Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
Since the first-suggested facial angle (that of Camper, 1786), many others have been proposed which differ in the selection both of the horizontal and of the particular points selected for the determination of the oblique facial line, as is indicated by the accompanying figure. The main purpose of the facial angle was to indicate the amount of gnathism or projection of the upper jaw, this being regarded as significant in zoological evolution, and also in the evolution of the higher races. For this distinctive purpose the ordinary facial angle is by some (Topinard) regarded as unsatisfactory, and the inferior facial or subfacial angle (formed at the alveolar point C by lines to the subnasal point D and the occipital condyle F) is regarded as a better index of prognathism. The significant difference in shape between an orthognathous and prognathous skull is shown in the topic PROGNATHISM (q.v.). For the subnasal facial angle Topinard gives for white races 89o to 51.3o, yellow races 76o to 68.5o, and black races (prognathous) 69o to 59.5o. Camper's angle varies in man from about 70o to 80o. Goniometers and craniometers are used for measuring facial angles.
Facilitation [Lat. facilis, easy]: Ger. Bahnung; Fr. facilitation; Ital. facilitazione, agevolezza. Increased ease of function, or of disposition for it, resulting from stimulation of any sort. It is one of the marks of the growth of HABIT (q.v., also for literature).
The term has been given technical meaning as a translation of the German Bahnung
(in neurology), which latter carries the idea of the preferential determination
of a function, relatively to other functions, as to its pathway of discharge.
Cf. TITCHENER, Amer. J. of Psychol., vii. 80. For cognate terms in psychology,
see EXERCISE, HABITUATION, and PREPARATION. (J.M.B.-
Fact is distinguished from TRUTH (q.v.) in that (1) it is immediate, a datum carrying the belief on the part of the observer that it is independent of him; and also in that (2) it is immediately objective, a matter of presentation in time or space. Such expressions as the 'universe,' or 'world,' or 'thing of fact,' all emphasize one or other of these two characters, in contrast with the spheres of desire, value, discourse, &c., which implicate attitudes or constructions on the part of the observer. Fact might be defined thus: datum of experience considered as abstracted from the experience of which it is a datum. The notion of fact includes abstraction even from the experience by which the fact is reached or asserted. And inasmuch as it is just this sort of abstraction which the notion of actuality -- or of the so-called 'trans-subjective' -- covers, we may say that a fact is anything which is found to be actual. The fact is, however, not absolute, but always relative to some experience.
Leibnitz distinguished 'truths of fact' (vérités de fait) from
'truths of reason' (vérités de raisonnement); the first being
guaranteed by the 'law of sufficient reason,' the second by the 'law of contradiction.'
Fact (in law). Whatever has occurred; an act or event by which a thing has been brought into relation with a person. Investitive fact: one by which a right comes into existence. Divestitive fact: one by which a right is divested. Translative fact: one by which a right is transferred.
Literature: POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence, chap. vi. 132; HOLLAND,
Jurisprudence, chap. x. 2. (S.E.B.)
Technical uses of the term are in mathematics, biology, aesthetics, &c.:
see FACTORS OF EVOLUTION. (J.M.B.)
The word factor is made to cover both terms of the distinction between FORCE AND CONDITION made under that topic. The causes of organic evolution must themselves be phenomena of an organic or vital sort -- the subject-matter of biology. But, as in other sciences, we find the operation of these properly biological forces or causes conditioned, limited, and interfered with by extra-biological conditions. The greatest of all these is natural selection, which is a restriction set upon mating, not a biological cause or even a positive force of any sort. So isolation, artificial selection, &c.: these are all conditions of evolution, and factors of a real but in a sense negative value. On the other hand, the vital functions of reproduction, variation, accommodation, direct competition, preying, &c., are biological forces, the motive principles belonging distinctively to life. These are causes or factors of a positive sort, in the determination of evolution. (J.M.B.)
This distinction roughly corresponds to that between (1) originative, and (2) directive factors, the latter being the conditions, the former the causes. Prior to Darwin, the chief factor recognized in evolution as progressive was that which is now associated with the name of Lamarck, the transmission to offspring of that which the organism gained by individual effort, together with that indicated by Buffon, the transmission of that which is impressed on the organism by the environment. Darwin and Wallace suggested natural selection as the chief directive factor in progress. Wallace and Weismann regard natural selection as the all-sufficient directive factor of progressive evolution. Mivart, Nägeli, and others believe in an inherent tendency to progress in certain directions. Natural selection as a directive factor is universally recognized, though its range is still open to discussion. Sexual selection by selective mating was regarded by Darwin as a supplementary directive factor in evolution. The ORGANIC SELECTION (q.v.) of Baldwin, Morgan, and Osborn, and Karl Pearson's REPRODUCTIVE OR GENETIC SELECTION (q.v.) have also been added to the list of factors of organic evolution.
The importance of ISOLATION (q.v.) as a factor was recognized by Moritz Wagner (1868), and has been emphasized by Gulick and Romanes. The PHYSIOLOGICAL SELECTION (q.v.) of the latter author is now generally regarded as an isolation factor.
Literature: see EVOLUTION, ISOLATION, NATURAL SELECTION, and the references
given under the special topics mentioned. (C.LL.M.)
Factors of Production: Ger. Factorender Produktion; Fr. facteurs de la production; Ital. fattori della produzione. Agencies of different character, whose combination is essential for the production of wealth.
Following the usage laid down (though not very explicitly) by Adam Smith, most
economists have recognized three such factors -- land, labour, and capital.
The French economists have, as a rule, recognized but two -- labour and capital;
land being included under capital. George recognizes only land and labour; capital
being stored-up labour. On the other hand, Walker and Marshall recognize four
factors -- land, labour, capital, and business ability. (A.T.H.)
To say that an individual mind possesses a certain faculty is merely to say that it is capable of certain states or processes. But we find in many of the earlier psychologists a tendency to treat faculties as if they were causes, or real conditions, of the states or processes in which they are manifested, and to speak of them as positive agencies interacting with each other. Thus persistence in voluntary decision is said to be due to extraordinary strength of will, or to will-power, or to the faculty of will. Certain mental processes in man are said to have their source in the faculty of reason, and certain other processes in lower animals are explained by the existence of a faculty of instinct. This mode of pretended explanation has received the name of Faculty Psychology. Locke, in criticizing the phrase 'freedom of the will,' has brought out very clearly the nature of the fallacy involved. 'We may as properly say that the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the will chooses, or that the understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys, or obeys not, the will; it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking' (Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. II. chap. xxi. § 17).
Literature: HERBART, Lehrb. d. Psychol.; LOTZE, Microcosmus, Bk. II.
chap. ii; STOUT, Manual of Psychol., Bk. I. chap. iii; citations in EISLER,
Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, 'Seelenvermögen.' (G.F.S.,
Faintness [ME. faynt, weak, feeble]: Ger. Ohnmacht, Schwächgefühl; Fr. faiblesse; Ital. languore, (senso di) mancamento. More or less loss of consciousness. (J.M.B.)
The feeling of faintness or loss of consciousness shows itself externally in
pallor of countenance, loss of muscular power, and difficulty in breathing.
It may be due to excessive exertion, to emotional shock, or may ensue as the
result of obscure central changes. The faint itself -- more precisely termed
SYNCOPE (q.v.) -- is the result of more or less severe disturbance of heart
action, and is characterized by suspended animation and unconsciousness. Cf.
UNCONSCIOUS STATE. (J.J.)
Faith [Lat. fides, trust]: Ger. Glaube; Fr. foi; Ital. fede. Faith is practically identical with BELIEF (q.v.), and may be defined as the personal acceptance of something as true or real, but -- the distinguishing mark -- on grounds that, in whole or part, are different from those of theoretic certitude.
The moment of will enters into the assent of faith in the form of some subjective interest or consideration of value. Some faith-judgments are translatable into judgments of knowledge; but we cannot say that all are. There may be content in the pistis that will resist the processes of the gnosis. In that case the final test of validity would have to be sought in the sphere of the practical rather than in that of theoretical truth.
Literature: the titles cited under BELIEF, and WILL TO BELIEVE; also
ORMOND, Foundations of Knowledge, Pt. III. chaps. i, iii. (A.T.O.)
Faith (saving). A distinction has been drawn between 'historical' faith and 'saving' faith. The former, as its name implies, leans upon institutions, customs, and the like, which have developed in the course of the evolution of the Christian consciousness. The latter is primarily subjective, that is to say, it implies pre-eminently a process proceeding within the individual man. As was natural, it acquired great importance from the principles of the Reformers, and it is delineated very fully, in its various phases and stages, in the writings of the early Protestant theologians, and of those who have since followed them more or less closely. Saving faith, as Martensen has pointed out in another connection, does not imply present perfection; it is 'a living commencement which contains within itself the possibility of a progressive development and a fulfilment of the vocation of man.' So far as it can be treated philosophically, the matter belongs to the sphere of religious psychology. Cf. CALVINISM.
Literature: SCHLATTER, Der Glaube im N. T.; CUNNINGHAM, Historical Theol.,
ii. 56 f.; BUCHNAN, Doctrine of Justification, its History and Exposition; NEWMAN,
Lects. on Justification; COPINGER, Treatise on Predestination, Election, and
Grace (with literature); DORNER, Syst. of Christ. Doctrine (Eng. trans.), ii.
318 f. (R.M.W.)
Faith and Knowledge (in theology). In the history of human experience, particularly on its moral and religious sides, periods have tended to recur in which the dualism, or even opposition, between faith and knowledge has constituted a prominent, sometimes a determining, characteristic; and one may add that, in every age, individuals or associations exist whose tendency is to emphasize it. Thanks to the distinctive teaching of the Ritschlian school, it has again acquired prominence within the last twenty years. It is easy to see that, during a time of deep religious feeling, faith in some mysterious process or object, conceived to be of the last importance for man's welfare, may lead towards an elimination or disparagement of the intellectual features usually associated with knowledge. At such a time, disposition of heart (will) is abstracted from knowledge, set over against it, and regarded as essentially superior. The process may go so far as to result in a settled conviction that blind assent to certain propositions, which cannot be construed rationally, constitutes the mark of moral and religious attainment. Tendencies of this kind may often be detected in so-called 'evangelical' circles and movements. On the contrary, periods and persons have been dominated by a desire to exalt knowledge at the expense of faith. Here insistence has been laid upon reason, especially in its analytic processes, to such an extent that everything in the nature of faith has been extruded. Eighteenth-century 'rationalism,' and its legitimate successor in the 19th century -- 'free-thought' -- are typical of this. The truth is that both views are based upon a false abstraction. Faith and knowledge cannot be separated in this way, because no part of man's psychological nature can be torn from the rest, and treated as if it were wholly uninfluenced by the other elements. Faith is itself a kind of knowledge, because it depends for its distinctive content upon the nature of the object to which it is directed. Knowledge is itself a kind of faith, for it depends upon the unrealized ideal of more perfect knowledge still, which supplies the immanent principle of all intellectual progress. The fact that the various elements in man's psychological constitution (intellect, will, &c.) can be separately named, does not sever them; they can be viewed in separation only on account of their prior unity. And, similarly, the fact that the individual and the social consciousness are inseparable, points to a necessary teleological unity (in which faith predominates) with past experience and present practice (in which knowledge predominates). Faith has objective as well as subjective aspects, and so cannot be divorced from knowledge. Knowledge has ideal as well as sensuous aspects, and so cannot be divorced from faith. In other words, the real problem of the relation between faith and knowledge lies not in their differences, but in the principle of their unity. Cf. FREEDOM (in theology), RATIONALISM, and FAITH PHILOSOPHY.
Literature: KÖSTLIN, Der Glaube, sein Wesen, Grund u. Gegenstand;
and Der Glaube u. seine Bedeutung f. Erkenntniss u. Kirche; KÖNIG, Der
Glaubensact d. Christen; J. CAIRD, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, i.
31 f.; and Philos. of Religion, 160 f.; KAFTAN, The Truth of the Christian Religion
(Eng. trans.), i. 14 f., 116 f., 403, ii. 408 f.; ORR, The Ritschlian Theol.,
chaps. iii, vii; WENLEY, Contemp. Theol. and Theism, 85 f., 135 f.; GARVIE,
The Ritschlian Theol.; HERRMANN, The Communion of the Christian with God (Eng.
trans.), Bk. III. (R.M.W.)
In some of its forms the faith philosophy includes both theoretical and practical principles among the truths thus maintained; more often it seeks support in such conviction for the postulates of ethics and religion. 'Faith,' again, is used in different senses: it may mean a direct apprehension of reality or a source of ideas (a special 'spiritual faculty'), in particular of ideas concerning the absolute and the transcendent world held to be free from the finite limitations of intellectual cognition; or it may mean the instrument of assent, conviction, assurance of truth, especially in relation to principles incapable of theoretical demonstration. The second of these interpretations commonly implies the third, and appears in connection with it; the third is much the most important.
Historically, the faith philosophy is often a product of reaction. Sometimes it makes its appearance in reaction from a prevalent intellectualism in favour of more spiritual views of the world and life; in this sense, particularly, it is akin to mysticism, and easily passes over into it (cf. the mediaeval mysticism, especially in its earlier phases, over against the scholastic rationalism). More frequently it takes its origin in opposition to negative or sceptical speculation, or is framed as a means of escape from such, either by the sceptic himself or by the defender of fundamental truth in opposition to particular negative systems, or to the spirit of the age. In this form it is a characteristic phenomenon of periods of Aufklärung, or of transition from one stage of culture to another, and is scarcely to be distinguished from the philosophy of feeling. The second half of the 18th century and the 19th have been especially prolific of movements of this type. The reaction against the enlightenment in France was headed by Rousseau with his 'sentimental Deism.' At the close of the same period in Germany appeared Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi, to whose thinking in the history of opinion the term faith philosophy (Glaubensphilosophie) most specifically applies. Chief among these was Jacobi, who opposed the witness of faith alike to the pantheistic (Spinozistic) and the phenomenalistic (Kantian) view of the world. Jacobi was severely criticized by Kant, the practical side of whose own system was based upon 'moral' or 'practical faith,' but faith in a sharply defined sense as bound up with the necessary implications of practical reason, and articulating into the ideal demands of pure reason, which the latter of itself alone was unable to satisfy. Since Kant the philosophy of religion has made large use of the principle of faith or feeling, sometimes in close dependence on the Kantian analysis, sometimes independently or in divergence from it. In Germany at the present time one chief school of theologians, the Ritschlian, takes its departure from Neo-Kantian positions. In Britain, France, and America the doctrine of faith has reappeared in various quarters, often under the pressure of the perplexities of the time in regard to the truths of morals and religion (Hamilton, Mansel, Romanes, Renouvier, James). The principle has peculiar attractions also for minds of the literary or artistic order. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Literature: J. J. ROUSSEAU (1762), Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard,
iv; JACOBI, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza (1785); David Hume ü. den Glauben,
oder Idealismus u. Realismus (1787); Von den göttlichen Dingen (1811);
KANT, Was heisst sich im Denken orientiren? (1786), Werke (2nd ed.), Hartenstein,
iii; Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 22-7, 87-92, 316-22, 370-85, 400-34, 526-47;
Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, 1-8, 53-60, 125-52; Krit. d. Urtheilskraft, 450-500;
HAMILTON, On the Philos. of the Unconditioned (1829); Metaphysics, Appendix,
Letter to Calderwood; MANSELL, Limits of Religious Thought (1858); ROMANES,
Thoughts on Religion (1895); JAMES, The Will to Believe (1897). (A.C.A.Jr.-
This subject is connected so universally with the statements made in Genesis (ii-iv), that some reference must be made to them. Many hold that these statements are nothing more than the Hebrew form of a legend that was widely current among the people who inhabited the Mesopotamian valley centuries before we know anything of Jewish civilization; and although there is no historical evidence as yet (there seems to be archaeological) that the Hebrews derived this legend, say, from the Assyrians, striking parallelisms have been brought to light. Further, myths of a more or less similar character are to be found in India, Thibet, Persia, China, Tahiti, and Greece; while, as is well known, the conception of a lost 'Golden Age' was very widely prevalent. It ought to be emphasized, however, that the Hebrew form of the legend bears marks of the religious genius of the Jews, in that many of the grosser and more purely materialistic characteristics of other accounts have been eliminated. The story in Genesis is probably unhistorical; that is to say, no such events as are narrated there ever occurred. On the other hand, its affinities for similar tales in widely varying civilizations preclude us from viewing it as merely allegorical. It is a pictorial or mythological presentation of a truth incident to the constitution of human nature and to the process of the race. As Wellhausen says, 'it is the yearning cry that goes through all the peoples; as they advance in civilization, they feel the value of the goods they have sacrificed for it.' Man leads a double life -- of aspiration (purpose) and of accomplishment (means). But in all the important or permanent things of life, the distance between the two proves so great that it seems incapable of being bridged. Hence arises a profound consciousness of defect, and an attempt to explain its origin. At this point the problem passes over to philosophy of religion.
As a result of inspecting various religions, philosophy of religion distinguishes three theories of the 'Fall.' (1) God may be defective in himself -- the theory supported to-day by Schopenhauer and v. Hartmann. (2) There may be a power opposed to God -- possibly responsible along with him for the creation, and continuing, with him, joint-governor of the universe; this is the theory exemplified classically in the old Persian religion. (3) There may be a fault in nature itself, or in a portion of nature, such as man -- in this case, the result of deterioration in some way from a primitive condition or perfection, or of sin. Another form of this theory is to be found in the legend of Prometheus, for whose transgression mankind suffers. This presents a curious parallel to 'Adam's guilt.' The theological view of the entire problem may be said to be of a mediating, or not fully reasoned, character. It is so drawn as to render belief in God accordant with an acceptance of evil as fact. It is ingenious, but not ultimate. Philosophically, the question belongs to metaphysics, and demands exhaustive treatment of the problem of evil. At present this problem awaits such elucidation as can be given only after an adequate critical appreciation of the principles involved in the much misunderstood conception of evolution. Cf. ANTHROPOLOGY (in theology), THEODICY, MANICHAEISM, and SIN.
Literature: PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion (Eng. trans.), iv. 1 f.;
MARTENSEN, Christ. Dogmatics (Eng. trans.), § 78; HEGEL, Philos. of Religion
(Eng. trans.), i. 271 f., ii. 200 f.; WEDGWOOD, The Moral Ideal, chaps. vii,
viii; J. CAIRD, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, i. 196 f., ii. 1 f.;
Evil and Evolution (anonymous); A. MOORE, Evolution and Christianity; MATHESON,
Can the Old Faith live with the New? 219 f.; DILLMANN, Commentary on Genesis
(Eng. trans.); RYLE, Early Narratives of Genesis; SCHRADER, Cuneiform Inscriptions
of the Old Test. (Eng. trans.), i. 37 f.; DELITZSCH, Wo lag d. Paradies?; SCHILLER,
Ueber d. erste Menschengesellschaft nach d. Leitfaden d. mosaischen Urkunde;
MÜLLER, Christ. Doctrine of Sin (Eng. trans.); ORR, The Christ. View of
God and the World; any treatise on dogmatic or systematic theology. (R.M.W.)
Fallacy [Lat. fallere, to deceive]: Ger. Beweis-Fehler, Schluss-Fehler, Fallacie; Fr. sophisme; Ital. sofisma. Fallacy is any violation of the conditions of proof, any failure to conform to the laws of valid reasoning.
As each condition of proof may be violated, the only complete description of fallacy would be given as an enumeration of the forms assumed by such violations. Concrete reasoning, involving generally a complex of such conditions, does not adapt itself readily to such detailed scrutiny; but the attempts to classify systematically the varieties of fallacy in concrete reasoning have not been very successful, and have generally involved a certain confusion between two distinct principles of division: (1) the nature of the circumstances inducing fallacy; (2) the logical condition violated. In the traditional treatment, which is an inheritance from Aristotle's logic, the former principle appears mainly in the case of so-called verbal fallacies. The discussion of fallacy having mainly a practical end, a classification which assigns a place to the more common and important types of fallacy is the most useful. The main groups in such a classification seem to be: --
(1) Formal Fallacies, violations of conditions which are stated in terms of non-significant symbols -- such, e.g., are the errors which arise from misinterpretation of the relation between a positive and a negative proposition, especially when the terms are complex, or confusion between contraries and contradictories; violation of the rules of conversion and contraposition; violation of the syllogistic rules, the most important being undistributed middle and illicit process; violation of the rules of hypothetical syllogism, of which Aristotle's fallacy of the consequent is the best known.
(2) Verbal Fallacies, those which depend on, or involve a double interpretation of, the parts of the reasoning, and which are possible by reason of the ambiguity of words or verbal expressions. Under this class come Aristotle's fallacies in dictione, though it has to be noted that what he called composition and division are really verbal or grammatical fallacies, and do not correspond to what modern logicians include under that term.
(3) Real Fallacies, those which arise from a confused conception either of the contents of the evidence put forward, or of the relation between that evidence and the conclusion taken to be proved by it, or of the bearing of the conclusion reached on some thesis or issue contemplated. Such confusion of thought may conveniently be further specified as in deductive or in inductive reasoning. Of the deductive, the main types are: (a) what may be called composition and division, for the error involved is a confusion of thought regarding the different relations of whole and part, of which the numerical is only one, though perhaps the most important; (b) what may bear the Aristotelian title fallacies of accident, resting on confusion of thought regarding the true relation of absolute and relative, abstract and concrete, general and specific or individual, unqualified and qualified, whether in terms or assertions; (c) petitio principii, begging the question; assuming as ground of proof what is in fact the probandum, or what can only be proved jointly with the probandum. Circulus in probando or in demonstrando, argument in a circle, a form of this fallacy, is generally characterized and facilitated by the interpolation of several intermediate steps between the identical assertions. Hysteron proteron (usteron proteron) is a name for one variety of such a circle. To this head may also be referred that frequent source of fallacy in indirect reasoning on concrete matters -- incomplete disjunction, or inadequate enumeration of alternative possibilities.
(4) Ignoratio elenchi, irrelevant reasoning, where the argument, sound, it may be, in itself, is supposed to establish a conclusion which is not that drawn from the premises used. Of this a number of special forms have received special names: argumentum ad hominem, ad populum, ad verecundiam, ad baculum, involving identification of the truth of a thesis with the character or consistency of its supporter, with its conformity to popular prejudice, with the moral elevation and purity of purpose of its advocates, or with the power of overcoming its antagonists by physical force. More subtle forms are those of shifting ground, objections, partial refutation, proving too little or too much.
Inductive fallacies, being violations of the conditions of inductive proof, can best be arranged as attaching to the several steps whereby a universal relating to concrete fact is formed, applied in explanation, and tested. Such fallacies have a considerable resemblance to those of deductive reasoning. There are few current technical designations of them. The most important varieties are: neglect of negative instances (including all types of non-observation): undue simplification, depending on neglect of points of difference and on intrusion of the subjective into the objective, and involving as cases oversight of plurality of causes and of the multiformity or complexity of both causes and effects; post hoc ergo propter hoc, the substitution of coexistence or mere temporal sequence for cause and effect; insufficient enumeration of conditions operative, of successive stages in a process, or of alternative possibilities of explanation; insufficient verification; false analogy.
Literature: the epoch-making treatments of fallacy have been: (1) that
of ARISTOTLE, in the Sophistici Elenchi (cf. ed. by E. Poste, with full notes
and translation, 1866); (2) BACON'S survey of the Idola, in Nov. Org., Bk. I;
(3) WHATELY'S, in Bk. III of his Logic; (4) MILL'S in Bk. V of his Logic. The
Aristotelian doctrine is well stated and illustrated in DE MORGAN, Formal Logic
(1847), and in N. K. DAVIS, Theory of Thought (1880). An excellent treatment
of the whole subject from the practical view of logic, as a preservative against
error, is given in A. SIDGWICK, Fallacies (1883). A very elaborate classification
and helpful treatment is in WELTON, Manual of Logic, ii (1896). There are also
excellent remarks, though confined to fallacy in one special field, in BENTHAM,
Book of Fallacies (1824). (R.A.)
Falsity (1) and False (2) [Lat. falsus]:
Ger. Falschheit and falsch; Fr. fausseté and faux;
Ital. falsità and falso. (1) The property of positively
violating in some respect the requirements of truth. (2) Not true. See TRUTH.
Family [Lat. familia, household]: Ger. Familie; Fr. famille; Ital. famiglia. (1) A natural group of persons consisting of father, mother, and children. (2) A larger natural group including grandparents, grandchildren, and collateral relatives. (3) A household: a group partly natural, partly artificial (including servants).
Definition (3) most nearly approximates the original meaning of the word, which
etymologically signifies the servants or slaves of a household. The word was
extended to mean the group partly natural, partly artificial, held together
under the patria potestas. The investigations of modern ethnologists
have brought into familiar use the terms polyandrian family, a woman
with more than one husband, and their children; polygynous family, a
man with more than one wife, and their children; punaluan family, a group
of brothers jointly married to a group of sisters, and their children;monogamous
family, one man with one wife, and their children. On the origin and significance
of the family see MARRIAGE; also on the forms of animal families, and for literature.
Fanaticism [Lat. fanaticus, inspired]: Ger. Fanatismus; Fr. fanatisme; Ital. fanatismo. The word anglicized as fanaticism was used in classical times of priests who were supposed to be the intermediaries of revelations or of oracles; in particular, it was applied to those of them whose actions were wild or noisy. The word has now come to be used in a disparaging sense. We say that, in the middle ages, extreme ascetic practices, such as scourging, branding, and the like, were products of fanaticism. The term implies credulity in religious or other matters, accompanied by a vehemence which expresses itself in hatred or violence towards opponents.
As Tylor says, fanaticism is enthusiasm inflamed by hatred. That is, it is a perversion of enthusiasm caused by excess or lack of balance. So far as it can be treated scientifically, fanaticism belongs to the province of psychology. It is often considered to be a form of abnormal brain action affecting persons predisposed to mental disease. It is very susceptible to the influences of contagion, and may certainly be regarded as belonging to the borderland between sanity and insanity. The history of persecution for religious belief, and of witchcraft, affords abundant illustrations of fanaticism which may be considered in part pathological. Cf. CONTAGION (mental), and references there cited.
Fancy [Gr. fantasia]: Ger. Phantasie; Fr. fantaisie; Ital. fantasia. IMAGINATION (q.v.) in cases in which the process is not controlled by subjective selection, according to a systematic plan, but proceeds according to the more temporary and accidental affinities of the ideas themselves.
In aesthetics fancy applies to quaint, airy, capricious, or even grotesque
products of imagination; therefore particularly to the lighter and less serious
aesthetic creations. (J.R.A.)
As applied to aesthetic objects, the fantastic is that quality which springs
from the capricious and arbitrary play of imagination, especially when engaged
with its lighter and more airy creations; applied to natural objects (e.g. cliffs)
when characterized by very unusual and bizarre features; distinguished from
the peculiar quality in caricature, in so far as the latter involves intentional
over-emphasis of certain characteristics in order to give them prominence, whereas
the fantastic involves a less definitely purposive playfulness of the imagination;
distinguished from the grotesque in art, in so far as this involves, intentionally
or otherwise, the same element of explicit and quasi-humorous over-emphasis
of certain features, as found in caricature. In the case of natural objects
the grotesque and the fantastic are often nearly synonymous, and latter applying
more appropriately to the more delicate and less violent effects. Cf. CARICATURE,
FANCY, and GROTESQUE. (J.R.A.)
Fatigue varies with different functions, and with the degree of mental concentration. A distinction is made (cf. MacDougall, Psychol. Rev., Mar., 1899) between fatigue (Ermüdung) and weariness (Müdigkeit). (J.M.B.)
In experimentation, it is directly dependent upon the number of observations taken in a single series, and is indicated by a steady decrease in delicacy of perception and readiness of judgment. It is characterized by (1) a weakening of attention, (2) a diminished capacity of reproduction, and (3) the prominence in consciousness of certain organic sensations. Cf. MUSCULAR SENSATION. (E.B.T.)
Literature: (mental and muscular) A. MOSSO, La Fatica (1891, also in
Fr.); A. BINET and V. HENRI, La Fatigue intellectuelle (1898); KÜLPE, Outlines
of Psychol., 43. References on aspects of fatigue will be found further in many
experimental monographs: e.g. BURGERSTEIN, Die Arbeitskurve einer Schulstunde
(1891); EBBINGHAUS, Ueber eine neue Methode z. Prüfung geistiger Fähigkeiten
und ihre Anwendung bei Schulkindern, 3rd Int. Cong. of Psychol. (1897), 134;
Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xiii. 401; FRIEDRICH, in Zeitsch. f. Psychol. (1896),
xiii. 1; GRIESBACH, in Arch. f. Hygiene (1895), xxiv. 124; LEUBA, in Psychol.
Rev. (1899), vi. 573; GERMANN, ibid., 599. See also MacDOUGALL (as cited above),
résumé and criticism; JOTEYKO, extensive résumé
and bibliog. (to 1899) of muscular fatigue, &c., Année Psychol. (1898),
v; HENRI (ibid.) on muscular sense. See also citations under MUSCULAR SENSATION.
(E.B.T.- L.M.- J.M.B.)
Fatigue (physical). (1) Nervous: those
changes observed in the nerve cell due to excessive functioning.
Recent experiments have shown that excessive or long-continued activity in nerve cells produces changes in their size and histological appearance. The activity of a nerve-cell is at first accompanied by turgescence of the protoplasm, but prolonged activity causes diminution of the size and changes the histological appearance. The nucleus suffers analogous changes. The nucleolus at first increases and then diminishes in size. An excitation continued for six hours produced in one case a shrinkage of 16.50 per cent. in ganglion cells. See the figure. Consult especially the works of Hodge, Tuke, Mann, Lugaro, Sadovski, Whitwell, Roth, cited in the list given below.
Literature: A. MOSSO, Les Phénomènes psychiques et la Température du Cerveau (Turin, 1892), and Arch. Ital. de Biol., xviii (1892), Eng. trans. in Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc., clxxxiii (1893); La Fatica (trans. into Fr. and Ger.); C. F. HODGE, Study of Changes due to Functional Activity in Nerve Cells, J. of Morphol., vii (1892) (contains a good bibliography); Die Nervenzellen bei der Geburt und beim Tode an Altersschwäche, Anat. Anz., xi (1894); VAS, Studien über den Bau des Chromatins in der sympathischen Ganglienzelle, Arch. f. mikr. Anat., xl (1892); P. VEJA'S, Ein Beitr. z. Anat. u. Physiol. d. Spinalganglien (Munich, 1883); G. MANN, Histological Changes induced in Sympathetic, Motor, and Sensory Nerve Cells by Functional Activity, J. of Anat. and Physiol., xxix (1894); E. LUGARO, Sulle Modificazioni delle Cellule, Lo Sperimentale, xlix (1895), also in Arch. Ital. de Biol. (1895-6), xxiv; G. LEVI, Contributo alla Fisiologia della Cellula nervosa, Riv. di Patol. Nerv. e Ment., i (1896); G. B. VALENZA, I. Cambiamenti microscopici delle Cellule nervose nella loro Attività funzionale, &c., Mm. R. Accad. delle Sci. di Napoli (1896); FRANZ NISSL, Die Beziehungen d. Nervenzellensubstanzen zu den thätigen ruhenden u. ermüdeten Zellzuständen, Neurol. Centralbl. (1896), xv. 20; HODGE, Changes in Ganglion Cells from Birth to Senile Death, J. of Physiol. (1894), xvii; A Mircosc. Study of the Nerve Cell during Electr. Stimulation, J. of Morphol. (1894), ix; M. LAMBERT, Note sur les modifications produites par l'excitation électrique dans les cellules nerveuses des ganglions sympathiques, C. R. Soc. de Biol. (Paris, 1893), v; F. C. EVE, Sympathetic Nerve Cells and their Basophile Constitutents in Prolonged Activity and Repose, J. of Physiol. (1896), xx; C. A. PUGNAT, Sur les modifications histologiques des cellules nerveuses dans l'état de fatigue, C. R. de l'Acad. d. Sci. (Paris, 1896), cxxx; L. JACOBSOHN, Ueber das Aussehen d. motorischen Zellen im Vorderhorn des Réckenmarks nach Ruhe u. Hunger, Neurol. Centralbl. (1897), xvi. (H.H.)
(2) Muscular: see FATIGUE (mental), MUSCLE, and MUSCULAR SENSATION (3).
Fault (moral) [Lat. fallere, to deceive]: Ger. Fehler, Schuld (guilt); Fr. faute; Ital. fallo. Used without precise definition for (1) a less serious moral defect; (2) a less important morally wrong or theologically sinful act; (3) the fact of responsibility for moral or other evil consequences.
Rousseau says in Émile, 'it is better to commit a fault (sense
2) than to contract a vice.' The expression, 'it is his fault,' illustrates
meaning (3); cf. also the distinction among sins and venial, heinous, &c.
See SIN, WRONG, and VICE. (J.M.B.)
Fear [AS. foer]: Ger. Furcht; Fr. peur, crainte (higher forms); Ital. paura, timore (higher). (1) An emotion, arising in a situation demanding practical adjustment; but of such a nature as to disable and disconcert either by its strangeness or by the threat of approaching evil. In intense fear no form of adjustment may be possible except evasion or escape; and in extreme cases even these are impossible. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)
(1) Fear belongs to the primary emotions, i.e. to those which are found at every level of mental development above the mere sense reflex. It may have its source either in the disconcerting strangeness or obtrusiveness of an occurrence, or in previous painful experiences connected with the object which occasions it. Some writers (e.g. Spencer and H. M. Stanley) have laid one-sided emphasis on the second mode of origin. Spencer seems to identify fear (at least in its primitive form) with the revival of past painful experiences with connected motor activities. 'To have in a slight degree such psychical states as accompany the reception of wounds, and are experienced during flight, is to be in a state of what we call fear' (Psychology, viii. 213). H. M. Stanley agrees in affirming that 'we can only have the pain of fear so far as we have experienced pain.' But he denies, with good reason, that the pain of fear is merely a reoccurrence of the previous painful experiences on which it depends. Yet he goes to the other extreme in emphasizing a supposed 'pain at pain.' Both Stanley and Spencer seem to neglect the other possible occasion of fear -- the startling and disconcerting effect of a strange, sudden, or violently obtrusive occurrence. But this is an undoubted condition of great importance, even in primitive forms of the emotion. The contrast between meanings (1) and (2) is that between lower or organic and higher or intellectual EMOTION (q.v.).
Literature: DARWIN, Expression of Emotions, 290 ff.; MOSSO, Fear (Eng.
trans.); SPENCER, Princ. of Psychol., viii. 213; H. M. STANLEY, Evolutionary
Psychol., chap. vii; W. JAMES, Principles, ii. 396, 415, 446; STOUT, Manual
of Psychol. On the genetic relation between fears of the two sorts, see SCHNEIDER,
Der thierische Wille, and BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret., chap. vi. (G.F.S.-
Fear (in religion). (1) A self-regarding emotion which had widespread influence on the character of religious thought and practices, especially in the higher animistic stage when sacrifices, magic, &c., became prevalent.
At the same time, it should be noted that this influence may be easily exaggerated. For it has to be remembered that, after ceremonies had crystallized sufficiently, their due observance often transformed fear into confidence -- confidence born of the realized propitiation of the cause of terror. It is customary to trace this phase of fear to the feeling of DEPENDENCE (q.v.); hence such a famous phrase as 'Primus in orbe deos fecit timor' (Statius, Theb., iii. 661).
(2) In religions which contain a strong moral infusion, representing a much higher stage than that alluded to above, fear commonly implies conviction of misdeed. Here 'conscience doth make cowards of us all.'
The self-regarding emotion gives place to an altruistic tendency caused by the connection which 'conscience' forms with the object of worship. Such phrases as 'Perfect love casteth out fear' (1 John iv. 18), and 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Ps. cxi. 10), point to a devotion which obliterates mere self, and by this very fact lifts man to the highest religious level. Cf. RELIGION (psychology of).
Literature: A. RÉVILLE, Prolegomena to the Hist. of Religions
(Eng. trans.), 30 f., 67 f.; TEICHMÜLLER, Religionsphilosophie, 32f. The
subject is treated incidentally in all competent works on primitive civilization.
Fechner, Gustav Theodor. (1801-87.) A German
scientist, educated at Sorau, Dresden, and Leipzig (in medicine), where
he became professor of physics, 1834-9. He wrote on a wide range of subjects,
and contributed much to aesthetics, psychophysics, ethics, and the theory
of electricity. See the next topic.
Fechner's Law: Ger. das Fechner'sche Gesetz; Fr. loi de Fechner; Ital. legge di Fechner. A deduction made by Fechner from WEBER'S LAW (q.v.), and called by him 'law of intensity' (Massgesetz), stating that the intensity of sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus.
Expressed as an equation, called the 'measurement formula' (Massformel), it is
in which I is the intensity of sensation, S the stimulus, and C a constant to be determined for different senses, different individuals, &c. If just noticeable differences in sensation are proportional parts of the stimulus (Weber's law), and if the just noticeable difference, including the threshold, may be used as a unit for measuring sensation, Fechner's law is valid, but these assumptions are questioned by many authorities. Wundt and other writers do not distinguish the law of Fechner from Weber's law. See the literature cited under PSYCHOPHYSICS and WEBER'S LAW, and in BIBLIOG. G, I, d. (J.McK.C.)I = C log S,
Federation [Lat. foederare, to league together]: Ger. Bundesstaat, Staatenbund; Fr. état fédéral; Ital. (con-) federazione. A political community formed by the combination of a number of smaller communities which remain distinct, although united.
The only statement which can be made about all federations is that they have
their origin in a pact or treaty. In other respects, they differ very widely
among themselves. Some federations have been little more than leagues of sovereign
states. The federal pact has differed from an ordinary alliance chiefly in its
greater permanence. (F.C.M.)
Feeble-mindedness: Ger. Schwachsinnigkeit;
Beschränktheit; Fr. faiblesse mentale; Ital. semplicitàdi
spirito. A minor degree of defective intelligence. Cf. IDIOCY, and IMBECILITY.
Feeling [AS. felan]: Ger. Gefühl; Fr. sentiment; Ital. sentimento (an imperfect rendering of feeling and Gefühl. The Latin-Italian forms fail to reflect the shades of meaning of feeling and sentiment in the abstract -- E.M.). Consciousness as experiencing modifications abstracted from (1) the determination of objects, and (2) the determination of action.
Despite the current controversies about feeling and the wide differences of usage -- both of which are equally embarrassing in the other modern languages -- and indeed because of them, a certain disposition has sprung up to adopt a wide sense of the term as against the narrower usages. The above definition aims (1) to recognize what is historically common in the usages of the languages having the equivalent terms. This excludes a variety of special definitions. (2) It aims to mark off a phase of mental life which current psychology recognizes with great unanimity, and more or less adequately expresses in various statements of the so-called 'threefold classification,' knowledge, feeling, and will, and which is fixed also in popular speech. (3) It allows unrestricted analysis looking toward further determination of feeling and its characters -- pleasure, pain, excitement, &c. -- and also of its psychological explanation by 'incoming' or 'outgoing' currents, by central processes, or what not. (4) It also admits free genetic inquiry into the stages of feeling, from the simplest, where object and action-determination may be held to be absent or to have any degree of conscious presence, up to the highest emotions, where these determinations may be so prominent that feeling can be assumed only by abstraction. (5) It allows both the analytic and the genetic discussion of the hedonic problem, making no preliminary decision on such matters as indifference, inhibition, fusion, summation, &c.
The growing demand for such a broad definition shows itself in the currency attained by the word affection, with its adjective form affective; and the fact that the adjective is more widely used than the noun indicates, in so far, that feeling is an abstraction from a concrete state of mind. (The use of the adjective affective seems to have come into English through the French.) Moreover, the noun affection is applied to the abstraction itself considered as a hypothetical element in the mental life. This has the danger of leading to the misuse of the abstraction -- a danger pointed out as real also in the case of CONATION (q.v.) -- and the failure to start out from the concrete. The recommendation accordingly is (1) that Feeling be used for this phase of experience in its combination, with knowledge and will, in a concrete state of mind, i.e. as a consciously made abstraction from a richer whole; (2) that Affective be employed as synonymous with feeling used adjectively; and (3) that Affection be used for the purely hypothetical element which underlie the concrete manifestations of feeling. This is carried out in the definitions of AFFECT, AFFECTIVE (or FEELING) TONE, and AFFECTION (see those terms).
Literature: the general works on psychology, and also the works cited
in BIBLIOG. G, 2, e -- especially the discussions of HAMILTON, WUNDT,
LEHMANN, LADD, WARD, STOUT, BALDWIN. JAMES' usage is erratic here, as in other
cases. Special questions concerning feeling are noted under PAIN AND PLEASURE,
EMOTION, and CLASSIFICATION (of the mental functions). (J.M.B.,
Feeling (aesthetic). (1) The affective thrill arising upon the contemplation of beautiful or impressive objects; the capacity of response to aesthetic stimuli. (2) The atmosphere or emotional tone characterizing the whole or any part of an aesthetic object.
The history of the analysis of aesthetic feeling as such is intimately bound up with the development of psychology. Plato and Aristotle both developed theories of pleasure and pain, and subsequent philosophic writers elaborate more or less upon their views. But it is not until the time of Kant and his immediate predecessors that we meet with a really serious attempt to differentiate feeling as an element of aesthetic experiences, and submit it to critical examination. Sulzer, writing under the influence of Leibnitz, may be mentioned as the first to carry out such a systematic analysis. He finds in feeling the essential characteristic of primitive consciousness. The pleasure actually felt in the beautiful, he insists, is to be referred to the increased feeling of mental activity -- a doctrine closely related to Aristotle's theory of pleasure -- although he admits with the Wolffians that the nature of beauty itself rests upon perfect unity in plurality. Tetens and Kant are largely responsible for the adoption of the term feeling (Gefühl) to designate the agreeable and disagreeable aspect of conscious processes, the term sensation (Empfindung) having generally been used before. Kant's development of the principle of aesthetic judgment involves a recognition of the significance on the one hand of aesthetic feeling merely as such, and on the other hand an elaboration of the more distinctly intellectual factors entering into aesthetic experiences. For him the act in which beauty is perceived constitutes essentially an implicit judgment in terms of feeling. This judgment rests ultimately upon the adaptation of the perceived object to our mental capacities. Under the influence of interests which were more distinctly ethical, Home, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Burke, and other English writers developed an analysis of feeling which, despite its shortcomings, marks a distinct advance in the attempts to unravel the complexities of aesthetic experience. Thus Shaftesbury reduces the moral sense and the sense for beauty to a fundamental regard in the mind for harmony and proportion wherever found. Hutcheson goes further, and maintains that we possess an 'internal sense,' through which we perceive beauty. This, too, is apparently much what Burke means, when he speaks of 'taste' as a name for the faculty with which we judge works of art. Coming to more recent treatments, we may mention the tendency shown by certain aestheticians toward the recognition of feeling as the basal aesthetic category, from which aesthetic theory should proceed. This movement is in somewhat definite antithesis to the logical, ethical, and metaphysical trend of those writers who emphasize more particularly form and content as the fundamental aesthetic elements. Köstlin, Carrière, and Bosanquet may serve as illustrations of the latter trend; Kirchmann, Horwicz, and Marshall of the former. Cf. SENTIMENT.
Literature: for general treatises, see AESTHETICS; indications under
FEELING; NAHLOWSKY, Das Gefühlsleben (1884); LEHMANN, Hauptgesetze des
menschlichen Gefühlslebens (1892); GROOS, Einleitung in d. Aesthetik; HARTMANN,
Aesthetik (1886-7); MARSHALL, Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics (1894). (J.R.A.)
That the morality of conduct depends upon its felicific consequences is the
thesis of EUDAEMONISM and of HEDONISM. See those terms. (W.R.S.)
The differentiation of the sexes forms an interesting subject of study both in botany and zoology. The theory of evolution has given it prominence. Associated with the differentiation of sex there has been a differentiation in the sexual individuals giving rise to the secondary SEXUAL CHARACTERS (q.v.).
Literature: O. HERTWIG, Die Zelle u. die Gewebe (1893); Y. DELAGE, Structure
du Protoplasma et l'Hérédité (1895); GEDDES and THOMSON,
Evolution of Sex (1889). (C.LL.M.)
Fénelon, François de Salignac
de la Mothe. (1651-1715.) Born at Périgord, France, he went
to the University of Cahors in 1663; afterwards, to the college of Plessis.
He began preaching in 1666, went to the seminary of St. Sulpice, and received
holy orders about 1675. In 1678 he became superior of the order of Nouvelles
Catholiques, and in 1686 was sent by Louis XIV to Poitou to convert Protestants.
He became preceptor to the duke of Burgundy in 1689; tutor to the duke
of Anjou in 1690, and to the duke of Berri in 1693; member of the French
Academy the same year; archbishop of Cambray in 1695. He died at Cambray.
Ferguson, Adam. (1723-1816.) A Scottish
philosopher and historian, educated at St. Andrews and Edinburgh. He was
ordained in 1745. He was professor of natural philosophy at Edinburgh,
1759-64; professor of moral philosophy, 1764-85. He was one of the commissioners
sent from England to the United States to effect peace in 1778.
Ferrari, Giuseppe. (1811-76.) Italian historian
and philosopher. Born at Milan, and educated in law at Pavia. He devoted
himself to literature. In 1840 he was chosen professor of philosophy at
Rochefort, and later at Strassburg. He was removed from the latter position
on account of his communistic ideas. In 1848 he was reinstated at Strassburg,
but again removed. In 1859 he returned to Italy, and became professor of
philosophy first at Turin, then at Milan, and finally at Florence.
Ferri, Luigi. (1826-95.) Born at Bologna;
studied at the Paris Normal School. He was made professor of history in
the Istituto di Perfezionamento at Florence in 1863, and in 1871 became
professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Rome. On the death
of Mamiani in 1885, he became editor of Filosofia delle Scuole italiane,
the title of which he altered to Rivista italianu di Filosofia.
He was eclectic, showing chiefly the influence of his French training and
of Mamiani and the Italian metaphysicians.
Ferrier, James Frederick. (1808-64.) A
Scottish moral philosopher, born at Edinburgh and educated at Magdalen
College, Oxford. In 1842 he became professor of history at Edinburgh, and
in 1845 professor of moral philosophy at St. Andrews. His fame rests on
his Institutes of Metaphysics.
Ferrier's Experiment: Ger. Ferrier' scher Versuch; Fr. expérience de Ferrier; Ital. esperimento di Ferrier. An experiment, devised by D. Ferrier, is disproof of 'innervation sensations' supposed to arise from efferent nervous processes.
The effort experienced when there is vigorous thought of a movement, but no execution of it, is shown by Ferrier's experiment (as e.g. holding the finger on the trigger of a gun and making the usual effort, while the finger is held still) to consist of respiratory sensations and sensations from actual movement of other muscles.
Fertility [Lat. fertilis, fruitful, from ferre, to bear]: Ger. Fruchtbarkeit, Zeugungsfähigkeit; Fr. fertilité (fécondité); Ital. fertilità (fecondità). The power of producing a relatively large number of young by sexual reproduction.
It is a somewhat vague term, since such fertility may be due to several distinct causes. The 'gross fertility' of a species is the ratio of the number of parents to the number of fertilized germ-cells, which is approximately the number of ova matured. Species differ widely in this respect; in some cases thousands of eggs are produced, as in many fish, in other cases only a few, or even one at a time, as in man.
The 'net' (or 'effective,' see below) fertility of a species is the ratio between the number of parents and the number of offspring which reach sexual maturity. Owing to the destruction of large numbers of young, it does not by any means follow that a species will numerically increase because its gross fertility is very great. See NATURAL SELECTION.
Fertility is, of course, subject to individual variation and modification. See STERILITY. That fertility is inherited has recently been shown by Karl Pearson, to whom the distinction between 'gross' and 'net' fertility is due. As a rule species which differ considerably in structure are not fertile inter se. See HYBRID. (E.S.G.)
The term 'effective' fertility is suggested to bring out the evolutionary significance of Pearson's distinction: only those individuals of the offspring which live to exercise the reproductive capacity are 'effective' or significant as representing the fertility of their parents. The idea that fertility is correlated with other characters -- taken with the idea that fertility is inherited -- lies at the foundation of Pearson's theory of REPRODUCTIVE (or GENETIC) SELECTION (q.v.). (J.M.B.)
Literature: CH. DARWIN, Origin of Species (1859), and Animals and Plants
under Domestication; K. PEARSON, The Chances of Death, i (1897); Mathematical
Contrib. to the Theory of Evolution, vi, Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc., v. 192 (1899);
and Grammar of Science (2nd ed.), chap. xii; see also under the topics referred
Fertilization [Lat. fertilis, fruitful]: Ger. Befruchtung; Fr. fécondation; Ital. fecondazione. Of animals: the process which occurs in all cases of sexual reproduction, consisting essentially in the union of two cells, derived generally from different parents, and termed respectively in animals the OVUM (q.v.) and the SPERMATOZOON (q.v.).
Of plants: the process by which the pollen is conveyed to the stigma.
Modern views of fertilization or fecundation are intimately associated with the later developments of the CELL THEORY (q.v.). Newport in 1854 observed the penetration of the ovum by the spermatozoon in the case of the frog. O. Hertwig showed in 1875 that in an egg fertilized by a spermatozoon there are two nuclei: one due to the spermatozoon; the other that of the ovum itself. Later research has shown that the essential feature of fertilization is the union of a sperm-nucleus of maternal origin. The meaning of the process is still sub judice. According to some (Bütchli, 1876), its purpose is to afford an impetus to the cell-divisions necessary for development. According to others (Weismann, 1891), its purpose is to secure a sharing for those nuclear elements (chromosomes), which are perhaps the bearers of heredity, and which, according to some recent observers, remain separate throughout all cell-divisions, so that each cell contains chromosomes derived genetically both from those of the sperm and from those of the ovum. Weismann regards the process as productive of variation; Haeckel as a means of checking variation. Another view (Boveri, 1887) to some extent combines the theory of impetus with that of hereditary sharing. The spermatozoon is by many held to supply the CENTROSOME (q.v.) which is effective in the division or cleavage of the ovum, the chromosomes being the hereditary substance which is thus divided, while the ovum supplies the cell-substance which surrounds the dividing nuclei. Artificial chemical fertilization has recently been experimentally produced by Loeb (Amer. J. Physiol., iii, Oct. 1889; iv, Jan. 1901). See PARTHENOGENESIS.
Literature: see EMBRYOLOGY, and CELL THEORY. (C.LL.M.)
Fetich (or-ish) and Fetichism (or-shism, or -cism) [derivation, see below]: Ger. Fetisch, Fetischismus; Fr. fétiche, fétichisme; Ital. feticcio, feticismo. Any object to which peculiar potency is attached by reason (1) of the supposed indwelling of a deity or spirit; (2) of its being regarded as a sign, token, or representation of such spirit; or (3) of some intrinsic peculiarity in structure, origin, &c.
The term was applied by the Portuguese in West Africa to the small objects, sticks and stones, claws, plants, &c., venerated by the natives, which they interpreted as charms. The French and English adopted the meaning from the Portuguese, although both languages already had the word: 'And French she spak ful faire and fetysly' (Chaucer). The term was first used in a scholarly sense by de Brosses, 1760, and its modern use is due to Tylor, Lubbock, and Schulze.
Fetichism is an important factor in the natural religions of primitive peoples. Any object may become a fetich, but there is a natural tendency to select, for the embodiment of hidden power, odd and unusual bits of stone, twigs, bark, root, corn, claws of bird or beast, teeth, skin, feathers, human and animal remains, and a host of curious trifles that chance discovers. The fetich becomes a charm which may be worshipped, prayed to, or petted, and thus may become the means of securing the good things and avoiding the ills of life. If disaster ensue the fetich may be trodden on and beaten until a change of luck produces apologies and promise of future regard. The fetich need not be the actual abiding-place of the spirit, but may be connected with it in some symbolic or mystic manner. Likewise, too, injury worked upon the representative or effigy may rebound by sympathetic magic upon the original. It thus may become a form of witchcraft, which in turn leads to counter-charms and magical preventives. The doctrine is closely related to the spirit theory of disease, and to the general animistic conceptions (see ANIMISM) of both nature and religion which are so closely merged in primitive thought.
Literature: TYLOR, Primitive Culture, ii. 143 ff., and elsewhere; SCHULTZE,
Der Fetichismus (Eng. trans in Humboldt Library), and references there given.
Also references under RELIGION (evolution of). (J.J.)
Fetich (in pathology). In certain perversions
of the sexual instinct, the person, part of the body, or particular object belonging
to the person by whom the impulse is excited, is called the fetich of the patient.
So used by Lombroso and Binet (Fétichisme dans l'Amour).
Cf. PERVERSION (sexual). (E.M.)
Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas. (1804-72.)
A German philosophical writer. Born at Landshut, educated at Heidelberg
and Berlin in theology and philosophy. Became a Docent in Erlangen, 1828-32,
but injured his chance of promotion by a public denial of immortality.
He lived for a long time on his own property at Ansbach, writing prolifically.
In 1860 he moved to Rochenberg, near Nuremberg, where he died.
Fiat (of will) [Lat.]: Ger. Willensentschluss; Fr. décision volontaire; Ital. decisione. The state of consciousness which exists in the moment of deciding between alternative courses of action. The negative form of fiat, i.e. the fiat to stop, check, inhibit, &c., had been called 'veto' or 'negat.'
Fichte, Immanuel Hermann von. (1797-1879.)
German philosopher, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Educated in philosophy
in Berlin, his father's system of philosophy attracted him, and he devoted
himself to it. He opposed Hegel, and in 1836 became professor of philosophy
at Bonn; 1842-63 at Tübingen. After 1863 he lived in private life
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. (1762-1814.) A
German philosopher. Baron von Miltitz placed the lad successively in the
family of a clergyman at Niederau, at the town school at Meissen, and at
the Princes' School of Pforta, where he read Goethe, Wieland, and Lessing.
Studied theology at Jena and Leipzig. He read Spinoza and Wolff, and became
a fatalist. After several years spent as private tutor in Zurich, he returned
to Leipzig (1790) and studied the Kantian critiques. In 1794 he became
professor of philosophy at Jena, where he met Goethe, Schiller, Wieland,
Herder, Humboldt, and Jacobi. He also fell into correspondence with Reinhold,
whom he had succeeded at Jena, the Schlegels, Tieck, Schelling, and Novalis.
In 1799, charged with atheism, disclaimed as an exponent of the critical
philosophy by Kant, and criticized severely for a work on the French Revolution,
he resigned his position and withdrew to Berlin, where he became rector
of the new University of Berlin. Fichte's system is often designated Ethical
Idealism. He died at Berlin.
Ficino (Ficinus), Marsiglio (Marsiglius).
(1433-99.) Celebrated Italian scholar and philosopher. He was carefully
educated by Cosimo de' Medici for a position at the head of an academy
of Platonism, which was afterwards founded (1460). The art of printing
was invented, and Ficino translated into Latin the entire works of Plato
and Plotinus, adding commentaries to each. He claimed to harmonize Platonism
with Christianity, and founded a school of mystics which included Reuchlin,
Agrippa of Nettesheim, Ramus, Telesino, and others. He with others opposed
Its investigation is theoretically important, as bearing upon the older associationist theory that memory, recognition, &c., imply the comparison of a given impression with its memory image. The method of 'reproduction' (see MEMORY, experiments on) aims to secure its quantitative measurement. (E.B.T.- J.M.B.)
Literature: KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol, 197, 207; KENNEDY,
Psychol. Rev., v. (1898) 477 (with bibliog.); BENTLEY, Amer. J. of Psychol.,
xi. 1 ff.; ANGELL and HARWOOD, ibid., 67 ff.; citations under MEMORY (experiments
The 'field' is analogous with field of vision in many details, attention being likened to fixation, inattention to indirect vision, the movements of attention to the exploration of the field of regard. 'Area of consciousness' is often employed to translate Umfang des Bewusstseins, especially when the German phrase is used to denote the apprehension of the maximum number of successive stimulations (sounds, &c.) in a single pulse of attention without readjustment; but 'span of consciousness' is better in this latter sense. (J.M.B.)
The field of consciousness varies with individuals, with conditions of attention, with states of health or disease. Remarkable narrowing of the field occurs in states of distraction, in certain anaesthesias, in suggestive (notably hypnotic) states, in the psychoses of fixed ideas. For the distinctions of parts of the field with respect to vividness or degree, see SUBCONSCIOUS. (P.J.- J.M.B.)
Literature: the psychologies generally, especially WUNDT and JAMES.
Experimental studies have been made principally on the SPAN OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Field of Regard: Ger. Blickfeld; Fr. champ de regard; Ital. campo di sguardo. The space which can be traversed by the regard of the moving eye; the fixation field of the eye when moved. Where only distant objects come into consideration, it stands to the field of vision as the projection of an unchanging retinal image stands to the projection of the retina itself.
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 617, 677, 680; SANFORD,
Course in Exper. Psychol., 119, 434; AUBERT, Physiol. Optik, 593, 646, 663 f.;
HERING, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., iii. 1, 442 ff.; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol
(4th ed.), ii. 125 f. See also FIELD OF VISION. (E.B.T.-
Field of Touch: Ger. Tastfeld; Fr. champ
tactile (rarely used, ambiguous -- L.M.); Ital. campo tattile. A
phrase formed after the analogy of 'field of vision,' to denote the sum-total
of tactile sensations aroused by stimuli acting upon the skin at any one time.
It is thus, so to speak, the 'projection' of the skin, as the field of vision
is the projection of the retina. (E.B.T.- J.M.B.)
Field of Vision: Ger. Sehfeld, Gesichtsfeld (Gesichtskreis); Fr. champ visuel; Ital. campo visivo. The sum-total of visual sensations aroused by stimuli acting on the unmoved retina at any given time.
'The field of vision is, so to speak, the outward projection of the retina, with all its images and other peculiarities' (Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 679). The field of vision moves, therefore, with movement of the eyes. It may be conceived of, in general, as a hollow hemisphere, shifted concentrically upon a similar hemisphere of slightly different radius -- the FIELD OF REGARD (q.v.).
Literature: SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., 119; WUNDT, Physiol.
Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 108, 126; AUBERT, Physiol. Optik, 591, 609; HERING,
in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., iii. 1, 351; HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd
ed.), 678, 680. (E.B.T.- E.C.S.)
Figure (and Figurative) (in aesthetics) [Lat. figura, from fingere, to form]: Ger. (1) Figur, (2) Bild (bildlich); Fr. figure, figuré; Ital. figura, figurativo. (1) Form or shape, considered with especial reference to outline. (2) A form or image. (3) A word or words used in a sense other than their usual meaning, especially when a concrete sensuous image is used to convey an abstract concept or relation.
The aesthetic value of figurative language seems to reside mainly in (1) the
thrill or resonance of feeling which is attendant upon the sensuous image; whereas
in dealing with abstract terms the image is relatively vague, and the feeling
element correspondingly lacking; (2) pleasurable elements or values of any sort
attaching to our experiences suggested by the image and transferred by association
to the thought presented; (3) the recognition of an analogy or underlying unity
between various objects or parts of experience, having the aesthetic value of
unity in variety. Cf. SYMBOL, and UNITY IN VARIETY. (J.H.T.)
Figure (syllogistic): Ger. Schlussfigur; Fr. figure du syllogisme; Ital. figure del sillogismo. Figure is the modification of the categorical syllogism, consequent on the relation in which the middle term stands to the major and minor terms in the premises.
Each of the possible relations, which -- position only being taken into account -- are four in number, determines a special figure or type of syllogism. For each figure there may be formulated special rules, embodying the particular conditions required in order that reasoning of that type shall conform to the fundamental general rules of syllogism. Practically, the special rules state the conditions necessary to secure for each position of the middle term that the middle term shall be once distributed, and that no term shall be distributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in the premises.
Only three figures, those commonly reckoned as I, II, and III, were recognized by Aristotle, whose grounds for the limitation are not explicit and have been matter of dispute. What was afterwards recognized as a IV figure was not indeed ignored by Aristotle, and its varieties or moods were elaborately worked out by the earlier Peripatetics, who still regarded them as indirect modifications of the I figure. By whom the IV figure was explicitly constituted, we do not know. Galen, on the authority of Averroes, has the credit of it, but the matter is doubtful. Cf. MOOD (in logic).
Literature: UEBERWEG, Logik, § 103; HAMILTON, Lect. on Logic, App.
X, and Discussions, App. II. A. In modern logic, discussion as to the grounds
and value of the distinctions of figure was revived by KANT (see especially
his tract, False Subtlety of the Four Syll. Figures, 1762, trans. by T. K. ABBOT,
in Kant's Introd. to Logic, 1885), and had some importance assigned to it by
Hamilton, mainly in connection with his doctrine of unfigured syllogism. See
REDUCTION, and QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE. In LAMBERT'S Neues Organon (i.
Pt. IV, especially § 232) an attempt is made to recognize a distinct function
for each figure, and to formulate for each a principle or dictum. HERBART (Lehrbuch,
§ 68) contrasts the I and II figures as subsumptive, with the III figure
as substitutive, a distinction which is partially adopted, though without expressive
reference to the figure, in LOTZE'S view of the types of reasoning (Logik, §§
97 ff.). (R.A.)
Filioque [Lat.]. The Nicene Creed as said in the churches of the West (Roman Catholic, Anglican, Protestant Episcopal in the United States) contains the following passage: 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son' (filioque). The italicized words were not in the original creed, and emerged first at the third Council of Toledo (589). Continued controversy with the ARIAN (q.v.) party doubtless caused their insertion, which was not approved till Charlemagne's Council of Aixla-Chapelle (809). Even thereafter Leo III does not recommend their usage, which, so far as the popes are concerned, dates as late as Benedict VIII (1014).
The insertion of the word raised the influential dogmatic controversey concerning the 'single and double procession of the Holy Spirit,' over which the final separation between the Eastern and the Western churches took place. It involves the whole question of the nature of the Trinity -- 'in essence' and 'in revelation.' The Boon Conference of 1875 (Old Catholic) proposed as a substitute the reading, 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from the Father through the Son.'
Literature: FFOULKES, Historical Account of the Addition of the Word
'Filioque' to the Creed; LANGEN, Die trinitar. Lehrdifferenz zw. d. abendl.
u. d. morgenl. Kirche; SCHAFF, Creeds of Christendom, ii. 545 f.; HOWARD, The
Schism between the Oriental and Western Churches. (R.M.W.)
Final Utility (abbreviation for 'final degree of utility'): Ger. Grenznutzen; Fr. ophélimité; Ital. utilità finale. The intensity of desire satisfied by the last increment of a commodity purchased or consumed. See MARGINAL INCREMENT.
About 1870, Jevons made an independent discovery of Weber's law in certain
new aspects, of which the most important was this: that the value of any stimulus
is the degree of satisfaction obtained from its last repetition, and therefore
varies inversely with the amount (or rather with the rate) at which the stimulus
is furnished. This was expressed by Jevons in the proposition that value depends
not on 'total' utility, but on 'final' degree of utility. Further developments
of this matter have been made by Say and Pareto. (A.T.H.)
Finance [OF. finance; Med. Lat. finantia, money payment]: Ger. Finanz; Fr. finances; Ital. finanza. (1) An orderly arrangement of receipts and expenditures. (2) Especially applied to the receipts and expenses of public corporations. (3) A scientific investigation of the laws governing these receipts and expenses.
A very large part of the early literature of political economy dealt with public finance. In fact one of the early German names for the science was Cameral-Wissenschaft (science of the exchequer). (A.T.H.)
Literature: ADAM SMITH, Wealth of Nations, ii; E. DE PARIEU,
Traité des Impôts (1862); P. LEROY-BEAULIEU, Traité
de la Sci. des Finances (1877); A. WAGNER, Finanzwiss. (1876 ff.); G. COHN,
Finanzwiss. (1889); H. C. ADAMS, The Sci. of Finance (1898).
Finite (in mathematics) [Lat. finis, end]:
A quantity conceived to have some definite value or boundary, as a finite straight
line which is bounded by two points between which it lies. (S.N.)
The notion of the finite is an abstraction which arises in opposition to INFINITE
(notion of, q.v.). The normal object is in a context or setting of which it
is a definite or limited part, and normal experience thus makes the assumption
of limits without explicit recognition of them as such. When, however, reflection
arises upon the fact of limitation or upon the possibility of inexhaustible
quantity, the notions of the finite and the infinite arise together. (J.M.B.)
Although we know numerous facts relating to fire-worship, which testify to its wide prevalence among different peoples in various stages of culture, it cannot be said that a complete or even systematic account of the subject is possible as yet. In the lower ranges of culture, fire-worship pertains to ANIMISM (q.v.) and FETICHISM (q.v.). Fire possesses a spirit which must be propitiated. For while its influence for good is great, man knows but too well, from sad experience, its terrible possibilities for evil. Forest-fires, hut-fires, and the like must have taught those who possessed no means of fighting the flames many a stern lesson. At this stage, either the fire is worshipped itself, being invested with qualities animistically and anthropopathically, or a fire-spirit receives adoration and gifts, the particular fire used in the worship being, as seems most probable, identified at the moment with this spirit. On a still higher level of culture, this fire-spirit is abstracted from all particular fires, and therefore becomes a god -- usually one god among others, as in Mexico, among the Semites, in the early nature-worship of India and Persia. (The later religion of eastern Iran, systematized by Zoroaster, is to be distinguished carefully from this last. Here fire gradually became more symbolical and less personal.) At this stage fire is sometimes a theophany (Exod. iii. 2). The main difficulties in dealing with fire-worship, apart from the abounding obscurity of the transition from the animistic to the polytheistic stage, arise from (1) the use of fire in numerous sacrifices unconnected with fire-worship; (2) the fact that worship of fire produced many observances which, although analogous to those connected with sun-worship, do not belong to the latter; and (3) the fact that there is sometimes fire-mythology without a development of fire-worship, as in Polynesia. Cf. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Persia, India).
Literature: TYLOR, Primitive Culture, ii. 277 f. (where much literature
is cited); JEVONS, Introd. to the Hist. of Religion, 229 f.; LUBBOCK, Origin
of Civilization, 312. The subject is treated incidentally in many works on primitive
society, civilization, and religion. (R.M.W.)
Fission [Lat. fissus, a cleft]: Ger. Theilung;
Fr. scissiparité; Ital. scissiparità. A method of
asexual reproduction among unicellular organisms, the lower Metozoa and the
unicellular elements of Metozoa, in which the parent divides into two, often
unequal parts. Each half subsequently grows into a complete organism similar
to the parent. This process of reproduction is called schizogamy. In the elements
of Metozoa the resulting daughter-cells rarely entirely separate. Cf. AGAMOGENESIS
and CELL DIVISION. (C.LL.M.- E.S.G.)
Fit [ME. fit, a fight]: Ger. Anfall;
Fr. attaque; Ital. attacco (di male, &c.). A popular
term applied to any sudden paroxysm or convulsive attack, but particularly to
attacks of EPILEPSY, PARALYSIS, or APOPLEXY: see these terms. (J.J.)
Fitness (consciousness of): Ger. Gefühl der Uebereinstimmung; Fr. sentiment de la congruence (or d'accord); Ital. sentimento di congruità. A general awareness of congruity or incongruity, not involving any definite recognition of what the congruity or incongruity consists in. It is thought to be an important factor in the constructive processes of IMAGINATION (q.v.).
Literature: the definition follows BALDWIN, Senses and Intellect, 232-4;
Feeling and Will, 202. (G.F.S.)
As an aesthetic principle this takes two distinct forms, according as the end in question is external or internal. The former gives the principle of utility, as the fitness of a house for a given use conceived as a separate matter from the house itself; the latter gives the principle of intrinsic fitness, as of the parts of the house to the whole. If, however, in the first case we introduce the conception of 'home' as that whole of which the house is a part, we may think of the fitness of the house to realize the idea or purpose of the home, and so the fitness becomes intrinsic. This ambiguity may explain why some have regarded fitness as an aesthetic principle, while others decidedly reject it.
Socrates apparently made fitness, in the sense of usefulness, the supreme aesthetic principle, and Plato allowed it to stand as one element, while recognizing, also, an intrinsic beauty. Cicero distinguished sharply the use from the beauty of objects, though he pointed out that the same form may be at once the most useful and the most beautiful; and Vitruvius agreed with him in holding the two to be independent, though both enter into perfect architecture, which involves 'firmitas,' 'utilitas,' and 'venustas.'
In modern writing, Hutcheson's 'comparative beauty' is nearly the same as intrinsic fitness, while Home's 'beauty of relation' is fitness for some external end. Burke rejects the identification of fitness, which satisfies the understanding, with beauty, which appeals to feeling, although each has its place in a work or art. Kant gave the problem a new turn. He rejected entirely fitness in the sense of utility, admitted intrinsic fitness as a constituent of dependent beauty, and finally made adaptation, not to any objective end, but to our mental powers, an essential characteristic of the beautiful of any sort. With this, fitness easily passes from a formal to a metaphysical principle.
In recent aesthetics the principle of utility has been discussed chiefly in
connection with the requirements of architecture, where Ruskin sets it beside
'skill' and 'beauty' as an essential factor; Fechner (Vorschule der Aesthetik,
i. 203 ff.) gives it an aesthetic value (1) by association, (2) as exemplifying
the general aesthetic principle of harmonious co-operation of the parts of a
whole, (3) as showing a task or idea successfully met or carried out. Hartmann
(Aesthetik, ii, 1887) gives extended consideration to the conception
of intrinsic fitness or adaptation to an immanent end, as it appears in organic
nature, and further makes usefulness an indispensable prerequisite to the beauty
of all tools and structures which belong to man's working life. Santayana (Sense
of Beauty, 1896) considers fitness in the sense of adaptation to environment,
and gives it indirect aesthetic value (1) through its establishment of permanent
forms, which then become for us the normal or typical; (2) through association.
In the third place, it is the principle or organization in the arts (determining
the styles of building that shall be permanent), and thus, as in (1), plays
a part in beauty. The conception of intrinsic fitness has not received special
treatment under that term in recent writing, having passed over apparently into
the more definite terms of proportion and harmony, or, in its aspect of conformity
to an ideal, into certain aspects of the conception of expression. Carriere,
however, makes Zweckmässigkeit, in the sense of immanent purposiveness,
the essence of beauty. 'Beauty is perceived purposiveness in a pleasing form.'
Cf. BEAUTY, EXPRESSION, HARMONY, PROPORTION, and UTILITY. (J.H.T.)
Fitness (in philosophy and ethics): Ger. Angemessenheit; Fr. convenance, conformité; Ital. convenienza, conformità. Being adapted or suitable (1) to the nature of things, or (2) or the constitution of man.
In both senses, fitness has been taken by certain moralists as the standard or right conduct. In opposition to Hobbes' doctrine of the dependence of morality upon social institutions, Samuel Clarke laid stress upon 'eternal and necessary differences of things, from which follows the "fitness" of certain actions antecedently to all positive command and irrespective of reward or advantage.' This conception of 'fitness' is common to many of the English moralists. It was made clearest by R. Price, who distinguished two meanings of the word, viz. 'aptitude of any means to an end,' and 'rectitude.' In the latter sense he spoke of 'fitness or duty.' In both of its meanings he held the term to be indefinable -- 'a simple perception of the understanding.' A less intellectual and more aesthetic view of this fitness had been previously put forward by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson; the latter referring to the 'peculiar perception of decency, dignity, and suitableness of certain actions.' Butler, while expressing assent to the views of Clarke, lays stress himself upon suitability to the constitution of man rather than to the nature of things. Paley, on the other hand, turns the phrase to his own purposes by regarding it as meaning 'fitness to produce happiness,' while Bentham criticizes it as worthless and capable of meaning 'whatever a man likes.'
Literature: S. CLARKE, Boyle Lectures (1706); PRICE, Principal Questions,
&c., in Morals (1758). (W.R.S.)
Fittest (survival of the): Ger. Ueberleben der Passendsten; Fr. survivance du plus apte; Ital. sopravvivenza del più adatto. A phrase used to express the effective result of the process of natural selection, during the struggle for EXISTENCE (q.v.), involving survival among (1) individual organisms, (2) groups of organisms.
Suggested by Herbert Spencer shortly after the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, it is sometimes used as equivalent to natural selection ('natural selection or the survival of the fittest'). But natural selection is the process from which the survival of the fittest follows as a result. The term 'fittest' is ambiguous, from its generality. It suggests the question, fittest for what? To which the answer is, fittest for the particular environment of the organism to which the term is applied, environment being used in its widest sense as including other organisms, and as forming a stage on which may be waged any of the forms of 'struggle for existence.' Critics forgetful of this have sometimes objected that those which survive are not the fittest, e.g., in human evolution it is not always the intellectually or morally fittest or highest which survive. The criticism is based on a misapprehension as to the meaning of the term fitness in biology. Fitness indicates any sort of endowment or acquirement by which the animal escapes elimination in the struggle for existence. His survival is ipso facto proof of his fitness.
Fixation of Memories: Ger. Fixiren der Erinnerungen
(suggested); Fr. fixation des souvenirs; Ital. (il) fissarsi
dei ricordi (E.M.). This term designates all of the conditions under which
sense impressions which modify consciousness leave traces or residuals capable
of revival in the form of images. (P.J.)
Fixation Point: Ger. Fixationspunkt, Blickpunkt; Fr. point de fixation, point de regard; Ital. punto di mira. 'In normal vision both eyes are so set that they fixate one and the same external point,' which is therefore termed the fixation point or point of regard (Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 617). It is the point of the field of regard which corresponds to the stimulation of the centre of the fovea centralis (cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psychol., 4th ed., ii. 99). The primary fixation point is the fixation point in the primary position for CONVERGENCE (q.v.).
Literature: WUNDT, as cited; HERING, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol.,
III. i. 350, 441; AUBERT, Physiol. Optik, 589. (E.B.T.)
Fixed Capital: Ger. stehendes Kapital; Fr. capitaux fixes; Ital. capitale fisso. Permanent investments; instruments of production which are not directly transformed into articles of sale, nor even consumed in production except by a gradual process of attrition or deterioration.
Adam Smith defined fixed capital as consisting of goods which yield a profit
without changing masters; and this is substantially Malthus' definition. Ricardo
said that it consisted of goods 'of slow consumption.' Mill defines it as capital
which exists in a durable shape, and the return to which is spread over a period
of corresponding duration, as distinct from circulating capital, which fulfils
the whole of its office in the production in which it is engaged by a single
Fixed Idea: Ger. fixe Idee; Fr. idéefixe,
obsession; Ital. idea fissa, fissazione (E.M.). The term
fixed idea, when used in the sense of a delusion, refers to a morbid or false
conception which dominates the reasoning processes of the patient, and forms
an integral part of his insanity. The various forms of MONOMANIA (q.v.) may
be cited as cases of fixed ideas in this sense. It is also used in the sense
of an IMPERATIVE IDEA (q.v., with literature). (J.J.)