Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
Cabala [Heb. gabbâlâh, tradition]: Ger. Kabbala; Fr. cabale; Ital. cabala. This word has two distinct meanings. (1) In Hebrew it means originally 'to receive,' hence it came to signify a 'doctrine received by tradition.' In this sense it was applied to Jewish sacred literature, the Pentateuch excepted, and to the oral traditions which came to be collected in the Mishnah. (2) The restricted meaning, alone important for philosophy, came into vogue during the middle ages, most probably in the 11th century. In this sense the term is applied to the semi-philosophical, semi-theological, or theosophical system which, although a product of mediaeval Judaism, purports to have been traditionally transmitted from the earliest times -- from Adam in Paradise, as the Sohar states.
The Cabala is essentially an esoteric system, which claims to render explicit doctrines contained implicitly in the Jewish sacred books. It deals with the original God, who, being boundless and incomprehensible, proceeds to acts of creation in order to reveal himself; with the emanations (Sephiroth) from God; with the creation and nature of man and angels; with the constitution of the material universe; with the meaning of revelation, particularly as given in the law.
The sources of the Cabala are two. (1) The Sepher Yetzira, or Book of Creation -- a short gnomic treatise containing a mystical theory of numbers; it purports to have been written by the Rabbi Akiba, who died in 120 A.D., but is probably referable to the close of the 9th century. (2) Of much greater importance is the Sepher Hazohar (usually referred to as the Sohar or Zohar), or Book of Splendour. This is an esoteric commentary on the Pentateuch, purporting to have been composed by Simon ben Yochi towards the end of the 1st century A.D. Modern investigators now hold that it was composed by Moses de Leon, a Spanish Jew, who died in 1305 A.D. In making the compilation he of course reduced to something like order a mass of floating material, the age of which cannot be determined. Cf. JUDAISM.
Literature: this is summarized in UEBERWEG, Hist. of Philos., i. 419
ff. (Eng. trans.). See also art. Kabbalah, in Encyc. Brit.; A. FRANCK, Syst.
de la Kabbale; H. GRÄTZ, Gnosticismus u. Judenthum; GINSBURG, The Kabbalah,
its Doctrines, Development, and Literature. (R.M.W.)
Kabanis), Pierre Jean George. (1757-1808.) French philosopher
and physician. Born at Conac, he studied medicine at Dubreuil and settled
at Auteuil in the vicinity of Paris. He became an intimate friend of Diderot,
d'Alembert, Condorcet, and Franklin in Paris, and the friend and political
supporter of Mirabeau. In 1796 he became a member of the Institute, and
in 1797 professor of clinical medicine in Paris.
Cacodemonia or Cacodemonomania
[Gr. kakoV, evil, + daimwn,
demon, + mania, madness]: Ger. Kakodämonie;
Fr. démonomanie; Ital. cacodemonia. A delusional belief
on the part of an insane subject that he is possessed by or under the influence
of an evil spirit. In opposition to Agathodemonia, the influence of a good spirit.
Cf. DEMON POSSESSION. (J.J.)
Cadence [Lat. cadere, to fall]: Ger. Schluss (Ganzschluss, Halbschluss, Plagalschluss); Fr. cadence; Ital. cadenza. A musical close in which the dominant passes into the tonic chord is a complete cadence; that in which the subdominant passes into the tonic is an imperfect or plagal cadence.
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Sensations of Tone, 293; SANFORD, Course in Exper.
Psychol., expt. 96; PARRY, art. Cadence, in Grove's Dict. of Music and Musicians,
i. 290 (1879). (E.B.T.)
Caird, John. (1820-98.) Born at Greenock
on the Clyde, he died at Dungourney. Educated in the Greenock schools.
At the University of Glasgow, 1840-5; he received the M.A. degree in 1845,
and was soon after ordained at Newton-on-Ayr. Elected to the Chair of Theology
in the University of Glasgow in 1862, he taught with great success, influencing
his countrymen in the direction of a more philosophical theology. He was
profoundly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel. In 1873 he was appointed
Principal of Glasgow University, and continued in that position until his
death. Delivered the Gifford Lectures in 1892-3, and again in 1895-6.
Calculus (in mathematics) [Lat. calculus, a pebble]: Ger. (Differential- und Integral- Rechnung; Fr. calcul (infinitésimal); Ital. calcolo (infinitesimale). A distinctive or well-defined system or method of reasoning by the aid of algebraic symbols.
The term is most familiarly applied to the infinitesimal calculus, in
which the laws of continuously varying quantities are investigated by supposing
the variations to be made up of an infinite number of infinitesimal parts, called
differentials. The aggregate of an infinite number of differentials,
making a finite quantity, is called an integral. Cf. INFINITE, INFINITESIMAL,
and LIMITS. (S.N.)
Callisthenes. A Macedonian historian
and philosopher who died about 328 B.C. He was a cousin and pupil of Aristotle,
and the companion of Alexander the Great in Asia. Fragments of his writings
Calvin, John. (1509-64.) An eminent
Protestant reformer and philosophical theologian. Born at Noyon, Picardy,
in France, and educated at Paris, Bourges, and Orleans. When twelve years
of age he was tonsured, but was afterwards won away from the Church by
relatives and friends, who showed him contradictions between the Bible
and Roman doctrines. He enlisted in the Reformation about his nineteenth
year. In 1533 he was forced to leave Paris, and retired to Angoulême.
He fled from France to Strassburg in 1534, to Basel in 1535, to Bern, Zurich,
Basel again, and Strassburg again in 1538, and to Geneva in 1541. At Geneva
he came to be ruler of the city. There he completed his famous Institutes,
fought all heretics, was implicated in the burning of Servetus, and died.
Calvinism: Ger. Calvinismus; Fr. Calvinisme; Ital. Calvinismo. Calvinism is the name of the theological system promulgated by John Calvin, and is summed up chiefly in his Christianae Religionis Institutio.
Calvinism had its historical and logical predecessor in AUGUSTINIANISM (q.v.), and, from a philosophical standpoint, possesses similar merits and defects. Calvin treats of pre-destination, sin, and grace in the spirit of Augustine; but, owing to the intervention of Reformation principles, diverges on such problems as the Church, faith, and justification.
Although, on the whole, Calvin was a practical rather than a speculative genius, his system, just because it is a system, possesses definite philosophical characteristics. It may be described as an account of human life set in the framework of a divine teleology. As such, it leans upon well-marked premises, and if they be granted, the resultant conclusions follow with great force. These premises may be summarized thus: (1) God, who is a self-conscious Spirit, has created the world and being all-powerful, is able to interfere supernaturally in his universe. (2) He created the world in order to manifest therein his own 'glorious perfections.' The final cause of creation must therefore agree with this original purpose. (3) As concerns mankind, this final cause implies an ultimate division into the 'elect' and the 'non-elect.' The very idea of election, in other words, implies reprobation also. God foreordained 'whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction.' (4) The eternal destiny of an individual is predestined by God's original purpose, which is one with final cause.
It is important to observe that, in elaborating the details of this system, Calvin was swayed, unconsciously, by the dead hand of Scholasticism. He was essentially a Realist. Adam, made in God's image, constituted the original human type; human nature as a whole was contained in him. By his own act he apostatized, thereby falling from fellowship, or 'concurrence,' with God, and coming under condemnation to death and moral corruption. Adam being in this way the archetypal man, all subsequent human nature was involved in his fall, and tainted by his apostasy. Hence men are not condemned for the sin of another, but on account of a taint which is inherent in their very nature, and which renders them hateful to God. Yet God is gracious; not only just, but benevolent. So, to accomplish the redemption of man, he became incarnate in Jesus Christ, who, by his life, passion, and death, merited for man the free gift of salvation. In order to share in this benefit, men must become one with Christ, must be 'members of his body.' This they accomplish through faith, which in turn produces repentance and justification -- justification implying that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to men. But God in his justice has predestined some to reprobation as well as to salvation. Those who refuse to accept the opportunity offered by the plan of salvation will be damned eternally; those who share it with living faith and a godly sorrow for sin will be saved by God's effectual calling, the 'concurrence' of his Spirit preserving them in ever-increasing holiness. The Church and the Sacraments are the supports which God has furnished for aiding the Christian on earth.
It is obvious that, in this scheme, a central position is occupied by the relation of the divine will to man's will. On this subject Calvin himself is not invariably decisive, and it has occasioned much discussion among his followers and opponents. The problem is: 'Whether did God predestinate man to sin, and therefore many to hopeless condemnation; or did man lapse by his own free will, which was in no way affected by God's predestination?' On the whole, so far as Calvin is concerned, the evidence seems to me to be decisive in favour of the former alternative. In other words, the system implies that, in order to the realization of the final cause of the universe, the Fall was eternally decreed. No doubt Calvin resiles from this in such a document as the 'Agreement by the Genoese Pastors'; but this is primarily of a mediating nature, and forms no part of the system as a whole. It is to be remembered, however, that as time passed, and scholastic influence weakened, Calvinists commonly adopted the latter or permissive alternative.
Calvinism long exercised profound influence in Great Britain, especially in Scotland, in Holland, in the French Protestant Church, in Switzerland, Hungary, Bohemia, and in the United States, particularly in New England. In some of these, like England and Holland, it has long ceased to possess control; while in others, like Scotland, its influence has been seriously undermined.
Literature: BAUM and REUSS, Calvin, Opera quae supersunt Omnia (Eng.
trans.); DE BÈZE, Hist. de la Vie et de la Mort de J.-C.; HENRY, Leben
C.s (Eng. trans.); FROTHINGHAM, Studies of Religious Hist. and Crit. LOBSTEIN,
Die Ethik C.s in ihren Grundzügen entworfen; JON EDWARDS, Works; NEANDER,
HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), v, vii; CUNNINGHAM, The Reformers and
the Theol. of the Reformation; MOZLEY, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination;
CHANNING, Moral Argument against Calvinism; McCOSH, Method of Divine Government;
COPINGER, Treatise on Predestination, Election, and Grace; KUYPER, Calvinism;
art. in Herzog's Real-Encyc.; HODGE, System. Theol. (R.M.W.)
The principal exponents of the movement are noted below under Literature. The school is in essentials one of the several examples of the reaction of Gnosis against Scholasticism. But peculiar elements belonged to the contemporary English environment, and variously determined the direction of the speculations of members of the group. The majority, being clergymen, were familiar with, and repelled by, the two leading types among their contemporaries -- the Obscurantist Sectarians, and the Laudian Sacerdotalists. But antagonism to Hobbes played a potent part. The reconciliation of reason with religion, broad toleration, contemplation of things spiritual, often in a mystical manner, were their chief characteristics. Plato and the Neo-Platonists, especially Proclus and Plotinus, Descartes, Malebranche, and Böhme, were their principal authorities; although Cudworth, Culverwel, More, and Smith possessed a wealth of learning extending over many other fields. In some respects, their learning proved a snare, for they had little or no conception of accurate investigation, and they did not approach their sources in a trained historical spirit; hence a distinct tendency to run into extravagance. Cudworth's hypothesis of the 'plastic nature,' and his proofs of the being of God; Culverwel's harmony of faith and reason: More's subtle mysticism; Norris' presentation of Malebranche to the English mind; Patrick's 'latitudinarianism'; Smith's interpretation of religion; Glanvill's conception and use of scepticism; and the ultimacy of moral distinction between right and wrong, common to several of the group, are probably the most important contributions of the school. It should be noted that the movement was in the air, and that Glanvill, Hales, and Norris were Oxford men, while others, like Gale and Pordage, were in no sense members of the inner circle, though evincing affinities with some of the salient tendencies. The school has never received the attention which it deserves, as the most concerted attempt ever made in England to furnish forth a satisfactory philosophy of religion. This is traceable mainly to the tradition that English thought is largely empirical. The Cambridge Platonists really represent a spiritualized Puritanism; an element which, on the whole, has never been absent from English thought, although its most marked influence is to be traced in literature rather than in philosophy.
Literature: TULLOCH, Rational Theol. and Christ. Philos. in England
in the 17th century; HUNT, Religious Thought in England; ROBERTSON, Hobbes;
HALLAM, Literature of Europe (chapter on the Hist. of Spec. Philosophy from
1650 to 1700); LECKY, Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, i. 110 f.;
FISHER, Hist. of Christ. Doctrine, 366 f.; ERDMANN, Gesch. d. Philos. (Eng.
trans.), ii. 99 f.; LOWREY, Philos. of Ralph Cudworth; V. STEIN, Sieben Bücher
z. Gesch. d. Platonismus; METCALFE, The Natural Truth of Christianity (selections
from Smith); POWICKE, John Norris; BROWN and CAIRNS, Culverwel's Light of Nature;
arts. Cudworth and Henry More in Encyc. Brit.; COOPER, Annals of Cambridge,
iii. (For full literature on separate members of the school see the following
articles in the Dictionary of National Biography: -- Ralph Cudworth, Nathaniel
Culverwel, Richard Cumberland, Edward Fowler, Theophilus Gale, Joseph Glanvill,
John Hales, John Howe, Henry More, John Norris, Simon Patrick, John Pordage,
George Rust, John Smith, Benjamin Whichcote, John Worthington.) (R.M.W.)
Campanella, Tommaso. (1568-1639.)
An Italian monk and philosopher. Born at Stilo, Calabria, he entered the
Dominican order. His work, Philosophy demonstrated by the Senses
(1591), was opposed by the Aristotelians. Imprisoned by the Government
in 1599, he remained confined for twenty-six years, during which he published
his most important philosophical works. Pope Urban VIII released him, and
he moved to Rome, 1626. In 1634, he removed to France for greater security,
and was befriended by Richelieu and pensioned by the king. He died in Paris.
He took his starting-point in philosophy from Telesio, but developed independent
Canon [Gr. kanwn, a straight rod, a measure]: Ger. Kanon; Fr. canon; Ital. canone. This word has two meanings: (1) in logic, ethics, aesthetic and historical criticism, &c.: a rule, a fundamental principle, a standard of excellence, a norm. Mill (Logic, Bk. VI. chap. iv. § 2, end) speaks of 'the true canons of inductive philosophy.'
In aesthetics the canon is a rule or law which must be observed if certain results are to be achieved; hence a rule for aesthetic CRITICISM (q.v.). Such, e.g., were held to be for the Greek drama the 'three unities' of time, place, and action, which it was attempted at one time to apply to all drama. They were not consistently carried out, however, in the practice of the Greek dramatists, nor did Aristotle fully maintain them. (J.H.T.-H.S.)
In law the canon is generally a rule of usage, not of regulation. Canons of interpretation: the recognized rules for construing documents. Canons of descent: the recognized rules of inheritance. Canons of the Church: the rules of Canon Law. (S.E.B.)
(2) In theology: a collection of books which are fundamental and authoritative. The latter is the important signification for philosophy of religion, as it applies specially to the 'scriptures' of the Old and New Testaments.
The second meaning is derived metaphorically from (1), probably through the custom of calling the Greek classical writers kanoneV.
Scholars trace the O.T. canon through several stages, which may be summarized as (1) Ezra (see 2 Esdras xiv. 44); (2) Nehemiah; (3) Prologue to the Wisdom of Sirach; (4) the Synod of Jamnia (90 A.D.). The history of the formation after Nehemiah is very complex. The O. T. canon really consists of three 'canons': -- (1) The Pentateuch; (2) the Prophetic Books, and the semi-prophetic, semi-historical writings like Judges and Joshua; (3) the HAGIOGRAPHA (q.v.).
Notwithstanding the wide use made of the N. T. books before that time, no formal canon of the N. T. antedates the organization of the Latin Church, and the occasion for according higher authority to some writings proceeded from the disturbance caused by the Gnostic and other 'heresies.' By the end of the 2nd century, the N. T., as we know it, was finally endorsed, but as some books still remained in dispute no canon, in the strict sense, can be said to have existed. Indeed, the first formal use of the term is by Athanasius (d. 373). Before his time there was merely a consensus of opinion as to 'the Gospel' and 'the Apostle.' The Council of Laodicea (363) forbade the reading of 'non-canonical' books, but the list of canonical writings purporting to proceed from it is unhistorical. The Council or Synod of Hippo Regius (393) gave a list of the canonical books of the N. T. which is identical with that now recognized. There are also canons of the Abyssinian, the Armenian, and the Greek Churches.
Literature: see also BIBLICAL CRITICISM; arts. in Herzog's Real-Encyc.
and Encyc. Brit.; also for Scripture usage Hastings' Dict. of the Bible; BLEEK,
Introd. to O. T.; DIESTEL, Gesch. d. A. T. in d. christl. Kirche; HOLTZMANN,
Kanon u. Tradition; S. DAVIDSON, Canon of the Bible. (R.M.W.)
Canon Law [Lat. ius canonicum] Ger. kanonisches Recht; Fr. droit canon; Ital. diritoo canonico. The rules of faith and order prescribed for any body of churches and their members by the competent ecclesiastical authority; most often used for those of the Church of Rome.
The regulations constituting the Canon Law of the Latin Church, which governed its corporate administration, and ruled its relations to the civil authority, consisted in (1) the 'canons' of the Councils of the Church, which are distinguished from 'dogmas' and from civil 'laws'; (2) the judgments of the Fathers; (3) the Decretals of the Popes. The whole subject is of the utmost importance in relation to the organization of religion in early and mediaeval Europe.
At the beginning of the English Reformation, Parliament provided for a national version of the Canon Law, and in the interim kept in force all decrees of English national or provincial synods, not repugnant to the general law of the land. No such version has ever been made, but a body of canons for the regulation of the clergy was compiled in 1604.
Literature: RICHTER, Corpus Iuris Canonici; HAASEEN, Gesch. d. Quellen
u. d. Lit. canonischen Rechts; PHILLIMORE, Eccles. Law of the Church of England;
MAITLAND, Canon Law in the Church of England. For full literature, see arts.
in Herzog's Real-Encyc. and the Encyc. Brit. (S.E.B.-
Canonization [Mod. Lat. canonizare (Gr. kanwn), to put into catalogue]: Ger. Kanonisation, Heiligsprechung; Fr. canonisation; Ital. canonizzazione; The ceremony by which, in the Roman Catholic Church, eminent deceased believers are raised to the rank of saints.
The custom of canonization had its origin in the commemoration of martyrs, but when it took its present formal shape we do not know. The first express use of the term occurs as late as the 12th century. The person canonized is 'honoured by the Church with public worship'; and the decree of canonization is viewed as an 'exercise of the infallible authority of the Church.' The judicial process of investigating claims is held to prove that miracles continue to be of common occurrence in the Church. No one can be canonized till a century after death.
Literature: POPE BENEDICT XIV, De Canonizatione; Decrees of POPE URBAN
VIII; FABER, Essay on Beatification. Cf. HAGIOLOGY. (R.M.W.)
Canthus [Gr. kanqoV,
the corner of the eye]: Ger. Augenwinkel; Fr. coin (or angle)
de l'oeil, grand canthus, petit canthus; Ital. angolodell'
occhio. Point of union of the upper and lower eyelids at the temporal (canthus
minor) and nasal (canthus major) angles of the eye. (C.F.H.)
Capacity [Lat. capax, able to contain]: Ger. Kapazität, Fähigkeit; Fr. capacité; Ital. capacità. (1) The power of receiving impressions or ideas, or of acting upon them; frequently in reference to passive receptivity only. (2) Physical power of any sort.
The term is used, particularly in anthropometrical studies, in reference to
the amount of innate or acquired endowment in a given direction; e.g. the capacity
of the muscles to endure strain, the visual capacity of the eyes as tested by
the greatest distance at which an object can be seen, or in general the extent
or comprehensiveness of the mind, mental capacity. The spacial capacity of the
skull is termed the Cranial Capacity (see the next topic). (J.J.)
Capacity (cranial): Ger. Schädelkapazität; Fr. capacité cranienne; Ital. capacità cranienne cubica del cranio. This is measured by determining how much shot, sand, peas, millet, or mustard seed, &c., the skull will hold; different skulls (of men and women, highly developed races, and poorly developed ones) vary in moderate cases from about 1,200 to 1,600, in extreme cases from 1,000 to 1,800 cubic centimetres in capacity; with an average in all races of 1,400 cubic centimetres (85 cubic inches).
Skulls whose capacity is 1,350 to 1,450 cubic centimetres are termed mesocephalic,
those smaller than 1,350 cubic centimetres microcephalic, and those larger than
1,450 cubic centimetres megacephalic. Cranial capacity in cubic centimetres
when multiplied by a fraction differing (according to size) a little from .9
gives the approximate brain weight in grammes. The volume of the skull naturally
exceeds the skull capacity, and is measured by the amount of water displaced
by the skull when immersed, or better, when held inverted and partly immersed
to a definite point, the rest being calculated by empirically determined formulae.
Cf. CRANIOMETRY, and the literature there given. (J.J.)
Capacity (in physics). Capacity
for heat, or thermal capacity, is the amount of heat required to raise the temperature
of unit mass of a substance 1o centigrade. Capacity for electricity
of a conductor is the quantity of electricity required to produce unit of potential.
Cf. UNIT OF MEASUREMENT. (S.N.)
No word in the whole range of economic terminology has given rise to more controversies and misunderstandings. There are two main questions whose settlement gives trouble: (1) Shall we regard capital from the social standpoint, as consisting of useful things, or from the individual standpoint, as consisting of property rights? (2) Shall we regard it as a mode of measurement of wealth, and contrast it with income, or shall we regard it as a mode of use of wealth, and contrast it with goods for consumption? According to the answers given to these questions, we have four sets of definitions.
(1) From the individual's standpoint, wealth measured as capital means 'his possessions at any given point of time' (Cannan).
(2) From the individual's standpoint, wealth used as capital means 'that part of a man's stock which he expects to afford him revenue' (Smith).
(3) From the social standpoint, wealth measured as capital 'is to be regarded as a stock of good left over from the satisfaction of present wants' (Kneis).
(4) From the social standpoint, wealth used as capital is 'that part of the wealth of a country which is employed in production' (Ricardo).
The fourth of these meanings is used by the great majority of economists; but it is one to which it is very difficult to give precision. How shall we determine what is capital and what is not, when in fact so many goods are employed partly to assist production, and partly at the same time to give enjoyment as articles of direct consumption? For instance, is the clothing woven by a loom capital or not, in this sense? Many answers have been given. Kleinwaechter says, 'The conception of capital should be limited to tolls of production.' Jevons takes the other alternative, calls it 'the aggregate of those commodities which are employed for sustaining labourers.' Ricardo and Senior regarded it as wealth which is employed productively. MacCulloch extended it to include all wealth which may be thus employed -- a much broader conception. Walras and Pareto count as capital all goods which 'serve more than one use'; a definition more curious than practical. Taussig, carrying out the same idea in better shape, considers capital as 'inchoate goods' -- goods which are not ready for the final consumer. But this comes very near the third definition instead of the fourth; for until the very act of final consumption we cannot tell whether goods have reached their last use or not. As long as they exist at all, they are in a sense inchoate. Boehm-Bawerk's definition of capital as 'a group of intermediate products' is practically equivalent to Taussig's; only he introduces the idea of individual capital by making acquisition the purpose for which such goods exist. Marx is much more explicit in this direction: 'Means of production and subsistence become capital when they serve as means of exploitation.' Mill, despairing of any objective criterion, simply remits the distinction to the mind of the employer; while Clark goes a step further, and makes complete logical separation between the capital itself, which is an aggregate of value (compare Turgot's concepetion of valeurs accumulées), and the 'capital goods by which it may be at any moment represented.'
This uncertainty as to what should be included under the term capital gives rise to many controversies on the propositions concerning wealth (witness the endless battles over the wage-fund theory), and makes it almost useless for purposes of quantitative analysis. For this reason a small but increasing group of economists is now adopting the third definition in preference to the fourth, and regards stocks of goods as capital, independent of the use to which they are put. The chief difficulty to this use of the term is that it occupies ground covered by the traditional definition of wealth, 'utilities fixed and embodied in material objects.'
Courcelle-Seneuil and Fisher adopt a definition which covers both the first and the third senses: 'La somme des richesses existantes, à un moment donné, dans l'espace qu'on désigne ou dans la possession de la personne dont on parle.' Capital is here regarded as a mode of measuring wealth: a wealth-fund, contrasted with income, which is a wealth-flow: an integral of which income is the differential. It is justified primarily and chiefly because, in the hands of an analyst like Fisher, it solves brilliantly a whole series of quantitative problems with which the older conception was unable to deal.
Literature: FISHER on Capital, Econ. J. (1896-7); BOEHM-BAWERK, Kapital
und Kapitalzins. (A.T.H.)
Cardinal Point and Value: Ger.
Kardinalpunkt u. -werth; Fr. valeur (et point) cardinale;
Ital. valore (and punto) cardinale. Introduced by Fechner
for the point and the stimulus-value (Reizwert) of the 'relative maximum of
sensation' (Fechner, Elemente d. Psychophysik, ii. 49). Cardinal value
is defined by Külpe (Outlines of Psychol., Eng. trans., 250) as
'the value at which sensation increases in direct proportion to stimulus intensity.'
See FECHNER'S LAW, and WEBER'S LAW. (J.M.B.)
The term seems to have been first used by St. Ambrose, who adapted to Christian usage the Platonic classification as he found it in Cicero. The cardinal virtues are there enumerated as prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice.
Literature: ZIEGLER, Gesch. d. chr. Eth. (2nd ed.), 234 ff.; SIDGWICK,
Hist. of Eth. (3rd ed.), 44, 133, 143. (W.R.S.)
Caricature [Ital. caricare, to charge,
overload]: Ger. Karikatur; Fr. caricature; Ital. caricatura.
A species of characterization in which there is exaggeration of some feature
with a view to producing a ludicrous effect, usually that of ridicule. It is
thus related to those aspects of the comic in which there is a feeling of superiority,
whereas the grotesque, in which there is often exaggeration, is allied to the
humorous. See COMIC, and CHARACTERISTIC. (J.H.T.)
Carmelites: Ger. Carmeliter; Fr. Carmélites; Ital. Camelitani; A monastic order, said to have been founded by one Berthold, on Mount Carmel, towards the close of the 12th century -- although much earlier records purport to refer to its existence.
It was recognized formally by the Church in 1224. The Crusades being over, it spread to Europe in the 13th century, and assimilated itself to the mendicant orders. It is chiefly celebrated for its invention of the scapulary, said to have been brought from heaven by the Blessed Virgin Mary. The miraculous qualities of this woollen yoke gave the order great vogue, and it flourished till its fatal dispute with the Jesuits -- brought to a close in 1698. Thereafter it tended to break up, there being at least four generals at one time. It is interesting as contributing a chapter to the history of religious emotion and belief in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, and furnishes one of the classical cases of 'Aberglaube.'
Literature: HELYOT, Hist. des Ordres Monastiques; MANNING, Life of St.
Teresa; ANON., Ordres Monastiques (Berlin, 1751, printed in Paris). (R.M.W.)
Carneades. (cir. 215-cir. 125 B.C.) A
Greek sceptical philosopher. He founded the New Academy. Sent as an ambassador
from Athens to Rome, his eloquent orations were greatly admired; but Cato
the Censor, to guard the youth from his sophistical teaching, had him dismissed
from the city.
Caro, Elme Marie. (1826-87.) A
French philosophical writer, born in Poitiers, and educated in Paris. Lecturer
of the École Normale, Paris, 1857; professor in the Sorbonne, 1867;
member of the French Academy, 1876. His best known works are devoted to
the defence of Christianity and the philosophy of theism.
Carpenter, William Benjamin.
(1813-85.) Eminent English physiologist and pioneer in physiological
psychology, born at Exeter, and educated in medicine at Edinburgh. About
1840 he settled in Bristol. He became professor of medical jurisprudence
in University College, editor of The British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical
Review, Fellow of the Royal Society, and President of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science (1872).
Carpocrates, or Carpocras.
A heresiarch of Alexandria, and Alexandrian Gnostic, who probably lived
in the 2nd century A.D. He had numerous followers called Carpocratians,
who still existed in the 6th century. He belonged to the Paganizing, rather
than the Judaizing, Agnostics.
Case (or Instance). The result
of a single observation or experiment. See ERRORS (of observation). (J.M.B.)
Case-law: Ger. Processrecht; Fr. droit des causes; Ital. giurisprudenza. Law stated in judicial decisions, published in the form of reported cases; particular judicial precedents, as distinguished from universal legal principles.
The opinions of courts of last resort, announcing their final determinations and stating their reasons for it, are now generally published by official reporters, as soon as there are enough of them to make up a volume. Similar publications are sometimes made of the opinions delivered in inferior courts, particularly in large cities. From the time of Henry VIII, when the 'Year-books' end, no official reports were published in England until 1865, their place being supplied by unofficial ones. The earlier American reports were also unofficial. Unofficial reports are generally called by the name of the compiler, e.g. Burrow's Reports, Johnson's Reports; official reports by the name of the Government, e.g. United States Reports, Virginia Reports; sometimes by that of the Court, e.g. Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division; Cour de Cassation (with date). In England and the United States official law reports are an authoritative declaration of the law, as to every point necessarily involved in the determination of the cause. So far as an opinion goes beyond this, it is obiter dictum, and not of binding authority. Obiter dicta are discouraged in France, and when they amount to laying down rules which it is the appropriate province of the legislative power to prescribe, the judge may be prosecuted criminally (Code Civil, art. 5; Code Pénal, art. 127). Case-law on the continent of Europe is generally not recognized. Judicial decisions are regarded as instructive but not authoritative. 'Non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum sit' (Code of Just., vii. 45, de Sententiis, &c., 13). Cf. LAW.
Literature: AUSTIN, Jurisprudence, lect. xxxix; HOLLAND, Jurisprudence,
chap. v, iii; MERLIN, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, Arrêt, vii.
Caste [Lat. castus, pure]: Ger. Kaste; Fr. caste; Ital. casta. A class distinguished originally by marks of race, but later by occupation, or religious faith, or both, and perpetuated by descent and rigid limitation of social intercourse; a name given by the first European (Portuguese) settlers in India to divisions of the social system.
'Caste, at first, means "pure," and signifies that there is a moral barrier between the caste and the outcast. . . . The native word [varna] means "colour," and the first formal distinction was national, (white) Aryan and "black man"' (Washburn Hopkins, The Religions of India, 28). 'In societies of an archaic type, a particular craft or kind of knowledge becomes in time an hereditary profession of families, almost as a matter of course' (Maine, Early Hist. of Institutions, lect. viii. 245). 'The maintenance of those class-divisions which arise as political organization advances, implies the inheritance of a rank and a place in each class. The like happens with those subdivisions of classes, which in some societies constitute castes, and in other societies are exemplified by incorporated trades' (Spencer, Princ. of Sociol., v. iii. § 444). (F.H.G.)
It commonly originates in usages which have become prescriptive, or have been stereotyped into duties; and where the division is most completely crystallized, religious sanction often plays a great formative part. Although the term is applied pre-eminently to the Brahmanic system of India, caste, or something like it, may be found in many civilizations, and at widely separated periods of time; e.g. in Iran (Persia), in pre-Brahmanic India, in Madagascar, among the North American Indians, in mediaeval Europe, and to-day in countries having nobility. Nevertheless, India remains the classic instance of the institution.
Literature: HAUG, Brahma u. d. Brahmanen; WEBER, Nachträge, 795;
Indische Stud., x; LYALL, Asiatic Studies (1st ser.), chap. vii; MUIR, in the
J. of the Roy. Asiatic Soc., N.S., ii. 217, and Old Sanskrit Texts, i. 454;
SCHOEBEL, Étude sur le Rituel du Respect Social dans l'État Brahman;
KERN, Ind. Theorieen over de Standenverdeeling; HOPKINS, Four Castes, and in
J. of Amer. Oriental Soc., xiii; SCHLAGINTWEIT, in Zeitsch. d. deutschen Morgenländischen
Gesell., xxxiii. 549. (R.M.W.)
Casual [Lat. casus, fall]: Ger. zufällig;
Fr. accidental, fortuit; Ital. casuale. Happening fortuitously
or accidentally. See ACCIDENT. (J.M.B.)
Casuistry [Lat. casus, a case]: Ger. Kasuistik; Fr. casuistique, arguments de casuiste; Ital. casistica. (1) The systematic discussion of the application of moral law to particular cases (called 'cases of conscience') in which such application is not clear and certain.
(2) The over-subtle or verbal discussion of the moral quality of particular acts or sentiments, especially when tending toward greater moral laxity than is permitted by the dominant moral opinion of the time or by the unsophisticated individual conscience.
Ethical reflection begins with the discussion of difficult cases of conduct. Discussion of this kind becomes prominent when new ideas of life enter an established social order, as in the time of the Sophists or in early Christian times. In the New Testament there are many examples of such discussion; and these become more numerous and more systematically worked out in several of the Church Fathers (e.g. Justin, Athanasius, Augustine). But casuistry, as a distinct body of ethical teaching, is the result of additional causes: in particular, the elaboration of church creed and practice, which reached completeness in the great scholastics of the 13th century; the growing externality of moral doctrine, which tended to look on the moral law as an external rule, a mere aggregate of numerous cases of action, and on conduct as separable into distinct processes of motive, intention, and act; the separation of different orders of men, especially clergy and laity, learned and unlearned; and the attempt to assess exactly the merit or demerit of each particular action, and to assign to each sin its appropriate penance -- an attempt in which the distinction, enforced by the later Stoics, of the morally indifferent from the obligatory and the forbidden, was further developed, and a classification of sins (original and actual, mortal and venial) was carried out. In this way manuals of conduct were prepared chiefly as guides for the confessional (Summa Artesana, 1330; Summa Pisana, 1470; Summa Angelica, 1492; Summa Rosella, 1495; Summa Pacifica, 1574): at first arranged according to subject, afterwards with the cases in alphabetical order. These manuals entered into the minutest details of conduct, and the subtlest refinements of motive and intention.
A famous example of a casuistical discussion is the controversy concerning the murder of tyrants, occasioned by the assassination of the Duke of Orleans in 1407 -- an act which was defended by Jean Petit, of the University of Paris. The variety of opinions brought out in these discussions, coupled with the absence of a dominating moral principal to guide the discussion, led to many differences of opinion amongst the doctors of casuistry which were fitted to perplex the lay conscience. Hence arose the doctrine of PROBABILISM (q.v.), which was the logical outcome of the casuistical method. Casuistry has appeared in history when external law, as opposed to ethical principle, has been taken as the ultimate guide of conduct. Conspicuous instances are to be found in Judaism, of which the Talmud is the main casuistical authority. Although there were casuists among the Reformers, Ethics has for long shaken itself free from these discussions. (W.R.S.- R.M.W.)
Literature: AQUINAS, Secunda Secundae; RAIMUND DE PENNAFORTI, Summa
de Casibus Poenitentialibus (1719); the Angelica (burnt by Luther); BUSENBAUM,
Medulla casuum conscientiae; ESCOBAR, Theologia Moralis; PASCAL, Provincial
Letters; PERRAULT, La Morale des Jésuites; W. PERKINS, Whole Treatise
of Cases of Conscience; SANDERSON, De Obligatione Conscientiae, and Nine Cases
of Conscience; ALSTED, Theologia Casuum; BALDWIN, Tractatus de Casibus Conscientiae;
SPENER, Pia Desideria; STRAUCH, Theologia Moralis; BUDDEUS, Isagoge Historica;
STAUDLIN, Gesch. d. Sittenlehre; H. MERZ, Das System d. christl. Sittenlehre;
J. RICKABY, Mor. Philos., 152; MIELZINER, Introd. to the Talmud; STRACK, Einleitung
in d. Talmud. JEREMY TAYLOR's Ductor Dubitantium (1660) is the chief manual
of casuistry by a Protestant theologian. It is an examination of doubtful 'cases
of conscience,' but is without the special characteristics, given above, of
mediaeval casuistry. See also GASS, Gesch. d. chr. Eth., §§ 123-8.
Catalepsy [Gr. kata, down, + lhyiV, from lambanein, to seize]: Ger. Katalepsie; Fr. catalepsie; Ital. catalessi. A nervous disease characterized by intermittent attacks of powerlessness, and a peculiar form of muscular rigidity which is either absolute, the limbs remaining as if petrified, or of a form termed flexibilitus cerea.
In this condition the patient's limbs may be placed by another in any position of flexion or contraction, although the patient is helpless to contract the muscles voluntarily. The state is further characterized by an inability to speak, an almost trance-like unconsciousness, succeeded upon awakening by a total forgetfulness of what ensued during the attack, and frequently by total or partial insensibility. The attack is usually in the nature of a paroxysm of a few hours' (rarely days') duration, with intervals of relief. It may occur at any age, but is most common in early adult life, and soon after puberty. It is distinctly more common in women than in men. In most cases it is associated with HYSTERIA (q.v.), but may occur in the absence of true hysterical symptoms. It is frequently induced by nervous exhaustion, by emotional disturbances, religious excitement, sudden shock, fright, or injury. It occasionally occurs in the course of mental affections, e.g. melancholia and in hebephrenia or puberal insanity, as well as in the various forms of paranoia, acute hallucination, &c.
It is differentiated from ecstasy or trance by the peculiar behaviour of the muscles; by the loss of memory upon the cessation of the attack; by the complete immobility and the suddenness of the loss of sense-functions. The inspired expression of the ecstatic is in marked contrast to the vacant immobility of the cataleptic. Catalepsy is distinguished from tetanus by the suspension of the mental activities and the freedom from pain. The attempts to simulate this condition are usually detected by the failure of protracted and complete rigidity, and by the presence of reflex and other signs of sensibility.
The cause (or causes) of the state is not satisfactorily explained; the possibility of passively moving the limbs which do not respond to powerful electric irritation offers a point of special difficulty. The fact that the attack may be induced by mental excitement suggests a cortical origin, possibly an inhibition of the restraining influence of higher over lower centres. Artificial catalepsy occurs in the state of hypnosis, and is characterized by a similar muscular rigidity and pliability (flexibilitas cerea). Charcot and his followers regard it as a distinct state, the first of the three which they recognize (cf. HYPNOTISM). It is induced by a sudden light, loud sound, or strained fixation; and in addition to the characteristic posture of the limbs, presents superficial anaesthesia, but special sensibility with general suggestibility remain intact; the eyes open with a vacant stare, and reflex irritability is almost completely abolished. The state may also be induced (Charcot) by opening the eyes of a lethargic subject. Those who do not recognize the distinct forms or phases of hypnosis as distinguished by the Paris school, regard artificial catalepsy as a special sate of muscular rigidity induced by suggestion through posture, unconscious contagion, or the like; and variable according to the nature of the suggestion.
Catalepsy has figured in mental EPIDEMICS (q.v.) and in religious ecstasy. The term owes its origin to the spiritualistic theory of disease which beheld in the paroxysm the seizure by some foreign agency or spirit. The tendency to use the term as including all forms of trance-like states is not to be approved. Cf. TRANCE. (J.J.)
Literature: CHARCOT, Maladies du système nerveux; A. BINET and CH. FÉRÉ, Animal Magnetism (Eng. trans.); BRIQUET, Traité de l'Hystérie (1889); PITRES, Leçons cliniques sur l'hystérie (1891); GILLES DE LA TOURETTE, Traité clinique et thérapeutique de l'hystérie (1891); P. JANET, L'État mental des Hystériques; RICHER, Études cliniques sur la grande hystérie (1885); LE MAITRE, Contribution à l'Étude des états cataleptiques (1895). (L.M.)
Cataphasia (or Kata-) [Gr. katafasiV, assent]: Ger. Kataphasie; Fr. cataphasie (acataphasie); Ital. catafasia. A degeneration of speech, usually connected with serious nervous disease, in which the patient, either spontaneously or in answer to questions, constantly repeats the same word or phrases.
The word is also used (Kussmaul) to describe serious degeneration in the formation
of sentences, the patient's language being reduced, like that of a child just
beginning to speak, to the skeleton words of a sentence with little grammatical
construction (hence also termed agrammatism) and much repetition. See SPEECH
AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J.)
Cataplexy (or -is) [Gr. kata, down, + plhxiV, from plhssein, to strike]: Ger. Kataplexie; Fr. cataplexie; Ital. cataplessia. A word suggested by Preyer (Die Kataplexie und der thierische Hypnotismus, 1878) to describe the immobility and apparent paralysis induced by rigidly restraining movements of an animal.
The experiment of holding a hen and making it stare at a chalk line and remain immovable was described by Kircher, 1646. Preyer has shown that the restraint is the essential factor, the chalk line or other method of fixing the attention being secondary. Such observations have been repeated upon pigeons and other birds, upon guinea-pigs, rabbits, lizards, crabs, frogs, and other animals. Almost all of these, after proper manipulations for a few seconds or minutes, cease to struggle, and may be made to assume, as if paralyzed, unusual positions, and to maintain them for a considerable period. The explanation of this state has wavered between the view that the cataplectic state is a form of hypnotic sleep (Danilewsky), and that it is a quasi-paralysis due to intensive shock or fright (Preyer). The latter view assimilates it to the natural fascination of animals by beasts of prey and to other forms of fright, and regards the instinct to feign death as a cognate phenomenon.
A more recent view (Verworn) regards the phenomenon as of the nature of a posture reflex (Lagereflex), the animal responding to the tactile stimulus of the manipulation by an attitude in some cases suggestive of the most suitable position for regaining its equilibrium. Although the fact cannot be satisfactorily explained, it is certainly the case that the tendency to assume certain positions is morbidly present in the animals subject to cataplexy. What is peculiar is the retention of the posture for so long a time. This is referred to the release of the inhibitory impulses sent down from the hemispheres to the lower centres; and this in turn is substantiated by the fact that frogs without their hemispheres retain such posture reflexes for a much longer time than the normal frog. Should this type of explanation be regarded as satisfactory, the term cataplexy would no longer be appropriate for the phenomenon in question.
The term is also used with reference to the similar paralyzing effects of shock or fright in men, and the effects of sudden and massive stimuli upon hypnotic subjects. Charcot's method of rendering subjects statuesquely immobile in the accidental position of the moment by the sudden sound of a gong or the flash of a light would be of this type; also the fact that sleep may be induced (in children -- Baldwin) by a sudden flash of light in a dark room. Cf. CATALEPSY, and HYPNOTISM.
Literature: PREYER, as cited above (with illustrations); VERWORN, Die
sogenannte Hypnose der Thiere (1898); E. GLEY, De quelques conditions favorisant
l'hypnose chez les animaux, Année Psychol., ii. (J.J.)
Catechetical Method (in
education) [Lat. catechismus, instruction by word of mouth] A form of
instruction by means of questions and answers, usually for purposes of examination;
when used in inductive teaching, it is equivalent to the Socratic method. See
METHOD, and SOCRATIC METHOD. (C.DE.G.)
Categorematic (Words, &c.) [Gr. kathgorhma]: Ger. kategorematisch; Fr. catégorématique; Ital. categorematico. Such words as may be themselves form the expression of one term, subject or predicate, of a proposition. All others, e.g. prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, are called Syncategorematic.
The term kathgorhma appears occasionally in Aristotle as equivalent to predicate. This meaning was definitely assigned to it by the Stoics, who, distinguishing noun and verb as the essential parts of a proposition, gave a foundation for the grammatical distinction of categorematic from syncategorematic. That distinction was taken over from the Latin grammarians (e.g. Priscian), and begins to appear in logic in the tract de Generibus et Speciebus, often assigned to Abelard.
Literature: PRANTL, Gesch. d. Logik, ii. 148, 191, 256, 266. (R.A.)
Categorical (Judgment, &c.) [Gr. kathgorikoV]: Ger. kategorisch; Fr. catégorique; Ital. categorico. A judgment in which the assertion is made simpliciter, as holding good without explicit reference to any condition. Kant connects the categorical judgment with the fundamental thought-relation of substance (thing), or attribute (quality), and so distinguishes it from other forms of assertion.
The term with Aristotle means always 'affirmative.' The current modern sense, in which it is contrasted with hypothetical or conditional, seems to have been directly derived from Boethius, though, as Prantl has shown, the new sense of the term had already appeared among the later Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle and in Galen, and may have been influenced by the Stoic usage.
Literature: PRANTL, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 554, 575, 691; KANT, Logik,
§ 24, and Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 86. (R.A.)
Categorical Imperative: Ger. kategorischer Imperativ; Fr. impératif catégorique; Ital. imperativo categorico. A moral law which admits of no condition or exception. The term is opposed to Hypothetical Imperative, which is a law relative to a further end.
The use of the term is due to Kant (Grundl. d. Met. d. Sitten, ii), who reduces the moral law to the single categorical imperative: 'Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' This formula of the imperative gives its bare form or universality. It is followed by a second formula for the same law giving its end, and thus stated: 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, and never as means only.' By combining these two formulae, a 'complete characterization' is reached, which gives the conception of a 'kingdom of ends.' This final formula of the absolutely good will is stated in the words: 'Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature.' These are, however, only different formulae of the same categorical imperative or law, and each of them involves the other two.
Literature: discussions are to be found in historical and systematic
works on ethics, and in the textbooks to Kant. (W.R.S.)
Category [Gr. kathgoria, an accusation, charge]: Ger. Kategorie; Fr. catégorie; Ital. categoria. (1) One of the ten classes of Beings, or of typical forms of speech used to assert Being, or, finally, of typical judgments regarding Being, as Aristotle distinguished these ten classes in his table of categories. (2) One of the forms or classes of conceivable objects, or one of the forms of judgments about objects, or, finally, one of the fundamental concepts of the understanding, as Kant classified these fundamental forms, classes, or concepts, in his table of categories. (3) Any very extensive or fundamentally important class of objects or of conceptions, especially if this class is distinguished from other classes, either by the general form or character of the assertions that can be made about it, or by the general method of thinking that is applicable to its study. Thus one may say, 'mind and body belong to different categories,' although both of them would actually fall under the same Aristotelian category of substance. (4) Popularly, and sometimes in technical usage, category becomes simply equivalent to the term class or general idea. (5) In post-Kantian technical usage (e.g. Hegel) the categories are any or all of the fundamental philosophical conceptions, whether metaphysical, logical, or ethical.
The original purpose of Aristotle in defining the categories of his well-known table was a complex one, and his motives were not very clearly analysed by himself. In part the categories represent a grammatical classification of forms of speech. In part they stand for very general classes of objects, as these classes get distinguished by ordinary speech. In part they are names for fashions of being, or for various ways in which objects can be regarded as real; and in so far they mark the chief varieties of meaning that can be assigned to the ontological predicate in metaphysical discussion. The latter way of viewing the categories is frequent in the treatise called the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and the philosopher here often observes that 'Being is variously asserted according to the categories,' as the characteristic of a substance, a quality, &c.
The full list of the categories of Aristotle is: onsia(substance), poson (quantity), poion (quality), proV ti (relations, especially such as double, half, greater than, &c.), pon (place), pote (time), keisqai (situation or position, such as is expressed by to sit, or to lie), ecein (possession or acquired character, such as dress or ornament), poiein (activity in the more special sense, such as is expressed by active verbs like to cut or to burn), pasxein (passivity or passion, such as is expressed by the passive voice of any active verb). The grammatical relation of these classes to parts of speech as such is obvious, especially in the case of the later categories of the list. The metaphysical contrast between the first category and all the others leads to the frequent reduction by Aristotle of the whole list to the two classes, substance and accident. The more exact classification into the three fundamental categories, substance, quality or character in general (paqoV), and relation, is also known to our philosopher. As to the principles that led to the statement of the list of ten categories, and as to the stress that Aristotle himself laid upon the precise classification in question, opinions differ. Prantl (in his Gesch. d. Logik, i) gives a statement of all the various forms which the table of categories takes in Aristotle's writings, and in his lengthy discussion in this volume maintains that Aristotle laid no stress upon the exhaustiveness or finality of the table of ten categories. Zeller regards the full table of ten as representing an essential thesis of Aristotle. But there should be no doubt of the actual union of various motives as determining Aristotle's classification.
The categories were often discussed by the later ancient philosophers, and both the Stoics and Plotinus undertook to give revised lists. Kant's discussion of the categories in the Krit. d. reinen Vernunft makes the list depend upon the forms of judgment. Forms of judgment, however, involve fundamental ways of thinking of objects, and Kant's table of categories is therefore explicitly a classification of the possible objects of human thought according to the fundamental ways in which we can think about objects.
The result is the well-known list:
1. Categories of Quantity: Unity (Einheit), Plurality (Vielheit), Universality (Allheit).
2. Categories of Quality: Reality (Realität), Negation (Negation), Limitation (Limitation).
3. Categories of Relation: Substantiality (Substantialität), Causality (Causalität), Reciprocity (Wechselwirkung).
4. Categories of Modality: Possibility (Möglichkeit), Actuality (Wirklichkeit), Necessity (Nothwendigkeit).
The four groups correspond respectively to the classifications of judgment: (1) as singular, particular, and universal; (2) as affirmative, negative, and 'infinite'; (3) as categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; (4) as problematic, assertory, and necessary. Kant is himself thoroughly convinced of the exhaustiveness of this list, and of its fundamental systematic value. The categories of relation he generally states in the dual form: Causalität und Dependenz, i.e. relation of cause to effect, relation of substance to accident, &c.
The lack of any principle sufficient to secure the exaustiveness of the Kantian table categories was, despite his own assertion, a matter of general comment among his critics from the very beginning; and the dissatisfaction with the list of the logical forms of judgment which Kant had used, led to numerous efforts to deduce a list of categories from some single principle constitutive of the thinking process. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were all much influenced both in terminology and in doctrine by such efforts. Inevitably these efforts led to a somewhat more extended technical conception of the categories than Kant had recognized, since Kant's list of fundamental conceptions could not be sundered, in the development of the idealistic systems, from concepts of logical, metaphysical, ethical, and even cosmological character. In consequence, the term category, in post-Kantian philosophy, comes to mean any relatively fundamental philosophical conception. (J.R.)
Categories are psychologically defined by Stout (Manual of Psychol., Bk. III. Div. ii. chap. i) as 'forms of cognitive consciousness: they are universal principles or relations presupposed either in all cognition or in all cognition of a certain kind.' And he refers to Ferrier (Introduction to Instit. of Met.) as showing how categories may be operative when their existence is not consciously recognized.
Literature: Works on metaphysics generally. An important recent work
is HARTMANN, Kategorienlehre. See extensive citation in EISLER, Wörterb.
d. philos. Begriffe (sub verbo). Psychological treatment is to be found in JAMES,
Princ. of Psychol., ii. fin.; SPENCER, Princ. of Psychol., ii; BALDWIN, Ment.
Devel. in the Child and the Race, chap. xi, and Selective Thinking, in Psychol.
Rev. (Jan., 1898); SIMMEL, Arch. f. syst. Philos., i. 34 ff. (G.F.S.-
Catharsis [Gr. kaqarsiV, purgation or purification]: Ger. Katharsis; Fr. catharsis; Ital. catarsi. A term used by Aristotle to express the effect produced by tragedy and certain kinds of music. Tragedy, by means of pity and fear, is said to effect a 'catharsis of such passions.'
The conception of Aristotle, as seems clear from the passage relative to music in the Politics (v. 7), is that of exciting by art certain passions already existing in the spectator, viz. pity, fear, enthusiasm, in order that, after this homeopathic treatment, the person may experience relief from them and return to the normal condition. The cure is not wrought by the mere excitement, but by an excitement produced by an artistic agency, which at the same time brings order, harmony, and wholeness to bear. In the case of tragedy there is the additional factor (through not explicitly stated in this connection by him), that the spectator is sympathizing with sufferings and heroism portrayed in their more universal aspects. Hence he is further freed from the morbid and selfish. The metaphor is primarily medical, but may quite possibly have reference also to religious purification, while in the actual psychical process there must be an aesthetic element as stated above.
The numerous interpretations of Aristotle's meaning, of which fifteen were enumerated at the end of the 15th century, may be divided into three groups according as they interpret the term to mean (1) purification in the sense of refining; (2) a religious expiation or lustration; (3) a medical purgation and healing. Lessing, in his Hamburgische Dramaturgie, was a typical representative of the first group, making the effect of tragedy to be the reducing of the passions to the mean. The Romanticists emphasized especially the thought that the soul is through art freed from all the contradictions and miseries of actual existence, and raised to the plane of divine IRONY (q.v.). The third and now generally accepted interpretation was suggested by Milton, E. Müller, and Weil, and presented convincingly by Bernays.
Literature: BUTCHER, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (1895);
ZELLER, Aristotle (trans. by Costelloe and Muirhead, 1897); WALTER, Gesch. d.
Aesth. im Alterthum (1893); BERNAYS, Zwei Abhandl. ü. die Aristotelische
Theorie des Dramas (1880); DÖRING, Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles (1876);
BÉNARD, L'Esthétique d'Aristote (1887); EGGER, La Critique chez
les Grecs (1887), and La Poétique d'Aristote (1878); BAUMGART, Handb.
d. Poetik (1887), 423 ff. The works of DÖRING, BÉNARD, and EGGER
contain bibliographies. See also UEBERWEGHEINZE, Gesch. d. Philos. (J.H.T.)
The word Catholic is found in early Christian writers with no reference to the Church. Justin Martyr (Dial. c. Tryph., 81) speaks of the Catholic, that is, the general, resurrection. Tertullian (Adv. Marcion, 2, 17) writes of the Catholic, that is, the all-embracing, goodness of God. It is first applied to the Church in the Epistle of Ignatius to the Church in Smyrna, where we read that where Christ is, there the Christian Church is. In Eusebius (Hist. Ecc., 4, 15) it is applied to the local religious associations which recognize themselves as parts of the Church universal. It was first generally employed in its present sense in contrast to the purely national religion of the Jews. Later, it was attached to the orthodox Christian Church as contrasted with the heretics, especially the DONATISTS (q.v.).
The Catholic Church is the community which holds, maintains, and expounds universally received Christian doctrine. The Roman Catholic Church regards itself as possessing exclusive right to the title 'Catholic,' chiefly on the ground of unbroken apostolic succession; it alone holds the doctrine, and therefore alone can maintain it. Protestant writers tend to view the phrase as indicating an ideal, which is better conveyed in the words 'the communion of saints,' meaning thereby that the Church is not restricted to any one Christian community, but will, in the end, become universal. Cf. ROMANISM.
Literature: AUGUSTINE, Epist. 53, 1; PERRONE, Praelectiones, T. de Locis,
cap. 3; PEARSON, On the Creed, art. ix; FAIRBAIRN, Catholicism, Anglican and
Catholic Reaction: Ger. katholische Gegenwirkung; Fr. réaction catholique; Ital. reazione cattolica. Catholic Reaction, also commonly known as the Counter-Reformation, is the name given to the movement of reform and restatement of fundamental principles that took place in the Roman Catholic Church, mainly as a result of the stimulus imparted by the Reformation. It is associated chiefly with: (1) the activity of the Jesuits (recognized by the Church, 1540); (2) with the Decrees of the Council of Trent (1542-63); (3) with the rehabilitation of the Inquisition.
As a whole, the movement was partly reformatory, partly reactionary. It was reformatory in so far as it purged the Church of much of the laxity, and nearly all the positive immorality, that had grown up under the influence of the Renaissance spirit. It was reactionary in so far as it stiffened the traditional organization and dogmas, and emphasized what was Roman rather than Catholic, thus accentuating the breach with the Reforming parties, and suppressing the reformers within the Church itself.
As results, (1) the Inquisitions stamped out incipient Protestantism in Italy and Spain; (2) the Jesuits checkmated the spread of Protestantism in Germany, and made Catholicism once more the paramount power in Austria, South Germany, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and France; (3) the recentralization of the ecclesiastical system, accomplished chiefly by the Council of Trent, rendered its policy so clear that the entire machinery could be set in motion for the accomplishment of the same ends in widely separated communities.
Literature: PHILIPSON, La Contre-Révolution Religieuse au 16me
Siècle; WARD, The Counter-Reformation (Epochs of Church History series);
RANKE, Hist. of the Popes in the 16th and 17th centuries (Eng. trans.); BELLESHEIM,
Wilhelm Cardinal Allen u. die engl. Seminare auf dem Festlande. For full lists
in literature, see G. P. FISHER, Hist. of the Reformation (1891), 509 ff. (R.M.W.)
Catholicity (in theology) [Gr.
kaqolikoV, general, universal]: Ger. Katholicismus;
Fr. catholicité; Ital. cattolicità. In ecclesiastical
controversy, Catholicity is the quality of universality which the Roman Church
claims as peculiar to itself on the grounds (1) that it is not confined to any
single people or to any one language; (2) that, as a matter of accomplished
fact, it is universal; (3) that its members greatly outnumber other Christian
sects, and that even taking all the others together, Roman Catholics are more
numerous. The properties of unity, holiness, apostolicity, catholicity, exist,
therefore, in no Christian society except that which recognizes the supreme
authority of the Roman pope. (R.M.W.)
According to Spinoza, 'that the idea of whose essence involves existence' (Ethica,
i. def. 1). Cf. citations in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos.
Begriffe, sub verbo. (J.M.B.)
Opposed to mere logical necessity, in which time is not involved, and to 'chance' or 'freedom,' in which the connection is not a necessary connection. See CAUSE AND EFFECT, and NECESSITY. (R.H.S.)
(2) Notion of: that by which a process is thought to take place in consequence
of another process. See CAUSE (notion of). (J.M.B.)
Cause (in law) [Lat. causa]: Ger.
Rechtsfall; Fr. cause, procès; Ital. causa.
A lawsuit. Cause of action: that which gives a right of action. It must
be the efficient and proximate cause: Causa proxima, non remota spectatur.
Cause (notion of): Ger. Begriff der Causalität; Fr. notion de cause; Ital. nozione di causa. Whatever may be included in the thought or perception of a process as taking place in consequence of another process. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)
The psychological treatment of causation must be distinguished from the logical. The logician has to inquire what the essentials of the conception are as a structural principle either of knowledge in general, or of this or that special department of science. The psychologist has to determine the elements which have actually entered into the conception or perception of causal connection in the various stages and phases of mental development.
Both logic and psychology have to discuss the existence and nature of necessary connection in the causal sequence. But they differ in their point of view. The logician may be right in affirming that for scientific purposes all that need be assumed is the regular recurrence of the same process on the repetition of similar antecedent conditions. But the psychologist who accepts this view does not find his own special problems solved by it. He has to inquire how the belief in uniform recurrence arises, and through what stages it passes. He may follow Hume in tracing the belief to the actual recurrence of certain experiences of uniform sequence which create an habitual expectation. He may also follow Hume in tracing the conception or necessary connection to the experience of a tendency produced by custom, which compels us to pass in thought from the perception of the antecedent to the ideal representation of the consequent. But if he does so he recognizes an element, necessary to the psychical development of the consciousness of causal sequence, which is of no logical value. This, indeed, is the position occupied by Hume himself. He puts forward habit, and the compulsory anticipation based on habit, as affording a psychological explanation of the growth of the concept of necessary causal connection; but he couples this doctrine with the emphatical denial that any such considerations can explain or justify its validity.
The psychologist may regard actual repetition of similar experiences as an inadequate explanation. He may find it necessary to posit a congenital tendency to assume uniformity, and to search for it even when it is not obviously present. But this may be only a psychological postulate. The existence of such an innate tendency cannot be taken, without fuller discussion, as a proof or explanation of its validity.
It may be that the psychologist consider both the custom-theory and the theory of innate mental tendency as inadequate or incorrect. He may find himself compelled to lay emphasis on something specific and characteristic in the nature of the causal process as it actually takes place on any particular occasion. The uniform recurrence would cease to be the essential point. Mere occurrence apart from recurrence would in some manner manifest its causal character by its own intrinsic nature. We may take as representatives of this point of view those who find the origin of the consciousness of causal necessity in the experience of subjective activity and regard its application to material phenomena as due in the first instance to anthropomorphic or ejective interpretation. Supposing this doctrine to be justified psychologically, it does not immediately follow that the logical conception must conform to it. The anthropomorphic element may have been an indispensable factor in the origin and growth of the concept, and yet it may now have become superfluous for its scientific application. Or it may be superfluous in the investigation of physical phenomena but necessary in the treatment of psychical processes, or in an ultimate philosophical account of the universe. Such questions are properly logical or epistemological.
Literature: psychological textbooks in general. HUME, Treatise of Human
Nature, Pt. III. § 14; REID, Works, 177 ff., 523 ff., 626 ff.; T. BROWN,
Inquiry; MAINE DE BIRAN, Nouvelles Considérations sur les Rapports du
Physique et du Moral de l'Homme; TETENS, Philos. Versuche, 312 ff.; HERBART,
Psychol. als Wiss., 2. Theil, 142; WAITZ, Lehrb. d. Psychol., § 52; MILL,
Logic, Bk. III. chaps. iii and v; VENN, Empirical Logic, 124 ff.; SIGWART, Logic,
ii. Pt. III. § 73; WUNDT, Logik, i. 525; Syst. d. Philos., 292 ff.; KÖNIG,
Entwickelung des Causal-problems; RIEHL, Der philos. Krit., ii. 248 ff.; FOUILLÉE,
Psychol. des Idées-forces, ii. 169 ff.; WARD, Encyc. Brit., art. Psychology,
82; Naturalism and Agnosticism; H. GRÜNBAUM, Zur Kritik der modernen Causalanschauungen,
Arch. f. syst. Philos., v. Heft 3; LOTZE, Metaphysics; BRADLEY, Appearance and
Cause and Effect: Ger. Ursache und Wirkung; Fr. cause et effect; Ital. causa ed effetto. (1) Cause and effect (aitia, aition; causa, effectus) are correlative terms denoting any two distinguishable things, phases, or aspects of reality, which are so related to each other, that whenever the first ceases to exist, the second comes into existence immediately after, and whenever the second comes into existence, the first has ceased to exist immediately before. They must possess in common some one existent property. Of any two such things, the one which exists first is called the cause of the second, and the one which exists immediately after is called the effect of the first.
It is not necessary that the cause should differ from its effect in any respect except that they occupy different moments in time; but the names are more commonly applied in cases where there is also some other difference, e.g. at least a change of position in space. From the above definition it follows that with regard to any two things which have this relation to one another, the prior or subsequent existence of the one may be always validly inferred from the existence of the other; and hence they are said to be necessarily connected. See NECESSITY.
(2) This necessary connection between two existent things, which thus forms part of the causal relation, is sometimes held to constitute the whole. See CAUSE (notion of).
But in such cases some kind of logical priority is commonly ascribed to the cause, in place of the temporal priority given to it in (1). In this sense things held to exist, but not in time, are often called causes; and priority, such as belongs to a reason or logical ground, is ascribed to them, so that (a) one cause is said to have many effects; (b) it is said to be capable of existing without its effects, though they could not exist without it; (c) it is said to be real, while they are said to be phenomenal. Further, it is often supposed that the necessary connection between cause and effect is not merely logical, but in some sense real; and it is then generally held to consist in the 'activity' of the cause, a notion drawn from psychological experience where it is felt to precede or accompany the production of certain effects. The chief ambiguity in the use of the terms cause and effect is, however, due to the fact that some complex thing or event, which for some reason attracts attention, is taken as a whole to be the effect of which we seek the cause, or the cause of which we seek the effect; and thus the demands that a cause should immediately precede its effect, that it should cease to exist upon the occurrence of its effect, and that their relation should be absolutely invariable, are sacrificed.
There is no regular correlative to the Greek words aitia, aition. The term which comes nearest in meaning to effect is apobainon; but snmbainon or epomenon, which also signify consequence, are more commonly used as correlatives. Aitia itself is used from the beginning in all the three senses afterwards distinguished by Aristotle as 'efficient,' 'final,' and 'formal' causes. It thus includes somewhat more of the meaning of reason than commonly belongs to the Latin and modern terms, being used in answer to the four different questions: What existed previously from which we might have inferred that this would happen? (efficient cause); With what purpose was this done? or, What good result does this produce? (final cause); What are the properties which make this thing what it is? (formal cause). All these meanings have in common the implications (a) that from a knowledge of the fact called cause, the existence of a fact, having the nature denoted by this, might have been inferred; (b) that the cause itself is capable of existence, being thus distinguished from a mere reason or ground; but one or other of the additional meanings, which distinguish the above questions, seems in general to have been vaguely included under the term. Before Aristotle, the chief points worthy of notice are (a) that the pre-Socratic philosophers made little use of the term, chiefly using the word arch, in a sense most nearly analogous to Aristotle's material cause, to denote an existent thing, generally conceived as prior in time to all others, but also existing along with them, and such that its existence was necessary to theirs, but not vice versa; (b) that in Plato strong emphasis is laid on those two meanings of aitia, in which it denotes either the reason why a thing is what it is, i.e. the qualities whose presence justifies us in calling it by the same name as other things, or the reason why a thing ought to exist. It was the method of Socrates which drew attention to these two questions. Aristotle distinguished by name four different kinds of cause, for each of which he has several synonyms, of which the following are perhaps the most important: (a) ulh or ex ou gig etai, material cause; (b) eidoV, logoV, to ti hn einai, formal cause; (c) arch thV kinhsewV, efficient cause; (d) teloV, to ou eneka, final cause. (i) The first of these conceptions is derived from the popular distinction of the material, out of which a thing is made as one of its causes. This does, of course, generally exist unshaped, before a thing is made out of it; and it is this fact of its priority in time which allows it to acquire the name of cause. But to philosophical analysis it soon became doubtful whether such priority can be ascribed to it universally; and hence in Aristotle it rather denotes one of the elements of an actually existing thing, without any prominent implication that it existed before the thing in question. It is distinguished from the other three causes in that, from a knowledge of its existence, you could not infer the existence of any particular thing, although it could not exist, unless some particular thing existed. (ii) The eidoV, meaning originally the visible qualities, particularly the shape, and hence also the other qualities, which distinguish one kind of thing from another kind, was conceived by Plato as existing eternally, separately from the things resembling it, which from time to time came into existence; and though he distinguishes eternity from everlasting duration, he does undoubtedly commonly regard the eidoV as prior in time to that which it 'informs.' Aristotle denies its separate existence; and with this its priority in time is also strictly destroyed, so that it becomes the mere correlative of ulh, denoting that one of the two elements composing an actually existing thing from which the existence of that thing could be inferred. Neither Plato nor Aristotle clearly distinguish the two meanings covered by this phrase, both of which they seem to affirm: (a) that the combination in the eidoV of certain properties is the reason why those properties are combined in things resembling it; (b) that the existence of the eidoV is the reason of the existence of things resembling it. (iii) The efficient or 'moving' cause is a thing which existed in time before that of which it is the cause. It thus corresponds to cause as now used, and defined above. (iv) In the conception of 'final' cause are mingled the three different senses which may be conveyed by the two questions given above. A final cause is (a) that for the sake of which a thing ought to exist, i.e. either the good qualities which the thing itself possesses (eidoV), or some other good thing of which it is the efficient cause; (b) that for the sake of which a given thing was produced by some intelligence; (c) the design, considered as a mental fact, which was the efficient cause of its production. It is only the failure to distinguish (c) from (b) which explains why the final cause was thought to be a cause at all, and why Aristotle regarded his ultimate final cause as also the ultimate cause of all motion. On the other hand, both Plato and Aristotle do generally regard that which is desired, and not our desire of it, as both final and efficient cause of the actions which lead to its attainment. It is through this confusion of (c) with (b) that (a) also comes to be regarded as capable of being an efficient cause, since (a) is identified with (b) both by Plato and Aristotle, on the ground that no one ever desires anything but what he at least thinks to be good. A further identification of the formal with the final cause, of which the grounds are to be found both in (a) and (b), leads to the curious paradox that both formal and efficient cause may be sometimes regarded as not prior but subsequent in time to that of which they are the cause. Partly as uniting the functions of formal and efficient cause, and partly in virtue of its own importance as defined by (a), the final cause was supposed to be more truly a cause than any other; and this position was generally maintained by the Stoics, as well as by the schools of Plato and Aristotle. The Epicureans, on the other hand, tended to restrict the term cause to things which could be observed regularly to precede in time. And some of the later sceptics, also in opposition to the Stoics, pointed out that cause and effect (under the names aition and pascon) are mutually dependent, thus denying to cause that logical priority which belongs to it in most of the Aristotelian senses. The Aristotelian tradition, however, remained substantially unaltered throughout the middle ages; but with the Renaissance and the growth of natural science important modifications began to appear. The material cause, as such, soon drops entirely out of sight, its place being taken by the notion of substance, which is not indeed generally denied to be a cause, but is regarded as contributing nothing to the definition of the term, since a cause must be an explanation why different things exist, in spite of their having one substance in common. This search for a cause, in the sense of something which accounts for differences, and will thus enable you to predict future changes, naturally throws the emphasis on cause in the sense of efficient cause. Accordingly we find that Bacon, though insisting on the importance of the search for forms or formal causes, regards this rather as an inquiry into the exact nature of efficient causes, by means of which you will be able to recognize each when you see it; and with regard to final causes, while not denying their existence, he strongly insists on their uselessness for the purpose of prediction, by which he must be understood to imply that we are incapable of discovering what the final causes of things are, not that, if known, inferences could not be drawn from them. As Bacon had ceased to use formal cause to denote one existent thing from which the existence of another could be inferred, so this term, like material cause, soon dropped out of use; and throughout modern philosophy only efficient and final causes have continued to be discussed. The meaning of the former has grown increasingly definite in the direction of definition (1); and the word cause, if used alone, is always to be understood as efficient cause.
The modern history of final and efficient causes may be conveniently divided as follows: -- (i) Final cause was most exactly defined by Leibnitz. He held that every real change is caused by a desire for the best possible -- either by God's desire for what is actually so, or by a finite spirit's desire for what it thinks to be so. But he seems to have considered that any desire, even if not for the best, would deserve the name of cause, though none such actually exist. That every change must be caused by a desire, and that in this world all changes are caused by a desire for the best possible, are propositions both included by him under the name 'law of SUFFICIENT REASON' (q.v.). He thus professes to have reduced all apparently efficient to final causation, but he is even less clear than Aristotle as to whether the object desired or the desire of it is to be regarded as final cause. The latter, the desire, he treats as an efficient cause, with this peculiarity -- that he denies its effect to follow from it necessarily. Since, however, he insists that a like desire always will produce a like effect, he preserves freedom only in name. This reservation he made in opposition to Spinoza, who denied final causes only in the sense in which they contradict necessity. Since Kant, the term end, which is more commonly used than final cause, has had a still vaguer meaning. The ambiguity as to whether it denotes part of the mental fact called desire, or the object of desire, still continues, and to this is added the further ambiguity that it is used to imply that the object of the desire is good, although it is now recognized that we do not always desire even what we think good. It is often used also to cover a mere good effect, without the express condition that this was either an effect or an object of desire. Some hold, with Leibnitz, that teleological causation is not incompatible with, but only more true than, mechanical, although they recognize, with Spinoza, that mechanical causation involves necessity; others deny the possibility of prediction in the case of actions determined by ends. See TELEOLOGY. (ii) The first prominent question raised in modern philosophy with regard to efficient causes was that connected with 'occasional causes.' The growth of the mechanical sciences had emphasized the fact that the causes and effect there dealt with might be regarded as equal quantities of some one quality, namely, that belonging to extended things as such. Descartes regarded the quality which was common to cause and effect in all such cases as one substance, and postulated that the causal relation could only hold between things which had such a common quality. This postulate, however, plainly did not hold between body and mind; and yet the more fundamental proposition, that a cause was that from the prior existence of which you could certainly infer the subsequent existence of something else, and vice versa, just as plainly did apply to the relation between impressions on the sense-organs and sensations on the one hand, and between the will and bodily movements on the other. Accordingly Descartes' followers, most prominently Geulincx, regarded mental and bodily states, in relation to each other, as a different kind of cause -- occasional as distinguished from efficient -- and they further postulated God as actually efficient in bringing about the invariable correspondence between occasional causes and their effects. This discussion renders it obvious that the possibility of reciprocal inference between two existents, i.e. their necessary connection, is not sufficient to define cause and effect; for since such inference is possible between simultaneous states of body and mind, it is necessary, in order to distinguish cause from effect, that we should include in our definition not only succession in time, but also identity in substance. The necessity for a new name to denote the relation between body and mind, and of a cause to account for their correspondence, is not equally obvious. Leibnitz also held that substances could not interact, but he also excepts God from the rule, in order to provide a cause for the correspondence of finite substances. A new question with regard to causality was raised by Hume, who declared effect to mean simply what habit led us to expect. He thus denied a necessary connection, i.e. the possibility of inference, between any two existent things; but since he himself assumes this relation to hold between habit and the expectations it produces, his discussion is rather to be regarded as an inquiry into what reasons we have for supposing particular things to be causes and effects, than an inquiry into the meaning of the terms. Such inquiries have been very frequent since. For our purpose the chief importance of Hume's results lies in the fact that they led Kant to make a detailed investigation of causality, from which it appeared not only that states of one substance, not substances themselves, could alone be causes and effects, but also that the necessary, in a sense in which the invariable correspondence of bodily and mental states is not necessary, since the validity of the former is implied in the truth of ordinary judgments of perception.
Since Kant, speculations on the subject have chiefly taken the two following directions: -- (a) The attempt to show that succession in time is not necessarily involved in any valid inference from existent to existent, but that, on the contrary, the true cause is, as Spinoza thought, an existent reason or ground of all other things. To this view Kant gave countenance by his inconsistent application of the term to things-in-themselves and to reason. (b) The discussion as to whether complex things or their states are causes, and, if the former, whether their causality is 'transeunt' or 'immanent,' i.e. whether they can or cannot produce effects on other things. With this question is closely connected the distinction between cause and 'necessary condition'; the question with regard to plurality of causes for one effect, and the plurality of effects from one cause; the question whether the whole state of the universe at any one moment must not be regarded as the only complete cause of any particular effect at the next; and the question whether a quantitative equality between cause and effect is necessary. On none of these points has any general agreement been attained. (G.E.M.)
In the usage of science we find three ways of locating a cause with reference to its effect, distinguished by Wundt (Logik). (i) The cause is a thing; (ii) it is a force; (iii) cause and effect are regularly connected processes or changes. For example, the cause of the fall of a stone is (i) the earth, (ii) the force of gravitation, (iii) the earlier process of raising the stone to the position from which it falls. (K.G.)
Literature: ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics; HUME, Treatise on Human Nature,
Bk. I; KANT, Krit. d. reinen Vernunft; LOTZE, Metaphysik, Bk. I; SIGWART, Logik.
See also BIBLIOG. B, I, c; 2, c. (G.E.M.)
Cause Theory (of mind
and body): Ger. Theorie der Wechselwirkung; Fr. doctrine de l'influx
(physique), or de l'influence naturelle; Ital. teoria dell'
interazione. The theory that the conscious processes and the nervous processes
which arise in immediate connection with each other are in some way causally
related. Either they are supposed to be relatively independent agencies in mutual
interaction, or one of them is supposed to act causally upon the other. Cf.
MIND AND BODY. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)