Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
Asceticism (in ethics and philosophy) [Gr. askhsiV, exercise or training]: Ger. Asceticismus; Fr. ascétisme; Ital. ascetismo. A system of conduct in which the realization of the moral life is attempted by means of a complete subjugation of sensuous impulse and worldly desire.
Asceticism is not so much the name of a moral theory as of a practical method of realizing morality. But it implies this element of theory, that the true good for man is something outside of and opposed to his animal nature and the ordinary interests of mundane life. The regulation of the impulses which morality requires is not possible without a subjugation of lower impulses in presence of higher needs. And the life of mere impulse (which is non-moral) has its most obvious antithesis in a complete subjugation of impulse. Hence asceticism is an early factor in the demand for a higher life. In particular it has characterized most oriental religions; and in them, abstinence from fleshy and worldly desire was commonly accompanied by various methods of actively mortifying the body. The Jewish religion is in this respect exceptional amongst oriental faiths: in it there were only slight traces of asceticism, although the Deity was frequently approached by fasting, as well as by prayer -- until the rise of the sect of the Essenes, shortly before the Christian era. The most complete system of ascetic morality is to be found in Buddhism, in which creed it is held that the struggle against impulse is continued by the individual soul in successive incarnations; and it is characteristic of this system that the victory over impulse is held to be capable of perfect attainment only in the complete submergence of the individual consciousness. In modern thought a similar view is to be found in the pessimistic morality of Schopenhauer: the self-annihilation of the will to live involves the destruction of consciousness, along with that which gives birth to consciousness. On the other hand, the Christian ascetics have mortified the flesh and the world for the sake of spiritual perfection; and their renunciation of the pleasures of this life has always been accompanied by a foretaste of the spiritual joys of a future state of existence.
Asceticism was, on the whole, hostile to the spirit of Greek ethics: but it appeared in the Pythagorean life, and in the contempt of pleasure which characterized at least the more extreme forms of Cynicism and Stoicism. Plato also, in the Phaedo, looked upon the bodily life as mere clog and obstacle to the true destiny of the soul, and held that life should be a practice of death. In the Republic, however, he reached a broader view, and sketched the moralization of civic life: although this moralization was only brought about by a reorganization of the state, under the rule of philosophers, in which the conflict of interests arising from appropriation was to be eliminated and individual activities were to be subjected to strict regulation. In the Neo-Platonic systems the contemplative life carried with it an ascetic attitude.
Elements of asceticism were present from the beginning amongst the Christians, and the ascetic spirit manifested itself in the second century in the recommendation to CELIBACY (q.v.). The Gnostics and writers influenced by them worked out a contemplative or mystical ideal of life in which the flesh had no part but to be subdued and kept under. The ascetic tendencies of the Church were further developed in opposition to the growing corruption of society. Of this movement monasticism was the most striking result. The ascetic ideal was put forward by Rufinus, Sulpicius Severus, Cassian, and Prudentius in the 4th century, and by many later writers. The ideal included various forms of abstinence, such as celibacy, poverty, frequent fasting, and, as the distinctive mark of monasticism, solitude. Connected with it was the distinction of two modes of life -- that of ordinary Christian morality, and the higher stage marked chiefly by celibacy and withdrawal from the world -- a Christian form of the distinction in Greek ethics between civic and philosophic virtue.
Asceticism has found its most constant antagonist in the Hedonistic morality. Cf. HEDONISM. But the view of Bentham (Princ. of Mor. and Legisl., chap. i), who contrasts his own doctrine with the ascetic, and describes the latter as taking pain instead of pleasure for its summum bonum, is -- and was perhaps meant to be -- a caricature.
Literature: LECKY, Hist. of European Mor., chap. iv; LUTHARDT, Hist.
of Christ. Eth., §§ 34 ff. (W.R.S.)
Asceticism (in religion). The view which teaches that maceration of the body, extirpation of passion, and the like, are essential to salvation. It is commonly connected with an APOCALYPTIC (q.v.) conception of the world, involving a low estimate of the present life, and a belief in the essentially evil nature of matter.
Asceticism is found in association with the doctrines of Buddhism; of some forms of Hinduism; of the Jewish Essenes; of the Egyptian Therapeutae; of the Alexandrian Neo-Platonists. Through the last it came into contact with Christianity, and, favoured by certain superstitions current in the early Christian centuries, effected a permanent lodgement in the Christian system. Some writers, chiefly Roman Catholic, assign a special place to ascetic theology, which, as distinguished from dogmatic, mystic, and moral theology, offers directions for a more intimate walk with God than is necessary for all.
Literature: ZÖCKLER, Krit. Gesch. d. Askese; DORNER, Christ. Eth.
(Eng. trans.), 405 f. (R.M.W.)
Aschenmayer, Adam Karl. (1768-1852.)
A German mystical philosopher, born in Neuenberg, Würtemberg. He became
professor of philosophy and medicine at Tübingen in 1811, and was
transferred to the chair of practical philosophy in 1818. In 1836 he moved
to Kirchheim, where he died. He is best known for a work on the philosophy
The metaphysical essence of anything is that which is special or peculiar to it. The Scotists maintained that infinity is the metaphysical essence of God; some of the followers of Aquinas assign this to God's complete self-knowledge; the prevalent view maintains that aseitas (or life in himself, John v. 26) is the attribute to which all others must be referred. The question has naturally entered into the quasi-metaphysical discussions concerning the relation of the Son to the Father. It dates back to Dionysius the Areopagite.
Literature: DORNER, Doctrine of the Person of Christ, I. div. i. 83,
and passim; OOSTERZEE, Christ. Dogmatics, 256; CLARKE, Discourse concerning
the Being and Attributes of God. (R.M.W.)
Asemia or Asemasia [Gr. a + shma, a sign]: Ger. Asemie; Fr. asémie (little used); Ital. asemia (a variety of dissemia). Loss of the power to form or to understand any sign or symbol, whether word or gesture or other action.
The essential nature of this defect is the same as in aphasia, but the term covers a wider field of application. The essential processes of speech are the comprehension and expression of thought by an acquired system of symbolization. Apart from the spoken or written systems (languages), gesture signs, facial and other forms of expression are employed; feeling is conveyed by music; and conventional forms of greeting and other social customs are readily interpreted. Asemia implies the loss of the power to interpret any of these systems, or indeed to interpret any group of sensations as the sign or symbol of a thought or feeling. The term Asemia is used by Steinthal, Kussmaul, and others; Hamilton proposes Asemasia; Finckelnburg, Asymbolia. The loss of any special set of symbols may be referred to by appropriate adjectives: Asemia graphica, loss of writing; Asemia mimica, loss of gesture signs; Asemia verbalis, loss of verbal symbols. If the defect extends to the mishandling and confusion of objects, it becomes APRAXIA (q.v.). The defect has also relations to BLINDNESS (mental, q.v.) and to SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS (q.v., also for Literature).
Literature: SÉGLAS, Les troubles du langage; HEILBRONNER, Asymbolie
(1897); MORSELLI, Semej. malat. ment., ii. (J.J.)
Asexual Reproduction (or multiplication).
Reproduction without sex in animals and plants. See
Aspiration [Lat. ad + spirare, to breathe upon]: Ger. Aspiration; Fr. aspiration; Ital. aspirazione. In the system of Christian ethics, aspiration is an integral element in the theory of the genesis of Christian character.
Faith in the Gospel possesses, as one of its most important consequences, a power of generating aspiration, i.e. either a 'longing desire' for reconciliation with Christ, or an 'overmastering determination' to lead the Christian life so far as possible.
Literature: DORNER, Christ. Eth. (Eng. trans.), 363 f. (R.M.W.)
Assent [Lat. ad + sentire, to feel]:
Ger. Bewilligung; Fr. assentiment; Ital. adesione. Agreement
with a judgment presented to one for acceptance. This meaning of the term replaces
its use loosely for various forms of judgment, belief, affirmation. (J.M.B.
Assignment (in law) [Med. Lat. assignamentum]: Ger. Übertragung eines Rechtes, Überweisung; Fr. transport, cession; Ital. cessione. The transfer of a right: less often, the transfer of a thing in possession. A General assignment is a transfer of all a man's rights of property for the benefit of his creditors. An Involuntary assignment is one made by operation of law, without the owner's consent.
By the common law of England and America an assignment cannot pass a legal
title to anything of which the person assigning is not at the time in possession,
that is, to choses in action. An equitable title, however, might thus be gained.
The Roman law was originally the same (Gaius, ii. 38). (S.E.B.)
Assimilation (in physiology)
[Lat. ad + similis, like]: Ger. Assimilation; Fr. assimilation;
Ital. assimilazione. The process of converting food materials into living
protoplasm. See ANABOLISM, and METABOLISM. (C.F.H.)
Assimilation (in psychology). (1) The union of elements in consciousness by which certain contents (those assimilated) take the form of or contribute material to the formation of others (those which assimilate). (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
(2) Association between like elements and compounds (Wundt).
Wundt (reference below) uses the term in the special sense (2), which is not recommended. A better usage is (1), in which it serves to indicate the content side of the Herbartian form of the notion of APPERCEPTION (q.v.). Assimilation describes what takes place in any case of mental synthesis from the point of view of how the elements of presentation behave. It is a convenient term, since the various cases of contrast, fusion, association (of all sorts), with consciousness of identity and resemblance, recognition, &c., can be construed as involving assimilation of different modes. Cf. Ward (art. Psychology, in Encyc. Brit.), who speaks of 'assimilation or recognition' of an impression in the process of perception. On the nervous side it rests upon the direct coalescence of sensory processes (James) or their indirect union through the synergy (Münsterberg, Baldwin) of motor processes.
Literature: WUNDT, Philos. Stud., vii. 345 ff., and Outlines of Psychol.,
228 ff.; LEWES, Problems of Life and Mind; WARD, art. Association and Assimilation,
in Mind (July, 1893, and Oct., 1894); BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and
the Race, 308 ff. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)
Assimilation (linguistic). A process by which contiguous sounds in language tend to approximate or become alike. Thus hands becomes handz, the voiceless s assumes the voiced quality of d; hemp from O. Eng. henep.
The organs of speech, in passing from one mode of ARTICULATION (q.v.) to another,
either carry forward somewhat of the position necessary for the former, or by
anticipation draw back somewhat of the latter. (B.I.W.)
Assistance or Concurrence:
Ger. Concurrenz; Fr. concurrence; Ital. concorrenza.
The act of God in maintaining the relation of mind and body on the theory of
PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY (q.v.) (J.M.B.)
(1) Classificatory (types of association).
Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 455; TRAUTSCHOLDT, Philos. Stud., i. 213; GALTON, Brain (1879); BOURDON, Rev. Philos., xxxv; MÜNSTERBERG, Beiträge, i. and iv. Cf. HÖFFDING, LEHMANN, and WUNDT, Philos. Stud., v, vii, viii, and Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos., xiv; CALKINS, Psychol. Rev., Monograph Suppl., 2 (1896); ZIEHEN, Die Ideenassoziation des Kindes (Berlin, 1898); WAHLE, Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos. (1885); RIBOT, Rev. Philos., xxxi. 35 ff.
(2) Analytic (mechanics of association).
Literature: SCRIPTURE, Philos. Stud., vii; MÜNSTERBERG, Beiträge, iv; W. G. SMITH, Z. Frage v. d. mittelbaren Assoc., Diss. (Leipzig, 1894); HOWE, Amer. J. of Psychol. Cf. BOURDON, Rev. Philos., xxxi; HÖFFDING, LEHMANN, WUNDT, as above; CALKINS, loc. cit.; ASCHAFFENBURG, Exper. Stud. ü. die Assoc., Psychol. Arb., i. 209 ff., ii I ff.
(3) REACTION TIME (q.v., for literature).
(4) Scattered experiments only exist upon associativeness, i.e. the conditions under which ideas are liable to be associated, and upon the capacity of a given idea to arouse an associated idea.
Literature: MÜNSTERBERG, loc. cit.; PILLSBURY, BIRCH, in Amer.
J. of Psychol., &c. See KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol., §§ 27-33.
Association (in aesthetics). As an aesthetic principle, association is used to explain aesthetic value by deriving the pleasure felt in the presence of the beautiful or sublime, not directly from the form or constitution of the object as such, nor from the sensations it excites, but from the recall or revival of pleasure previously experienced in connection with the same or a related object or quality; e.g. a red cheek suggests youth and health, and is beautiful; red hands suggest disagreeable, labour, and are ugly.
The principle of association has been used to explain either all or only a part of aesthetic value. Some writers have had in mind the accidental associations which individuals have formed in their particular experience; others, the universal relations of natural processes and qualities. Buffier (1724) and Reynolds (1759), in connection with the view that the beautiful in nature is a fixed form for each species toward which nature inclines -- a sort of mean or average - and that the ugly is a departure therefrom, drew the conclusion that 'the effect of beauty depends on habit alone, the most customary form in each species of things being invariably the most beautiful.' We admire beauty for no other reason than that we are used to it. Alison (Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste, 1790), while recognizing that association cannot account for the effect of beauty unless the associated elements have intrinsic pleasing quality, developed the working of the principle in great detail, and was followed by Jeffrey, who asserted that 'beauty is not an inherent property or quality of objects at all, but the result of the accidental relations in which they may stand to our experience of pleasures or emotions.' Any object may become beautiful in this way. Stewart (1810), while rejecting the extreme form of the theory as held by Reynolds, agreed in the main with Alison, and made a specific application of the principle to explain how the word 'beauty,' which originally referred to objects of sight only, came to be applied 'transitively' to perceptions of other senses. Spencer (Princ. of Psychol., ii) accepts the general principle 'under an expanded form,' which would include not merely our own individual associations, but those of the race, transmitted by heredity. Spencer, however, does not use this as the sole principle of explanation.
The same is true of Fechner (Vorschule d. Aesthetik, 1876), who has given the most extended recent discussion. He emphasizes especially the constant and universal associations found in nature -- colours with grass, sky, or fire -- as contrasted with accidental or individual experiences. The principle, so far as it implies a conscious recollection, was criticized by Volkelt (Der Symbolbegriff in d. neuesten Aesthetik, 1876), and has been reaffirmed in the sense not of conscious recollection or comparison of separate elements, but as 'the implicit relation existing between different ideas,' by Stern (Einfühlung u. Assoc. in d. neuren Aesthetik, 1898). See also Thomas Brown, Philos. of the Human Mind, 124 ff.
Literature: The work of STERN, cited above, contains a sketch of recent
discussions in Germany. BEGG, The Devel. of Taste, 1887, and STEWART, Essays,
in Works, ed. Hamilton, v, contain some historical material. See also GURNEY,
Power of Sound, chap. vi; SANTAYANA, Sense of Beauty (1896), Pt. IV; and the
authors named in the text. HARTLEY, Observations on Man (1749), and JAS. MILL,
Anal. Phenom. Human Mind (1829), treat aesthetic association briefly. (J.H.T.)
Association (in education). A purposive comparison of newly presented facts with other related facts already known; a phase of inductive teaching that leads to the perception of a general truth; a stage in Herbartian method. See METHOD (in education).
Literature: McMURRY, The Meth. of the Recitation, chap. vii. (C.DE
Association (of ideas) [Lat. ad + socius, companion]: Ger. (Ideen-) Association; Fr. association (d'idées); Ital. associazione. A union more or less complete formed in and by the course of experience between the mental dispositions corresponding to two or more distinguishable contents of consciousness, and of such a nature that when one content recurs, the other content tends in some manner or degree to recur also. (G.F.S.-J.M.B.)
Aristotle, in his treatise on Memory and Reminiscence, recognizes the principle of association, and distinguishes association by similarity, by contrast, and by contiguity. The doctrine is further explained and illustrated by ancient commentators on Aristotle and by the Schoolmen. In the period of the Renaissance, Ludovicus Vives is distinguished by his careful treatment of this topic. It occupies a very prominent place in the psychology of Hobbes. The phrase 'association of ideas' was first introduced by Locke; but he seems to have had no insight into its general psychological importance. Berkeley was the first to extend the principle of association so as to make it cover not merely the sequence of ideas in train, but also the formation of percepts and higher states. Hartley proceeds further in the same direction, and so becomes the founder of modern ASSOCIATIONISM (q.v.).
Literature: for a compact history of the subject see CROOM ROBERTSON,
Philos. Remains, 102 f.; FERRI, La Psychol. de l'Assoc., is also historical;
HOBBES, Leviathan, chap. iii, and Human Nature, chap. iv; SPINOZA, Ethics, Bk.
II, Prop. xviii (applied in Bk. III to theory of emotion); HARTLEY, Observations
on Man, passim; JAMES MILL, Anal. Phenom. Human Mind; BAIN, Senses and
Intellect (4th ed.), 336-40, and the exceedingly detailed and instructive exposition
which follows throughout the rest of the book; SPENCER, Princ. of Psychol.,
chaps. vii and viii, especially § 120; SULLY, Human Mind, i. 185-205; S.
HODGSON, Met. of Experience, iii. chaps. i and ii; JAMES WARD, Encyc. Brit.,
xx. 60; JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., i. chap. xiv; FRIES, Neue Krit., 159; VOLKMANN,
Lehrb. d. Psychol., i. 73-9; LIPPS, Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens, Pt. II,
chap. vi; KARL DEFFNER, Die Aehnlichkeitsassociation, in the Zeitsch. f. Psychol.,
xviii. Heft 3; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol., ii. chap. xvi; Grundriss, 265 f.; STRICKER,
Stud. ü. die Assoc.; TAINE, On Intelligence, Pt. I. Bk. II. chap. ii; FOUILLÉE,
La Psychol. des idées-forces, i. Bk. III. chap. ii; BRADLEY, Stud. in
Logic; VILLA, Psicol. Contemp. (1899). Also the textbooks cited under PSYCHOLOGY;
EISLER, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe (for many quotations); and BIBLIOG.
G, 2, l. (G.F.S.)
Association (nervous). The process
by which the activities proper to several centres of the central nervous system
are brought into a state of mutual influence or interdependence. The process
of neural association is probably at the bottom of all mental processes more
complex than the simplest sense presentation, and is accordingly much wider
than the psychological term association of ideas. Cf. ASSOCIATION FIBRES. (H.H.)
Association (social): Ger. Association (1), Verein, Gesellschaft (2); Fr. association (1), compagnie (2); Ital. associazione. (1) The spontaneous being together of creatures, in regular ways, without regard to the mental states which actuate them; that is, without regard to the presence or absence of COOPERATION (q.v.) on their part, or to its degree when present.
Association used in this sense is a sociological rather than a psychological term. It applies to social and gregarious life looked at by an outsider rather than as involving the recognition of it by the beings themselves. When used at all -- it were better avoided altogether, unless qualified as 'social'; cf. AGGREGATION -- it should be very carefully defined, seeing that one of the elements of conscious social and gregarious life is the association of ideas, a very different conception; and the confusion of the two is sometimes made. For example, Giddings (Princ. of Sociol.) contrasts psychology as the science of 'the association of ideas' with sociology as the science of 'the association of individuals.' For a direct working out, however, of an analogy between the two, see Bosanquet, Philos. Theory of the State. chap. vii.
(2) An organization to promote an object or to realize a purpose, e.g. The British Association for the Advancement of Science, The American Psychological Association. Legalized or chartered associations are called Companies.
Rousseau first clearly distinguished between association and aggregation. In
his Contract Social, chap. v. § I, he says of a society held together
by force 'c'est, si l'on veut, une agrégation, mais non pas une association.'
'In the situation of an ignorant labourer . . associating with no one except
his wife and his children, what is there that can teach him to co-operate?'
(J.S. Mill, Diss. and Discussions, i. 193). This usage continually
recurs with reference to all possible modes of friendly and useful association
in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. (F.H.G.)
Association Fibres. Those fibres which connect different parts of the brain. More specifically fibres (usually collaterals) which unite different areas of the same hemisphere of the cerebrum as contrasted with commissural fibres, such as connect corresponding parts of the opposite hemisphere via the callosum and precommissure. For a diagram of the latter relation see SPINAL CORD (Fig. 4). For illustration of the course of the more definite association tracts cf. the figure on p. 79.
Literature: MEYNERT, Neue Studien über die Associationsbündel
des Hirnmantels, Sitzber. d. kais. Akad. d. Wiss. Wien, ci. (1892), 361-79;
BECHTEREW, Zur Frage ü. d. äusseren Associationsfasern der Hirnrinde,
Neurol. Centralbl. (1891); FLECHSIG, Zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des Associations-systems
im menschlichen Gehirn, Berichte u. Verh. d. kgl. sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss.
(1894); FLECHSIG, Gehirn u. Seele, Rede (2nd ed., 1896); BARKER, The Sense-areas
and Association-centres in the Brain as described by Flechsig. J. of Nerv. and
Ment. Dis., xxiv. 6, 326-56 (1897); SOURY, Le Syst. nerv. centr. (1900), ii.
See also BRAIN, and NERVOUS SYSTEM. (H.H.)
Associationism: Ger. Associationspsychologie; Fr. associationisme; Ital. dottrina psicologica dell' associazione. The theory which, starting with certain simple and ultimate constituents of consciousness, makes mental development consist solely or mainly in the combination of these elements according to certain laws of ASSOCIATION (q.v.). According to this theory, rigidly carried out, all genesis of new products is due to the combination of pre-existing elements. Cf. COMPOSITION THEORY, and MIND-STUFF THEORY. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
We may quote from Hartley (Observations on Man, 1749) as at once the founder and, together with James Mill, the most typical representative of modern associationism: 'Sensations may be said to be associated together when their impressions are either made precisely at the same instant of time or in the contiguous successive instants. . . . Any sensations, A, B, C, &c., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over the corresponding ideas a, b, c, &c., that any one of the sensations A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mind b, c, &c., the ideas of the rest' (Pt. I, prop. 10). By frequent repetition of this reproductive process 'the simple ideas of sensation run into clusters and combinations; and each of these will at last coalesce into one complex idea, by the approach and commixture of the several compounding parts. . . . If the number of simple ideas which compose the complex one be very great, it may happen that the complex idea shall not appear to bear any relation to these its component parts. . . The reason of this is that each single idea is overpowered by the sum of all the rest, . . .' as 'in very compound medicines the several tastes and flavours of the separate ingredients are lost and overpowered by the complex one of the whole mass. . . . One may hope, therefore, that by pursuing and perfecting the doctrine of association, we may some time or other be enabled to analyse all that vast variety of complex ideas, which pass under the name of ideas of reflection and intellectual ideas, into their simple compounding parts, i.e. into the simple ideas of sensation, of which they consist' (prop. 12). 'Admitting the powers of leaving traces and of association, compounds of mental changes will arise from simple bodily ones by means of words, symbols, and associated circumstances' (prop. 33). 'The passions must be aggregates of the ideas, or traces of the sensible pleasures or pains; which ideas make up, by their number and mutal influence upon one another, for the faintness and transitory nature of each singly taken' (prop. 89). Hume, whose Treatise on Human Nature was first published ten years before Hartley's Observations, is the first among English writers clearly to distinguish between association by contiguity and association by similarity. He adds to these causality, and considers himself to have given a complete list of the conditions of association. The chief interest of his work, however, lies in his attempt to give an explanation on the lines of associationism of the psychological origin of the categories of causality and individual identity. James Mill (1773-1836) works in an original manner on the lines of Hartley. In him associationism culminates. Its later representatives, J. S. Mill and A. Bain, are by no means pure associationists. J. S. Mill breaks away from the old tradition in his doctrine of 'mental chemistry,' and Bain does the same in a different way by laying stress on the importance of subjective selection as determining motor activity and attention. (G.F.S.)
Literature: see ASSOCIATION.
Assumption [Lat. ad + sumere, to take]: Ger. Voraussetzung; Fr. assomption; Ital. assumzione. In modern logic, an Assumption is the statement of a proposition, the truth of which is taken as granted for the purpose of the argument into which it enters. It is the more general type of which POSTULATE and HYPOTHESIS (see these terms) are the more important varieties.
Assumption among the earlier Latin logicians, from Boethius onwards, was the
technical name for the minor premise. See Hamilton, Logic, i. 281, 284.
Assumption (in theology): Ger.
Mariä Himmelfahrt; Fr. Assomption; Ital. Assunzione.
In Roman Catholic usage, particularly, Assumption means direct reception into
heaven. Like freedom from original sin (though not with the same dogmatic certainty)
it is viewed by the Roman Catholic Church as one of the 'privileges of the Virgin.'
The feast of the name is celebrated on August 5. (R.M.W.)
Assurance [OF. assurance, from Pat. Lat. assecurare, to secure to one]: Ger. Zuversicht; Fr. assurance; Ital. certezza. A term which came into general use at the time of the Reformation. In its technical sense it means personal certainty of grace or, more commonly, of salvation (cf. Rom. viii. 38; xiv. 5; Col. ii. 2; iv. 12; 2 Tim. i. 12; Heb. vi. II; x. 22). See also INSURANCE.
Historically, three great theological groups have expressed themselves on the subject: -- (1) the Reformers; (2) the Council of Trent; (3) the Wesleyans. (1) With Luther, the assurance of salvation is one distinctive feature of 'saving faith.' Knowledge of the faith brings sure and firm consolation to pious minds; the foundation is individualistic. With Calvin, the same doctrine holds true; belief in Christ's imputed righteousness implies assurance. (2) The Council of Trent, consistently with the Roman Catholic and scholastic position, allows the possibility of assurance, but treats it as a purely private affair. The Virgin and Jesus are the only subjects of a certain revelation on the matter. For, if thus favoured, the believer would be freed from obligation to the offices of the Church. (3) Wesley held a doctrine closely akin to that of the Reformers. 'Witness of the Spirit' is the source of this assurance in the evangelical churches. Cf. JUSTIFICATION.
Literature: DORNER, Hist. of Protestant Theol. (Eng. trans.), i. 227,
292; CUNNINGHAM, The Reformers and the Reformation Theol., 124; HUNTER, Outlines
of Dogmatic Theol., iii. 127. (R.M.W.)
Asthenia [Gr. a + sqenoV,
strength]: Ger. Asthenie; Fr. asthénie; Ital. astenia.
Lack or impairment of strength or vitality; general debility; also used in combination,
as in neurasthenia, lack of nervous vigour. The term angiosthenia is used for
lack of muscular force. (J.J. - E.M.)
Asthenopia [Gr. a
+ sqenoV, strength, + wy,
eye]: Ger. Asthenopia; Fr. asthénopie; Ital. astenopia.
A visual weakness due to the susceptibility to fatigue of the muscular mechanism
concerned in the accommodation or in the general movements of the eyes. It may
result from special strain or weakness in the accommodation mechanism or in
the ocular muscles, or as a system of more general disorder. Cf. VISION (defects
of). A retinal asthenopia is also spoken of. See Norris and Oliver, Syst.
Dis. Eye (1900), iv; Clarke, Eye Strain (1892). (J.J.)
Astigmatism [Gr. a + stigma, a point]: Ger. Astigmatismus; Fr. astigmatisme; Ital. astigmatismo. A defect in the refractive mechanism of the eye, owing to which not all the rays of light proceed from a single point are brought to a single point on the retina.
In regular astigmatism, one of the refracting surfaces, generally the cornea, is ellipsoidal instead of spherical; that is, it has meridians of maximum and minimum curvature at right angles to each other, though in each meridian the curvature is regular. When this is the case, the rays proceeding from a single luminous point are brought to a focus earliest when they lie in the meridian in which the surface is most convex; the pencil of rays will therefore have two linear foci at right angles to each other separated by a space in which the cone of rays is first elliptical, then circular, and then again elliptical. (An excellent binocular diagram of the course of such rays is given by Bowditch in Howell's Amer. Textbookof Physiol.) The defect may be detected by simple tests: if straight lines drawn in various directions through a common point cannot all be seen with equal distinctness at the same time, it is evident that the eye needs to be differently accommodated to focus rays in different meridians -- i.e. it is astigmatic. The degree of astigmatism may be accurately determined by the ophthalmometer. The defect is corrected by the use of appropriate cylindrical lenses. Nearly all eyes are slightly astigmatic. Helmholtz could see sharply a vertical and a horizontal line at the same time if the former was 65 cm. and the latter 54 cm. distant; for Thomas Young (who first studied the defect) the sense of the error was reversed. The name was proposed by Whewell.
In irregular astigmatism there is a lack of homogeneousness in the refracting media (or else their curvatures in certain directions are not arcs of circles or ellipses). It is incapable of correction. It is the cause of monocular polyopia -- of the several images which most people see of the horns of the crescent moon, for instance -- and also of the rayed appearance of stars and of distant streetlights. See VISION (defects of). (C.L.F.)
Literature: HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optik (2nd ed.), 169; RUEL, in Richet's
Dict. de Physiol. i. 779; WALLER, Human Physiol., 422; BURNETT, Astigmatism
(1887); DONDERS, Refraction (ed. by Oliver, 1900); LE CONTE, Sight (2nd ed.),
46. (E.B.T. - J.J.)
Asymbolia [Gr. a +
snmbolon, symbol]: Ger. Asymbolie; Fr. asymbolie;
Ital. asimbolia. Loss of the power of forming or understanding signs
or symbols of expression. The term is also used by Finkelnburg as a general
synonym of aphasia. Cf. ASEMIA. (J.J. - E.M.)
Asymmetry [Gr. a + sun + metron, a measure]: Ger. Asymmetrie; Fr. asymétrie; Ital. asimmetria. An unusual degree of unlikeness in structure or function in the two corresponding organs or halves of the body.
A large degree of symmetry is the rule in all but the lower forms of animal life, and seems to be related to the constant direction of progressive locomotion characteristic of such organisms. Yet symmetry is not complete, and the term asymmetry may be used to denote its normal lack of completeness, as well as an abnormal deviation in parts usually alike or nearly so. The nervous system and sense-organs share in this general symmetry, but more precise observation reveals slight or marked divergences. The two eyes are rarely alike in visual actuteness nor the ears in delicacy of hearing. The tendency to right-handedness is doubtless the most marked of the functional asymmetries, and is related to a greater development of the left hemisphere of the brain. Unusual asymmetries of structure or function -- such as marked differences in the shape of the two sides of the head -- are cited as signs of degeneration, and have been noted in the insane and criminal classes. See also DEXTRALITY and literature there cited.
Literature: HALL and HARTWELL, Bilateral Asymmetry of Function, in Mind, ix. 93, 899; VAN BIERVLIET, L'homme droit et l'homme gauche, in Rev. Philos. (1899); V. MAGNAN, Recherches sur les centres nerveux. (J.J. - L.M.)
Lobrosso (l'Uomo deliquente) and the Italian school of criminal anthropologists
have investigated all forms of somatic and physiological asymmetry in lunatics,
epileptics, and criminals. Cf. CRIMINAL. (E.M.)
Asymmetry (in vision; of ocular movements). (1) Movements of ocular CONVERGENCE (q.v.) may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. In the former case the point fixated is in the median plane of the head; in the latter case it is outside that plane, and the lines of regard make unequal angles with that plane. Asymmetrical convergence is confined to transverse movements of the eyes; since they are in a horizontal line, asymmetry of movement upward and downward would be inconsistent with convergence, and hence it does not occur in normal eyes.
Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 165 f.
(2) Asymmetrical innervation of the muscles of an eye (e.g. paresis of the abducens) leads to wrong localization in the field of that eye. When the patient is required to turn the eye in the direction of the normal action of the paralyzed muscle there is displacement of objects in the visual field, despite the fact that the eye has not moved. The phenomena of displacement have been turned to account for theories of visual localization. Cf. LOCAL SIGN.
Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), i. 424.
(3) Normal asymmetry of muscular innervation in the vertical and horizontal directions is thought to account for certain geometrical OPTICAL ILLUSIONS (q.v.).
Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 137. (E.B.T.)
Atavism [Lat. atavus, a distant ancestor]: Ger. Atavismus; Fr. atavisme; Ital. atavismo. Reversion to a more primitive type shown by the reapperance by hereditary transmission of ancestral characters, which normally are no longer developed. The cases of atavism may be classed in two main groups: (1) the reappearance in the progeny of a character (normal or abnormal) absent in its immediate progenitors, but present in its more remote ancestors; (2) the reapperance in a race or individual of a character originally derived by the crossing of more or less remote ancestors from another race. Atavism often accompanies intercrossing, or a pronounced change in the conditions of life. In practice, however, atavism is not always distinguishable from the recurrence of variation of like character, or from the direct effect of external influences on plastic organisms. Indeed, it is probable that the latter may act as stimulating conditions under which the atavistic characters arise. (E.S.G. - E.B.P.)
Literature: CH. DARWIN, Animals and Plants under Domestication (1888); A. WEISMANN, Germ-Plasm (1893); Y. DELAGE, L'Hérédité (1895). (C.LL.M.)
The theory of atavism has recently been applied in criminal anthropology (see
CRIMINAL); a class of criminals being considered, on the ground of certain apparently
atavistic physical characters, as owing their criminal propensities to reversion
through heredity. See the literature given under CRIMINAL (anthropology), especially
the works of the Italian school, Lombroso, Ferri, Garofalo, &c. (J.M.B.)
Ataxia [Gr. a + tassein, to order, to arrange]: Ger. Ataxie; Fr. ataxie, tabes; Ital. atassia. Although the term ataxia indicates any irregularity of function, its use is practically restricted to inco-ordination of muscular action; a difficulty or inability in co-ordinating voluntary movements. Furthermore, as locomotor ataxia is the most common form of the disorder, the single term ataxia is frequently used as synonymous with that form; and again, as locomotor ataxia is the most characteristic symptom of a disease of the spinal cord known as tabes dorsalis, the term locomotor ataxia is frequently used as a synonym of the disease of which it is the prominent symptom.
This last usage, however, is certainly not desirable; and it is well, in order to differentiate the several forms of ataxia, to retain that term in its general sense. Asynergia is another term used to designate this general defect of co-ordination. Ataxia is distinguished as static, or motor; the former appearing as an irregularity in the maintenance of attitudes and positions, while the latter becomes evident in the difficulty and lack of precision of movements. As forms of static ataxia (also symptomatic of tabes) may be mentioned the excessive swaying and tottering which occurs when one is standing still with the eyes closed, the inability to balance the body on one leg, or to extend the arm steadily (also called astasia).
Motor or muscular ataxia is much more striking and varied; it much more frequently affects (and in tabes usually first affects) the legs than any other organ of movement and is then locomotor ataxia. As examples of ataxia of the upper extremities may be mentioned the shakiness of the handwriting, difficulty in handling objects, in grasping and pointing, in playing upon an instrument, and in all actions which require skill in manipulation. The difficulty becomes greatly emphasized if any of the simpler co-ordinations is attempted with the eyes closed. A similar disorder affecting speech would be termed atactic aphasia or ataxophemia. The signs of locomotor ataxia have been carefully studied. The ataxic gait is most characteristic; walking with the eyes closed becomes impossible, and sticks or crutches are depended upon. The normal pendular swing of the leg is replaced by a jerky lifting and propulsion of the foot to be advanced, which is then frequently brought down with a thump. The body is not well balanced, and the trunk is elevated unduly in shifting the weight of the body from one leg to the other. In less pronounced cases walking is less seriously affected, but there is considerable uncertainty in starting out, or in suddenly rising from a chair and walking, in starting and stopping at command, in turning about, in going down stairs, &c. These and other tests have been used to detect the incipient stages of tabes dorsalis. Cf. TABES.
Literature: P. BLOCQ, Les troubles de la marche dans les maladies nerveuses;
PICK, art. Ataxie, in Eulenberg's Real-Encyk.. ii. 409; GRASSET et RANGIER,
Traité pratique des maladies nerveuses (4th ed., 1894, also for bibliography).
Athanasian Creed: Ger. Athanasianisches Glaubensbekenntnis; Fr. symbole d'Athanase; Ital. simbolodi Atanasio. A pseudonymous document, chiefly remarkable as an orthodox summary of the conclusions arising from the great Christological discussions which broke out at the time of Arius, and continued till the 5th century. This creed is notorious for its damnatory clauses.
The origin of this formula is unknown; it was certainly not written by Athanasius. Internal evidence would seem to relegate it, in its present form, to a period after the 5th century. Although often so classed, it cannot any longer be regarded as an Oecumenical creed, for it is rejected by the Greek Church and the American Episcopal Church, and has been seriously questioned by the Church of England. Its main value lies in the precision with which it summarizes the decisions of Oecumenical Councils and the doctrines of AUGUSTINIANISM (q.v.) in regard to the Trinity and the Incarnation. In these matters it is more dogmatic and abstruse than the Nicene Creed, of which it may be regarded as a development.
Literature: SCHAFF, Church Hist., iii. 689, and Creeds of Christendom,
i. 34; OMMANNEY, Early Hist. of the Athanasian Creed; LUMBY, Hist. of the Creeds;
HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iv. 133 f. (R.M.W.)
Athanasius, Saint. (cir. 296-373
A.D.) A famous Greek Father, the pupil and friend of Archbishop Alexander.
His zeal and eloquence against Arius made him prominent in the Council
of Nice. As archbishop of Alexandria, he is said to have refused to restore
Arius to communion as ordered by Constantine I. Accused of sacrilege, he
was condemned and exiled without proof, restored by Constantine II, and
again deposed by Constantius. The Synods of Rome and Sardica approved his
cause and doctrines, and he returned to Alexandria, but was again exiled
by Julian, and lastly by Valens. The last five years of his life were spent
in possession of his see. He was the firm and efficient champion of the
'orthodox party' which centered in the doctrine of the Trinity. Cf. ARIUS,
and ATHANASIAN CREED; and see PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
Atheism (theological use of) [Gr. a + qeoV, God]: Ger. Atheismus; Fr. athéisme; Ital. ateismo. Within recent years theologians have so far departed from their ancient usage as to concentrate discussion upon the historical question: 'Are there atheistic peoples or tribes?' Great interest, too, has recently surrounded the view of God as a subjective phenomena, issuing from the Ritschlian school. But neither question falls within the range of theology proper; the first belongs to anthropology and the science of religions, the second to psychology and metaphysics. Although, as a rule, theologians have employed the term with reprehensible looseness, especially in controversy, it may be said that, strictly speaking, from the necessarily dualistic standpoint of theistic theology, atheism can be applied to one theory only: Pancosmism is, for orthodox theology, the sole atheism.
Literature: ROSKOFF, Religionswesen d. rohesten Naturvölker; ORR,
Ritschlian Theol.; WENLEY, Contemp. Theol. and Theism; FLINT, Anti-theistic
Theories; HARRIS, Philos. Basis of Theism; MAINLÄNDER, Philos. d. Erlösung;
GARVIE, Ritschlian Theol.; D'ERCOLE, Teismo, i (1883). (R.M.W.)
Four senses in which the term has been used are traceable: (1) meaning life, particularly animal life, when the word often appears in the form 'tman'; (2) meaning the life principle -- much in the same sense as the Aristotelian expression, 'soul is the primary reality of organism'; (3) meaning the individual subject or ego, with an emphasis, making it comparable to the scholastic conception of 'essence'; (4) meaning the soul of the world or universe. The former two may be called poetical, the latter philosophical, usages. In later Sanskrit (3) and (4) are the common meanings. Cf. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (India).
Literature: OLDENBERG, Buddha, 25; MAX MÜLLER, Ancient Sanskrit
Lit., 18. (R.M.W.)
Atom and Atomism
(philosophical): see PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY (Atomists), and MONADOLOGY. Cf.
extensive literary citations in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos.
Begriffe, 'Atom' and 'Atomistik.' Cf. also MATTER. (J.M.B.)
Atonement [ME. at-one-ment, probably]: Ger. Versöhnung (Anselm), Acceptationstheorie (Eisler); Fr. expiation; Ital. espiazione. The term used to characterize Christ's redeeming relation to mankind. The relative terms in the Old Testament embody the idea of 'satisfaction' and 'ransom'; in the New Testament, those of 'expiation,' 'redemption by blood,' 'release' (from the law), and 'ransom.' In the field of theology discussion of the subject falls within the doctrinal division of systematic theology, and is the chief problem in the section which treats of God's relation to man under historical conditions.
On a philosophical analysis it may be said that the history of the doctrine has always depended upon (1) the dominant religious conceptions of the day, with their philosophical presuppositions and accompaniments; (2) upon the nature of the answers given to these three questions: (a) What is the nature of Christ? (b) From what does man stand in need of being saved? (e.g. from sin? from guilt? from evil?). (c) What is the nature of God? On this basis it may be said very generally (1) that with the Fathers (especially the Greek Fathers) a metaphysical conception predominated; reunion of mankind with God was the end of atonement. (2) As speculative interest waned, and social and ecclesiastical organization became more fixed, a juridical conception emerged (Anselm) which, nevertheless, like the former, still left the personal, or subjective, element largely out of account. The purport of Abelard's moral influence theory was to recognize this subjective side; but, owing to the circumstances of the time, it exercised small formative influence: on the whole, scholasticism remained steadfast to the objective juridical idea. (3) With the Reformation the subjective element, in the shape of personal conviction of guilt, altered the entire trend of the discussion. Extreme theories tended to be formulated, of which Kant's may be taken as a reasoned type. (4) The metaphysical tendency of the earliest theories was resuscitated at the beginning of the 19th century, mainly by Hegel and his school; union of mankind with God once more became the leading problem. Objective ideas of a more specially theological character were promulgated by Hugo Grotius, whose scheme, known as the governmental theory, became the official 'New England' theology; by McLeod Campbell, a mediating theory of an ethico-penal character. (5) The chief modern representative of the subjective tendency was Schleiermacher, according to whom Christ transmits to men a new spiritual life of fellowship with God through his personal power over them. This theory may be termed mystical. Other notable modern discussions are those of Dorner and Rothe, the former being conspicuous for knowledge and analytic power, the latter for spiritual insight; both attempt to combine the subjective and objective elements. Finally, Ritschl has reiterated a subjective view by teaching that men are able to judge of sin only through the impression made upon them by the life of Christ. From a purely philosophical standpoint it cannot be said that the personal subjective and metaphysical objective elements have been adequately reconciled as yet. The contact of the reforming subjectivity with the objective conclusions derived from evolution and other recent conclusions serves to make this the plainer. Many prominent theologians recognize the existence of the difficulty.
Literature: the relative article in Herzog's Real-Encyc. (with literature);
DORNER, Syst. of Christ. Doctrine (Eng. trans.), Pt. II, first main division
(with literature); BRUCE, Humiliation of Christ; ORR, Christ. View of God and
the World. (R.M.W.)
Atrophy (-ia) [Gr. atroqia, lack of nourishment]: Ger. Atrophie; Fr. atrophie; Ital. atrofia. Reduction in size or efficiency in an organ or mechanism of the body as a result of disuse, injury, or disease. Atrophy differs from degeneration in that the latter implies an actual destruction of the tissue. It is also distinguished from aplasy by careful writers. Cf. APLASY, and DEGENERATION. (H.H.)
In connection with the theory of evolution the term atrophy is now used for the diminution of an organ or tissue owing to its being useless (through change of habit or environment), or through its being superseded by some other organ. The inheritance of atrophy due to disuse is one of the tenets of the Lamarckian school of evolutionists.
Literature: art. Atrophy, Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.); J. DEMOOR, J. MASSART,
and E. VANDERVELDE, Evolution by Atrophy (1899). (C.LL.M.)
The attention is commonly described by such expressions as 'being occupied with,' 'concentrating upon,' 'absorbed in,' &c.
The two sorts of attention commonly distinguished are: 'reflex,' 'passive,' sometimes inappropriately called 'spontaneous,' on the one hand; and 'voluntary' or 'active' on the other hand -- attention being reflex when drawn without the subject's foreknowledge by an unexpected stimulation, and voluntary when (1) it follows a purpose to attend, or (2) pursues an object intrinsically interesting. If we call the first of these cases 'volitional,' the latter may be named 'unvolitional' or 'spontaneous,' both being 'voluntary.' Cf. the recommendations made under ACTION. This main distinction, between reflex and voluntary attention, marks so clear a fact that it should be preserved (as against, e.g., Stumpf, Tonpsycholgie, ii. 283).
To these may be added, though not correlative with them, Primary Attention (cf. Ladd), which indicates the supposed form of attention, or its organic analogue, in organisms so low as to be incapable of having a life of presentation. If attention be used with this meaning (cf. Ward, Encyc. Brit., art. Psychology) it is better to qualify it by some such word as 'primary.'
Other distinctions are marked by the phrases: (1) Expectant Attention, or Pre-attention, with the variations Preperception (Lewes) and Ideational Preparation (Bain, Emotions and Will, 373; James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 438; Münsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, 67), with (2) Diffused or Scattered Attention, characteristic of states of Indifference, lack of Interest, and Apathy, terms of degree used (in contrast with Strained, Concentrated, Effortful Attention) in reference to mental objects which are clearly taken in but quickly passed over. (3) Selective Attention, having reference to the outcome, on which see SELECTION (mental).
States of attention are also distinguished with reference to their objects as (1) Sensorial (attention to a sensation) and (2) Ideational, Ideal, or Intellectual (attention to an idea). For the one Sensorial is preferable to 'sensible,' as a translation of the German 'sinnlich,' and for the other Ideational is recommended. In regard to attention directed to the motor functions we find that it facilitates strictly voluntary functions, but interferes with and retards those which are automatic or tending to become so.
With some notable exceptions (Wolff, Kant, and James Mill) the attention was greatly neglected until more modern times, notably by the English empiricists (cf. James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 402). It was considered an unanalysable attribute of the soul, and direct evidence of the independent activity of the mental principle (Hamilton, Carpenter, McCosh). With Leibnitz it was the essential mode of receiving new experiences which he termed apperception.
Recent literature, however, is full of theories of attention, which may be grouped under certain headings. There are (1) the affective theories (Horwicz, Ribot); (2) the 'psychical energy' and 'original activity' theories (Lotze, Wundt, Stumpf, Ward, Ladd, Jodl); (3) the conative and motor theories (Bain, Lange, Münsterberg, Stout, Baldwin); (4) the 'intensity' and 'reinforcement' theories (Condillac, G. E. Müller, Bradley); (5) the 'inhibition' theory (Ferrier, Obersteiner).
The differences of opinion on the question as to whether attention is a separate or independent faculty or a function of the content in mind, are now reflected in the question as to whether it be, if a function, a common and constant, or a variable and specialized function. It has recently been argued, in opposition to the 'constant function' view, that attention is a variable function: that we have not one attention, but many attentions. On this view, while there is a constant element in the different reactions of attention to different contents, there are nevertheless both 'typical' (visual, auditory, &c.) and also individual or special elements characteristic of each. The discussion of the question is facilitated by the use of symbols put in a formula: --
Att (attention) = A + a + a: a formula showing the mental elements which enter into an act of attention, apart from the object attended to, in which the symbols have the following significance:
A = elements common to all acts of attention.
a = elements special to acts of attention to different classes of objects, but common to acts of attention to all the objects of each class.
a = elements special to acts of attention to each single object, but common to repeated acts of attention to the same object.
The advantage of the symbols is that they can be used in the discussion of any of the theories of attention; that is, they can be given motor, affective, or intellectual values. It does not even require the view that all the symbols have positive values; for on the theories which consider attention as a constant faculty or function, the formula reduces itself to A = A, the other symbols being each zero (cf. Baldwin, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, chap. x. § 3; chap. xi. § 2; chap. xv).
Literature: CHR. WOLFF, Psychol. Empirica, § 245; JAMES MILL, Analysis
of the Phenomena of the Human Mind; BAIN, Emotions and Will, 373 f.; BRADLEY,
Mind, xi. 305 ff.; WARD, art. Psychology, in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed.); STUMPF,
Tonpsychologie, i. 33, and ii. 208 ff.; MÜNSTERBERG, Beitr. z. exper. Psychol.,
i, ii, and Die Willenshandlung; G. E. MÜLLER, Zur Theorie d. sinnlichen
Aufmerksamkeit; LADD, Psychol. Descrip. and Explan., chap. v; JAMES, Princ.
of Psychol., ii. chaps. xi, xxvi; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol., ii,. chaps. xv,
xvi; LEWES, Problem of Life and Mind, 3rd series, Prob. 2, chap. ix. 106, and
chap. x. 184; RIBOT, La Psychol. de l'Attention; PIERRE JANET, art. Attention
in Richet's Dict. de Physiologie, and Névroses et idées fixes,
i. 69; WAITZ, Lehrb. d. Psychol., § 55; VOLKMANN, Lehrb. d. Psychol., ii.
§ 114; BALDWIN, Handb. of Psychol., Feeling and Will, chaps. xii, xvi,
and Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race; N. LANGE, Philos. Stud., v. 413;
MARILLIER, Rev. Philos., xxvii. 566; FERRIER, Functions of the Brain, §§
102 f.; OBERSTEINER, Brain, i. 439 ff.; HEINRICH, Die mod. physiol. Psychol.
in Deutschland; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., i. 180 ff.; EISLER, Wörterb.
d. philos. Begriffe (for German references) (J.M.B.
Attention (defects of). Inasmuch as the normal exercise of attention, considered in both its spontaneous and volitional forms, involves the ability to concentrate the intellectual processes in a desired direction, and also a susceptibility to the influence of a large and variable number of impressions, and marked deviation from these may be regarded as defects of the attention. Abnormalities in the former direction would involve a deficiency of voluntary attention, and in the latter direction its excessive concentration, and consequently an undue limitation of its field.
Deficiency of Attention. 'As attention is the great conditioning factor in our intellectual life,' any serious impairment of intelligence will naturally bring with it a defect of the attention. This is well marked in IDIOCY (q.v.) and IMBECILITY (q.v.), as also in the waning of the mental powers in SENESCENCE (q.v.) and DEMENTIA (q.v.). In the former case, the very limited capacity, which is normal in childhood, to direct the line of intellectual effort for any considerable period, never passes beyond the undeveloped stage; while in the latter case the normal range of attention has been established, but has again become unduly contracted. A subnormal capacity to fix the attention is also characteristic of several varieties of functional derangements of the nervous system, particularly in cases of brain exhaustion (cf. NEURASTHENIA). Sufferers from this disorder find great difficulty at certain times in concentrating their efforts in a given direction; a few minutes of reading may bring on feelings of mental confusion and distress, or there may result a 'swimming' of the page, the words floating by without conveying a meaning. Talking, or listening to conversation, may unduly strain the weakened power of the attention, and cause vague feelings of mental uneasiness or positive pains (headache, &c.). While this defect is intimately related to defects of the will (see WILL, defects of), it is well to note that many neurasthenics have appearance of energy and desire to work, but the actual effort brings on speedy exhaustion. Purely physical fatigue, or abstinence from food, defective nutrition, weakness from illness, may also produce similar symptoms of a more or less temporary character.
The cerebral intoxication induced by the action of drugs (cf. PSYCHIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS) is frequently characterized by a wandering of the attention and difficulty of concentration. This is true of the effects of large doses of alcohol, and perhaps even more of opium and its related medicaments. That such drug habits may bring with them a permanent impairment of the mental powers, in which attention is markedly affected, is sufficiently indicated by accounts of alcoholism and opium-eating (De Quincey, Opium Eater; cf. Carpenter, Ment. Physiol.). A form of attention may also appear in normal men of gifted intellectual ability and high originality, whose minds overflow with plans and projects, but for whom the effort of execution and definite concentration seems almost impossible, which is yet not a defect. It has been called 'fluid attention,' and described by Baldwin (Story of the Mind, chap. viii. 3) as characteristic of the 'motor type.'
No definite pathology of the attention has been made out, and may by the very nature of the case be impossible; but there is considerable evidence (from disease and injury, from artificial experiments, and from comparative development) for regarding the functions of the frontal lobes of the brain as intimately connected with the power of attention.
Literature: D. FERRIER, Functions of the Brain; and titles given under PSYCHIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS, and under LOCALIZATION (cerebral). (L.M.)
The name aprosexia has been given by Guye (Brit. Med. J., 1889, 709) to an impairment of the attention due to nasal obstruction. Most of the cases occur in boys and young men of the student class. Aprosexia is also used in a general sense for the inability to fix the attention; when due to neurasthenia, it would be neurasthenic aprosexia; when due to nasal obstruction, nasal aprosexia.
Fixed Attention. A typical example is furnished by the insistent or FIXED IDEA (q.v.), which occupies the narrowed field of attention and prevents the access of other impressions. Such a condition is frequently characteristic of the brooding phases of grief or melancholia, and likewise of conditions of undue excitement and the delusions of monomania. States of ECSTASY (q.v.) and deep religious absorption may present longer or shorter periods of intense oblivion to outer impressions. Many writers regard the hypnotic condition as involving by suggestion a similar cramp of the attention upon the suggested action or idea, and a consequent lack of receptivity to all other impressions.
Literature: P. JANET, Névroses et idées fixes, i, ii (1898), and L'automatisme psychol. (1889); RIBOT, Psychol. of Attention (Eng. trans., 1890); Dis. of the Will (Eng. trans., 1884); CARPENTER, Ment. Physiol. (Eng. trans., 6th ed., 1891), chap. iii, &c.; MAUDSLEY, Physiol. of Mind (1878), and Body and Will (1884), chap. iii; FERRIER, Functions of the Brain; EXNER, Psychische Erscheinungen, chap. iv; SOLLIER, Psychol, de l'Idiot et de l'Imbécile (1891); L. MARILLIER, Remarques sur le mécanisme de l'attention, Rev. Philos. (1889), and Du rôle de la pathologie mentale dans les recherches psychologiques, Rev. Philos. (1893). (J.J. - L.M.)
Also PAOLO RICCARDI, L'Attenzione nella serie animale (1876); G. BUCCOLA, Leggi
del tempo nei fenomeni del pensiero (Milano, 1883); DE SANCTIS, Patologia dell'
Attenzione (Rome, 1896). See also ATTENTION (above and below). (E.M.)
(1) FLUCTUATIONS of attention (see that topic).
Literature: URBANTSCHITSCH, Centralbl. f. med. Wiss (1875); Pflüger's Arch., xxvii; N. LANGE, MARBE, PACE, ECKENER, LEHMANN, in Philos. Stud.; MÜNSTERBERG, in Beiträge, ii; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 295 ff.; HEINRICH, Anz. d. Akad. d. Wiss. in Krakau (Nov., 1898); COOK, Amer. J. of Psychol. (1899).
(2) COMPLICATION (see that topic). Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 389 ff.; von Tschisch, Philos. Stud., ii; Pflaum, Philos. Stud., xv; Pierce and Angell, Jastrow, Amer. J. of Psychol., iv, v.
(3) Range of Attention (see SPAN OF CONSCIOUSNESS). Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), 286 ff.; Cattell, Dietze, in Philos. Stud.; Bechterew, in Neurol. Centralbl. (1889).
(4) DISTRACTION of attention (see that topic).
(5) Influence of attention on the estimation of time intervals (see TIME-SENSE). Cf. WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), 409 ff.
(6) Reaction-time experiments (see REACTION TIME).
(7) Attention and concomitant processes, physiological and psychological.
Literature: Breathing and pulse: DELABARRE, Rev. Philos., xxxiii. 639; LEHMANN, Philos. Stud., ix; MÜNSTERBERG, Beiträge; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 297; MENTZ, Philos. Stud., xi. Muscle sensations: MÜNSTERBERG, Beiträge. Adaptation or organ (eye): HEINRICH, Zeitsch. f. Psychol., ix, xi; MAC DOUGALL, Psychol. Rev., iii. 158; ANGELL and MOORE, Psychol. Rev. (1896), iii. 245; (ear): HEINRICH, Physiol. Centralbl. (1896); Wien. med. Wochensch. (1896). Organic processes: ANGELL and THOMPSON, Psychol. Rev. (1899), vi. 32.
(8) Effects of attention.
Literature: MÜNSTERBERG, Psychol. Rev., i; LALANDE and PAULHAN,
Rev. Philos., xxxv; HAMLIN, Amer. J. of Psychol., viii. Cf. JAMES, Princ. of
Psychol., i. 424. (E.B.T.)
Attitude [Lat. aptus, fit]: Ger. Haltung, Einstellung (cf. PREDISPOSITION); Fr. attitude; Ital. attitudine. Readiness for attention, or action, of a definite sort. A mental attitude is thus a motor or attentive DISPOSITION (q.v.) which represents a definite, relatively independent, and conscious function.
Attitude is used of both mind and body. Mentally, it is a state of the attention primarily, and secondarily an expression for habitual tendencies and interests. A physical attitude is primarily a state of partial stimulation to action of a definite kind, and secondarily an expression of HABIT (q.v.).
The theoretical question concerning mental attitudes is as to their relation to the respective mental contents or objects to which they have reference. A mental attitude is always directed towards something in mind: is the attitude a function of this, or is this content brought up by the attitude? Put this way, the question presupposes, however answered, a vital connection between content of whatever kind and attitude with its resulting action.
Psychologists distinguish between voluntary and non-voluntary attitudes, and for the latter class it is held that both attitudes of the attention and those of action result from mental contents (purely physical attitudes being due to habit or to direct organic stimulation). With reference to attitudes toward action, most contemporary psychologists hold that they are revivals of earlier actions brought about by the perception or thought of the object to which they are appropriate (James, Münsterberg, Wundt lately, Baldwin). Some, however, still hold (Ladd, Ward) that the mind may take a quite original attitude, which is not a function of the content, and realize action or new thought from this attitude. With this latter position is associated the view (Wundt formerly, Ladd, Waller) that this original mental attitude has its seat in the motor centres of the brain, whose discharge in action is accompanied by 'sensations of innervation' and 'feeling of effort.' See INNERVATION (sensations of). James holds that higher intellectual and moral attitudes are original and initiative of action (Princ. of Psychol., i. 453 f.), a view which is not reconciled with his other position that effort is due to kinaesthetic sensations and is ultimately attention.
The tendency to consider attitudes apart from contents was practically universal in psychology until very recently. But felt attitudes are now considered on a par with presented contents as elements of analysis, under the terms 'motor elements,' 'dispositions,' &c. Münsterberg, Fouillée, Royce, Stout, Baldwin, have worked out theories which recognize motor attitudes as links of association in mental compounds (Münsterberg), as dynamic units correlative with ideas (Fouillée), as the unifying and the general, in all the mental life, contributing the subjective phase to various psychoses, such as recognition, judgment, belief (Bain, Royce, Stout, Baldwin). Further, in genetic psychology the view has been worked out that the organizing and conserving of experience on which mental development proceeds are due to two typical attitudes, under which all those of attention and action may be subsumed, the attitudes of HABIT and ACCOMMODATION (see these terms). See also SELECTION (mental).
Literature: see the titles given under the special headings cited in
this article. Also BAIN, Emotions and Will (3rd ed.), 505 ff.; JAMES, Princ.
of Psychol., i. chap. xi, and ii. chap. xxvi; and The Will to Believe; MÜNSTERBERG,
Beitr. z. exper. Psychol., i; FOUILLÉE, La Psychol. des Idées-Forces,
and Rev. Philos., xxviii. 561 f.; LADD, Psychol. Descrip. and Explan., chaps.
v and xi; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., Bk. II, chaps. i, iii, vii, viii, xi; BALDWIN,
Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, chaps. viii, xv. (J.M.B.
Attraction and Repulsion [Lat. attractio et repulsus]: Ger. Anziehung und Abstossung; Fr. attraction et répulsion; Ital. attrazione e ripulsione. Attraction is a force exerted between two bodies or particles tending to bring them together or to prevent their separation.
When the bodies in question are at an appreciable distance apart attraction always varies inversely as the square of the distance, as in the case of GRAVITATION (q.v.) and magnetic and electric attraction. When the attracting particles are in contact, the result may be cohesive attraction, keeping the parts of a body together; surface tension, a contractile force between the surface molecules of a liquid which makes a drop of liquid assume its spherical form; or capillary attraction, between a solid and a liquid. The laws governing the various forms of cohesive attraction are essentially different from the law of gravitation, because two particles could not cohere by virtue of an attraction which did not increase more rapidly than the inverse square of the distance.
Repulsion is the opposite or algebraic negative of attraction, and is
a force tending to separate two particles or bodies. Its most familiar forms
are the tendency of two like magnetic poles, or two bodies electrified by like
electricities, to move away from each other. As in the case of attraction, the
intensity of the force is inversely as the square of the distance between the
repelling particles. The impenetrability of matter, or the resistance which
it offers to compression, is, so far as its manifestation goes, of the nature
of a repulsive force, the negative of molecular or cohesive attraction. (S.N.)
Attribute [Lat. ad + tribuere, to assign]: Ger. (1) Attribut, (3) Eigenschaft; Fr. attribut; Ital. attributo. (1) An essential characteristic of a being. Without its attributes, the existence of a thing is unthinkable. It is opposed to QUALITY, MODE, ACCIDENT. Cf. these terms.
Used in this sense by the Scholastics as a translation of the Aristotelian snmbebhkoV. Usually applied to them to the essential characteristics of the Deity. The term is still in use in theology. The 17th century philosophers apply the term to substance. Extension and thinking are the two attributes which we may know. It is defined by Spinoza: 'That which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.' The precise meaning of the term in Spinoza's system is disputed. K. Fischer makes 'attribute' equivalent to a force proceeding from the substance which he conceives as a causa efficiens; J. Erdmann considers the 'attributes' as forms under which the limitations of the finite mind compel us to view the infinite substance (Hist. Philos., iii, 72).
(2) The logical predicate is sometimes called 'an attribute' or said to be attributive.
(3) Loosely, any quality or property is called attribute; an incorrect use
of the word. (R.H.S.)
Attributes (of God, doctrine of): Ger. die Lehreder) göttlichen Eigenschaften; Fr. attrbuts de Dieu; Ital. attributi divini. An integral part of the division of systemic theology devoted to discussion of the nature of God. An attribute is a quality which may, or must, be joined to the conception; but junction with a conception by no means implies that it is merely subjective. Cf. ESSENCE, PROPERTY.
(1) From the Christian standpoint, other religious inevitably lead to partial or abstract views; e.g. Judaism to undue exaltation of holiness, heathenism to a merely physical conception. (2) In early Christian thought the subject was not systematically explored. Knowledge of God, and the fact of the divine unity (as against Gnostics and Manichaeans), constituted the centres of interest. (3) With the rise and spread of Christological and Trinitarian controversies, systematic treatment of the attributes became necessary; the relation of unity (of nature) to diversity (of attributes), and of unity (of substance) to diversity (of persons), now became the central problems. On them the mediaeval and scholastic theories of God converged. The tendency was to elaborate the intellectual aspects and to pass lightly over the ethical. (4) Even after the Reformation this tendency continued, thanks (a) to the special Christology of the Reformers and to its prominence, and (b) to the Deistic controversies. Similar leanings were present in the Mystics, the most marked difference being traceable to the doctrine of knowledge termed the 'beatific vision.' (5) In the 19th century the influence of the idealistic movement (Herder to Hegel) and of Schleiermacher at length brought systematic theologians face to face with the entire problem, on the ethical as well as on the intellectual side. The analyses of Philippi, Thomasius, Nitzsch, and others, more particularly Dorner, are the most adequate presentations of the subject as a whole. Much has been done, from a more specially philosophical standpoint, by I..H. Fichte and his group (including Lotze). As concerns philosophy of religion, the central problem still remains that of the reconciliation of immanence with transcendence, and at the present moment it is attracting increased attention.
Literature: DORNER, Syst. of Christ. Doctrine (Eng. trans.), i. 187,
324, 344, 453; Person of Christ (Eng. trans.), i. division i. 88; Hist. of Protestant
Theol. (Eng. trans.), ii. 452; HUNTER, Outlines of Dogmatic Theol., ii. 50;
S. CLARKE, Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God; WEBER, Vom
Zorne Gottes; BRUCH, Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften; HARNACK, Hist.
of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iii. 244 f., v. 110 f. (R.M.W.)
Attrition [Lat. attritus, from atterere,
to rub]: Ger. Attrition; Fr. attrition; Ital. attrizione.
These are degrees of sorrow for sin -- conviction of guilt, implying contrition,
being the highest. Attrition is the name given to sorrow proceeding from some
lower motive, e.g. fear of future consequences. (R.M.W.)
Atwater, Lyman Hotchkiss.
(1813-83.) An American divine, graduate of Yale College and of the
New Haven Divinity School. Held a Congregational pastorate at Fairfield,
Conn., and chairs in Princeton College in turn in mental and moral philosophy,
logic, and moral and political science. He was, for a time, acting president
at Princeton. He published several discussions, and an elementary work
Audition Colorée [Fr.]: Ger. farbiges
Hören; Fr. as in topic; Ital. udizione colorata. See SYNAESTHESIA.
Augsburg Confession: Ger. Augsburgische Konfession; Fr. Confession d'Augsbourg; Ital. Confessione di Augusta. The Augsburg Confession is the most authoritative of the Lutheran creeds. It was prepared by Melanchthon in 1530, with the approval of Luther, and at the request of the Emperor Charles V.
Its main value to the student of history of thought lies in the admirable moderation with which it sets forth the points of agreement and difference between the Reformers and the Church. This Confession drew a 'Confutation' from Eck and other Catholic divines, which the emperor approved. Melanchthon in turn prepared a confutation of this, known as the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. This is a more valuable document for the history of thought than the Confession -- of which it is the authoritative exposition. It was completed fourteen months after the Confession.
Literature: SCHAFF, Creeds of Christendom, i. 225; iii. 3. (R.M.W.)
Augustine was the founder of Christian philosophy in the West, and by far the most important of patristic writers, holding a supremacy among the Latin Fathers which even Origen by no means enjoyed among the Greek.
In the course of his long career Augustine passed through several distinct stages of intellectual and spiritual experience; these have left their mark on his work everywhere. (1) After receiving a good education, he devoted himself to the principal higher study of his time, rhetoric; was aroused to the pursuit of truth by Cicero's Hortensius, and, to this end, studied the Scriptures in Latin translations, his knowledge of Greek being very defective. (2) Dissatisfied with the results of this inquiry, he turned to the MANICHAEANS (q.v.) for aid, and belonged to their sect for ten years (till 383). (3) Having gone to Rome, he was there appointed to a professorship of rhetoric at Milan. In his new home he listened, first as a rhetorician and for practical purposes, to the eloquent preaching of Ambrose, but soon passed from connoisseurship of its manner to consideration of its matter. This, with special study of Paul's writings, led to his conversion in 386, and baptism in 387. (4) Passing once more to his native Africa, he lived as a recluse for several years, in marked contrast to his former laxity. In 391 he was ordained priest at Hippo, in 395 coadjutor-bishop, and six months later succeeded to the full bishopric. The rest of his career, coincident with his episcopate of 35 years, was spent in Africa, where ecclesiastico-religious conditions exerted an important influence over his thought and writings. He was prominent in three great controversies -- with the MANICHAEANS (q.v.), the DONATISTS (q.v.), and the PELAGIANS (q.v.). Opposition to the teachings of the first and last was of particular importance in moulding his views, especially of God and the Trinity, and of Grace and Free Will. His ignorance of Greek left him independent of previous doctrinal controversies, while his training as a rhetorician lent peculiar force to his speech, and elegance to his writing.
Three main elements combine in the formation of his opinions: (1) The personal, consisting in vivid spiritual experiences, and in remarkable talent for self-analysis; (2) the philosophical, emanating chiefly from the pursuits and training incident to his pre-Christian period, and destined to exercise more influence in his earlier than in his later ecclesiastical life; (3) the religious, traceable partly to his early struggles, partly to his conception of the Catholic Church, and partly to the difficulties of Christian doctrine which he was compelled to face as a controversialist. This element, particularly as connected with the idea of the Church, grew in force, and finally became paramount. In his philosophy, Augustine starts from the principle of the immediate certainty of knowledge. Even doubt cannot but testify to the fact of knowledge. Thence he at once passes to show that the existence of God is necessarily involved in this first principle. With these two normative principles he has a firm basis, and finds himself able to unite the individual and the universal. Here the influence of Plato exercises marked influence, especially in the proof that all knowledge is ultimately knowledge of God. Proceeding to fill out the conception of Deity, Augustine at once shows his tendencies as a master of introspection by adopting the will as central characteristic; and in this what is commonly known as Augustinianism has its source. The world was created by God's free choice; the Timeless created the world in time, and upon God it ever depends for continued existence. Evil was not created by God, and is good only in so far as it must exist with God's permission, and because he can cause good to grow out of it. Human souls are essentially personal or individual, and come into existence along with their bodies. Memory, intellect, and will are the soul's principal faculties and they serve to reflect the triune nature of God. This psychological theory immediately passes over into an ethical one. Individuality and will are intimately related. Hence, free will is the foundation of the possibility of morality. Free will implies freedom of choice, or, in another aspect, exemption from evil -- which may be expressed also as freedom for good. In the latter sense -- which predominates as concerns this life -- freedom is wholly dependent upon the grace of God. Here philosophy passes over into theology. Man was free at the first, and therefore had the capacity to sin from choice. This Adam did, and, through him, all men lost freedom; it became impaired as concerned the soul's most vital interest. Man could not attain salvation because of original sin. But God in his grace had elected some to salvation; before the beginning of the world he had predetermined the saved. But this grace can be received only through the Church. The conceptions of God, original sin, and the Church are therefore organic to each other, and serve to explain at once one another and man's worldly vocation. Freedom of the will and Predestination are the two foci of Augustine's theology. By means of the former, he triumphs over heretics; by means of the latter he is able to furnish a systematized Weltansicht. Christian subjectivity and Greek objectivity lie side by side. The development of Augustine's influence, especially in Aquinas and the Reformers, shows that the two sides had not been completely united.
Literature: art. in Herzog's Real-Encyc. (with literature); any history
of mediaeval philosophy -- STÖCKL, WINDELBAND, ERDMANN, HÖFFDING;
HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), v. (R.M.W.)
Aura [Gr. anra, breeze]: Ger. Aura; Fr. aura; Ital. aura. (1) Any subjective sensory or motor phenomena that ushers in a nervous seizure such as epilepsy or hysteria; (2) specifically, the subjective sensation as of a current of air rising from some part of the body to the head, which is a frequent premonition of an epileptic attack; (3) a supposed emanation or fluid assumed by believers in mesmeric or similar forces as the medium of conveyance of such forces.
The premonitory symptoms of epilepsy are frequently spoken of as the aura epileptica, and of hysteria as the aura hysterica. The forms of aura are extremely various. They may be motor, such as local tremors, twitchings, or spasms, deviations of the eyes, contortions of the face, &c.; they may be sensory, as a general feeling of heat or cold, tingling, numbness, pain, dizziness, as well as subjective auditory and visual sensations; they may be visceral or vaso-motor sensations, blushing, choking, burning in the stomach, excessive salivation; and they may be mental, such as sudden fright or apprehensiveness. The nature and development of the aura is at times of importance in detecting the precise nature of the malady. See EPILEPSY (also for literature), and HALLUCINATION. (J.J.)
Literature: PARISH, Hallucinations and Illusions (1897); MAGNAN, Leçons
clin. sur les maladies ment. (1893); MARINESCO and SENEUX, Essai sur la pathogénie
et le traitement de l'épilepsie (1895); CH. FÉRÉ, Les épilepsies
et les épileptiques (1896), particularly chap. vi. (L.M.
Authenticity [Gr. antoenthV, anqenthV, one who does anything with his own hand; Ger. Authenticität, Echtheit; Fr. authenticité; Ital. autenticità. A main problem of 'higher,' as distinguished from 'lower' (or merely textual), criticism, involving all questions of authorship and title; of genuineness, compilation, and forgery; of tradition with respect to authorship. Possibly the most vivid practical example of the problem is to be found in Bentley's work cited below. Cf. CANON, CRITICISM, and EVIDENCE (external and internal).
Literature: BENTLEY, Diss. on the Epistles of Phalaris (Wagner's ed.,
Authority (in religion) [Lat. auctoritas, a decree]: Ger. Autorität, Zeugnis (of writings); Fr. autorité; Ital. autorità. The term has several meanings. (1) Ecclesiastical. (a) The Roman Catholic view, of an infallible Church, implies that an external organization, being universal, submerges the individual, or at least sets the bounds within which conclusions reached by individuals must fall. Pushed to an extreme it falls into a one-sided legalism, and this is always its prevalent tendency.
(b) According to the Protestant view, the Church (in its creed chiefly) and the Bible are norms from which the individual sets out; but their influence, qua authoritative, is dependent upon his personal response and willing co-operation. This view often runs the danger of rating belief higher than life, just as the Roman Catholic rates conformity.
(2) Theological. (a) The creed of a Church, or the theory of ecclesiastical organization, and the scriptural records are the norms from which the theologian starts; they provide the implicit subject-matter, the principles of which he is to render explicit.
(b) In Speculative Theology, which approaches most closely to philosophy, the norms are the facts of God's existence, his relation to the universe, and his peculiar nature. Here the authority may lie either in a common or universal reason, held to be revealing itself in the universe, according to the liberal interpretation; or in certain dogmas -- which stand in need of being systematically rationalized -- according to the conservative view. In recent years, owing to the influence of philosophy, such writers as Dorner, Sterrett, the authors of Lux Mundi, and others, have tended to fuse these two views.
Literature: WATERSWORTH, Faith of Catholics; MARTINEAU, Seat of Authority
in Religion; OETTINGER, Die Autorität; DORNER, Hist. of Christ. Doctrine
(Eng. trans.), i. 79; STERRETT, Reason and Authority in Religion; GORE (editor),
Lux Mundi; BALFOUR, Foundations of Belief; LEWIS, Authority in Matters of Opinion.
Examples (q.v.): AUTOMATIC, AUTONOMOUS, AUTOSUGGESTION. (J.M.B.)
The Greek means 'ruling by oneself'; and the adjective (antokrathV)
often means 'independent.' But antokratwr is used
of absolute rule as well as of simple independence. In post-classical times
it was translated dictator, and later still imperator in the sense of emperor.
The typical autocracy is Russia, and the Russian word,,
was borrowed from Byzantine Greek. (J.B.)
Autokinesis [Gr. antoV,
self, + kinein, move]: Ger. Autokinese; Fr.
mouvements spontanés or involontaires; Ital. autocinesi.
Movements due to causes within the organism. See MOVEMENT. (J.J.)
Automatic and Automatism [Gr. antomatoV, self-moving]: Ger. automatisch, Automatismus; Fr. automatique, automatisme; Ital. automatico, automatismo. A machine which shows complex adjustments is automatic, and its action illustrates automatism.
1. In physiology: the adjective automatic is applied, in a strict sense, to those functions of the living organism which are independent of external stimuli, finding their stimulus in the conditions of the organism itself -- such processes, e.g., as the circulation of the blood, respiration, the beating of the heart.
2. In neurology: the terms are frequently used in a wider sense, to include what are more strictly known as REFLEX (q.v.) reactions. See AUTOMATIC ACTION (in psychology). It then indicates the performance of responsive acts independently of higher cerebral control. (C.LL.M. - J.M.B.)
Literature: LLOYD MORGAN, Compar. Psychol. (1894), Monist (1896), and Habit and Instinct (1896); HARTLEY, Essay on Man; CARPENTER, Ment. Physiol. (C.LL.M.)
3. In philosophy: automatism characterizes the whole behavior of a living organism, so far as that is not influenced by conative consciousness.
Many of the actions of men and other animals fall admittedly under this category, and the question has been raised whether the whole life-experience of animals may not be so explained. This theory, called Automatism or the Automaton Theory, was propounded by Descartes in regard to the lower animals, whose actions he explained throughout on purely mechanical principles, going so far, apparently, as to deny to them any consciousness accompanying the changes which transpired in their bodies. During the last half-century the attempt has been made by Huxley, D. Spalding, Shadworth Hodgson, and others to apply the same theory to man, in whose case, however, it is impossible to deny consciousness accompanying the bodily changes. The theory of conscious automatism does not seek to ignore the irreducibility of conscious facts to terms of matter and motion, but it regards consciousness as, in its own language, an EPIPHENOMENON (q.v.), an inactive accompaniment of a series of molecular changes which form in themselves a closed circle of causes or real conditions. In Huxley's words (Essay on 'Animal Automatism,' Collected Essays, i. 244), 'our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism; and, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act.' As Shadworth Hodgson insists, states of consciousness not only do not cause material movements; they are not even the causes of other conscious states. They are 'effects of the nature, sequence, and combination of the nerve states without being themselves causes either of one another or of changes in the nerve states which support them' (Theory of Practice, i. 336). 'The doctrine that we are essentially nervous machines, with a useless appendage of consciousness somehow added' (Sully, The Human Mind, ii. 368), seems to involve the contradiction of an effect which costs its cause nothing; for transformations of energy are supposed to go on entirely in the bodily sequence. The mental accompaniment is either mere surplusage or it must absorb some of the energy of the material system. The DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY (q.v.), which in some of its statements closely resembles automatism, endeavours to avoid this inconsequence by referring both series conjointly to the causation of a single substance. It is to this group that Clifford more properly belongs, though sometimes cited as an automatist. Cf. PARALLELISM, and MIND-STUFF THEORY.
4. Aristotle uses the term to antomaton in a special sense to designate what would now be called the contingent -- events which, as he explains, are not due to the purposive power of nature, but which occur, as it were by the way, as by-products, in consequence of some action which was purposive. See also MONISM. (A.S.P.P.)
Literature: cf. MIND AND BODY. The best exposition is contained in SHADWORTH
HODGSON, Met. of Experience, ii. chap. ii. § 6; see also HUXLEY, Sci. and
Culture, 199 ff. The best criticism is contained in HERBERT, Mod. Realism. See
also LEWES, Problems of Life and Mind, 2nd series, and The Physical Basis of
Mind, 307 ff.; WARD, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Lect. 12; JAMES, Princ. of
Psychol., i. chap. v. (G.F.S.)
Automatic Action (in psychology). A succession of acts in response to repeated or continuous excitation, proceeding in more or less complete independence of attention. Cf. CONSCIOUS-REFLEX. (G.F.S.)
We owe to Hartley the distinction between 'primarily' and 'secondarily' automatic actions. Under the first head he includes all congenital reflex actions; under the second head, those actions which we perform without attention because we have become used to them. The typical cases of primarily automatic actions are the rhythmical organic processes, such as breathing (Hartley, Observations on Man, Introd., and props. 19 and 21). We adopt Waller's distinction between the simple reflex and the automatic process. The automatic process is a serial effect of serial stimuli (cf. Waller, Physiol., 293). The word automatic is also sometimes used in the sense of self-moving or spontaneous. This clashes with the commoner usage, and should be discarded, except so far as the physiological usage given under (1) above is meant, in which case, however, the reactions are due to constant stimulating conditions.
Automatic Writing: Ger. automatisches Schreiben; Fr. écriture automatique; Ital. scrittura automatica. The name given to a form of writing that is recorded without the complete and conscious co-operation of the individual who writes; it is an elaborate and consequently less usual form of automatic movement which seems to be associated with obscure functional disorders of the nervous system (hysteria, &c.), but also occurs in persons who are healthy and entirely normal.
While really of the same general character as the unconscious movements involved in MUSCLE-READING (q.v.), it goes beyond these in involving not merely a definite direction of movement, or number and combination of movements, as in 'table-turning' or 'table-rapping,' but also a constant and complex as well as conventional co-ordination of the movements necessary to form letters, words, and sentences. In a typical but simple case, a pencil placed in the hands of the automatist will begin to write apparently of its own accord; the automatic character of the result being indicated by the fact that the writing proceeds the more successfully the more the subject is distracted from the action (by being directed to read aloud or by being engaged in conversation), and frequently, too, by the content and character of the writing. Such an experiment is still more likely to succeed when several persons co-operate by placing their hands upon a planchette or similar instrument, for then the slightest automatic tendency of any one of the party is apt to remain unchecked by the writer, and to be taken up and encouraged by the movements of the others. In a typical hysterical case, in which, according to the testimony of the normal consciousness, a hand or other member of the body is anaesthetic, the psychical character of such anaesthesia is revealed by the record automatically produced in response to touches upon the anaesthetic member. Much more elaborate and obscure forms of automatic writing have been recorded, which it is difficult to comprehend psychologically, and in which an element of unconscious deception is not excluded. It seems proper to speak of the directing intelligence of such writing and to endeavour to determine its relation to the conscious normal intelligence. The most usual theory ascribes the automatic expressions to the agency of a subconscious personality, which has become dissociated from the main conscious stream of thought, a secondary personality split off from the main personality, and accessible only by psychological means like hypnotism, or by automatic writing which reveals as 'out of gear' the usual co-ordinating relations of the highest cerebral centres. Much study and ingenuity have been expended upon the description of the phenomena, but no very satisfactory explanation has as yet been reached.
Literature: A. BINET, Alterations of Personality; P. JANET, Automatisme
Psychol. (1889), and Névroses et idées fixes; JAMES, Princ. of
Psychol., chap. x; MYERS, series of articles in Proc. Soc. Psych. Res., especially
May, 1885; FLOURNOY, Des Indes à la planète Mars (1900); W.R.
NEWBOL, Pop. Sci. Mo., xlix. See PERSONALITY (disorders of). (J.J.)
Automatism (psychic, psychological): Ger. psychischer Automatismus: Fr. automatisme psychologique; Ital. automatismo psicologico. The performance of actions apparently involving some degree of psychological determination, without the consciousness of the personal subject.
This term has gained currency from the usage of P. Janet in his work Automatisme
Psychologique, which is devoted to the study of the phenomena described
more fully under PERSONALITY (disorders of) and AUTOMATIC WRITING. The aspect
emphasized by the term is that of the analogy to nervous automatic movement
in which no conscious control or initiative is exercised. Here the movements,
&c., though apparently involving psychological processes, are nevertheless
psychically or mentally unconscious, and are variously ascribed to 'secondary,'
'split-off,' 'low,' 'unconscious' forms of mentality resident in restricted
portions or areas of the nervous system. Following the usage recommended under
PSYCHIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, psychic or mental automatism is the more exact expression.
Cf. the literary references made under the terms cited. (J.M.B.)
(2) By autonomy of the will may be meant either the actual freedom of the will (i.e. its freedom from causal necessity), or its relative freedom from externally suggested or imposed motives, such as social or theological restraints. In the latter sense a believer in necessity could still speak of the relative autonomy of the will of an independently minded man.
(3) In Kantian terminology, the character belonging especially to the rational
will as such, the character, namely, of being altogether its own lawgiver. The
law that the will or the practical reason gives to itself is in Kant's view,
namely, quite independent of experience, as well as of all ordinary forms of
authority. This autonomy implies metaphysical freedom. Cf. the next topic. (J.R.)
Autonomy (ethical). The characteristic of a moral being in virtue of which he is said to be a 'law to himself'; not in the sense of following his desires, but because the law which he recognizes as morally binding upon him is the law laid down by his own moral consciousness. (W.R.S.)
In this sense the term is used by Kant, Grundl. d. Met.
d. Sitten, ii; Krit, d. prakt. Vernunft,
I. i. I, §§ 7, 8. He distinguishes between the true or rational self
and the natural self with its content of sense and desire. This true self, which
is practical reason, is at the same time will, and determines itself by its
own law, which is the moral law. In other passages, however, it should be remembered
(e.g. Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, 229-31, ed. Rosenkranz),
empirical character is referred to the 'causality of the noumenon.' All other
ethical systems, inasmuch as they rely upon a law or end outside the rational
will, are classed by him as systems of Heteronomy. (W.R.S.
Wundt uses the term Fremdsuggestion for the contrasted and usual process of
suggestion from another person. The analogous Greek formation would be Heterosuggestion.
Autotelic (1) and (2) Heterotelic [Gr. antoV, self, and eteroV, other, + teloV, end]. (1) Autotelic: having or being its own end, existing 'for its own sake,' as contrasted with (2) Heterotelic: having or serving a foreign or external end.
Autotelic is suggested as serving, in the phrases autotelic function, process,
&c., the meaning indicated by the German Selbstazweck, especially in recent
discussions of the aesthetic. According to certain theories, the aesthetic and
play impulses are autotelic. It is analogous to autonomic (in contrast with
heteronomic), but narrower in its connotation. The distinction is important
also in discussions of ethics and TELEOLOGY, under which it is further illustrated.
Vishnu became specially prominent in later Brahmanism for his incarnations. These were not THEOPHANIES (q.v.), nor demi-gods, but men in whom the god was actually present. The doctrine is that of a theanthropos. But the rich mythology has included beasts and monstrosities among the Avatars.
Literature: BARTH, Religions of India, 170; HOPKINS, Religions of India,
Heinrich Ludwig. Son of Eduard Avenarius, a German publisher and bookseller
in Paris, where Richard was born in 1843. The family removed to Leipzig,
and soon after to Berlin. Here began his education, continued later at
Leipzig, where he was especially influenced by Carl Ludwig, Drobisch, and
Zarncke. He was one of the founders of the Akademisch-Philosophischer Verein
of Leipzig. He became Docent at the same university in 1876, and founded
the Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. He succeeded
Windelband as professor of philosophy at Zurich in 1877, where he died,
August 18, 1896. His philosophical system, called Empiriocriticism, has
gained considerable currency (cf. the general account, biographical and
expository, by Carstanjen, in Zeitsch. f. wiss. Philos.,
xx, 1896, 361 ff., with references to the writings of Avenarius). An extended
criticism of the system is by Wundt, in Philos. Stud., xiii,
Averroës, or Averrois, or
Averois, or Averoys, or Averrhoës. (1126-98.)
The greatest of the Arabian philosophers and physicians. The pupil of Avempace
and of Avenzoar, he became cadi (judge) at Seville and Cordova, enjoying
great favour at the court at Morocco. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle
and numerous works on medicine, theology, law, logic, &c. See the next
topic, and the remarks on Arabian philosophy under SCHOLASTICISM.
In Averroës' thought, as in that of other Muslim thinkers, three main elements meet.
(1) The philosophy of Aristotle. (2) Neo-Platonism as deflected through eastern Muslim thought, which was indebted chiefly to the NESTORIANS (q.v.). (3) The influences incident to Islam as a religion. Averroës is thus at once a philosopher, a theologian, and a theosophist. But in him, more than in any other, the philosophic tendency predominates, thanks to his faithfulness to Aristotle. His peculiar and normative tenets are: (1) the eternity of matter and of the universe, thus eliminating creationism; (2) the unity of the intellect of the individual man with the universal spirit, involving a denial of immortality, and a doctrine of return to an 'over-soul.' This 'over-soul' (Erdgeist) is not God, but an emanation from God. Averroës was thus a speculative rationalist. As such he came into collision with Islamic orthodoxy and was rejected; for the same reasons he was attacked by Albertus Magnus and Aquinas. Through Maimonides he exerted widespread and profound influence; lived again in the teaching of the school of Padua, of which Pomponatius (1495) was the most brilliant ornament. Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, John Baconthorpe, Walter Burley, and Michael Scott, the 'wizard of the North,' were all affected by him.
Literature: UEBERWEG, ERDMANN, STÖCKL, Histories of Philos.; AVERROËS,
Philos. u. Theol. (Ger. trans. by Müller); MUNK, Mélanges de Philos.
juive et arabe; RENAN, Averroës et l'Averroïsme. (R.M.W.)
Aversion [Lat. a + vertere, to
turn]: Ger. Aversion, Abneigung; Fr. aversion; Ital. avversione.
See APPETENCE, and ANTIPATHY. (J.M.B.)
Avesta. Avesta, Avesta-Zend, or, as it is popularly and incorrectly termed, Zend-Avesta, is the name applied to what remains of the sacred writings of Zoroastrianism. 'Avesta' probably means 'law'; 'Zend' (Zand) means 'commentary.'
What remains in the Avesta is but a fraction of a great literature, which probably perished during, or after, the destruction of the Persian power by Alexander the Great. The fragments date back possibly as far as the 6th century B.C. What then remained was gathered carefully together under the Sassanians (213 A.D.). This, with further losses incident to the Muslim conquest, was made known to the Western world by Du Person in 1771. It may be divided into six parts. (1) Yasna and Gathas -- liturgy and hymns. (2) Visperad -- invocations. (3) Yashts -- hymns to angels and heroes. (4) Smaller texts -- prayers and 'doxologies.' (5) Vendidad -- the law directed specially against demons. (6) Other fragments.
Literature: Sacred Books of the East, iv, xxiii, xxxi; F. SPIEGEL, Eranische
Alterthumskunde. For other literature see TRÜBNER, Amer. and Oriental Lit.
Rec. (July 20, 1865); TIELE, Hist. of Ancient Religions, 160; JACKSON, Zoroaster.
For a philosophical interpretation see JULIA WEDGWOOD, Moral Ideal, chap. ii.
Avicenna's philosophy consists mainly of Aristotelianism plus Neo-Platonism; but the mystic elements drawn from the latter are affected by MAZDAISM (q.v.). He is thus interested mainly in philosophy on its religious side, and his system is a doctrine of Being, based on Aristotle. God is necessary being; space, time, and the like, which receive necessity from God, are actual being; while the objects of the physical sciences are possible being. God is thus shot through all things, and the doctrine of emanation mediates between a crude creationism and an equally crude materialism. Hence Avicenna's doctrine of an 'active' intellect, common to all men, imparted to them, and destined to return again to God. In spite of this, Avicenna holds personal immortality. His doctrines had wide influence in mediaeval thought. Those who opposed Averroës respected Avicenna, not perceiving that the later thinker only drew the logical conclusions to which the earlier unconsciously pointed. It should be noted that his influence is most marked in Dante and the Mystics.
Literature: UEBERWEG, Hist. of Philos., i. 107; Encyc. Brit., sub verbo;
ERDMANN, Hist. of Philos., i. 362. It should be pointed out that existing literature
is far from exhausting the subject. (R.M.W.)
Award (in law) [Old Fr. esguart]: Ger. Schiedspruch,
Entscheidung; Fr. jugement arbitral; Ital. arbitrio. (1)
The final sentence pronounced by an arbitrator upon the matter submitted to
his determination. (2) That which is to be said or done according to this sentence.
An award differs from a judgment in that upon its publication the authority
by which it is pronounced terminates, and therefore does not extend to its enforcement.
Cf. ARBITRATION. (S.E.B.)
Axiom [Gr. axiwma, dignity]: Ger. Axiom, Grundsatz; Fr. axiome; Ital. assioma. A proposition, general in import, and held as standing in no need of, or indeed as incapable of, proof. Axioms are self-evident truths.
Aristotle uses axiwma in the sense of ultimate principles, which were regarded by him as being of two kinds: common, i.e. principles ultimate as regards any kind of reasoning or knowledge, such e.g. as the law of contradiction; special, i.e. principles which unfolded the ultimate nature of some type or kind of real existence. Such ultimate nature he took to be apprehensible, even if approached through the subordinate offices of sense-perception, by the intuitive grasp of reason. The same term axiwma was afterwards used by the Stoics to denote merely a proposition, and this usage was followed by the Ramist logicians partly by Bacon, who, however, takes more in the sense of generalized statements. With Kant, axioms are synthetical propositions only, self-evident and intuitively apprehended. In his view, therefore, axioms are possible only within the sphere of intuition, i.e. of space and time. Round such axioms, much modern discussion is concentrated. (R.A.)
In mathematics, the term is commonly restricted to the self-evident propositions on which geometry is based, and those facts of general experience which are so familiar that every one must admit them. (S.N.)
Literature: CROOM ROBERTSON, Philos. Remains, 119-134; B. ERDMANN, Die
Axiome d. Geometrie; EISLER, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe, sub verbo. (R.A.)
Axion. The central nervous system or cerebro-spinal
axis; cf. NEURAXIS. To be distinguished from Axon, used by Wilder for the longitudinal
skeletal axis of the vertebrate body and by Kölliker for the NEURITE (q.v.).
Axis Cylinder: Ger. Primitivband,
Axencylinder; Fr. cylindre-axe; Ital. cilindrasse. The
central nervous axis of a nerve fibre. Cf. NERVOUS SYSTEM, NERVE. For axis-cylinder
process, see NEURITE. Sometimes abbreviated to 'axis' (Howell and Huber). Opinion
differs as to whether the axis cylinder consists of an outgrowth of a single
cell. There is much evidence in favour of the view that the longer peripheral
nerves are formed by a moniliform union of many neuroblasts or ganglioblasts.
Azymites (and Prozymites) [Gr. a + xnmh, leaven]. Azymite is one of the names which arose during the dispute between the Eastern and Western Churches. It was applied by the Greeks to the Latins, because the latter used unleavened bread in the celebration of the Eucharist. The Latins retorted upon the Greeks with the epithet Fermentarii or Prozymites (1051 A.D.).
Literature: PICKLER, Gesch. d. kirch. Trennung zwischen d. Orient u.
Occident, i. 255; NEANDER, Church Hist. vi. 337. (R.M.W.)