Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
(2) In experimental psychology, the symbol of excitation or stimulus; a varying quantity, as ounces of pressure, units of sound, light, &c.
(3) E-values (Ger. E-Werthe). One of the most important of the
special symbols of Avenarius' EMPIRIO-CRITICISM (q.v.). Cf. also INTROJECTION.
Earnings is a narrower term than income, which includes property acquired by
any method whatsoever. Thus taxes form part of the public income, but not of
the public earnings; the latter being confined to receipts from mails, water-works,
and other forms of economic activity on the part of the state. (A.T.H.)
Eberhard, Johann August. (1739-1809.)
German philosopher, born at Halberstadt, Prussia, and died at Halle. He
was educated in theology at Halle, and in 1778 became professor of philosophy
there. In theology he was rationalistic.
Ebionites [Heb. pl. 'ebjonim, the poor]: Ger. Ebioniten; Fr. Ébionites; Ital. Ebioniti. Although unsolved or partially solved problems still surround this name, one may say that it has been used in three distinct senses: (1) It was applied at first to all Christians, on account of their poverty; (2) it was used of the Jewish Christians exclusively, as by Origen; (3) by the time of Epiphanius and Jerome it designated a distinct sect among the Jewish Christians -- one contrasted with the Nazarenes. The Ebionites, in all probability, had their rise in the Pharisaic influences naturally incident to Palestinian Christianity. This can be gathered from the doctrines in which they always agreed. They were Christians because they accepted Jesus as Messiah. But they were Jews, because they (1) denied Jesus' divinity, (2) enforced the obligation of the law, (3) rejected and anathematized St. Paul. Latterly, however, these Jewish elements were transformed by doctrines derived from the ESSENES (q.v.), as is proved by the Book of Elchaisai; while later still (by the beginning of the 3rd century) important GNOSTIC (q.v.) factors became prevalent. These are to be seen in Alcibiades of Apamea (219 A.D.).
Literature: GIESELER, in Arch. f. Kirchengesch., iv. 279 f.; SCHLIEMANN,
Clement, 449 f. (for the primary sources); RITSCHL, in Nieder's Zeitsch., iv.
573 f.; BAUR, De Ebion. orig. et doctrina; HILGENFELD, Nov. Test. extra Canonem
receptum, fasc. iii. 153 f.; LIGHTFOOT, Ep. to the Galatians, 306 f., and Ep.
of Ignatius, i. 319 f.; STANTON, The Jewish Messiah, 166 f.; CAMPBELL, Critical
Studies in St. Luke, 169 f. (R.M.W.)
Eccentric Projection: Ger. excentrische Projection; Fr. extériorisation des sensations (L.M.); Ital. projezione (o localizzazione) eccentrica (delle sensazioni) -- (E.M.). The fact that when a stimulus works not upon the nerve-ending, but upon the nerve-tract, the corresponding sensation is regularly referred to the peripheral ending of the nerve. Cf. PROJECTION, and PROJECTION (nervous). (TH.Z.)
Eccentric projection, which is a phenomenon of nervous projection, should be
carefully distinguished from projection as misused for localization in space.
Cf. Ladd, Physiol. Psychol., 385 ff., and James, Princ.
of Psychol., ii. 31 ff. (with numerous references). See Höfler,
Psychol., 343 f., for the restriction as in the definition. (J.M.B.)
Insane persons are frequently eccentric, but eccentricity alone is by no means
a conclusive symptom of insanity. It is obvious that what is unusual in one
age or in one group of surroundings may be quite usual in another, and that
unusual or eccentric behaviour may be expressive of very different motives and
influences in different cases. As a rule the eccentric is indifferent to the
world's blame or criticism, and pursues his own methods with little reference
to the sanctions of society. The term is thus popular rather than scientific,
and frequently occurs in discussions of the borderland that separates sanity
from insanity (Maudsley, Mental Pathol., 297-8). In the discussion
of the possible relations between genius and insanity, the question of morbid
eccentricity is again prominent (see art. Eccentricity in Tuke's Dict.
of Psychol. Med.; see also Moreau de Tours, Les Eccentriques,
Echolalia (also Echophasia) [Gr. hcw, echo, + lalia, prattle]: Ger. Echosprache, or Echolalie; Fr. écholalie; Ital. echolalia, lalomimesi. The thoughtless and somewhat automatic repetition by the subject of the words and tones addressed to him.
It occurs as a symptom in degenerative nervous disorders (imbecility, dementia,
Guinon's disease) and also in disturbances of speech (see Bateman, Aphasia).
The word is due to Romberg, 1853. Gilles de la Tourette (Arch. de
Neurol., 1885, 19) notes an allied symptom in the nervous malady of Siberia,
termed myriachit. (J.J.)
Eckhart, Meister (Master).
(cir. 1260-1327.) 'The greatest of the German mystics.' Born in Thuringia,
he became vicar of the Dominican order at Erfurt, vicar-general in Bohemia,
teacher at Paris, 1311-2, teacher of theology at Strassburg, and in 1327
provincial in Cologne. A reformer of monasteries, an eloquent and scholarly
preacher, a free spirit, he has been called 'the father of modern pantheism.'
A papal bull after his death denounced twenty-eight sentences in his sermons.
Eclampsia [Gr. ek + lampein,
to shine]: Ger. Eclampsie; Fr. éclampsie; Ital. eclampsia.
A form of CONVULSION (q.v.). (J.J.)
Eclecticism [Gr. ek + legein, to gather]: Ger. Eklekticismus; Fr. éclectisme; Ital. eclettismo. A system of philosophy which strives to incorporate the truth of all systems. The best known example is the Alexandrian Neo-Platonic school, usually known as the Eclectic school. See ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL. Among modern eclectics, Leibnitz and Cousin are best known.
Since a more or less arbitrary choice is apt to be a mosaic rather than
an organized philosophy, the method is rather in disfavour and the term
often a reproach. (H.R.S.)
The first outburst of eclecticism in theology occurs at Alexandria with Clement, Origen, and Synesius, who draw upon Pagan, classical, and Christian sources. Here, however, there are distinct traces of syncretism -- that is, the fusion of elements which eclecticism, strictly so called, does not allow to modify one another. In modern times the term has been applied to theologians who attempt to mediate between the faith of the Church and the results of scientific, critical, or philosophical inquiry, without, however, possessing a fundamental or unitary system. Such are I. A. Dorner, Martensen, J. P. Lange, Chr. v. Hofmann, Lipsius, and others. Schleiermacher might be classed in the same group. It is represented among British-American writers by such a thinker as A. B. Bruce. Indeed, this tendency may be ascribed to nearly all 'liberal' theologians belonging to the 'Evangelical' churches of Great Britain and the United States. It is to be remembered, in this connection, that electicism has a wider legitimate field in theology than in philosophy, and so cannot be applied fairly in a derogatory sense exclusively. O. Pfleiderer's classification of A. Ritschl as an eclectic can hardly be maintained.
Literature: O. PFLEIDERER, Devel. of Theol., Bk. II. chap. iv; A. B.
BRUCE, Apologetics; I. A. DORNER, Syst. d. christl. Glaubenslehre (Eng. trans.).
Economic Freedom: Ger. Rechtszweck des Staats; Fr. liberté economique; Ital. libertà economica. The absence of any legal restrictions upon rights of property or contract, except such as are necessary for preserving similar rights of property or contract to different individuals.
The idea of economic freedom was the result of a protest against the 'mercantile system' of international trade restraints on the one hand, and the system of internal police restrictions adopted by the Wohlfahrtsstaat on the other. The idea expressed in the definition has been perhaps most fully developed by W. v. Humboldt.
The development of these ideas, both in theory and in practice, has been checked
by the growth of democracy and the ideals of equality connected with it. As
Lassalle so well showed, equal rights under unequal conditions mean assured
inequality. Hence the pressure for factory acts, for laws governing the prices
and profits of large corporations, for progressive taxation, and for extension
of government activity. (A.T.H.)
Economic Harmonies: Ger. Interessen-Harmonien; Fr. harmonies économiques; Ital. armonie economiche. A series of coincidences between the self-interest of individuals and the general interest of society in matters relating to wealth.
The agreement between the results of egoism and altruism is perhaps no closer in economic life than in other departments of human activity; but it is, at any rate, more verifiable. As a natural consequence, the relations between self-interest and public interest have been more clearly recognized in this field than in any other; and there has been a tendency to assume the existence of such a harmony in all cases where it is not specifically disproved. The laissez-faire principle of the PHYSIOCRATS (q.v.), urging non-interference with industry, was the natural result of this assumption, which was afterwards carried to an extreme by Bastiat in France and Prince-Smith in Germany.
Literature: BASTIAT, Harmonies économiques. Among the most active
critics of the views represented by Bastiat may be mentioned the names of PROUDHON,
LASSALLE, MARLO, and MARX. (A.T.H.)
Economic Law: Ger. Gesetz des menschlichen Verkehrs, ökonomisches Gesetz; Fr. loi économique; Ital. legge economica. A universal proposition relating to wealth: e.g. law of diminishing return; law of supply and demand.
The earliest students of political economy regarded their subject as an art, and often thought of economic laws as matters of human enactment. The economists of the early part of the present century went to the other extreme. Having discovered certain sequences of cause and effect, they thought that these sequences applied to a wider range of places and times than was actually the case. In other words, they overlooked the conditional character of these laws. They are universal in the sense that they are not subject to exceptions; but they are to be stated in narrowly defined terms rather than in loose or broad ones. In the view now generally held, the conditions of their applicability are determined by natural selection. The struggle for existence between different groups creates economic types; and so far as an economic law involves an assumption as to human motives, its application may be limited by the extent of the conditions which create and perpetuate the type to which a certain motive belongs.
Literature: BAGEHOT, Postulates of Eng. Polit. Econ. (A.T.H.)
Economic Method: Ger. ökonomische Methode; Fr. méthode économique; Ital. metodo economico. The logical processes habitually employed by an investigator for the discovery or development of laws relating to wealth. These processes fall into two groups -- deductive methods, which start from generalizations as to the conduct of individuals; and historical methods, which start from observation of the conduct of masses.
Down to the end of the last century the dominant methods were historical, though the French and English economists both made much use of deduction when it suited their purpose. Ricardo's work, on the other hand, was rigorously deductive, and so was that of Malthus. Deductive methods were carried to an almost absurd extreme by the 'orthodox' writers of the first half of the 19th century. John Stuart Mill showed a healthful reaction from this extreme; and Mill's use of historical method was carried yet further by a group of German writers of the third quarter of the century (Knies, Roscher, Brentano, Schmoller, Cohn, &c.), who called themselves by the distinctive name 'Historical school.' About 1870 a counter-reaction toward deductive methods made itself felt, headed by Menger in Austria, and by the MATHEMATICAL ECONOMISTS (q.v.) of all countries of Europe. At present the leading economists make use of both deductive and historical methods, being guided in their choice by the character of the problems under investigation.
Literature: KEYNES, Scope and Method of Polit. Econ. (A.T.H.)
No term in the whole range of philosophic discussion has been more loosely
used. Under one set of conceptions of the term, an economic motive is equivalent
to a hedonistic motive. Another conception is derived from the abstraction of
an 'economic man,' of which the English economists about the middle of the 19th
century made some use. 'Political economy,' says Mill, 'is concerned with man
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging
of the comparative efficacy of means to that end.' A more precise and more useful
meaning of the term can be developed on lines like this: social services, in
their objective or impersonal aspect, tend to take the form of wealth. When
they do this, they become capable of measurement. So far, therefore, as wealth
forms the basis of motives, the balance of such motives can be compared with
impersonally measurable causes or effects, or both. To motives whose balance
can be studied in this way, we give the name 'economic' (A.T.H.)
Economic Science, or Economics, or Political Economy [Gr. ta oikonomika, matters of the household]: Ger. Oekonomie, National-Oekonomik; Fr. économie politique; Ital. economia politica. The science which deals with the phenomena of wealth.
Economics, as conceived by the Greeks (e.g. Xenophon, Aristotle), dealt with the questions involved in the ordering of a household, as distinct from politics, which dealt with the questions involved in the ordering of a state. In the middle ages the separate study of wealth fell into abeyance. Economic questions were handled only as part of a system of morals (Aquinas), or in connection with some disputed points of law -- especially those involved in the taking of interest or usury.
About the beginning of the 16th century we see attempts to develop an art of political economy, which should guide the statesman in his attempts to promote public wealth, in the same way that the art of domestic economy guides the householder in his attempts to promote private wealth. The first economists who took this view are known as Cameralists, because they dealt almost entirely with the conduct of the cameralia or goods belonging to the exchequer. It is hardly necessary to say that this conception, which identified public wealth with government property, was a very narrow one. It was the outgrowth of a conception of the state which made the ruler stand in loco parentis towards his subjects. Though the phenomena of government property must always form an important field of economic investigation, they now constitute the domain of the special science of finance rather than of the more general science of economics.
In the 17th century another school arose, generally known as the Mercantilists. This school remained dominant until after the middle of the 18th century, nor is its influence wholly lost at the present day. The most noted practical exponent of mercantile principles was the great French financier, Colbert; the best known writers who advocated them were perhaps Thomas Mun, William Petty, and, later, James Stuart. The name given to this school is derived from the conception, prominent in its writings and practice, that a nation makes money in the same manner as an individual merchant, by selling more than he buys -- i.e. by exporting more than the nation imports. In the hands of all but its most able advocates, this mercantile system tended to become a miserly system -- to lay too much stress on the hoarding of the precious metals, and too little on wise purchases of outside commodities.
The reaction against the errors of the mercantile system led to the development of the French school of Physiocrats, who laid stress on natural resources as a measure of wealth. Quesnay (1694-1774) was the most original writer of this school, Turgot its most eminent statesman. The physiocrats laid stress on the agricultural produce of the community as the basis of its prosperity, and counted the value of the manufactures as limited by the surplus of food which the farmers had left over beyond their own wants. >From the over-valuation of money and manufactures, which was characteristic of the mercantilists, they passed to an under-valuation.
This error was corrected by Adam Smith (1723-90), whose Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is usually counted as the starting-point of modern political economy. In its general basis the work of the English school, from Smith to Mill, is nevertheless essentially physiocratic; and its most serious errors, like the wage-fund theory, have resulted from carrying over to its broader definitions of capital and wealth, certain propositions which were quite true when capital was identified with food supply alone. The great positive contribution of the English school to economic science was its theory of free competition; and in developing this theory, it may be said to have passed from the old art of political economy to the modern science of economics. Among the many notable names which it includes, we may, without unfairness, select those of Ricardo, Malthus, and John Stuart Mill in England, and Say in France. Still greater precision was given to the theory of competition by the mathematical economists, of whom Cournot and Jevons have been the most influential, and later, by the Austrian school, of whom Boehm-Bawerk is perhaps the ablest exponent.
The study of the workings of free competition tended naturally (though not universally) to produce an economic optimism, which regarded free trade, among nations and among individuals, as a panacea for all social ills. In matters of international trade a reaction against this view is represented by the protectionists (see PROTECTION); in matters of individual trade, by the socialists, of whom Karl Marx is by far the most prominent (see SOCIALISM).
Both Individualism and Socialism, in their extreme forms, are essentially deductive in method, carrying certain assumed premises out to a logical conclusion. The opinion is gaining ground that more stress should be laid on the rest of the premises, and less on the subsequent logical process, if we are to make real progress in economic study. This is the avowed policy of the German historical school, founded by Knies and Roscher in the middle of the present century, and culminating in Wagner and Cohn; it was less loudly preached, but quite as successfully practised, by most of the English and French successors of Mill. The danger which beset the earlier exponents of the German school was a tendency to eclecticism, which sometimes went so far as to deprive their work of all claim to scientific character. The younger generation of writers, brought up under the influence of Darwin, are able to avoid this danger, while preserving the historical character of their investigations.
One or two examples will illustrate this point. In the older generation, the orthodox economists were inclined to treat interest and rent as necessary consequences of the existence of capital and land as factors in production; while their opponents, like Lassalle or George, seeing in history certain cases where interest or rent did not exist, argued that these things were the result of arbitrary enactment, and might be abolished. But the modern historical economist is able to show in actual experience why the present institutions of private capital and private landholding were adopted, and to deduce the consequences of these institutions. He is not compelled to regard them as part of the order of nature, or adjust their results to his conceptions of natural right. He admits their institutional character, but he does not admit that their enactment was arbitrary. On the contrary, he can prove that they were a result of a struggle for existence between different peoples; he can show why they were necessary at the time of their adoption, and can judge with a high degree of accuracy what changes must take place before they become unnecessary to retain. Again, look at the theory of population. Malthus deduced certain consequences from a tendency of population to increase faster than food supply, and argued for 'preventive checks.' His opponents said that there was no such general pressure -- only a local one -- and that preventive checks were therefore unnecessary. The historical economist is able to show that this localization of the pressure of poverty is the result of the instituting of the family and inheritance, in themselves most powerful preventive checks; and that while Malthus may have been technically wrong in certain details, his opponents are practically wrong in far greater measure.
As a result of these methods, the conception of the relation of economics to ethics has changed radically. They are no longer regarded as independent sciences. The ethics of a people is at once the basis and the consequence of its economic activity. The balance and play of economic motives is the result of the people's ethics; but the future development of that ethics depends largely, and sometimes almost exclusively, upon the economic results of the public morality. The attempt to study either of these sciences without references to the other is practically a thing of the past.
Literature: for a general bibliography see RAND, Bibliog. of Economics
(1895). The great book on the subject is still ADAM SMITH, Wealth of Nations
(excellent edition, with notes by Thorold Rogers, Clarendon Press, Oxford; good
abridgment by Ashley, in Macmillan's Economic Classics); next to it stands J.
S. MILL, Principles of Political Economy. A brief bibliography of some of the
more modern writings will be found at the beginning of the successive chapters
of HADLEY'S Economics (N.Y. and London, 1896); a fuller one in ANDREWS' Institutes
of Economics (Boston, 1889); a very complete and good one in COSSA'S Introduction
to the Study of Political Economy (trans. by Dyer; London, 1893). (A.T.H.)
Economy (in aesthetics): Ger. Oekonomieprincip; Fr. principe d'économie; Ital. principio dell' economia. The principle or law which asserts that the aesthetic value of any object, as a statue, or act, as dancing, depends upon the absence of all superfluous features or elements, and upon the presence of the essentials only.
The brothers Weber (Mechanik d. mensch. Gehwerkzeuge, in Pogg. Ann.,
1837) appear to have been the first to maintain, on the basis of experimental
observations, that the physiologically correct, that which involves no wasted
energy, is synonymous with the aesthetically beautiful. Spencer (Essays,
Scientific, &c., ii., 1892) has developed the principle of economy
in a somewhat similar manner as applied to literary style and to physical grace.
Avenarius, under the title Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses (Philos.
als Denken d. Welt, 1876), employs essentially the same conception
as a basal philosophic doctrine. Fechner also accords the principle distinct
importance (Vorschule d. Aesth., ii., 1876). It has been criticized
by Bosanquet (Aesthetics, 1892) as essentially a restatement, with certain
additions of a physiological character, of Aristotle's doctrine of the appropriate
relations of the parts to the whole in a work of art. On this last point see
HARMONY; for the bearings of the physiological considerations see RHYTHM. For
applications of the principle of economy to painting and sculpture, see Hildebrand,
Problem d. Form (1893). See also Ruskin, 'The Lamp of Sacrifice,'
in Seven Lamps of Architecture. (J.R.A.)
Economy (logical principle
of). A principle maintained by E. Mach that general concepts are merely an adaptation
for the economy of mental process. That they have that effect was noticed by
Ecstasy (as a condition) [Gr. ekstasiV, displacement]: Ger. Ekstase; Fr. extase; Ital. estasi. A condition of the nervous system and mind characterized by immobility, suspension of normal sensory and motor functions, and rapt concentration upon a limited group of ideas.
It is particularly characteristic of various forms of religious absorption. 'The symptoms are very much alike in all cases: after sustained concentration of the attention on the desire to attain an intimate communion with heavenly things, the self-absorption being aided perhaps by fixing the gaze intently upon some holy figure or upon the aspirant's own navel, the soul is supposed to be detached from the objects of earth, and to enter into direct converse with heaven; the limbs are then motionless, flaccid, or fixed in the maintenance of some attitude which has been assumed; general sensibility is blunted or extinguished, the special senses are unsusceptible to the impressions which usually affect them, the breathing is slow and feeble, the pulse is scarcely perceptible, the eyes are perhaps bright and animated, and the countenance may wear such a look of rapture, the fashion of it be so changed, that it seems to be transfigured and to shine with a celestial radiance' (Maudsley). Sensibility to external impressions is not always completely destroyed, but there seems an inability to break through the trance and respond to such impressions. At times there is nearly a complete forgetfulness of what has occurred during the ecstatic state, but usually the ecstatic can give some account of his vision and experiences; such reports have been influential in the shaping of religious doctrines both among primitive men and in historical religions.
The condition is closely related to HYPNOSIS (q.v.) and to CATALEPSY (q.v.), and as a rule ecstasy is not closely differentiated from trance except by the presence of a religious or supernatural absorption not found in TRANCE (q.v.). It is usually self-induced, and seems subject to contagion and the dominance of psychological motives. Ribot regards it as a typical form of extinction of the will. The insensibility to pain may be so diminished that severe tortures remain unfelt; martyrs dying at the stake may have been spared the anguish of their fate by the insensibility produced by religious ecstasy. Conditions of violence or of automatic movements connected with religious excitement are also described as cases of ecstasy; such are the 'jumpers,' 'shakers,' 'dancers,' 'flagellants,' &c. Cf. CONTAGION (mental), and also HYSTERIA, EPILEPSY, STIGMA.
Literature: MAUDSLEY, Pathol. of Mind, 70-3 and elsewhere; HAMMOND,
Diseases of Nerv. Syst. (7th ed., 1881), 775-86. For cases see art. Ecstasy
in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med., and RIBOT, Diseases of the Will (Eng. trans.,
1884), of Personality (1887), and Psychol. of Attention (1890); MANTEGAZZA,
Estasi Umane (1887), and in French translation. (J.J.)
Ectoderm [Gr. ektoV,
outside, + derma, skin]: Ger. äusseres Keimblatt;
Fr. ectoderme; Ital. ectoderma. The outer layer of coelenterate
animals. Also used to denote the outer of the two primitive cell-layers of the
embryo animal, sometimes termed epiblast. See BLASTODERM, EMBRYO, and EPIBLAST.
Long recognized in certain unicellular organisms, and termed ectosarc. The observation has been extended to the tissue cells of higher animals and plants.
Literature: C. KUPFFER, Ueber Differenzierung des Protoplasma an den
Zellen thierischer Gewebe., Zeitsch. naturw. Ver. Schles.- Holst. (1875); O.
HERTWIG, The Cell (trans., 1895). (C.LL.M.)
Education [Lat. educatio, from educare, to rear, nourish]: Ger. Erziehung; Fr. éducation; Ital. educazione. The science and art of human development; the training of the mind and body through instruction and exercise. See INSTRUCTION, TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, and CULTURE. (C.DE.G.)
The capacity to profit by experience in such a way as to accommodate to conditions which recur has been called educability in psychology and biology. The burnt child which dreads the fire is a more familiar case than the bird which, once misled by a bright-coloured distasteful insect, thereafter avoids insects of the same marking. The method in most of the instances is by trial and error, or EXPERIMENTATION (q.v.).
Literature: LLOYD MORGAN, Habit and Instinct; LANKESTER, Nature (April
28, 1900). (J.M.B.)
It is a watchword of the Herbartians (erziehender Unterricht). By it they mean that the entire subject-matter of instruction should be so selected and taught as to conduce to the ethical upbuilding of the pupil, both as an individual and as a member of the various social, economic, and political groups to which he may belong. This idea lies at the foundation of Ziller's doctrine of CONCENTRATION (q.v.). See CULTURE EPOCHS.
Literature: ZILLER, Allg. Päd., 160-79; HERBART, Sci. of Educ.
(trans. by Felkin), 135-42; McMURRY, Gen. Meth., 14-105; DE GARMO, Herbart and
the Herbartians; ARDIGO, Sci. dell' educazione (1893). (C.DE.G.)
Edwardeans (no foreign equivalents in use). The name given to a group of American theologians who, starting from the distinctive ideas of Jonathan Edwards, transformed the traditional Calvinism in some of its leading doctrines. Other names, such as New England Theology, Berkshire Divinity, &c., have been applied to the movement.
The 'governmental' theory of the atonement; choice as the characteristic embodiment of the moral nature of the will; man's 'ability' or freedom, yet dependence on a sovereign God; and a denial that original sin is 'imputed,' are among the leading doctrines, though advocated, as was natural, in various ways by different members of the group. The whole movement is of undeniable importance with reference to the evolution of philosophical thought in the United States; an evolution which, in its early stages, was bound up with theological questions even more than that of Scottish thought.
Literature: JONATHAN EDWARDS, Works, i. 481 f.; G. P. FISHER, Discussions
in Hist. and Theol. (the Essay on the Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards); and Hist.
of Christ. Doctrine, 394 f.; EDWARDS A. PARK, in Schaff-Herzog's Religious Encyc.,
ii (the art. New England Theology, where the literature is fully given). (R.M.W.)
Edwards, Jonathan. (1703-58.)
An American minister and metaphysician, born at East Windsor, Conn., and
died at Princeton, N.J. Graduated from Yale College, 1720. Received the
Master's degree from Yale, 1723. He was a tutor at Yale, 1724-6. In 1727
he became pastor of the church at Northampton, Mass. In 1750 he was forced
to give up his charge, after having attempted certain reforms in the communion
service. In 1751 he became missionary at Stockbridge among the Housatonic
Indians, and pastor of the white church there. In 1757 he was elected President
of Princeton College, N.J., but died soon after.
Effectual Calling: Ger. wirksame Berufung; Fr. grâce (or vocation) suffisante; Ital. grazia sufficiente. In the language of Evangelical theology, 'calling' is the first indication of 'conversion.' God's grace working through the Word (usually as preached) effects the 'call.' In the Calvinistic theology, there is an 'external' call, which is extended to all equally; and an 'internal' call, which is addressed to the elect. The latter is known technically as effectual calling.
Literature: Westminster Shorter Catechism, 31. See CALVINISM, and GRACE.
Effeminacy [Lat. ex + femina, a woman]: Ger. Feminismus, weibisches Wesen (no exact equivalent); Fr. féminisme; Ital. effeminatezza. The presence of feminine characteristics of mind and character in the male. Effeminacy is mainly used in reference to the more delicate and conventional attributes of woman, while the term feminism refers to the appearance in the male of distinct physical and mental approximations to the female type. If excessive, this condition may be termed sexual inversion, and the subject so afflicted an invert. See SEXUAL CHARACTERS.
Literature: H. ELLIS, Sexual Inversion and references there given; H.
MEIGE, in Nouv. Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, and Rev. d'Anthropol.
Efferent [Lat. ex + ferre, to bear]: Ger.
centrifugal; Fr. efférent; Ital. efferente. The
term applied to those nerves (also termed centrifugal) which carry impulses
outward from the central nervous system; also to the impulses so transmitted.
Suggested by W. B. Carpenter (1842), Human Physiol. (1st ed.), 83. It
is opposed to AFFERENT, or CENTRIPETAL (see those terms). (C.LL.M.)
The Continental economists, especially the Germans, have given precision to
this idea of economic efficiency by discussing the difference between 'productivity'
-- an excess of product over the waste involved in production -- and 'rentability'
-- an excess of earnings to the owner above the expenses involved in the ownership
of a piece of property. (A.T.H.)
Effort, Bodily (consciousness of): Ger. Spannungsempfindung, Kraftempfindung; Fr. sentiment de l'effort moteur; Ital. sensazione (or sentimento) di sforzo or di tensione. The experience which accompanies bodily movement, so far as it involves the overcoming or the attempt to overcome resistance. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)
It is a disputed point whether sense of motor effort is peripheral in its origin (KINAESTHETIC, q.v.), or a concomitant of the outgoing current (a sensation of INNERVATION, q.v.).
Literature: BAIN (Senses and Intellect, 4th ed., 79-80) represents the
first view in its purest form. WUNDT held (Physiol. Psychol., 1st and 2nd eds.)
that sensational consciousness of effort is correlated with the outgoing current;
but, in his later works, he does not regard this sensational consciousness as
an ultimate and undeniable fact. Its quality, he now thinks, is ultimately determined
by prior experiences due to peripheral stimulation; cf. note by TITCHENER, Mind,
N.S. ii. (1893) 143, on Innervationsempfindung in Wundt's Psychology. The outgoing
current view is also supported by MACH, Die Bewegungsempfindungen, and by WALLER,
The Sense of Effort, and objective Study, Brain, liv and lv. (1891) 179 ff.
(cf. adverse criticisms by G. E. MÜLLER in Zeitsch. f. Psychol., iv. 122
ff., and by BALDWIN in Amer. J. of Psychol. v. (1892) 273; for a statement of
the opposite view, see JAMES, The Sense of Effort, and Princ. of Psychol., ii.
189 ff., 480-518; BASTIAN, The Brain as an Organ of Mind (1880), 543; MÜNSTERBERG,
Die Willenshandlung, 78 ff., and Beitr. z. exper. Psychol., i. 152 ff.; GLEY,
Le Sens musculaire, Rev. Philos. (Dec. 1885); DELABARRE, Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen
(1891); BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race; report of discussion
of the subject following a paper by BASTIAN, in Brain (1887); LADD, Psychol.,
Descrip. and Explan.; BEAUNIS, Les Sensations internes, chap. xii; and a résumé
by HAMLIN, Amer. J. of Psychol., viii. 13. (G.F.S.-
Effort, Mental (consciousness of): Ger. Anstrengung; Fr. sentiment de l'effort mental; Ital. sentimento dello sforzo mentale. The intensification of mental activity which arises on the occurrence of any sort of obstruction.
The antithesis between effort and resistance has played an important rôle
in the development of French psychology under the lead of Maine de Biran, to
whom the experience of effort was fundamental. (L.M.)
The place and function of effort in school work forms an important part of the doctrine of interest. The view is held by some that pure volitional effort on the part of the pupil, quite apart from any interest whatever, is the result most to be desired in school study. Others hold that we should esteem highly only the effort that arises from a genuine interest in the studies themselves. See under INTEREST.
Literature: DEWEY, Interest as related to Will, second supplement of
the First Year-Book of the National Herbart Society. (C.DE.G.)
Ego and Alter [Lat. terms for self and other]: Ger. same, or das Selbst und das Andere; Fr. same, or le moi et l'autre; Ital. same, or il se-soggetto e il se-oggetto. The object-self (the ego) of the individual consciousness as distinguished in the same individual's thought from another (the alter).
The antithesis of ego and alter necessarily restricts the meaning of ego to the object-self (see SELF for the distinction of object-self from subject-self), inasmuch as it is in relation to the alter, which is object of thought. The interpretation of the ego-alter relation has been variously attempted. For the intuitive theory there is immediate apprehension of both the self and the other. For many thinkers, the alter is a reading into another's body of the essential features of the object-ego; for which process the term 'ejection' was suggested by Clifford. See EJECT. Other writers have developed the thought that the ego is a reproduction of traits first discovered in alter personalities. This latter view has been united with the theory of ejection by the present writer in what he calls the 'dialectic of personal growth,' which includes the two processes going on together and equally essential. The self-thought tends to a general form which includes two poles, one the ego and the other the alter. The elements of content, at first 'projective' in the social environment (i.e. cognized as objects but with no antithesis to subject), are taken up by imitation, thus becoming 'subjective' or part of the ego, and being then ejected into the other, constitute the alter. Apart from the use of terms a substantially similar view has been independently developed by Royce and adopted by Stout.
Ego and Non-Ego [Lat. terms for
self and non-self]. The self and the not-self of the individual's consciousness.
See SELF, and NOT-SELF. (J.M.B.)
Egoism [Lat. ego, self]: Ger. Egoismus,
Fr. égoïsme; Ital. egoismo. Attitudes or dispositions
having as their conscious end the advantage of the personal self are termed
egoistic, and constitute egoism. Egotism is also used in this sense. Cf. ALTRUISM,
and SELFISHNESS. (J.M.B.)
Egoism (ethical). Exclusive interest in self: more precisely, it describes one or another of two theories, the former psychological (see the preceding topic), the latter ethical, i.e. that the standard for conduct is its tendency towards the preservation, interest, or pleasure of the individual agent.
Both theories are commonly accompanied by a hedonistic interpretation of the nature of the individual's interest or good; even when (as in Hobbes and in Spinoza) the notion of self-preservation is preferred to that of pleasure. The psychological and ethical theories were conjoined in the doctrine of Epicurus, and of most hedonistic moralists, before the rise of utilitarianism in the 18th century in Great Britain. More recently the two theories (hedonistically interpreted) have been combined by A. Barratt.
Literature: A. BARRATT, Physical Eth. (1869); SIDGWICK, Meth. of Eth.,
Bk. II; H. SPENCER, Princ. of Eth., Pt. I. chaps. xi-xiii; SORLEY, Eth. of Nature,
chap. ii; general treatises on ethics. See also BIBLIOG. F, 2, a. (W.R.S.)
Eject and Ejective [Lat. eiectum, from eiicere, to throw out]: Ger. Ejekt; Fr. éject; Ital. ejettivo (ejective). Some one else thought of in terms of the thinker's own consciousness of himself. In its earlier stages it amounts to the interpretation of external phenomena, expressions, signs, &c., as involving experience analogous to that of the percipient or thinker.
Suggested by Clifford (Seeing and Thinking); employed by Romanes (Matter,
Mind, and Monism), by whom the principle of ANTHROPOMORPHISM (q.v.)
in theism is said to produce the 'world-eject'; by Morselli (Semej. malat.
ment., ii) in pathological conditions; and by Baldwin (Social and
Eth. Interpret.), who makes the process of ejection a necessary and
continuous factor in the development of the consciousness of PERSONALITY (q.v.).
The adjective 'ejective' qualifies the matter or content which in a particular
case constitutes the 'eject.' See also PERSONIFICATION. (J.M.B.-
Elaboration and Elaborative Faculty [Lat. e + laborare, to labour]: Ger. (1) Denkvermögen; Fr. élaboration; Ital. elaborazione. (1) The process and function of thinking or reasoning. Synonymous with DISCURSIVE FACULTY (under which see citations). See also REASONING.
Electric Organs: Ger. elektrische Organe; Fr. organes électriques; Ital. organi elettrici. Masses of peculiarly modified tissue found in certain fishes, which are capable of generating and discharging more or less severe electric shocks.
These organs are in most cases metamorphosed muscular masses, though, in the electric shad of the Nile, Malopterurus, they are developed from cutaneous structures, probably glands. They are under the control of the brain, and are supplied by nerves which, except in Malopterurus, correspond to motor nerves, and whose peculiarly developed terminal organs and modified motor end-plates. The electric nerves arise from special enlargements of the medulla or spinal cord which are variously placed in different species. These 'electric lobes' correspond to excessively developed and modified motor nuclei. In Malopterurus, however, there are two electric nerves, each arising from a single huge cell in the spinal cord and dividing into over a million branches.
Literature: GUSTAV FRITSCH, Die elektrischen Fische (Erste Abt., 1887;
Zweite Abt., 1890), Leipzig (with bibliography); E. DU BOIS- REYMOND, Gesammelte
Abhandlungen, ii (Berlin); BABUCHIN, Uebersicht der neuen Untersuchungen über
Entwickelung, Bau, und physiologische Verhältnisse der elektrischen und
pseudo-elektrischen Organe, Arch. f. Anat. u. Physiol. (1876). (H.H.)
Electro-biology: Ger. Elecktrobiologie; Fr. électrobiologie; Ital. elettrobiologia. A term under which the phenomena now known as hypnosis were described by certain exhibitors and writers in England and America (about 1850).
The term involves an extravagant hypothesis to the effect that the process
by which the operator influenced his subject was in some way connected with
electricity and the vital factor of animal existence. See W. B. Carpenter, Mesmerism,
Spiritualism, &c. (1877). (J.J.)
In science the term refers to the different kinds of atoms, the sorts of material,
of which the world is composed. See MATTER. During the ancient and mediaeval
periods earth, air, fire, water constituted the elements. In logic the simplest
idea which enters into a conception or system of conceptions is called an element
of that conception or system. (H.R.S.)
Element of Consciousness: Ger. Bewusstseinselement; Fr. élément de la conscience; Ital. elemento della coscienza. Any content of consciousness in which introspection fails to detect internal complexity is elementary, and for the psychical life an element.
This use of element is opposed to that which applies the term to the original
mental functions from the point of view of psychological ANALYSIS. The element
is such for psychical or mental ANALYSIS. See the distinction made under those
terms. See also CLASSIFICATION (of the mental functions). (J.M.B.,
Elenchus [Gr. elegcoV].
Refutation by argument. See IGNORATIO ELENCHI. (J.M.B.)
Elimination [Lat. eliminare]: Ger. Elimination, Ausschalten (Gross); Fr. élimination, sélection négative; Ital. eliminazione. (1) By natural selection: the process by which, under nature, the weakly or anywise unfit are excluded, in the struggle for existence, in greater or less degree, from taking part in the propagation of their kind. See NATURAL SELECTION. (C.LL.M.- J.M.B.)
Darwin, in the Origin of Species, laid great stress on the struggle for EXISTENCE (q.v.). Herbert Spencer applied to the result of the process the phrase 'survival of the fittest.' It is now generally recognized that the survival of the fittest as a result is due to the elimination of the unfit under the stress of the struggle for existence.
Literature: C. DARWIN, Origin of Species; H. SPENCER, Princ. of Biol.; works on evolution. (C.LL.M.)
(2) By conscious selection. A similar result to (1), secured by the intentional exclusion of certain individuals on the part of man.
This is best illustrated by the weeding-out practised by horticulturalists, and by other cases of ARTIFICIAL SELECTION; also seen in SOCIAL SELECTION AND SOCIAL SUPPRESSION. See those terms.
In both these cases (1) and (2), the elimination may be complete or only partial,
according as the individual has already been productive or not, while remaining
still fertile. The result of partial or late elimination is the same as that
of reduced fertility, and is subject to similar treatment to that given to relative
fertility by the theory of REPRODUCTIVE (or GENETIC) SELECTION (q.v.). Until
the work of Pearson on this latter subject biologists had done nothing towards
establishing quantitative results in the matter of greater or less fertility,
and the experimental investigation of the question by conscious elimination
has never been undertaken. GALTON'S LAW (q.v.) of ancestral inheritance gives
the contribution of each parent to the endowment of each child, &c., but
does not determine the entire contribution of the individual to the subsequent
generations in terms of his relative fertility. (J.M.B.,
Emanation [Lat. e + manare, to flow]: Ger. Emanation, Ausstrahlung; Fr. émanation; Ital. emanazione. A pantheistic conception of the being of the universe. The emanated being 'flows out' or proceeds' from the Godhead, so that all finite beings at different removes from the primitive essence are part and parcel of the Divine Being. It is one of the various devices for solving the problem of the one and the many. The plurality of the emanated beings was not supposed to affect the unity of the primitive Divine Being. (H.R.S.)
Emanation is essentially a cosmological, or rather a cosmogonic, process: series of beings, often in a descending scale, proceed from the original unknowable and unbroken unity till, at length, the present world with all its imperfections and evils is produced.
It has happened in the history of thought that God and the universe have been separated, either metaphysically -- as reality and appearance, or morally -- as good and evil. When this separation became very marked, the problem arose: How can the two be connected? One form of the answer was furnished by the theory of emanation. Technically, the theory may be said to involve a pluralism based on an abstract monism. For this reason it is utterly untenable. Its most characteristic examples are to be found in Indian philosophy (Vedânta), and particularly in the various Gnostic systems, also in Neo-Platonism (Plotinus, Proclus).
Literature: see ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL, and GNOSTICISM. (R.M.W.)
The term emancipation was originally applied to the act whereby a Roman parent
or master conferred freedom upon a child or slave. In modern times the term
has been applied to any change whereby a class of persons has been relieved
from old disabilities or invested with new rights, e.g. the abolition of slavery
in the United States, or of serfdom in Russia; the removal of disabilities imposed
on Roman Catholics in the United Kingdom; the extension of the parliamentary
franchise to classes hitherto without political power, &c. The term has
also been applied to changes which increase personal liberty or independence
in a less definite manner, e.g. the changes in the position of women which have
taken place in our time are sometimes comprehensively described as the emancipation
of women. (F.C.M.)
Embryo [Gr. embruon]: Ger. Embryo, (Keim-) Frucht; Fr. embryon; Ital. embrione. The term applied to the developing animal prior to the stage at which the tissues and organs are fully differentiated; in phanerogamic botany, to the rudimentary plant in the seed.
Early writers distinguished between the mammalian embryo and the foetus -- the former term being applied during the period of germination, the latter during the period of cherishing. But it is difficult to determine exactly when embryonic development is superseded by that which is post-embryonic.
The fertilized OVUM (q.v.) undergoes a process of cleavage or segmentation. This, in the case of alecithal and HOMOLECITHAL (q.v.) ova, affects the whole ovum, and is then termed holoblastic. When there is much food-yolk and the ova are markedly HETEROLECITHAL (q.v.), the cleavage only affects at first a portion of the ovum, and the segmentation is meroblastic. In the case of holoblastic segmentation the cell divides into two; these again divide, and so on, giving rise to a number of cleavage cells or blastomeres. To the group of cells thus formed, the term morula or polyblast is applied. In the midst of these a cavity, the segmentation cavity of von Baer, or blastocoel is formed. The hollow vesicle is called a blastosphere. Rarely, the blastosphere splitting by delamination into two layers, an outer epiblast or ectoderm, and an inner hypoblast or endoderm, the blastocoel becomes the digestive cavity or enteron.
In the majority of cases (among the Coelomata) the hollow blastosphere is invaginated so as to form a two-layer cup or gastrula (see figure), the inner layer being the hypoblast, and the outer the epiblast. The orifice of invagination is termed the blastopore (Lankester), the invaginated cavity the archenteron or gastrocoel. The primary layers may also be differentiated from the morula stage by an inner mass of cells (hypoblast) becoming overgrown by an outer layer of cells (epiblast); so-called epibolic invagination. A middle layer (mesoblast or mesoderm) is formed between the epiblast and hypoblast.
Embryology [Gr. embruon + logoV]: Ger. Embryologie, Entwicklungsgeschichte; Fr. embryologie; Ital. embriologia. The study of the changes undergone by the animal in developing from the ovum to the stage where the tissues and organs are fully differentiated.
For the history of embryology see Allen Thomson's art. in the 9th ed. of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, iii. What Hutton and Lyell did respectively for geology, von Baer and F. M. Balfour did for embryology. The limits of the term are hard to set. Balfour says: 'The term embryology is now employed to cover the anatomy and physiology of the organism during the whole period included between its first coming into being and its attainment of the adult state.' The definition here given is somewhat narrower, and more closely accords with the scope of Balfour's own work.
Literature: ALLEN THOMSON, as above; F. M. BALFOUR, Compar. Embryol.
(1880-1); O. HERTWIG, Textbook of Embryol.; Man and Mammals (Eng. trans. by
Mark, 1892); KORSCHELT and HEIDER, Textbook of Embryol., Invertebrates, i (Eng.
trans. by Mark and Woodworth, 1895); C. S. MINOT, Human Embryol.; E. SCHÄFER,
in Quain's Elements of Anatomy, Part I, Embryology (1890); Bibliography of Vertebrate
Embryology, Mem. of Brit. Soc. of Nat. Hist., iv, No. 11 (1893). (C.LL.M.-
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. (1803-82.)
An American poet and essayist, who stimulated the philosophical movement
in New England called Transcendentalism. Born in Boston, educated in a
Boston public school and Harvard University, he taught school 1821-6, chiefly
in Boston. In 1826 he was 'approbated to preach,' and in 1829 was ordained
as the associate of Henry Ware in the second Unitarian Church in Boston.
In 1832 he resigned his pastoral charge, announcing in a sermon that he
could no longer conscientiously administer the Lord's Supper. The following
year he spent in Europe, where he made the acquaintance of Carlyle, and
remained a firm friend until the latter's death. After 1834 he devoted
himself to literary work, writing and lecturing on a variety of themes.
His lecturing began in Boston Mechanics' Institute, but continued in all
parts of the United States and in England.
Emersonianism. TRANSCENDENTALISM (q.v.)
as contained in the writings of R. W. Emerson. (J.M.B.)
Eminent Domain [Mod. Lat. dominium eminens]: Ger. Oberhoheit über das Staatsgut; Fr. domaine éminent; Ital. dominio eminente. (1) The right of the sovereign to take any private property for public use, in case of necessity. (2) The right of the sovereign to control those property rights of a public nature which pertain to the citizens generally, and to control or take any private property for public use, in case of necessity.
The sovereign's right to devote the persons and lives of his subjects to public use is styled 'eminent power,' and, added to eminent domain, constitutes 'eminent right' (Wolff on The Law of Nature, Lib. II. §§ 1065).
Eminent domain covers personal property as well as real, but is seldom exercised with regard to the former, since there is seldom any necessity for such action. To take land is often necessary, because no other land than that taken will answer the purpose. Compensation to the owner is generally required by modern legislation (see Code Civil of France, art. 545). It is invariably required by American constitutional law (see Cowley on Constitutional Limitations, chap. xv). When the legislature authorizes a taking for certain purposes, and declares them to be public ones, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless they are palpably such that they cannot be brought under that description (United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 160 United States Reports, 680).
Literature: VATTEL, on the Law of Nations, Lib. I. chap. xx. §
244; HEINECCIUS, Elementa Iuris Naturae, Lib. II. §§ 169-71. (S.E.B.)
Eminenter [Lat.]. Beyond measure or degree. 'Eminenter est supra omnem mensuram, super omnes gradus. Deus causa ac principium eminenter' (Goclenius, Lex. Philos., 146: quoted by Eisler; cf. his other citations, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, sub verbo).
A scholastic term used by Descartes, Spinoza, Wolff, &c. (J.M.B.)
Emmetropism (or -ia, or -y) [Gr. en + metron, measure, + wy, eye]; Ger. Emmetropismus; Fr. emmétropie; Ital. emmetropismo. Normal or perfect vision in regard to focal adjustment. When the shape and refractive media of an eye are such that without the aid of the muscles of accommodation parallel rays of light can be brought to the focus precisely on the retina, such an eye is termed emmetropic.
For practical tests rays of light from a point more than twenty feet away may
be regarded as parallel. By some writers, emmetropism also includes the power
to focus sharply for all distances, from 5 inches or over. An eye which cannot
accomplish this is ametropic. See VISION (defects of). (J.J.)
Emotion: Ger. Affekt (see below); Fr. émotion; Ital. emozione. A total state of consciousness considered as involving a distinctive feeling-tone and a characteristic trend of activity aroused by a certain situation which is either perceived or ideally represented. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)
The use of the word emotion in English psychology is comparatively modern. It is found in Hume, but even he speaks generally rather of passions or affections. When the word emotion did become current its application was very wide, covering all possible varieties of feeling, except those which are purely sensational in their origin. 'All' emotions 'agree in this respect, that they imply peculiar vividness of feeling, with this important circumstance to distinguish them from the vivid pleasures and pains of sense; that they do not arise immediately from the presence of external objects, but subsequently to the primary feelings which we term sensations or perceptions. Perhaps, if any definition of them be possible, they may be defined to be vivid feelings, arising immediately from the consideration of objects perceived or remembered, or imagined, or from other prior emotions' (Brown, Philos. of the Human Mind, i. 405). Bain's usage is equally wide.
It is common in defining emotion to assign as a distinctive characteristic a special degree of intensity or vividness. See EXCITEMENT. This introduces a certain vagueness and ambiguity into the conception. We have accordingly omitted reference to degree of intensity, and considered solely the characteristic nature of emotion. Otherwise our definition is an attempt to find a conception which will serve as common ground in the discussions which gather round the subject of emotion.
The subject of emotion has been much cleared up through the discussions stimulated by the so-called JAMES-LANGE THEORY (q.v.). The questions now receiving attention are the relation of emotion to the so-called 'expression' -- the psychophysics of emotion; the distinction of 'coarser' from 'finer,' and of emotion proper from sentiment; the analysis of the emotional psychosis, leading to the recognition of separate qualities, besides the hedonic tone (as opposed to the older theory that emotion is only compounded pleasure and pain); and the origin of emotion, together with the 'expression' -- the genetic question, as involved in the evolution of mind in general.
The German use of terms is as difficult as the English. Gefühl is used -- as in the English feeling -- for abstract emotion considered as mainly a modification of the affective life. Concrete states of emotion are designated Affekte. The fact, however, that emotion involves conation as well makes it a matter of Gemüth, and we have the phrases Gemüthszustand, Gemüthsbewegung, Gemüthserregung. The higher states of mind in which ideal representation is prominent, and for which the English 'sentiment' is used, are designated höhere Gefühle. The most useful and frequent single term, however, is Affekt for the cruder emotions, with which may well be used Gefühlsdisposition (Höfler). In French, émotion is fairly equivalent to emotion, sentiment having the broader connotation of the words feeling and Gefühl. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Literature: BALDWIN, Handb. of Psychol., Feeling and Will, 135-7, 174
ff. (important for definition), and Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race,
chap. viii; JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., chap. xxv, and Psychol. Rev., i. 516
f.; SHAND, Character and the Emotions, Mind, N. S., No. 18 (April, 1896); LANGE,
Über Gemüthsbewegungen; D. IRONS, The Nature of Emotion, Philos. Rev.
(1897), vi. 242-56, 471-96; STUMPF, in Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xxi. (1899) 47;
LEHMANN, Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefühlslebens, 56 ff.; STOUT, Manual
of Psychol.; JODL, Lehrb. d. Psychol.; RIBOT, Psychol. des Sentiments (Eng.
trans.); ZIEGLER, Das Gefühl; SERGI, Dolore e Piacere. See also BIBLIOG.
G, 2, e; the lists in loc. in Psychol. Index, i. ff.; EISLER, Wörterb.
d. philos. Begriffe, 'Affekt'; and textbooks of psychology. (G.F.S.)
Emotion (aesthetic). What has generally been meant by the emotional element in aesthetic psychoses is a condition of mental excitation, whether agreeable, disagreeable, or both, involving processes of a distinctly intellectual and spiritual character, and especially such processes in distinction from merely sensuous pleasures and pains. In this sense the idea is most closely represented by the present use of the term SENTIMENT (q.v.).
Literature: on the differentia of aesthetic emotion see BOSANQUET, Aesthetic
Emotion, Mind (1894); MARSHALL, Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics (1894); BAIN,
Emotions and Will (3rd ed., 1875); RIBOT, Psychol. of the Emotions (Eng. trans.,
Emotional Disposition: Ger. Gefühlsdisposition
(Höfler); Fr. disposition émotionelle; Ital. disposizione
all' emozione, emotività. A permanent mental disposition
giving rise to certain kinds of EMOTION (q.v.) on presentation of a certain
object. The emotion varies according to the circumstances under which the object
is presented. Cf. DISPOSITION. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)
Emotional Expression: Ger. Ausdrucksbewegungen; Fr. expression émotionelle; Ital. espressione emotiva. The characteristic bodily changes which occur in connection with EMOTION (q.v.). (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)
The detailed determination of these changes for the separate emotions involving the facial muscles is called 'facial expression.' Since Darwin's book on the Expression of the Emotions, the theory is current that the grosser emotional expressions are survivals of reactions which were of utility to the animal when in the presence of the conditions which excited the emotion. To this law of 'utility,' called by Darwin that of 'serviceable associated habits,' he added others to account for other cases: the law of 'analogous feeling stimuli' (developed by later writers, especially James, from Darwin's suggestion), by which experiences which excited similar emotions are supposed to issue in the same expression; that of 'antithesis,' whereby opposite emotions show opposite expressions, although only one of the expressions may have utility; that of 'direct nervous discharge,' according to which stimulations, mainly of an excessive character, would discharge themselves in muscular activity. This principle has taken formulation in later writers in the principle of 'hedonic expression' (Spencer, Bain; the expression is from Baldwin), which recognizes the facts that pleasure increases muscular movement in certain muscles, and that pain lessens it; the same principle being used by the last-named writer to explain 'antithesis.' Darwin assumed that the state of emotion preceded the expression and caused the latter: the so-called CAUSE THEORY (q.v.) of emotion. Recently the theory has been advanced -- called the 'James-Lange Theory' -- that the emotion is the mental indication of the changes which constitute the so-called 'expression'; that is, the actions of utility or other take place, and these are reported in the brain, giving rise to the qualitative experiences which we call emotions. The recurrence of a certain emotion, or its artificial stimulation, in the absence of its appropriate object, is the incipient revival of the earlier expressions -- an 'organic reverberation' (James). This, called variously the 'effect theory,' the 'peripheral theory,' &c., of emotion, is still under discussion, in opposition to the 'cause theory,' noted above.
Literature: see under EMOTION, also BIBLIOG. G, 2, e; DARWIN,
Expression of the Emotions; BELL, Anatomy of Expression; LANGE, Die Gemüthsbewegungen;
JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., ii. chap. xxv; and Psychol. Rev. (1894), i. 516;
PIDERIT, La Mimique et la Physionomie (1888); MANTEGAZZA, Fisionomia e Mimica
(1878); IRONS, arts. in Mind and Philos. Rev. (since 1893); DEWEY, The Theory
of Emotion, Psychol. Rev., i. 553, ii. 13; STOUT, Manual of Psychol.; SOLLIER,
Rev. Philos. xxxvii. (1894) 241; WORCESTER, Monist, iii. (1893) 285; LEHMANN,
Hauptgesetze des Gefühlslebens; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and
the Race, chap. viii; STUMPF, Begriff der Gemüthsbewegung, Zeitsch. f.
Psychol., xxi. 47 ff.; the general works on psychology, especially those of
WUNDT, LADD, JODL. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Empedocles. Greek philosopher, who lived
in the 5th century B.C. Born at Agrigentum in Sicily. His talents and scientific
attainments led his countrymen to offer him a crown, which he refused,
using his influence to found a republic in Sicily. Fragments of a poem
on Nature remain from his works.
Empirical [Gr. empeigia,
experience]. Based upon (empirical views), guided by (empirical medicine), derived
from (empirical knowledge) EXPERIENCE (q.v.). (J.M.B.)
Empirical Logic: Ger. empirische Logik; Fr. logique empirique; Ital. logica empirica. The treatment of logic on the basis or from the point of view of a sensationalist or other markedly empiricist theory of knowledge. (R.A.- C.S.P.)
The latter term, however, is very indeterminate. The defining marks of an empiricist theory of knowledge can hardly be assigned with theoretical accuracy; and, on the historical side, theories of knowledge that are rightly described as empirical have not always exhibited the same features. In its extreme form, the empirical theory of knowledge identifies knowing with the immediate process of sense perception, and represents all connection in the content known as identical in kind with such connection as it is assumed may be apprehended in sense perception. From this point of view, the problem of empirical logic becomes the description of the ways in which a transition is made from the restricted, individualized basis of sense perception to the elaborated, generalized representation of experience constituting science, together with an explanation or justification of the admitted difference between the primary and the derived aspects of knowledge. It is easily seen that in such an inquiry the central question is that of the universal, whether in the form of the general notion, general idea, concept, or in that of the general proposition; for it is universality that stands most sharply in conflict with the features assigned to the primary, fundamental type of knowledge. One or other of the aspects of this universality may be the more prominent, as e.g. the rather psychological feature of generality, as in notions or terms, in the discussion of which empirical logic tends towards extreme nominalism; or the more comprehensive aspect of knowledge as involving truth, objective validity, in the treatment of which empirical logic becomes a theory of inductive inference. The questions entering into the fundamental discussion regarding knowledge are so varied, some being psychological, some metaphysical, and empiricism has been so much determined in scope and direction by the counter-theory to which it has been opposed, that historically empirical logic has been presented in many degrees of completeness. The distinguishing features of knowledge on which it proceeds -- (1) rejection of the universal, or explanation of it by reference to the psychological mechanism of association and language; (2) restriction of necessity in thought to analytical connections; with (3) the correlated denial of any absolute value in matters of fact; (4) restriction of the import of judgments, i.e. of the kind of relations known, to such connections as are within the range of immediate perceptive experience, e.g. similarity, coexistence, sequence -- may not all in conjunction be used as the basis of a logical theory. Historically, there have been combined views of a strictly rational character regarding mathematical knowledge with those strictly empirical regarding matters of fact. So, too, a thoroughly empirical logic in respect to physics may be combined, as by the Scottish philosophers, Reid and Stewart, with assumptions as to first principles altogether irreconcilable with strict empiricism.
Empirical logic may be said to begin with the first attempts to describe the rise and formation of knowledge from the basis of sense perceptions. In any such description there is involved something of the specifically logical question, the question as to the worth of a form or way of knowing, as to the justification of its obvious claim to give insight into objective reality. Even prior to the definite formulation of the logical problem by Aristotle, indications are to be found of the beginnings of an empirical logic. Probably nothing contributed more to determine the question as to the method by which we gather generalized knowledge from particular facts of experience than the rapid development of the one physical science in which the Greek mind holds the same place that it has assured for itself in philosophy and in the formal sciences of mathematics and astronomy, viz. medicine. Alcmaeon of Crotona, whose empirical description of knowledge is referred to in the Phaedo (96 B), was a physician, and in the works that can be assigned to Hippocrates there occur the first discussions as to method in relation to matters of experience (see Chauvet, La Philos. des Médecins Grecs, 1886, 8-42; Gomperz, Griech. Denker, i. Bk. III. chap. i; and Galen, De Placitis Hippoc. & Platonis, Bk. IX). Unmistakable traces of the empirical strain are to be found in the imperfectly recorded speculations of Antisthenes, who first definitely advanced some of the characteristic marks (v. sup.) of an empirical view of knowledge (cf. Dümmler, Antisthenica, and Gomperz, loc. cit. ii. Bk. IV. chap. ii. 7, 9). It is quite possible that from his acquaintance with and interest in medical work, Aristotle was led to fomulate, as Hippocrates had already done, some of those very general precepts as to comparison of like and unlike cases, division of a problem into parts, ascent from particulars and descent thereto which make up his otherwise unimportant contribution to empirical logic (see Eucken, Die Methode d. Aristot. Forschung, 1872, esp. § iv). The Aristotelian logic is in itself dominated by a conception of nature so profoundly opposed to empiricism as above defined, that it may rather be taken as a typical representation of the rationalist doctrine. It proceeds under the guidance of an ideal of knowledge so definite, and it describes in such methodical detail the forms of knowing, that it determined for all later times the lines along which an empirical logic must be elaborated.
The Stoic logic, owing to the new point of view, that of monism, from which the Stoics worked over the Aristotelian material, presents in several of its features a pronounced empirical colouring. Their extreme nominalism, dependent on their metaphysical individualism -- a doctrine in which they anticipate Leibnitz -- involved as natural consequence an equally mechanical mode of explaining the formation of higher types of knowledge than simple sense apprehension. With individualism, however, which is the root-principle of all empirical theories of knowledge, the Stoics managed to combine the representation of a teleological connection of all things, and the influence of this counter-thought is reflected in their theory of knowledge, and forbids us to describe that as through and through empirical (see Nikolai, De logic. Chrysippi libris, 1859; Heinze, Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker, 1880; Stein, Erkenntnisslehre der Stoa, 1868; Bonhöffer, Epiktetu. die Stoa, 1890). To induction and inductive methods, the Stoics contribute nothing; though Philodemus informs us that they were absolutely opposed to induction.
All the characteristic features of empiricism are represented, with perfect consciousness of their significance, though without due recognition of the problems they raise, in the unfortunately scanty remains of the Epicurean doctrine of knowledge. It is evident that the Epicureans did attempt to work out some general representation of the ways in which the mind passes from the immediately given, the isolated phenomena, which serve as signs, to the inferred realities underlying them and signified by them; and the dominating conception of nature under which they worked was adapted to a strictly empirical, almost mechanical, account of these processes. But we have only imperfect knowledge of their labours (see Gomperz, Herkulanische Studien, i, 1865; Bahnsch, Des Epikureers Philodemus Schrift peri shmeiwn kai shmeiwsewn, 1879; Marquand, in Johns Hopkins Studies in Logic, 1883).
Undoubtedly the speculations of the academic and sceptical schools, particularly of Arcesilaus and of Carneades, the Hume of the Hellenic world, had the view of knowledge from which the only logic possible is that we have called empirical, but of their doctrine of probability we have very scanty information (see Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs, 1887). Galen's large work on scientific proof is lost (see J. Müller, Galen's Werk v. wiss. Beweis, 1896), but in his minor philosophical and in his medical works there is much to show how he strove to elaborate a general theory of method (cf. Chauvet, op. cit., 109-70). What he has to offer, however, is of much the same generality as the corresponding part of Aristotle's work. In truth the development of empirical logic from this time onward is dependent mainly on the advances made in detailed knowledge of nature, on the alteration gradually brought about in general conceptions of reality, and therewith on the changes introduced in human ideals of knowledge.
Within mediaeval times, it is to be said that there is little or no development of empirical logic. Some features of empiricism are of course to be detected wherever nominalism or mysticism is found, but for the most part they failed to produce effect on logical theory. The strong current in Renascence times towards first-hand knowledge of nature could not be without effect on doctrines of knowledge and so on portions, more or less extensive, of logic. Among the revived systems of antiquity, Epicureanism was not overlooked, and a new theory of induction was from Bacon's time a problem for the logician and philosopher. The philosophical basis of empirical logic in modern times was laid by Locke, who otherwise contributed little to the discussion of the more specifically logical questions. So far as knowledge or external nature is concerned, no theory of knowledge can be more empirical than that of Berkeley, whose nominalist views are pronounced, and who at the same time supplied, from another side of his speculative view, the universal factor otherwise wanting on the empirical theory of knowledge. In all essentials his view is that accepted by the Scottish school -- Reid, Stewart, Brown -- for as regards the logical problem, it is indifferent whether the external world be regarded as an orderly congeries of perceptions or as having a mode of independent existence.
A special and more resolutely consistent strain of empiricism than Locke's takes its start in Hobbes, whose work, even more than that of Locke, finds continuation in Condillac, De Tracy, and the ideologists. Hume's strongly empirical interpretation of knowledge leads him to dismiss the logical problem as of small value. The omission was made good in J. S. Mill's Logic (1893), which, with some inconsistencies of language, may be said to present logic from the point of view of the empirical theory of knowledge. In essentials the same account of logic, but with much improvement in detail, and a deeper recognition of the philosophical interests involved, is given in Venn. The important works on method by Jevons, Wundt, Sigwart, though in no case founded on the strictly empirical interpretation of knowledge, agree in so many points of general principle with Mill that they might without injustice be reckoned among empirical logics. Finally, positivism, which emphasizes one characteristic of the empirical doctrine, and shares its ideal of knowledge, is, as regards its method or logic, strictly empirical.
Literature: as representing ways in which the new ideas of the Renascence
were brought to bear upon logic, may be instanced VALLA (1415-65), VIVES (1492-1540),
and particularly NIZOLIUS (1498-1576), whose remarkable attack on the notion
of universality deserves notice. His work De veris Principiis et vera Ratione
philosophandi (1553) was re-edited by Leibnitz (1670). See also BACON, Novum
Organum (1620; best edition, with full commentary and introduction, by T. Fowler,
1878); JOS. GLANVILL, Vanity of Dogmatizing or Seipsis Scientifica (1661), Plus
Ultra (1668); GASSENDI (1592-1655), De doctrina Epicuri (1647); Logica, in Opera,
v. 1 (1655) see THOMAS, La Phil. de Gassendi, 1889); J. B. DUHAMEL, De Mente
Humana; MARRIOTTE, Essai de Logique, contenant les Principes de la Science (1678);
HOBBES, Computatio sive Logica (1655); CONDILLAC, La Logique (1780), L'Art de
Penser (1755), L'Art de Raisonner (1755), La Langue des Calculs (1798), forming
vols. xxii, xxvi, xxviii, and xxiii of Condillac's Œuvres; DESTUTT DE TRACY,
Él. d'Idéologie, Pt. III. La Logique (1805); DE GERANDO, Des Signes
et de l'Art de Penser (4 vols., 1800); LEIDENFROST, De Mente Humana (1793);
LOCKE, Human Understanding (1689); P. BROWNE, Procedure, Extent, and Limits
of Human Understanding (1728); BERKELEY, Princ. of Human Knowledge (1710); HUME,
Treatise (1739), Human Understanding (1748); BEDDOES, Obs. on the Nature of
Demonstrative Evidence (1793); TH. BROWN, Inquiry into the Relation of Cause
and Effect (1804; 3rd ed., 1818); HERSCHEL, Discourse on the Study of Nat. Philos.
(1831); J. S. MILL, Syst. of Logic (1843); OPZOOMER, De Weg d. Wetenschap (1851);
W. S. JEVONS, Princ. of Sci. (1873; 2nd ed., 1877); R. SHUTE, Discourse on Truth
(1877); K. PEARSON, Grammar of Sci. (1892); L. T. HOBHOUSE, Theory of Knowledge
(1896); VENN, Logic of Chance (1866; 2nd ed., 1876), Empirical Logic (1889);
COMTE, Cours de Philos. Positive (1839), and Synthèse Subjective, i (1856).
Empiricism: Ger. Empirismus; Fr. empirisme; Ital. empirismo. (1) The doctrine that truth is to be sought in immediate sense experience. Opposed to RATIONALISM (q.v.), and usually a reaction from extreme idealism.
(2) In EPISTEMOLOGY (q.v.) the opposite of nativism in any form. With the English empiricists the doctrine took the form of denying innate ideas. See NATIVISM AND EMPIRICISM.
The tendency shows all grades of radicalness, from a wholesome reaction against
unbridled speculation to the purest SENSATIONALISM and MATERIALISM (see those
terms). See also EXPERIENCE, and EMPIRICAL LOGIC. (H.R.S.-
Empirio-criticism: Ger. Empiriokriticismus;
Fr. empiriocriticisme; Ital. empiriocriticismo. The philosophical
system of Richard Avenarius. Besides the works of Avenarius, see Willy in Vtjsch.
f. wiss. Philos., xx. 57 ff.; and on the term, ibid., xxii.
53 ff. The system is criticized by Wundt in Philos. Stud., xii,
xiii (1896-7). A new exposition and further development of the system is J.
Petzoldt's Einführung in d. Philos. d. reinen Erfahrung
(1900 -- ). (J.M.B.)
Employer [Fr. employeur]: Ger. Prinzipal, Brodherr; Fr. employeur, patron; Ital. padrone. A man who pays wages from funds which he either owns or borrows, as distinct from a superintendent who hires labourers at others' expense; especially one who hires large bodies of workmen on these terms.
The root 'employ' in this word does not have the simple meaning 'use'; it has
the more complex meaning 'give employment to.' There is no force in Henry George's
remark, 'It is not capital that employs labour, but labour that employs capital.'
The Jesuits, who made the most extensive use of emulation as a principle of instruction, called it the 'whetstone of talent, the spur of industry.' In the lower schools they arranged the boys in pairs of rivals, each boy being constantly on the watch to catch his rival tripping, and instantly to correct him. Each class also was divided into two hostile camps called Rome and Carthage, which had frequent pitched battles (concertations) on set subjects. Remains of this system are still seen in competitive exercises between pupils, classes, and literary societies. Emulation as a principle should be much restricted, because of its powerful tendency to divert the mind from the real ends of study, and to direct it to unworthy personal ends.
Literature: HUGHES, Loyola and the Educ. Syst. of the Jesuits, 208-17;
PAINTER, Hist. of Educ., 171-3; SCHMIDT, Gesch. d. Päd., 245. (C.DE.G.)