary of the Royal Society, and rector of the University of Aberdeen
(1872); president of the Royal Society (1883); and Privy Councillor (1893).
See Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley, by Leonard Huxley (1900),
and cf. AGNOSTICISM.
Hybrid [Lat. hybrida, spurious, possibly from Gr. ubriV]: Ger. Bastard- (hybridisch); Fr. hybride (offspring of two natural species -- Y.D.), métis (offspring of two races of domestic animals; mongrel -- Y.D.); Ital. ibrido. The result of a fertile cross between two species.
The existence of hybrids (e.g. mules) has long been known. Govelin is said to have first observed hybridism in plants, but Kölreuter during the latter half of the last century laid the foundations of our knowledge on the subject. Herbart, Gärtner, Wichert, Nägeli, and many others carried on the work, which Focke (1881) has summarized and extended. Darwin considered the question of hybridization in connection with the origin of species. Early observers held that hybrids were in all cases sterile. Later observations show that this is not always the case either among plants or animals. In connection with this subject the origin of cross-sterility between species has been discussed recently by Romanes in connection with his theory of PHYSIOLOGICAL SELECTION (q.v.).
Literature: C. DARWIN, Animals and Plants under Domestication; W. A.
FOCKE, Die Pflanzen-Mischlinge; G. J. ROMANES, Darwin and after Darwin, iii.
Hydrocephalus (or -ly) [Gr. udwr, water, + kefalh, head]: Ger. Hydrocephalus, Wasserkopf; Fr. hydrocéphalie; Ital. idrocefalia. An abnormal accumulation of fluid within the cranium; popularly termed 'water on the brain.'
The disease is most apt to be congenital, or to appear in the first months of life. Its most marked result is an enlargement of the head. The mental condition of developed cases of hydrocephalus is that of dullness, impaired mental action, and imbecility; muscular weakness is also apt to be present. Hydrocephalus is distinguished as internal (the usual form) when the serous fluid is in the ventricles; or external when it is in the meninges. It is termed chronic, infantile, or congenital when of slow growth and early appearance; acute when it appears as the result of meningitis.
Literature: HUGUEMIN, in Ziemssen's Encyc., xii, sub verbo; HEUBNER,
in Eulenburg's Real Encyck., sub verbo. (J.J.)
Hylozoism [Gr. ulh, matter, + zwh, life]: Ger. Hylozoismus; Fr. hylozoïsme; Ital. ilozoismo. The doctrine which endows matter with an original and inherent life, and conceives life and the spiritual process in general as a property of matter.
In the philosophy of antiquity, hylozoistic tendencies were often associated with the crude attempts at a philosophy of nature (Thales, Anaximenes), or with speculations concerning the soul of the world (the Stoic view of the cosmos and the immanent divine reason). Similar tendencies appeared in the Renaissance philosophy of nature (Paracelsus, Cardanus, Bruno, Gassendi), and among the Cambridge Platonists (Cudworth, More). In later times hylozoistic views have been, in part, suggested by the results of physical, in particular of organic, science.
Literature: DIDEROT, Entretien entre d'Alembert et Diderot, and Le Rêve
d'Alembert; ROBINET, De la Nature; HAECKEL, Der Monismus; cf. EISLER, Wörterb.
d. philos. Begriffe, 331, and the histories of philosophy. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Hyper- [Lat. hyper-; Gr. uper, over, above]: Ger. über-; Fr. hyper-; Ital. iper-. (1) In pathology: a prefix indicating an unusual, abnormal, or excessive degree of the condition named in the compound.
Thus, hyperaesthesia, an excessive or exalted state of sensibility to sensory impressions in general, or to tactile ones in particular; hyperbulia, an excessive tendency for desire to lead to action; hyperaemia, an excessive supply of blood, &c. The conditions thus indicated are frequently the result of an irritation of inflammation of a portion of the nervous system; and are opposed to conditions denoted by the prefix hypo-, or the prefix a, an, or ab, which indicate a defect or lack of the normal condition indicated (as anaesthesia, abulia, hypaesthesia, hypobulia). (J.J.)
(2) In philosophy: a prefix denoting a higher or limiting outcome or determination (so also Super-).
Thus hyperpersonal or superpersonal is that which is of the nature of personality,
but to which the predicates of personality, some or all, do not apply; that
which personality pressed to its limits would or might be. The hyperphenomenal
is that which grounds or explains phenomena, while yet not itself phenomenal.
Cf. LIMITING NOTION. (J.M.B.)
Hypermetropia (also Hyperopia) [Gr. uper, over, + metron, measure, + wy, eye]: Ger. Hypermetropie; Fr. hypermétropie; Ital. ipermetropia. That defect of the eye in which, with the accommodation relaxed, parallel rays come to a focus behind the retina; the opposite of myopia; long-sightedness.
It forms one of the common defects of refraction, or ametropia. Its most frequent
cause is a shortness of the eyeball in its anterior-posterior axis (axial hypermetropia);
yet it may be due to deficient refracting power, or deficient convexity of the
refractive mechanism (curvature hypermetropia). It is further distinguished
according to its degree and mode of manifestation, particularly whether or not
it can be overcome by accommodation. The axial form is nearly always congenital.
The hypermetropic eye requires accommodation for very distant objects, for which
the emmetropic eye need not accommodate at all. For nearer distances an unusual
degree of accommodation is required, which is aided by the use of convex lenses.
It is said that in old age the normal eye acquires a low degree of hypermetropia,
while in the absence of the lens (APHAKIA, q.v.) a very high degree of it is
usually present. See also STRABISMUS, and VISION (defects of). (J.J.)
Hypertrophy [Gr. uper, over, + trofh, nutrition]: Ger. Hypertrophie; Fr. hypertrophie, hyperplasie, hypergenèse; Ital. ipertrofia. (1) Excessive growth of an organ by enlargement of its tissue elements.
(2) Abnormal multiplication of elements, for which Hyperplasia is preferred. (H.H.)
In the French, when a distinction is made between hypertrophie and hyperplasie,
hyperplasie means more especially an increase of the organ by an increase of
the number of its cells; hypertrophie, the same by an increase of the size of
its cells. When this distinction is not made, the proper word is hypertrophie.
Hypnagogic [Gr. upnoV, sleep, + agwgoV, leading]: Ger. hypnagogisch, Halbschlaf- (Zustand); Fr. hypnagogique; Ital. ipnagogico. Inducing to sleep, and thus synonymous with hypnogenic; but specifically used of the condition introductory to sleep, the half-waking condition experienced in going to sleep or in coming out of sleep, or resulting from the action of a general anaesthetic (ether, chloroform, &c.). The appearances and fancies of this transitional condition are termed hypnagogic hallucinations or illusions, and often determine the content of the dream state.
Hypnogenic, -genetic, -genous [Gr. upnoV, sleep, + genesiV, production]: Ger. schlafbringend, hypnogen; Fr. hypnogène; Ital. ipnogeno. Sleep-producing; more specifically applied to agencies which induce the hypnotic state.
The term is applied to the physical accessories that are used in the production
of the hypnotic state, such as the strained fixation of a bright object, rotating
mirrors, a sudden light or sound, stroking the face or hands, &c.; also
the mental methods of suggestion, direct or indirect. (See HYPNOSIS). (J.J.)
Hypnosis [Gr. upnoV, sleep]: Ger. Hypnose; Fr. état hypnotique (hypnose -- TH.F.); Ital. ipnosi, stato ipnotico. An artificially induced sleep-like or trance-like condition of mind and body.
On the physiological side, the condition resembles that of normal sleep, except in the phase called somnambulism, which is similar to normal somnambulism or sleep-walking. On the mental side -- to which the term hypnosis especially applies -- the state of somnambulism is characterized by 'suggestibility,' alterations of memory, and personal 'rapport' with the hypnotizer. Many authorities bring all the phenomena under these three heads; but different writers show the widest differences in their explanations of the details, and also in their theories of hypnosis as a whole. In general, the theory of 'suggestion,' advanced and developed by the 'Nancy school,' is now adopted, in opposition to the theory of the 'Paris school,' to which, however, much of the earliest and best investigations of the phenomena are due.
The suggestion theory brings hypnosis within the normal workings of consciousness in relation to personal and other stimulations, including the normal phenomena of sleep and dreaming. The Paris school held, on the other hand, that hypnosis is a pathological condition, having certain well-marked stages ('catalepsy,' 'lethargy,' 'somnambulism'), with which certain equally well-marked physiological conditions were connected. Janet notes that these three stages were recognized by Déspine in 1840. This position gave rise to an elaborate method of dealing with hypnosis in its different stages, which those who criticize the Paris school hold is based largely upon suggestion.
The terminology of the subject includes 'animal magnetism' (a synonym of hypnotism), 'suggestive therapeutics' (hypnotic treatment of diseases), 'post-hypnotic' or 'deferred' suggestion (suggestions given in hypnosis to be carried out after return to normal life), 'auto-suggestion' (suggestion to one's self; in this case self-hypnotization), 'exaltation' (increased acuteness of the senses and all the faculties), 'criminal suggestion' (hypnotic suggestion of crime). For early designations of the whole field, see HYPNOTISM. Hypnosis is often called 'Hypnotic Suggestion' and classed under SUGGESTION (q.v.), and illustrates the group of phenomena somewhat loosely termed FASCINATION (q.v.). Hypnology (Liégeois) has been used for the science of artificially induced sleep and trance-like states. A state in animals analogous to hypnosis is called CATAPLEXY (q.v.).
Literature: JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., ii. chap. xxvii; JANET, Automatisme
psychol.; CHARCOT, OEuvres complètes, ix; LEHMANN, Die Hypnose; WUNDT,
Hypnotismus u. Suggestion; DESSOIR, Bibliog. des modernen Hypnotismus (with
supplements); FOREL, Hypnotismus; SCHMIDKUNZ, Psychol. d. Suggestion; MYERS,
The Subliminal Consciousness, in Proc. Soc. Psych. Res. (since 1892); OCHOROWICZ,
Mental Suggestion; MOLL, Hypnotism (3rd ed.); BERNHEIM, Suggestive Therapeutics,
and Études nouvelles sur l'Hypnotisme; BINET, Alterations of Personality,
and (with FÉRÉ) Animal Magnetism; E. MORSELLI, Magnetismo animale
(1886). Early works are JAMES BRAID, Neurypnology; GRIMES, Electro-Biology;
DURAND (de Gros), Électro-dynamisme. See also the psychological journals,
especially the Zeitsch. f. Hypnotismus, the Rev. de l'Hypnotisme, and Ann. d.
Sci. Psych., and many of the titles given under SUGGESTION. (J.M.B.)
The term hypnotism was first used by the English surgeon James Braid. The term
mesmerism belongs -- with such other terms as neurypnology (Braid), electro-biology,
odology, &c. -- to the older ante-scientific period of knowledge of the
subject; it arose from the name of Mesmer (F.A.),
a physician who practised hypnotism in Europe in the last third of the 18th
century. His 'cures' were unfavourably reported upon by a royal French commission
appointed in 1785. (J.M.B.)
Hypo- [Gr. upo, under]: Ger. unter-; Fr. hypo-; Ital. ipo- or sub-. A prefix indicating a subnormal degree of the condition indicated in the compound, as hypobulia, a defective power of exercising the will; hypokinesia, deficiency of reaction to a stimulus; hypomania, a moderate degree of mania; hyposmia, deficiency of smell, &c.
Its use is not so general as might be expected, owing to the use of the prefix,
a, ab, or an, not in the strict sense of total lack of,
but to include also any serious deficiency. Hypo- is also used in the anatomical
sense of under (hypoglossus, hypogastrium), and in a chemical sense (hypochlorite,
Hypoblast [Gr. upo, under, + blastoV, bud]: Ger. inneres Keimblatt; Fr. hypoblaste ( = endoderme); Ital. ipoblasto. The inner of the two primitive layers of the embryo animal. Also termed ENDODERM (q.v.).
The term is due to Michael Foster; first published in Huxley's Vertebrated
Animals (1871). The hypoblast arises in some cases by INVAGINATION (q.v.),
in others by DELAMINATION (q.v.). Which of these two modes of origin is to be
regarded as the more primitive is a matter of discussion. See GASTRAEA THEORY,
PLANULA THEORY, ENDODERM, and EMBRYO. (C.LL.M.)
Hypochondria (or -iasis) [Gr. upo, under, + condroV, a cartilage]: Ger. Hypochondrie; Fr. hypocondrie; Ital. ipocondria. A condition of nervous origin characterized by consciousness and morbid anxiety about the physical health and functions.
As the derivation of the term implies, the disease was supposed to be connected with the hypochondriac region (the liver and parts of the digestive organs). As a symptom variable in degree, it is characteristic of certain temperaments and of weakened conditions of the nervous system; but in its extreme development it becomes a symptom of insanity, and frequently constitutes the main factor of diagnosis of the insanity, which is then termed hypochondriacal insanity or hypochondriacal melancholia.
It is closely allied to melancholia, with its depression of spirits and concentration of mind upon self, but it differs from it in that the melancholic is absorbed in his own thoughts, often to indifference regarding his health and food, while the hypochondriac is constantly busy with his bodily sensations. These may be vague and general, or formulated with regard to certain organs. The hypochondriac reads medical literature, consults various physicians, examines his own secretions, fears this or that trouble, analyses and exaggerates every minute symptom, is conscious of his digestion, respiration, or circulation, administers endless remedies, and changes them as rapidly for others. He may entertain definite delusions as to the specific cause of his ill health, but he may be free from delusions and simply absorbed in his bodily feelings and misery. Such disorder is allied to hysteria as well as to melancholia, into which it often develops. It may be further distinguished according to the particular organs (the head, the digestive tracts) which are supposed to be affected; but the mental type is similar throughout.
Literature: art. Hypochondriasis, in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med.;
the textbooks of mental diseases, in locis; TANZI, in Tratt. ital. di Med. (1898);
BINSWANGER, in Nothnagel's Spec. Pathol. u. Ther., xii. (J.J.)
The verb to hypostasize (sometimes written hypostatize) is used of the making actual or counting real of abstract conceptions. (J.M.B.)
Derived from Stoic thought, hypostasis was in common use amongst Christians during the Christological and Trinitarian controversies of the 3rd and 4th centuries. Literally, the word means 'a support'; in theosophical and theological discussions, it came to mean 'substance,' essential nature, modality; and finally, as accepted in Christian dogma, 'subject' or person. Subject at first had merely the nuance of a mode of existence; latterly it came to imply a distinct, self-conscious personality. Its precise meaning in this last sense was doubtless rendered clearer to those who used it by the developed implications of the word persona in Roman law. This definite meaning was not fully attained till 362; and it probably grew out of the necessity for preserving the definite (personal) (being of the Son even as sharing the essence of the Father. The history of the matter is still far from being clearly understood.
Literature: HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iv. 33 f.; STENTRUP,
in Innsbrucker Zeitsch. f. kath. Theol. (1877), 59 f. (R.M.W.)
It is set forth in the Creed of Chalcedon (451) as against the errors of EUTYCHIANISM (q.v.) and NESTORIANISM (q.v.). It consists in the declaration that the two natures are supernaturally united inseparably, and this by means of the Incarnation. They remain distinct, notwithstanding they together form a single personality. They are not to be thought of as merely absorbed or confused or mystically united. For, as Leo says, 'the same who is true God is also true man, and in this unity there is no deceit; for in it the lowliness of man and the majesty of God perfectly pervade one another.' Hypostatical union is to be carefully distinguished from the unio mystica (or internal communion) of the individual Christian with Christ. See CHRISTOLOGY.
Literature: HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iv. (R.M.W.)
Hypothesis [Gr. upoqesiV]: Ger. Hypothese; Fr. hypothèse; Ital. ipotesi. Hypothesis, expressed in its most general terms, is a name given to any assumption of a fact or connection of facts from which can be deduced explanation of a fact or connection of facts already known.
The formation of hypotheses, thus defined, is therefore to be regarded as but the exposition in concrete fashion of the 'explanatory tendency,' which is the vital spring of all thought. It is not necessary, though it is natural, that the term hypothesis should be restricted to the more organized departments of thought called sciences. In this quarter, however, questions arise of general logical interest regarding the kinds, conditions, and limits of hypothesis, and the exact place they hold in relation to other distinguishable parts of the whole process of tentative explanation. To such questions definite answers are probably impossible, on account of the continuous alteration in the contents of acquired knowledge and the varying boundary between established truth and conjecture. Without detailed specification, it is hard to maintain the distinction, on which Mill insists, between a hypothesis which defines conjecturally the law or laws of a collocation of facts already known to exist and to be concerned in the facts sought to be explained, and a hypothesis whose content is the assumed existence of a fact either not known to exist or not known to enter into the collocation determining the phenomenon to be explained. It is only on the grounds supplied by already established knowledge that we can formulate even the most general restrictive conditions for the formation of a hypothesis. The treatment of the testing of hypotheses too often proceeds with neglect of the two considerations: (1) that the establishment of a law and the formation of a hypothesis are two distinct things occupying different positions in the order of thought, and (2) that there are no special conditions of proof in the case of hypothesis; the conditions are those of proof in general. Cf. THEORY.
Literature: an excellent summary of the chief views regarding the nature
and place of hypothesis is given in NAVILLE, La Logique de l'Hypothèse
(1880); also JEVONS, Princ. of Sci., generally, and especially chaps. xxiii,
xxiv, xxvi; BOSANQUET, Logic, Bk. II. chap. v. Some good remarks on the philosophical
issues involved will be found in LIEBMANN, Die Klimax d. Theorien. (R.A.)
(2) In logic: the general character of the hypothetical judgment and syllogism is defined by the relation of dependence which is expressed by the one and which enters into the premises of the other.
Hypothetical Judgment: If you go, you will be killed.
Hypothetical Syllogism: If you go, you will be killed,
(1) You will go, hence you will be killed or (2) You will not be killed, hence you will not go.
As to the more precise definition of this relation, there has been, and is yet, great divergence of view among logicians. According to some the only relation truly hypothetical is that formally expressed in the principle of reason and CONSEQUENT (q.v.), the relation of logical dependence or consequence; and even in respect to this, there is permissible the more refined difference between the interpretations of the relation as either merely stating such dependence or as implying what Mill called 'inferribility.' According to others, the relation includes all types of general statement of a law connecting two facts in such fashion that the one indicates the other, or serves as a sign of it. The difference depends to some extent on the varying views taken as to the scope and import of categorical assertion. It is probable that a reconciliation of the divergent views is to be found by the method of genetically surveying the types of judgment; for in each of them a gradual ascent is discernible from concrete to more and more abstract relations. In all cases the hypothetical judgment rests upon the assertion of some general relation as holding good; and all are agreed as to the general principle of the judgment -- that given the antecedent, the consequent must be accepted, and that from denial of the consequent there follows denial of the antecedent. According to the different interpretations taken of the judgment, there will be different doctrines, as (1) to the admissibility of distinctions of quantity and quality, (2) as to the possibility of applying the formal premise of conversion, and contraposition and opposition. >From the more psychological side, the question has to be considered, how thought comes to express itself in hypothetical fashion; and here stress may be laid on the element of doubt, which is clearly of like nature with the thought involved, and may affect not the general relation represented, but the concrete cases in which it is embodied; or on the factor of supposition, i.e. ideal experiment, which again rests on a general relation implied. The hypothetical syllogism is generally defined as syllogism having a hypothetical major premise, and a minor which either categorically affirms the antecedent (modus ponens) -- (1) above -- or denies the consequent (modus tollens) -- (2) above. Such a syllogism is perhaps more strictly to be designated hypothetico-categorical. There is obviously possible a form of reasoning, purely hypothetical, in which premises and conclusion are all hypothetical judgments.
Neither hypothetical judgment nor syllogism was formally recognized by Aristotle. What he called reasonings from a hypothesis or proposition assumed to be true, were treated by him in connection with indirect proof; and though they closely resemble the later hypothetical syllogisms, were not recognized by Aristotle as having any special features. The treatment of them was carried much further by the early Peripatetics; and in the Stoic logic there is clear recognition of the peculiar thought of 'consequence,' 'logical dependence' as the import of the hypothetical judgment, a judgment which they, however, grouped along with copulatives and disjunctives. Most points of the modern theory are discussed by Boethius, from whose elaborate treatment the later logic mainly drew. In modern logic the discussion has been largely influenced by the decisive view taken by Kant, who connected the hypothetical judgment with the principle of reason and consequent, and therefore assigned to it a quite special place distinct from and co-ordinate with the categorical judgment. Kant's predecessor Wolff had, on the other hand, tended towards the view, frequently taken, and to some extent encouraged by the current mode of defining the hypothetical judgment, that the hypothetical judgment is a subordinate form of the categorical, the real assertion being the consequent which is put forward not absolutely, as in the categorical, but subject to an expressed condition. (R.A.)
From this point of view (which indeed is the only tenable one), hypotheticals are characterized only by their composite character -- they are statements concerning possible statements, instead of concerning terms; that is to say, 'if a is b, c is d' affirms the invariable sequence (whether empirical or inferential) of 'c is d' upon 'a is b.' It is an essential part of this doctrine that the hypothetical proposition does not deserve the extreme amount of attention that has been given it -- it is of no greater consequence for logic than many other relations that are constantly affirmed to hold between statements (some universal in quality and some particular); as, unless a is b, c is d; not only if a is b, is c d; never when a is b, is c d; though a is b, c is sometimes d. Sigwart, returning to the doctrine of the Stoics, showed (1871) that the hypothetical judgment asserts the sure following of the validity of the consequent upon the validity of the antecedent, and that by this alone it deserves the name of judgment. (C.L.F.)
Herbart, from his modification of the formal doctrine, was led to raise the question as to the categorical judgment, and deciding that it was not existential, practically identified it with the hypothetical, a view from which conceptualist logic can hardly free itself. His follower, Drobisch, introduced a distinction between qualitative predications and predications of relation, the latter embracing the hypothetical. Boole, accepting the view that the hypothetical is an assertion about the truth of an assertion, called it a secondary proposition, defined the 'universe of discourse' in such secondary propositions as being the time at which they together hold good, and so brought them within the scope of his general symbolic method.
Venn's treatment from this point of view (Symbolic Logic, chap. viii),
and his discussion of the more philosophical questions involved (Empirical
Logic, chap. x) are of special interest. Much acute discussion will be found
in Keynes (Formal Logic), who adopts and works out a distinction
between the conditional and the hypothetical, resembling that above indicated
between concrete and abstract relations. The best historical account of views
is that of Sigwart (Beitr. z. Lehre des hyp. Urth.,
1871); see also his Logik, §§ 35-6, 49-50. A psychological discussion
of judgments and syllogisms, in which a classification is reached on the basis
of belief, and the hypothetic is made a fundamental form, is to be found in
Baldwin, Handb. of Psychol., i. chap. xiv. Cf. JUDGMENT, CATEGORICAL
JUDGMENT, SYLLOGISM, and INFERENCE. (R.A.)
Hysteria [Gr. ustera, the womb]: Ger. Hysterie; Fr. hystérie; Ital. isterismo. The term hysteria is used in so many different senses that it should hardly be accepted as a serious term unless the context shows what definition is implied. The common but objectionable usage covers states of deficient emotional control and states of 'imaginary' diseases. The common medical usage is a little less crude, but fails to rise to a clear definition of what is implied by 'imaginary.' In neurological literature there is a growing tendency to limit the term to those psychogenic disorders which Charcot and his school have worked out: disorders of function depending usually on subconscious states of mind of the nature of those observed in hypnotism. Lloyd defines it as a psychoneurosis, of which the physical symptoms are the most conspicuous, tending to disguise the (really fundamental) mental phenomena and to simulate superficially the effects of various organic diseases. (A.M.)
The etymology of the term reflects the supposed connection of this disorder (a view dominant until within recent times) with uterine troubles. While the name is retained this view is abandoned, and even the special association of hysterical symptoms with the female sex must be modified.
If insanity may be considered as a disorder in the functionally highest layers of the cortex (which involve the most complex intellectual processes, and inhibition of which renders control impossible), hysteria may be considered to involve the next lower level of functional action, which is amenable to control. Its disturbance is consistent with intellectual ability, and is liable to bring with it sensori-motor disorders (Mercier). Hysteria is best considered a special type or tendency of neurotic or psychopathic instability which comes either as an abnormality of development (constitutional inferiority) or as a feature of acquired nervous disturbances. In accordance with the view that hysteria is a tendency or diathesis rather than a disease, and that mental characteristics form its distinctive features, these aspects may be first considered.
Subjects of Hysteria. Hysteria exhibits its connection with other forms of nervous disorders in its hereditary relations; neuropathic families present cases of distinct insanity, of epilepsy, and of hysteria in close connection. While it may come on earlier, it is most apt to appear soon after puberty, the ages between fifteen and twenty being most productive of it. The complex unfoldment and enlargement of emotions and ideas which ensue at this time make it a period of special stress and strain, a crisis in which any latent nervous instability is especially apt to become manifest. The more marked suddenness of onset of this period in woman, its more automatic relations with her physical economy, her deeper emotional development and the greater-restraint of expression and action which social custom places upon her, contribute to a feminine preponderance of hysteria. But this is by no means so marked as was formerly considered; hysteria in males is quite common, and certain French statistics show that in the lower classes hysteria is more common in men than in women, while in the higher social strata the reverse is the case. It is certain that lack of rational interests and occupations, of wholesome outlets, for natural instincts, as well as hereditary taint, contribute to the development of hysteria. Emotional shock, long-continued anxiety or strain, and a large number of special disorders which deplete or unbalance the nervous system may act as special excitants of hysteria.
Mental Symptoms. Exaggerated impressionability, the liability to tremulous emotion on slight provocation, undue concentration upon self, a craving for sympathy, a limited power of adaptation to circumstances, irresoluteness, imperfectly controlled action -- these are some of the prominent characteristics of the hysterically disposed temperament. They do not constitute insanity, and indeed the mental disorder may be very slight. The outrageous and improper actions at times performed are recognized by the patient to be the result of a want of control. As in all temperamental abnormalities, there are endless degrees, from the lowest to the highest; and in hysteria especially the variety of the mental symptoms and the doubt which is cast on their genuineness by a probable admixture of imposture renders the state most difficult to describe. While the craftiness and subtlety of certain hysterical subjects must be fully admitted, it is a mistake to regard the disease itself as in any way a sham; although one must admit the proneness to deception, which in some cases becomes a dominant passion for falsehood and deceit, and in others is only the natural resource of a temperament longing for sympathy and interest. Apart from the sensory and motor disorders, the true nature of which is indicated by their amenability to suggestion and psychic influences, it is difficult in many cases to detect any tangible mental abnormalities.
Sensory Disorders. Hyperaesthesia, anaesthesia, pain, and perverted forms of sensibility (dysaesthesia, paraesthesia) are most common. Excessive tenderness in certain regions (abdomen, epigastrium, spine, ovary, joints) is a frequent symptom, the hysterical nature of which can be determined only by elimination of true objective causes. Certain spots or areas may exhibit anaesthesia or analgesia; these may be superficial or so deep that needles may be thrust into the skin without evoking pain or sensation. The conjunctiva may be quite insensitive to touch. There may be hemianaesthesia, limited to the entire half of the body and affecting the special senses as well, or affecting only certain unilateral tactile areas. Frequently the patient is unaware of the anaesthesia.
The psychical origin of such anaesthesias is indicated by their sensibility to suggestion and 'transfer' (see below). In the sphere of the special senses may occur intolerance of light, abnormal acuity of vision, subjective sensations of flashes, bad tastes or odours, partial deafness, &c. The craving for unnatural and distasteful articles of food is referred to disorders of taste. Specially noteworthy are the visual troubles; the most frequent being the narrowing of the visual field, usually affecting both eyes, but one more than the other. The absence of ocular and tactile reflexes is frequently noted, as well as the capricious and variable character of the sensory disorders in general. These are extremely common, and again indicate a participation of centres lower than those connected with the mental symptoms.
Motor Disorders. These occur mainly in the form of (1) spasms, (2) convulsions, and (3) various paralyses. (1) Characteristic forms of spasms are the globus hystericus, which is described as though a lump were rising from the epigastrium to the throat and there causing a choking and flow of tears. Spasmodic cough, respiratory difficulties, vomiting, stomachic or intestinal spasms, and both tonic and clonic spasms of muscles may be present, and in some cases may disappear suddenly after enduring for months or years. The mixture of laughter and weeping is perhaps the commonest example of hysterical spasm. Contractures have been noted, especially by French observers. They may persist during sleep, resist slight etherization, and yield only to electric stimulation. It is noteworthy that they may be aroused by slight tapping or excitation as well as by psychical causes. (2) Convulsive seizures are of common occurrence in pronounced hysteria. These may be preceded by a feeling of choking, a pain, headache, vertigo, or the like; they rarely come with extreme suddenness, and are frequently resisted by the patient for some time. If the patient falls, severe injury or dangerous positions are avoided (unlike the epileptic). The resulting spasms are irregular (seldom clonic), opisthotonos -- a position in which the body is arched backwards and rests on the head and heels -- is noted by French observers. The avoidance of injury in falling, the use of language, and other symptoms indicate that the unconsciousness in the hysterical fit is partial only. (3) Lessened muscular power and any degree and form of paralysis may occur affecting the visceral or voluntary system. Hysterical aphonia is a common variety. In this the voice alone is affected, and a characteristic whisper is used. In hysterical mutism the defect is more psychical, and all spoken language is lost, even the most common words, so often retained in true aphasia; intelligence is unimpaired, there is a desire to speak, and writing proceeds fluently. The legs are apt to be concerned in paresis, with rigidity in thighs and feet, and, to a less extent, the arms. Paraplegias and abnormalities in response to electrical stimuli are frequent. Hysterical paralysis can be distinguished from true organic paralysis only by carefully noting the absence of symptoms of true organic disorders. There is, too, in hysteria, a characteristic want of effort, indicating a defect in will power, resembling that in awaking from sleep. The tendency to sudden disappearance, to modification by suggestion, with the accompanying mental symptoms, is a significant mark of hysterical paralyses.
To sum up, it may be said that the characteristic change is the predominance of disorders of whole psychogenetic complexes of movements, e.g. disorders of the use of the legs for walking, while the patient can still climb; without involvement of those features which are not under psychic control, i.e. without influence on reflexes, electric reaction of nerves and muscles, &c.
Bodily Condition. Disorders of circulation and digestion are common. A tendency to syncope, palpitation, high temperatures of short duration, unusual sensations of cold and heat, have been noted; as have also vomiting, accumulation of gas in the digestive tract, abnormal secretions, difficulty in taking food, constipation, and the like.
Hysterogenic Zones. The existence of certain areas, stimulation of which by pressure may provoke or arrest the paroxysm of hysteria, was indicated by Charcot (1873); not only in the ovarian region, but particularly the definite regions of the head and trunk. They are frequently associated with dysaesthesias, and may be related to these. Their variability in some cases, and the fact that pressure may both provoke or arrest the attack, indicate the psychic factor in this process.
Hysteria and Hypnosis. Whether one maintains, with Charcot and his supporters, that hypnosis is a neurosis with definite stages and somatic symptoms, or, with the Nancy school, that mental suggestion is the one sufficient clue to the entire range of phenomena, the existence of a special relation between hysteria and hypnosis cannot be denied. It is certainly easier to produce the deeper stages and the more unusual phenomena of hypnotic suggestion in hysterical subjects than in others. According to Charcot the relation is more intimate; the grande hypnotisme with its definite forms (lethargy, catalepsy, and somnambulism), its marked bodily stigmata and symptoms, its hypnogenic spots, its spasms, &c., occurs almost wholly in hysterical patients. Hypnotism has also been used as a means of study of the hysterical condition; it has been found, for instance, that while the anaesthetic or paralytic arm of an hysterical subject is apparently devoid of sensation and voluntary control, it does respond to the suggestions made in the hypnotic condition by touches and movements. Such observations, which have been ingeniously varied (see Janet, L'Automatisme psychologique), are of importance in the study of automatism and disorders of PERSONALITY (q.v.). Cf. HYPNOSIS, and HYSTERO-EPILEPSY.
Historical. Apart from the variations in the conceptions of this malady, and particularly its relations with ovarian troubles and its dependence upon nervous conditions (see Féré, as cited below, 551 ff.), hysteria has been of importance historically because it furnishes the clue to many of the phenomena of possession and ecstasy, of WITCHCRAFT (q.v.), demonomania, and mental epidemics (Féré, loc. cit., 451 ff.). The paroxysm of hysteria so suggestive of possession, the anaesthetic spots found in witches, the marvellous sudden cures at holy shrines, as well as the special susceptibility of hysterical persons to suggestion and contagion, indicate some of the directions in which modern study illuminates the phenomena of the past (cf. White, The Warfare of Science with Theology, 1896, chap. xvi; and Lehmann, Aberglaube, u. Zauberei, 1899).
Literature: art. Hysteria in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med. (1892); GILLES
DE LA TOURETTE, Traité de l'Hystérie (3 vols., 1896-8); A. PITRES,
Leçons sur l'Hystérie (2 vols., 1891); PRESTON, Hysteria and allied
Conditions (1897); JANET, État mental des Hystériques (1894);
CH. FÉRÉ, Hysteria, in Twentieth Cent. Pract. of Med., x (1897,
with bibliography); BREUER and FREUD, Stud. ü. Hysterie (1895); general
works on PATHOLOGY (q.v., notably CHARCOT). (J.J.-
Hystero-epilepsy: Ger. Hystero-epilepsie; Fr. hystéro-épilepsie; Ital. istero-epilessia. A term which has its origin in the difficulty of distinguishing between many forms of convulsions of true epilepsy or true hysteria. It is also applied to those cases of hysteria in which convulsions occur (grande hystérie of Charcot).
The paroxyms in this form of disorder may be violent; the patient often, after distinct aura, falls with a cry, more completely loses consciousness than in ordinary hysteria, presents tonic convulsions usually more marked on the side where dysaesthesia or paralysis has been manifested, and may go through a series of flexions and extensions of the whole trunk, which are either general writhings or movements coarsely suggestive of the influence of various passions. This epileptic stage, which comes first, has many of the characteristic symptoms of true epilepsy: the suspension of respiration, the swelling of the neck, the foaming at the mouth, the position of the limbs. But the subsequent irregular movements, the admixture of speech mimicry and other mental elements, as well as the personal history of the patient and the absence of other epileptic symptoms, are sufficient to differentiate the one from the other. Fixed positions or contractions are apt to occur, and are often maintained during sleep and for a long time. In addition the dysaesthesias and paralyses, the pain and hysterogenic zones, the curious disorders of vision and voice, which have been described as characteristic of severe cases of hysteria, are equally characteristic of hystero epilepsy. See HYSTERIA.
Literature: CHARCOT, Leçons sur les Maladies du Système
nerveux (1886), i. chap. iii: RICHER, L'Étude clinique sur l'Hystéroépilepsie
(1881); also citations under HYSTERIA. (J.J.)
In the concrete the fallacy -- a very common one -- occurs partly because the
order of acquiring knowledge is generally different from the logical, objective
order, partly because the interconnectedness of conditions in nature prevents
our recognizing the true order of dependence. It is possible that the time-order
of our perceptions, e.g., may reverse the real order of dependence. (R.A.)