Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
Flexor and Extensor Muscles [Lat. flectere, to bend, and extendere, to stretch out]: Ger. Beugmuskel, Streckmuskel; Fr. muscle fléchisseur, muscle extenseur; Ital. muscolo flessore ed estensore. Muscles that either bend (flexor) or straighten out (extensor) a joint.
A pair of muscles, one flexor and the other extensor, are called antagonistic
muscles. Cf. ANTAGONISM. A common German expression is 'Beuger und Strecker.'
For a list of flexor and extensor muscles see Quain's Anatomy. (C.F.H.)
Flexure [Lat. flexura, a bending]: Ger. Krümmung; Fr. courbure; Ital. flessione. (1) The deviation from a straight line in the axis of a body, especially of the medullary tube. (2) The regions of such bending in the embryonic brain; cf. BRAIN (Embryology).
The future configuration of the brain is largely determined by these flexures,
which are necessitated by inequalities in the development of the different segments
of the medullary tube, especially in the lateral zones. (H.H.)
Flicker [AS. flicerian, to flutter]: Ger. Flimmern (Flackern, Flattern); Fr. papillotement; Ital. scintillio, scintillamento. A visual perception whose condition is intermittence or intensive alternation of stimuli, within certain time limits.
The limit of flicker, according to Helmholtz, on rotating disks is passed, in diffuse daylight or intense lamplight, at a speed of 40-50 rotations in one sec.; in moonlight or candlelight, at a speed of 20. Other authorities, however (e.g. Cattell), consider these figures incorrect. Flicker has auditory and tactual analogues in beating and tickle, and, like them, is unpleasant. Cf. PHOTOMETRY (methods of). (E.B.T.- J.M.B.)
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 489; EBBINGHAUS,
Psychol., 243; KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol., 250; SANFORD, Course in
Exper. Psychol., expt. 161; FICK, in Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., III.
i. 215; BELLARMINOW, Arch. f. Ophthal., XXXV. i. 25 ff.; MARBE, Philos.
Stud., ix. 384 ff., &c.; SZILI, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., iii. 359 ff.;
SCHAPRINGER, ibid., v. 385 ff.; SCHENCK, Pflüger's Arch., 1xiv ff.
Fluctuations of Attention [Lat. fluctuare, to move to and fro]: Ger. Schwankungen der Aufmerksamkeit; Fr. oscillations de l'attention; Ital. oscillazioni dell' attenzione. If a stimulus of minimal intensity (watch-tick at some distance, flow of sand, tuning-fork tone, liminal smell, &c.) or of minimal difference from its surroundings (light grey on white, dark on black) is steadily attended to, the sensation is found to disappear and reappear at irregular intervals; this is attributed to variations or 'fluctuations' of the attention.
Attempts have been made to give a peripheral explanation of the phenomenon (fatigue and recuperation of the sense organ); but differential experiments have supported the hypothesis that the fluctuations are of central origin. (E.B.T.)
Literature: SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expts. 61 b, 140 c;
WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 295. The first investigation was made
by URBANTSCHITSCH (cf. ATTENTION, experiments on). The first systematic tests
were carried out by N. LANGE, Philos. Stud., iv. 390 ff. See also BUCCOLA, La
legge del tempo nei fenomeni psichici (1883); DE SANCTIS, Atti Soc. Antropol.
Roma (1897); H. ECKENER, Philos. Stud., viii. 343 ff.; K. MARBE, ibid., viii.
615 ff.; E. PACE, ibid., viii. 388 ff.; J. B. HYLAN, Psychol. Rev., iii. 56
ff., and Monog. Suppl., VI; H. O. COOK, Amer. J. of Psychol., xi. 119 ff.; H.
MÜNSTERBERG, Beitr. z. exper. Psychol., ii. 69 ff. See also ATTENTION (experiments
on). (E.B.T.- E.M.- L.M.)
Folie [Fr.]: Ger. Wahnsinn, Verrücktheit; Fr. (as in topic); Ital. follia, pazzia (scientific). The French term for madness or insanity; but referring more particularly to the loss of reason involved in the disorder.
Alienation ('aliénation mentale') is a broader term which refers to
all forms of mental changes, of whatever origin or nature. Many forms of mental
disease have been first or chiefly described by the French; and for these the
French terms are current. Of these may be mentioned folie circulaire, or recurrent
or alternating insanity, characterized by the alternation of periods of excitement
and depression; folie à deux, or communicated insanity, insanity affecting
two or more persons, generally of the same family, at once; folie du doute,
or DOUBTING MANIA (q.v.); folie épidémique, or epidemic insanity,
&c. In addition many of the French equivalents for forms of mental disease
are composed of the term folie with an appropriate context: folie des grandeurs,
folie des ivrognes, folie épileptique, folie simulée, &c.
Folk-lore (the English word is used in all the other languages). Folk-lore has been defined as 'the comparison and identification of the survivals, in modern ages, of archaic beliefs, customs, and traditions' (Gomme).
The word was invented by W. J. Thoms (1846), from folk + lore, after analogy with German compounds. In all civilizations there is a considerable part of the population whose habits of thought are relatively unaffected by the advances of culture, and who retain, by tradition and the conservatism of custom, something of the mental and material life of bygone periods of development. The collection of the customs, superstitions, myths, and lore of this 'unlearned and least advanced portion of the community,' and the systematic exposition and interpretation of these in the light of historical civilizations, of analogous primitive conditions among savages, and as an aid to the ethnology of races, is the object of the study of folk-lore. In one aspect folk-lore is not so much a special collection of facts, as a special mode of viewing them -- namely, as survivals or mental relics of past ages, as things existing in our time, but not of it. It is thus a subdivision of anthropology, which considers similar material in its general aspects. The special material of folk-lore has been divided by Gomme into: (1) Superstitious beliefs and practice; (2) Traditional customs; (3) Traditional narratives; (4) Folk-sayings. Each of these in turn is much subdivided: the superstitions in regard to nature, plants, animals, goblins, witches, magic, &c.; festival, ceremonial, local customs and games; nursery tales, hero tales, creation, deluge, fire-myths; ballads, songs, place legends; jingles, nursery rhymes, riddles, proverbs, nicknames, place rhymes.
Literature: GOMME, The Handbook of Folk-lore (1890), and Ethnology in
Folk-lore (1892); FRAZER, The Golden Bough; A. LANG, Custom and Myth; Publications
of the Folk-lore Society; and more special references given in the works cited.
Folk Psychology: Ger. Völkerpsychologie; Fr. psychologie des peuples; Ital. demopsicologia, psicologia etnica (E.M.). The psychology of races, nations, or analogous social groups.
Folk psychology is specifically the study of the mental products in primitive peoples, and is thus closely related to anthropology and to folk-lore. The chapters of general anthropology which deal mainly with intellectual organizations, such as myth, legend, animism, religion, the beginnings of art and science, furnish much of the material. The effect of climate on mental endowments, the evolution of national characteristics, the analysis of mental processes in undeveloped peoples, and many other topics of similar import belong as definitely in this field as in any other. It is not possible to differentiate sharply the content of folk psychology from other parts of anthropology, and yet the term suggests a point of view and an interest which is important and readily intelligible.
Folk psychology is to be distinguished from SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.), which is concerned generally with the part played by the social factor in determining mental development. The term folk psychology is traceable to Steinthal and Lazarus, who planned and edited the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (1860). They did not, however, distinguish clearly between folk psychology and social psychology. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)
It is desirable that the term folk psychology should be retained in this sense in preference to RACE PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.), since the latter has been given the different meaning -- designating the science of the evolution of mind in the animals and man -- by Spencer (Princ. of Psychol.), and since no other suitable term with this meaning has been suggested. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Literature: WAITZ, Völkerpsychol.; STEINTHAL and LAZARUS in Zeitsch.
f. Völkerpsychol.; LE BON, Psychol. of Peoples (Eng. trans.); TOSTI, Psychol.
Rev., v. 347; WUNDT, Völkerpsychol., I. i, ii (1900); SCHULTZE, Psychol.
d. Naturvölker (1900). Much psychological material of this character is
to be found in the general works cited under ANTHROPOLOGY; see particularly
STEINTHAL, Grammatik, Logik, u. Psychol. (1855); LAZARUS, Das Leben d. Seele
(3rd ed., 1883); BASTIAN, Der Mensch in d. Gesch. (3 vols., 1860), Beitr. z.
Ethnol. (1871), Geographische u. ethnol. Bilder (1873), Der Völkergedanke
(1881), Wie das Volk denkt (1892), Ethnol. Bilderbuch (1887), and Allerlei aus
Volks- u. Menschenkunde (1888). (J.J.- J.M.B.)
Fool [Lat. follis, a bellows, a wind-bag]:
Ger. Narr; Fr. fol, fou; Ital. scemo, scimunito.
Used popularly as a term of disparagement in reference to mental ability; more
exactly to refer to one defective in judgment and reasoning power, but not to
a sufficient degree to merit the term imbecile or idiot. It implies low capacity
for rational action, accompanied by a harmless, innocent disposition. See IDIOCY,
and IMBECILITY. (J.J.)
Left to itself, every particle of matter would move only in a straight line, with uniform velocity. Hence change of this uniform motion occurs only under the action of some cause, and this cause, and at the present time this alone, is, in physics, called force.
The matter of our own bodies is subject to its action, and through this fact, together with the muscular sense, do we become conscious of the action of force. If a weight is held in the hand, we are conscious of a cause acting on the muscles tending to overcome the muscular power we exert, and of an effort necessary to resist this action.
Fundamental laws of force are these: -- (1) It acts only between bodies; no body ever changes its motion except under the influence of some other body. (2) The action takes place in right lines; in the case of each particle of a body this line is that in which the force acting on the particle impels it to move. (3) The action along every such line is mutual; the line passes from the particle, A, acting to that acted on, B; and then B exerts an equal action on A along the same line, but in the opposite direction.
A ______________________________ B
If A and B are the acting particles, A can impel B only in the direction AB or BA; and then B impels A equally in the opposite direction, BA or AB. If A attracts B, B attracts A equally; if A repels B, B repels A equally; if A presses against B, B presses equally against A. This law is that of action and reaction.
The ideal measure of a force is the change of velocity which it is competent
to produce in a body acted on by no other force, and entirely free to move.
The unit is the force which, acting on a unit-mass during a unit of time, will
produce a unit of velocity. But as all bodies accessible to us are acted on
by gravity, which causes them to fall when free to move, this measure is not
the practical one. Practically a force is measured by the weight which it will
balance. Cf. ENERGY, with which force is often confused. (S.N.)
Force (figurative meanings) and Condition. Used, as in SOCIAL FORCE (q.v.), moral force, economic force, &c., with much ambiguity. When so used the word should lose its physical connotation; and the fact of agency should be defined in terms of the material and changes peculiar to the sphere in which the force is said to work.
Force means that which produces a change of rest or motion; and the sorts of forces are those producers of change which manifest themselves under different but constant physical conditions. We speak of mental, sociological, &c., forces in the analogous case of change in phenomena of one of these several orders; and to give the term any intelligible meaning we must keep within the particular order of phenomena as strictly as does the physicist in defining his forces always in terms of motion in space which determines other motion in space. In other words, the force is intrinsic or internal to the movement in which it is said to be exerted.
Thus social forces are social grounds of social change; moral forces, moral grounds of moral change, &c. The real force in the particular case is often confused with the extraneous conditions which limit them or interfere with them. Variations in agricultural conditions which limit production are not economic forces; the farmer's changed expenditures, conditional upon agricultural variations, are economic forces. So also, brain-changes are not psychological forces. The President is not a political force, though his message to Congress is.
These figurative meanings given to the word force carry confusion throughout
the borderlands of the sciences generally; we find such confusion between biological
and BIONOMIC FORCES (q.v.); between social and SOCIONOMIC FORCES (q.v.); between
psychological and PSYCHONOMIC FORCES (q.v.). We recommend the carrying out of
the distinction suggested under the terms cited (ending in 'nomic,' Gr. nomoV)
into the various spheres where the separation may be made between forces proper
to the group of phenomena of a science and those of another group and science
which limit or in any way condition the former. This preliminary distinction
would go some way towards settling many of the disputed questions of the demarcation
of the bounds of the sciences. (J.M.B.)
Force (political). (1) Compulsion exercised by the state. See SOVEREIGNTY, and GOVERNMENT; also FORCE (figurative meanings). (J.M.B.)
(2) When the opinions or aims of a part of the nation exert an influence on the action of the governing body, that part of the nation is said to be a force in politics, or a political force. More strictly, the expression should be 'a section of opinion, &c., has (not is) a political force,' i.e. exerts political influence.
The expression has become current only in recent times; but we find the germ
of it in such passages of Bentham as the Parliamentary Reform Catechism
(1818), 150, § 7: 'The sense of the whole body of the people cannot be
adequately conformed to by their representatives except in so far as the suffrage
of each person has a force and effect' equal to that of every other. The meaning
of 'a political force' was essentially conveyed by the Times (London)
when it declared (Nov. 18, 1843) that the Anti-Corn-Law League was 'a great
fact. He who frames laws must to some extent consult' it. (J.B.)
Foreign (in law) [Fr. forain]: Ger. ausländisch;
Fr. étranger; Ital. straniero. Pertaining to a foreign
sovereignty. 'The several states of the United States are, as respects their
relations to each other, excepting only such of these as are regulated by the
constitution of the United States, independent and foreign sovereignties' (Fisher
v. Fielding, 67 Connecticut Reports, 105). A corporation chartered by
one state is therefore a foreign corporation in every other. (S.E.B.)
If God, according to our idea, must be omniscient, as theology contends, then he must be as fully aware of the future as of the past, and therefore possesses foreknowledge. This conclusion has had great importance for religious thought on account of the manner in which it has been applied to 'the plan of salvation.' If God's foreknowledge be a determining element in the salvation of mankind, what room is left for spiritual freedom in men? This problem, running back to the writings of Plato, has produced endless discussion; for instance, as between Calvinists and Arminians. Philosophically, the questions connected with foreknowledge are secondary; that is to say, they depend upon the solution of the problem of omnipresence. According to the answer given to this will the speculative view of foreknowledge be. Cf. ATTRIBUTES (of God), CALVINISM, and GOD (in theology).
Literature: A. B. BRUCE, The Providential Order of the World, lect.
x; K. MÜLLER, Die göttl. Zuvorersehung u. Erwählung; SCHLEIERMACHER,
Glaubenslehre; SANDAY and HEADLAM, Commentary on Romans, 214 f., 310, 342 f.;
BEYSCHLAG, Die paulin. Theodicee, Römer, ix-xi; and Theol. of the N. T.
(Eng. trans.); JOWETT, St. Paul's Epistles, ii. 483 f.; DORNER, Syst. of Christ.
Doctrine (Eng. trans.). (R.M.W.)
Forensic domicile: a domicile assigned or selected for the purpose of investing
a particular court with jurisdiction in a particular case. Forensic medicine:
the application of medical science to aid in determining questions of legal
right or responsibility; legal medicine or medical jurisprudence. (S.E.B.)
Although the relation of God to the world and to man, implied in the term fore-ordination, has been argued oftener from the standpoint of theology than from that of philosophy, the problem belongs essentially in the philosophical field; that is, all theological replies involve philosophical presuppositions. The first striking feature of the question is its ubiquity. Under varying aspects, but with substantially identical implications, we find it in the oriental doctrine of metempsychosis, in Plato, in the Stoics, in the ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL (q.v.); among the PHARISEES and ESSENES (q.v.); in the theology of Mohammedanism. Among Christians, it is systematized by Augustine, whose treatment is almost entirely theological. From him it passes over to the scholastic doctors, especially to Thomas Aquinas, who attempts to provide a philosophical basis for Augustine's conclusions by means of the doctrine of 'concurrence.' Here necessity is modified, as regards man, by enthroning the human will (voluntary) as the proximate cause of action, although this was determined originally by God. In post-Reformation times the theological aspect of the doctrine once more ousts the philosophical, and in Calvin we have a new Augustine. This theological interest has dominated till the present time.
Philosophy will be ready to attack the problem again only when, in the light of a constructive criticism of evolution, the abstract, external deity of the middle ages, which is still the God of much theology, has given place to a more worthy, not to say rational, conception. The failure of Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer to further the solution of the problem must be traced to their inability to advance beyond a shadowy verbal Theism, or an abstract agnostic Monism. See AUGUSTINIANISM, CALVINISM, and DETERMINISM.
Literature: PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion (Eng. trans.), iv. 29 f.;
VATKE, Die menschl. Freiheit; A. SABATIER, L'Apôtre Paul, 347 f.; AQUINAS,
Summa, Quaest. 29; MOZLEY, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination; EDWARDS,
Free Will; CHANNING, The Moral Argument against Calvinism; MÜLLER, Christ.
Doctrine of Sin (Eng. trans.); McCOSH, Meth. of Divine Government; DORNER, Syst.
of Christ. Doctrine (Eng. trans.), i. 188 f. (where full literature is given).
It may be due to decay of mental dispositions, or to other conditions. It is a normal limitation of memory, not such a defect as would illustrate AMNESIA (q.v.). See also MEMORY (defects of).
Form and Formalism (in aesthetics): Ger. Form, Formalismus; Fr. forme, formalisme; Ital. forma, formalismo. A shape or figure, as in a painting or group of statuary; and hence the arrangement or disposition of the parts of an object or series, as contrasted with the matter or content, is its form.
There are three elements of which aesthetics takes account in estimating aesthetic value: (i) The sensuous impression, as the colour, or lustre, or sound (tone-colour); (ii) the form, viz. the arrangement of these elements; (iii) the ideal content or significance. Emphasis on either of these to the exclusion of the others gives respectively impressionism (colourists), formalism, idealism (as against formalism, but not in the sense in which it is opposed to realism). Form may be considered either in relations of quantity, under which fall rhythm, proportion, symmetry, greatness of extension or power, &c.; or in relations of quality, embracing harmony, variety, &c. In general, it may be said that the aesthetic value of the formal aspect of beauty is based upon two principles: (1) positive stimulation, or heightening of mental activity, as in the case of the sublime; (2) ease of apperception, which is furthered by a correspondence on the part of the object to the general characteristics of all mental activity, such as unity in variety, and the rhythmic nature of attention. Cf. FEELING, PLEASURE (aesthetic), and the specific topics cited above.
As indicated under the topic BEAUTY, the Greeks placed supreme value upon form, i.e. upon order, limit, measure, symmetry, harmony, in the conduct of life as well as in the products of art. This found recognition in Plato's preference for pure (geometrical) forms, and in his statements that every art and craft and organism is full of rhythm and harmony and grace, or beautiful form (euschmosunh), and that tragedy is the arranging of its elements in a manner suitable to each other and to the whole. This last demand received more definite formulation in Aristotle's definition of tragedy as 'a whole action,' which has beginning, middle, and end.
Aristotle makes the general statement also that beauty depends on size and order; and again, that the main species of beauty are order, symmetry, definite limitation. The art and literary criticism of the 17th and 18th centuries laid great emphasis upon form, and the principle of unity in variety was frequently accepted as the adequate explanation of beauty. The admiration for Greek art, especially sculpture, furthered the tendency towards the emphasizing of formal beauty. Kant expressly excluded the sensuous element from a claim to aesthetic value, and while admitting the value of the ideal element, under the title of dependent beauty, still insisted that this was not in the proper sense aesthetic, but intellectual value. A 'pure judgment of taste' relates only to free beauty, and has as its determining ground merely the purposiveness of the form (i.e. the adaptation of the form to our mental powers). This gave the principle which was taken up by Herbart, and developed by Zimmermann, in opposition to the idealism of Schelling, Hegel, and Vischer. Herbart (e.g.) excluded from aesthetics the concepts of the charming, the noble, the pathetic, the touching, and others, as belonging not to the beautiful, but to the interesting. Zimmermann made this formalism more abstract in connection with the general Herbartian theory of Vorstellungen, or presentations, and stated as the most general aesthetic laws: (i) Under the form of quantity: the stronger presentation is the more pleasing; (ii) quality: prevailing identity of the formal elements pleases, opposition is unpleasant. Köstlin has made the most complete analysis of the elements of beautiful forms and of their various concrete embodiments, but is hardly a formalist. Fechner also, while examining aesthetic forms experimentally, is careful to give other factors due recognition. Helwig and Herckenrath represent a recent formal theory: 'Beauty is a mean.' See also BEAUTY, ART, CHARACTERISTIC, and EXPRESSION.
Literature: ZIMMERMANN, Gesch. d. Aesthetik (1858); Aesthetik als Form-Wissenschaft
(1865); VISCHER, Krit. Gänge, vi (1860); HARTMANN, Aesthetik, i. 267-303,
484-509 (1886); BOSANQUET, Hist. of Aesthetic (1892); FECHNER, Vorschule d.
Aesthetik, xxi (1876); KÖSTLIN, Aesthetik (1869); HELWIG, Eine Theorie
des Schönen (1897); HERCKENRATH, Problèmes d'Esthétique (1898);
SANTAYANA, The Sense of Beauty (1896); A. HILLEBRAND, Das Problem d. Form in
d. bildenden Kunst (2. Aufl., 1897); MARIO, L'Estetica (1896). (J.H.T.)
The question of form qualities has been stated and discussed by the writers cited below. Gestaltsqualität was suggested by Ehrenfels. Meinong used the term 'funded content' (fundirte Inhalt) for the same 'quality of form' considered as common (or funded) to different (funding) contents; as the form of the same melody played in different keys. Stout uses the phrase 'form of combination' as the English rendering; it avoids the ambiguity of the term 'quality.'
Literature: EHRENFELS, Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos. 1890, 249; MEINONG,
Zeitsch. f. Psychol., ii. 245; CORNELIUS, ibid., xxii. 101; LIPPS, ibid., xxii.
385; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., i. Bk. I. chap. iii; HÖFLER, Psychologie,
153. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Grammar is typical, since it considers primarily the correct forms for the
expression of thought, rather than the thought itself. For this reason, linguistic
studies in their early or grammatical stages are called 'formal,' whereas such
studies as history and geography are called concrete, since they deal chiefly
with facts and their relations. In varying degree all studies have their formal
as opposed to their concrete side; thus, mathematics is both pure and applied.
Cf. INSTRUCTION. (C.DE.G.)
This doctrine is used as a standing argument for so-called disciplinary education, especially that in pure mathematics and classical languages. The assumption is that if the student masters these, he will thereby acquire a mental power that can be applied almost equally well to any kind of practical or professional life. This gymnastic theory of education involves the idea that it does not matter upon what the mind is exercised, provided only the exercise be vigorous and long-continued. The inadequacy of the theory lies in the fact that it ignores or underestimates the importance of the choice of subjects, both for their gymnastic efficiency, and their ultimate worth in developing the individual. A life of crime develops acuteness of intellect, but it does not develop good citizens. Again, mental alertness in philology, or grammar, or higher algebra, does not insure corresponding altertness in those fields in which there is neither knowledge nor interest. The mind is never efficient in any department of endeavour in which either education or experience has not provided rich and abundant masses of apperceiving ideas.
Literature: HINSDALE, Disciplinary Studies, Proc. Natnl. Educ. Assoc.
(1894), 625-35; TOMPKINS, The Philos. of Teaching, 265; BAKER, Educational Values,
Proc. Natnl. Educ. Assoc. (1895), 197-203; ZILLER, Allg. Päd., 95-8. (C.DE.G.)
Formal Logic: Ger. formale Logik; Fr. logique formelle; Ital. logica formale. Usually identified with the Aristotelian logic (see below), and contrasted with material and empirical logic. (J.M.B.)
The notion of formal logic can only be determined historically. All logic is, and is admitted to be, formal in one sense -- as having to deal with the general laws and modes of thinking by which knowledge is constructed, and not with the special character which determines each type of concrete knowledge. On the recognition of such a distinction logic is based, and it constitutes the common element in all conceptions of logic. But so soon as it attempts to define more closely the object of logical treatment, and the method of treating it, differences of a fundamental kind appear, and only in reference to them is the notion of formal logic definable. In its modern significance, formal logic presents itself as of three distinct types.
(1) The first, which has perhaps obtained too readily a monopoly of the title, takes its origin in the Kantian philosophy, and in all its varieties bears more or less traces of Kant's way of distinguishing forms of thought from matter, and of isolating the function of thought. As this common, universal function of thought is identified, more or less closely, with the process of uniting diverse contents of consciousness through their partial agreement in a notion, or concept -- that is, is identified with generalization or abstract classification -- it follows that the laws of thought are contemplated as conditions involved in the formation of notions, and that the processes of thought, judgment, and reasoning are interpreted from the point of view of the notion as the unit involved. Historically this formal view found much with which it could amalgamate in the traditional, Aristotelian logic, which, though originally based on a different principle, gave great prominence to classification, and was indeed dominated by the ideal of knowledge as a completed classification. Of this first view, commonly called, in modern works, 'formal' or 'subjectively formal' logic, the best known representatives in English philosophy are Hamilton and Mansel. Hamilton's New Analytic is a development from the principle that all thinking is expression of the relations among notions, such relations being conceived as of classes to one another.
(2) A second type of formal logic is that expressed in Herbart's view of the logical treatment of thought, as isolating the content represented in thought, and viewing it in abstraction, either from the psychological processes by which thinking is produced, or from any metaphysical question as to real existence. It was natural that from this point of view the relation of position and negation in thought contents should have been made prominent, and have been at least co-ordinated in importance with the relations of greater and less generality. Theoretically, Herbart's view is the transition stage from the Kantian to the third modern type of formal logic.
According to this third type, the function of thought which is truly universal, and which alone is capable of complete isolation and perfectly abstract treatment, is that presented in the antithesis of positing and negating. Of all other relations in thought, however general, it may be said that they depend on the special content of the terms about which position and negation may be exercised. In this view, clearly, there is not involved any philosophical theory as to the nature of thought, nor is it dependent upon any psychology. It may be united with rationalism or with empiricism. It may work either with the mechanism of expression of thought contained in the Aristotelian logic, altering or modifying as is required, or by the adoption of some more or less symbolic method for representing its terms and the relations among them. Of this third type the representatives are Boole, Jevons, and generally modern exponents of SYMBOLIC LOGIC (q.v.), such as Venn and Schröder.
Literature: criticism and discussion of formal logic has generally had
reference to the first type, that more or less Kantian in character. On it,
pro and con, see MANSEL, Letters, &c., and Prolegomena Logica; UEBERWEG,
Logik (passim; Ueberweg carries out a continuous critique of the way in which
formal logic handles the main logical questions); TRENDELENBURG, Log. Untersuch.,
chap. ii; MILL, Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xx. (R.A.)
The distinctions between formal and material rightness, and between formal
and material wrong or sin, are connected with a view of morality which takes
into account, and treats as having a certain (at least relative) independence,
both the external manifestation of the act and the internal volition or intention.
The will or intention to do right constitutes formal rightness. But, owing to
intellectual deception, or physical hindrance, formal rightness may not always
issue in material rightness. Similarly, material rightness may be present without
formal. Cf. Rickaby, Mor. Philos., 33. For an illustration, see
Formal Steps (in method): Ger. formale Stufen; Fr. degrés formels; Ital. (not in use). The essential stages of a rational method; so called, because these steps are conceived to be a sort of formula for correct methods of teaching.
Herbart conceived four such formal steps, which he named Clearness, Association, System, and Method. Ziller and his followers subdivide differently, using less technical terms, as follows: Preparation, Presentation, Association, Generalization, Application. Cf. METHOD.
Literature: HIWET, Die formalen Stufen des Unterrichts; McMURRY, Method
of the Recitation; DE GARMO, Essentials of Method; HERBART, Sci. of Educ. (trans.
by Felkin), 126-8. (C.DE.G.)
Fortitude [Lat. fortitudo]: Ger. Tapferkeit; Fr. courage; Ital. fortezza d'animo. The name given (e.g. by Cicero) to the virtue of courage (andreia); one of the four cardinal virtues of the traditional classification.
Owing largely to the influence of the Christian moralists, whose doctrine was
affected by the social conditions of the Christians during the early centuries
of the empire, fortitudo, as a Christian virtue, came to signify more
especially the passive side of courage -- that of bearing pain and injury --
rather than the active courage shown in carrying out enterprises involving danger.
See COURAGE. (W.R.S.)
Fortune [Lat. fortuna]. A popular term
meaning variously destiny, fate, future ill-fortune or welfare of any sort.
Cf. NECESSITY, and PROVIDENCE. (J.M.B.)
Fortune physique (1), and Fortune morale
(2). French expressions, used also in other languages, for the distinction between
so-called objective or external (1), as contrasted with subjective or internal
(2), fortune or experience. Generalized to apply to the contrast between the
moral sphere, universe, or economy as a whole, and the physical. (J.M.B.)
Forum (in law) [Lat. forum, market-place]: Ger. Gerichtsstand, Jurisdiction; Fr. ressort, juridiction; Ital. foro, giurisdizione. (1) The tribunal having cognizance of a cause. (2) The territory of the sovereign having jurisdiction of a cause.
Lex fori: the law of that territory, applicable to the cause. This regulates the form of procedure.
Ordinarily personal actions are brought before a court, to the process of which
the defendant is subject; actor sequitur forum rei. This is the court
of his domicil, forum domicilii, or one within whose territorial jurisdiction
he is found, and served with process. Real actions are brought in the forum
rei sitae; criminal proceedings, commonly, in the forum delicti (commissi).
Fourier's Law: Ger. Fourier'sches Gesetz; Fr. loi de Fourier; Ital. legge di Fourier. A law of periodic vibration, formulated by the French mathematician Fourier (1768-1830), and reduced by Helmholtz to the following acoustical terms: -- Any vibratory movement of the air, corresponding to a musical tone, may be always (and in the given case only a particular manner) represented as the sum of a number of simple vibratory movements, corresponding to the partials of the musical tone.
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Sensations of Tone (Eng. trans.), 3rd., 34. (E.B.T.)
Fovea centralis [Lat.]: Ger. Netzhautgrube; Fr. fovea centralis; Ital. fovea centralis, fossa centrale. The central depression of the macula lutea or yellow spot of the retina, which consists here of little more than a single layer of attenuated cones.
The fovea is also called the 'spot of clearest vision,' since visual discrimination falls off towards the periphery of the retina. Cf. INDIRECT VISION, and VISION.
Literature: WALLER, Human Physiol., 410, 411; HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik
(2nd ed.), 34; in general, any work on physiological optics; SANDFORD, Course
in Exper. Psychol., expts. 111, 117; see also YELLOW SPOT. On the question of
the colouration and night-blindness of the fovea, see HERING, Pflüger's
Arch., liv. 281, lix. 403; KÖNIG, Sitzber. d. Berl. Akad. (June, 1894);
LADD FRANKLIN, Psychol. Rev., ii. 137; SHERMAN, Philos. Stud., xiii. 434; UHTHOFF,
Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xx. 326; and references cited above. (E.B.T.)
Corporate franchise: the rights granted by a charter of incorporation, or acquired by incorporation under general laws. Elective franchise: the right of suffrage. Formerly franchise was used also to denote the place within which the priviledge enjoyed was to be exercised. Thus the franchises of churches were the church enclosures within which the right of asylum existed.
A franchise is (except by special authority from the government) a personal
priviledge, and incapable of assignment. (S.E.B.)
The Order was founded 1210-23; a century later it is said to have attained a membership of over 200,000, and it had received many privileges from the Holy See. It is of importance in the history of mediaeval philosophy, because its doctors were realists as opposed to the nominalism of the Dominicans; and again, Scotists as opposed to Dominican Thomism. The Order came to be torn by internal strife regarding the interpretation of the vow of poverty, a strife which in 1415, and again in 1517, gave rise to two specially recognized divisions -- the Observants and the Conventuals. Among the distinguished thinkers of the Order have been Bonaventura, Alexander of Hales, William of Occam, and Roger Bacon.
Literature: the relative arts. in Herzog's Real-Encyc., and Encyc. Brit.,
9th ed.; MORIN, St. François et les Franciscains; LITTLE, The Grey Friars
in Oxford; HAURÉAU, De la Philos. scolastique, ii. 214 f. (R.M.W.)
Fraternity [Lat. frater, a brother]: Ger. (1) Brüderlichkeit, (2) Brüderschaft; Fr. fraternité; Ital. (1) fraternità, (2) frateria. (1) Brotherly feeling and conduct. (2) An organization supposed to be characterized in a high degree by brotherly feeling, e.g. Greek letter societies.
Some of oldest words in every language express the idea and sentiment of fraternity, which was the attitude of mind peculiarly characteristic of the CLAN (q.v.). The notion of a fraternity of all men became possible only after gentile organization gave place to civil and imperial. It was because of this transition that Stoic philosophy and the Christian religion inculcated the duty of striving for universal brotherhood. Fraternity, with liberty and EQUALITY (q.v.), became a shibboleth of the French Revolution. (F.H.G.)
Fraternity may be distinguished from equality as positive from negative. It
is the 'enthusiasm of humanity' not enforceable by law. The difficulties of
reconciling it with liberty and equality are brought out by J. Fitzjames Stephen,
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, chap. vi. (J.B.)
Loss must in fact result, before it is actionable, at law. In equity: any intentional
act or omission involving a breach of confidence or good faith, and naturally
resulting in loss to another. See Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, §
873. Actual fraud always involves untruth, but in equity there need not always
be moral culpability. Constructive fraud, in equity, is fraud imputed from reasons
of public policy by the rules of equity, where there is no proof of actual fraud
or wrongful intent; as where a trustee buys the property which it is his duty
to sell, although he may pay its full value. (S.E.B.)
Fraunhofer Lines: Ger. Fraunhofer'sche Linien; Fr. raies de Fraunhofer; Ital. linee di Fraunhofer. The colours of the solar SPECTRUM (q.v.) are not continuous; they are crossed vertically, at unequal intervals, by fine dark lines or bands. These lines, which mark the absence of certain degrees of refrangibility in the rays that reach us, are produced by the passage of light through incandescent vapours in the solar atmosphere. The chief Fraunhofer lines are a constant series of ten, named A, a, B, C, D, E, b, F, G, H. Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 287) gives the following table of corresponding wave-lengths (mm): --
A 760.400 extreme red.
B 686.853 red.
C 656.314 limit of red and orange.
D 589.625-589.023 golden yellow.
E 526.990 green.
F 486.164 cyan blue.
G 430.825 limit of indigo and violet.
H 386.879 limit of violet.
The lines were discovered by Wollaston in 1802; described by Fraunhofer in
1814; explained by Kirchhoff in 1859. They form the constants of all spectroscopic
Free and Freedom [AS. freo and freedom]: Ger. frei, Freiheit; Fr. libre, liberté; Ital. libero, libertà. The conception 'freedom' seems to imply first, negatively, the absence of external constraint; and second, positively, the power inherent in the object called 'free,' of following the laws of its own nature.
Further than this very general account, it is perhaps impossible to give an exact signification which will cover the allowable use of the term in all connections. The signification of the term tends to vary according to the kind of object called 'free.' (1) Movement is said to be free when unrestrained by any obstacle outside the moving body or its normal conditions; e.g. the movement of the limbs of an animal when unparalyzed and unbound.
(2) As applied to voluntary action, especially in choosing between alternatives, the question of the meaning of freedom leads to the controversy concerning free-will. See FREE-WILL CONTROVERSIES.
Here three views may be distinguished: (a) that volition is free when, and in so far as, it is due to the character and motives of the individual -- because it is his action (as distinguished from actions due to the application of external force, or to physiological reflex); (b) that the free volition is in some way and to some extent independent of motives -- being due to a self not entirely accounted for by character, motives, and circumstances; (c) that free action means action in accordance with reason, reason being thus regarded as a man's true self (Spinoza and Kant). See WILL.
(3) In political and ethico-political reasoning, different meanings of freedom
may be distinguished: (a) a nation is said to be free when not under
the rule of another nation, or when not subject to a tyrant who is above law;
(b) as referring to the relations of the citizens or people to the state.
Freedom (a) sometimes implies full political rights: a man is free who
has the 'franchise'; this signification is called political (or 'civil') freedom;
(b) sometimes it is used for what is called individual
freedom. This is commonly interpreted as implying the absence (so far as possible
or expedient) of interference with the individual by the government. And this
meaning is connected with the political ideal of INDIVIDUALISM (q.v.): that
the liberty of any individual should be restrained by the government only in
so far as necessary to prevent his interference with the like liberty of others
(Kant, Spencer). According to another view, which also takes freedom as its
ideal, this freedom must be not merely negative (freedom from interference),
but positive, and therefore implying a social order which provides, for the
individuals, opportunity for cultivating and exercising their capacities (cf.
T. H. Green, Works, ii. 308 ff.). (W.R.S.)
Free (in economics): Ger. frei; Fr. libre;
Ital. libero. Not subject to special acts of restrictive legislation,
e.g. free labour, that which is not under a special status like that of the
slave or apprentice; free trade, trade which is either untaxed or at any rate
not subject to discriminating taxes in favour of other trade. (A.T.H.)
Freedom (consciousness of): Ger. Freiheitsgefühl;
Fr. sentiment or expérience intime de la liberté;
Ital. sentimento della libertà. The consciousness that a decision
arises from the self, and not from conditions in any way foreign to the self.
See FREE AND FREEDOM, and WILL. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)
Freedom has been discussed by theologians in every age, and the subject is so large that it is impracticable to enter upon it historically here. It may be said, generally, that, when separated from 'moralism,' the theological treatment of freedom has been developed along two lines, a negative and a positive. (1) Negative: this aspect of the matter has consisted chiefly in criticism of metaphysical views, which imperil, or are supposed to imperil, the foundations of dogma, even although deterministic theologians, like Luther, have not been wanting. As a rule, Pantheism, naturalism, and evolutionary Agnosticism have been attacked in turn. (2) Positive: here the problem has been to reconcile the antinomy between God's overruling power, especially as regards man's salvation, and human freedom. It has been held that, while man is free, divine justice demands a restriction of the freedom of the lawless (sinful) will, a view which reappears in many guises. Again, the antinomy may be overcome by supposing that God is conditioned by free human causality, but that, at the same time, he is not passive in this process, because, being God, he mediates it. God's life and man's are distinct; and God's plan with man is to lift him from less to more complete freedom. In a word, man, though free in his own action, cannot be viewed as the author of his freedom, for God cannot but be the cause whence man's free causality proceeds. This is held to be shown by the growth in strength for the realization of ideals which the good man enjoys. Schleiermacher's psychological 'determinism' is a reaction against old dualistic views, and may be said to initiate modern tendencies. The conclusions still remain obscure or unsatisfactory, mainly because the relation of mankind and men to God and his plan has not been analysed sufficiently and without pre-possession. Humanity and individuals can hardly be regarded as free or unfree in precisely the same sense.
Literature: DORNER, Syst. of Christ. Doctrine (Eng. trans.), ii. 106
f., iii. 10. (R.M.W.)
Free-thought and Freethinkers: Ger.
Freidenken, Freidenker; Fr. libre pensé, libres
penseurs; Ital. libero pensiero, liberi pensatori. Untrammelled
rational reflection on matters of religion, apart from, or in defiance of, dogmatic
authority, together with the negative results of such reflection; and those
who advocate it. Specifically, the rejection, on the basis of such reflection,
of the distinctive doctrines of Christian revelation. The term is characteristically
used in designation of 18th-century Deism. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Frenzy [Gr. frenhsiV, inflammation of the brain]: Ger. Raserei; Fr. fièvre chaude (popular), manie aiguë (scientific); Ital. frenesia. An agitation of the brain, which renders the individual temporarily delirious or deranged.
It is used mainly in a popular sense for extreme maniacal excitement, aroused
perhaps by anger, passion, and the like; but it also retains an older usage,
in which it is regarded as equivalent to a temporary madness or derangement.
Friendship was a specially prominent feature of Greek life. Philosophical schools, such as the Pythagorean and Epicurean, were constituted as societies of friends, and two books (viii, ix) of Aristotle's Ethics were devoted to the topic, which was afterwards discussed by Cicero and many other moralists. Its position in modern life is hardly so conspicuous, owing to the larger part played by domestic life, and perhaps also to the more varied organizations for different purposes entailed by the complexity of modern society. At the same time, the word is often used in a wide sense: sometimes it means little more than acquaintance; sometimes it is used with reference to any object of benevolent interest (where reciprocity is hardly possible) -- thus men are called friends of the poor, of their country, of mankind, of art, of religion. The stricter sense of the word implies both some intensity, and also reciprocity, of sentiment. This does not necessarily involve (as in the Pythagorean and in the early Christian society) community of goods, but it does involve readiness to serve and benefit one another. Nor does it require equality of age, or of social position, or of business, or even of opinion, though, when these are absent, friendship is less commonly met with. But it does seem to require a certain harmony of sentiment or of character; though the harmony may be due not so much to any striking similarity, as to the two characters being complementary.
Aristotle's division of friends, according as they have pleasure, utility,
or the good as their object, and his recognition of the last as the only true
kind, serve to bring out the characteristic which gives to friendship its value
in the moral life. (W.R.S.)
Fries, Jacob Friedrich. (1773-1843.) German
philosopher. Born at Barby, educated at Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Jena. In
1801 he lectured in Jena. He travelled in Germany, Switzerland, France,
and Italy. In 1805 he became professor of philosophy and elementary mathematics
at Heidelberg, returning to Jena in 1816 as professor of theoretical philosophy.
In 1819 he was, for political reasons, deposed, but restored in 1824. Died
in Jena. He called his system 'philosophical anthropology,' making self-knowledge
the basis of all other forms. His most important work is his Neue Kritik
der reinen Vernunft.
Fringe: Ger. Relationsfärbung (Cornelius, Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, 168); Fr. (not in use); Ital. frangia (Ferrari, in trans. of James' Princ. of Psychol.). The notional awareness of the meaning or significance which accompanies mental images, e.g. words, as they succeed each other in a train of thought. See NOTION.
Froebel, Friedrich. (1782-1852.) An important
German educational reformer. A childhood saddened by the loss of his mother,
the instruction of an affectionate brother, and deep religious impressions
received in his first school, mark his early years. He studied at both
Jena and Berlin. He visited Pestalozzi twice, and, in co-operation with
a friend, started a school at Keilhau. He opened schools also in Switzerland
-- at Watersee, Burgdorf, and Willisau. He studied comparative philology
in Göttingen. In 1840 he established the first Kindergarten in Brandenburg,
and afterwards opened schools in various other German cities. His principle
is that free creative activity is the means as well as the end of education,
especially with children. His greatest work is Die Menschenerziehung.
Function [Lat. functio, from fungor, 1 execute]: Ger. Funktion; Fr. fonction; Ital. funzione. (1) In biology and physiology: any normal activity, process, or performance accomplished by an organism or an organ. (J.M.B.)
(2) In mathematics: a variable y is called a function of a second variable x when to each value of x there corresponds a definite value or a set of definite values of y. Cf. VARIABLE AND CONSTANT QUANTITY.
It should be observed that the relation between y and x is not
necessarily one which admits of analytical expression. Thus the statement: 'y
= 1 for every rational value of x, and y = 0 for every irrational
or imaginary value of x,' defines y as a function of x,
although it would evidently be impossible to express the relation between y
and x analytically. It is customary to indicate the fact that y
is a function of x by the formula y = f(x), and
then to represent the value of y which corresponds to any particular
value of x, say b, by the symbol f(b). In like manner,
y is called a function of the two variables x and z, y
= f(x, z), when to each pair of values of x and
z there corresponds a definite value or set of values of y, &c.
Fundament [Lat. fundamentum]. Used by
certain neurologists as translation of the German Anlage. See RUDIMENT, and
cf. PROTON, and DISPOSITION. (J.M.B.)
Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 63; STUMPF, Tonpsychologie,
ii. 2; HELMHOLTZ, Sensations of Tone (3rd ed.), 22. (E.B.T.)
Fundamental Truth: Ger. Grundwahrheit;
Fr. vérité fondamentale; Ital. veritàfondamentale.
Ultimate or essential truth: the ultimate principle or principles of any department
of thought or of knowledge as a whole. The term is characteristically employed
to designate principles deemed indispensable to sound thinking and right action,
e.g. by McCosh in the sub-title of his critique of the philosophy of J. S. Mill,
A Defence of Fundamental Truth. (A.C.A.Jr.)
Fundamentum (in logic): (1) Eintheilungsgrund or Eintheilungsprincip, (2) Beziehungsgrund; Fr. (1) principe de division, (2) fondement de relation; Ital. fondamento. The term fundamentum is used in logic in two references: (1) fundamentum divisionis: the principle according to which the co-ordinate species of a genus are distinguished from one another; more exactly, then, the generalized attribute, variations in which constitute the species.
(2) Fundamentum relationis: the connecting circumstances taken into
view, together with the objects or terms connected, and constituting part of
the meaning of each correlative. (R.A.)
Funding [Lat. fundus, farm]: Ger. Fundirung; Fr. consolidation, conversion; Ital. conversio (di debito). The conversion of a debt due on demand to one whose principal and interest can only be called for at stated dates.
If a corporation (private or public), or an individual, simply leaves bills
unpaid, telling the creditors to get what security they can, the result is an
unfunded, or floating, debt. If these bills are taken up by the issue of formal
obligations to pay interest (and usually principal also) at dates distinctly
specified, the debt is said to be funded. When these obligations set a date
for payment of the principal (maturity), they are known as bonds. When the principal
is paid by the issue of a new loan, whether at maturity or before it, the operation
is known as refunding. (A.T.H.)
It may be caused by specific disorders (furor uterinus, furor epilepticus),
may be directed towards a special object or person, and may be characterized
for its special symptoms as furor brevis, furor transitorius,
&c. It is mostly characteristic of MANIA, EPILEPSY, and HYSTERIA. (J.J.)
Fusion [Lat. fundere, to pour]: Ger. Verschmelzung; Fr. fusion; Ital. fusione. When partial constituents of a total experience, owing to their similarity or other intrinsic affinity, combine in such a way that it is difficult to discriminate or analyse them, they are said to be fused. The more difficult discrimination or analysis is, the greater is the degree of fusion. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)
A term whose definition is still in the making. We may say provisionally, that fusion is either (1) a relation obtaining between certain sensory (or, perhaps, between these and affective) contents, whose occurrence implies an approximation of the fused processes towards sensational simplicity, or (2) the result of the realisation of such a relation, i.e. the fused mass itself.
The term has played a large part in recent systematic psychology, but it takes on a slightly different meaning in the hands of different psychological schools. We note the following usages: (1) Stumpf defines fusion as that union of two sensation-contents in which they form not a mere sum, but a more or less unitary whole (Tonpsychologie, ii. 128). He offers a psychophysical theory of fusion in which it is based on what he calls specific synergy (loc. cit., 214. Cf. Meinong, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., vi. 429). Stumpf's views are more fully developed in the Beitr. z. Ak. u. Musikwiss., 1, 'Konsonanz und Dissonanz' (cf. the notice by Pace in the Psychol. Rev., Mar. 1900, 185). Külpe has extended the notion of fusion to non-sensational contents. For him there are only two forms of conscious combination, fusion and colligation: if the elements combined are temporally and spatially identified but differ in quality, their connection is termed fusion; if they differ in duration or extension, colligation (Outlines of Psychol., 277). Müller deprecates the employment of the word as an explanatory concept (Zeitsch. f. Psychol., x. 43). For the fusion of tones the term Blend is often used (Sanford).
(2) Wundt employs the term fusion throughout his treatment of perception, to denote the fundamental form of simultaneous association (Physiol. Psychol., 4th ed., ii. 437), without laying stress, as Stumpf and Külpe do, upon the typical character of tonal fusion. He includes in the meaning of the word (i) the intimacy of the combination, and (ii) the novel character of the product (loc. cit., 38). The idea of space is the result of an 'extensive fusion' (233) (a fusion of different sensational elements -- in this case movement sensations and tactual sensations); auditory ideas are 'intensive' fusions (fusions of like sensational elements).
(3) Certain logicians (e.g. Erdmann, Logik) use fusion (Verschmelzung) for the union of elements involved in abstraction.
The doctrine of fusion stands in close relation to that of 'funded contents' (fundirter Inhalt), elaborated with differences of emphasis and of terminology by Ehrenfels, Meinong, Witasek, Cornelius (Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xii. 189 n.), which has its roots in Mach's discussion of tone sensations (Analyse d. Empfindungen, 128). (E.B.T.- C.L.F.- J.M.B.)
Literature: SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol. expt. 83; articles in
the Zeitsch. f. Psychol., by FAIST, xv. 102; MEINONG and WITASEK, xv. 189; MEYER,
xvii. 401, xviii. 274; LIPPS, xix. 1; STUMPF, xv. 280, 354, xvii. 422, xviii.
294; and in the Philos. Stud. by SCHULZE, xiv. 471; BUCH, xv. 1, 183; HERBART,
Psychol. als Wiss; CORNELIUS, Ueber Verschmelzung u. Analyse, Vtljsch. f. wiss.
Philos., xvi. 404 ff., xviii. 30 ff.; LIPPS, Der Begriff d. Verschmelzung u.
damit Zusammenhängendes, in Stumpf's Tonpsychologie, ii, Philos. Monatsh.,
xxviii. (1892), 547 ff.; MEINONG, Beitr. z. Theorie d. psychischen Analyse,
Zeitsch. f. Psychol., vi. 340, 417; ARDIGO, Opere filosofiche, vii, viii, and
L'unità della coscienza (1898), who uses the word confluenza. (E.B.T.-
Future (consciousness of) [Lat. futurus,
about to be]: Ger. Zukunftsgefühl; Fr. sentiment de l'avenir;
Ital. sentimento del futuro. The mode of time-consciousness which attaches
to preadjustment to a coming impression or ideal representation of a coming
event. See TIME (cognition of). (G.F.S., J.M.B.)