Classical Texts in Psychology
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)
A parte ante and A parte post [Lat.].
Scholastic expressions for those aspects of the eternal life of God whereby
it is thought as without limits in the past (ante) and in the future (post).
Cf. ETERNITY OF GOD. (J.M.B.)
It is a frequent symptom in conditions of physical and nervous weakness as
well as of mental impairment. It appears in the mental states of MELANCHOLIA
(q.v.) when characterized by stupor rather than by agitation; and in states
of dementia. See Féré, Pathol. des émotions
(1892); cf. NEURASTHENIA. (J.J.)
Apathy expresses the negative ideal of the wise man in the Stoic philosophy. The wise man is regarded as unmoved by the effects which external excitations produce upon the feelings. In this consists the rule or hegemony of reason in the soul. Reason (nouV), seeing that the violence of the paqh is contrary to its nature, refuses to be hurried along by them. The wise man thus overcomes the impulses which external stimuli tend to originate, and prevents them from becoming his paqh. In overcoming these impulses his personality remains unmoved. Pleasure or pain may arise: but, as he refuses to call pleasure good or pain evil, he remains self-sufficient.
A similar conception appears in modern writers, e.g. Spinoza; and it appears as a general characteristic of ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (q.v.). But the modern use of the term apathy is rather popular than technical; although it has the same signification of emotionlessness.
Literature: ZELLER, Philos. d. Griechen, III. i. 8; and cf. STOICISM.
Apeiron [Gr. to apeiron].
The unlimited or indeterminate of Anaximander. See PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
and GREEK TERMINOLOGY. Cf. the citations in Eisler, Wörterb. d.
philos. Begriffe, sub verbo. (J.M.B.)
Aphakia [Gr. a + fakoV,
lentil, taken for lens]: Ger. Aphakie; Fr. aphacie; Ital. afachia.
Absence of the crystalline lens in the eye; the condition may result from an
operation for cataract. See VISION (defects of). (J.J.)
Aphasia [Gr. a + fanai. speak]: Ger. Aphasie; Fr. aphasie; Ital. afasia, disfasia. Loss or impairment of any or all of the faculties concerned in the understanding or use of spoken or written language; such loss being dependent upon injury to the nervous centres involved, and being independent of any serious mental incapacity, and of any disease or paralysis of the organs concerned in articulation.
The term is thus a most general one, and includes the various forms of speech
defect -- sensory and motor, complete and partial, defects in speaking and in
comprehension, in reading and writing -- that depend upon a lesion in any of
the centres involved, a breaking down of the connection between any two of these
centres or of the paths entering or leaving them; or again upon an impairment
of the imitative and reflex functions of speech. The term has been used in more
specialized and somewhat different senses, but the usage here given is at once
the most useful and general. Dysphasia is sometimes used as synonymous with
aphasia. For an account of the various forms of aphasia and all other details
see SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J. - J.M.B.)
Aphasia (motor): Ger. motorische Aphasie; Fr. aphasie motrice, aphasie de Broca, aphémie; Ital. afasia motrice, afasia del tipo Broca. Loss or impairment of the power to express oneself in spoken or written language, due not to a defect in articulation or in general intelligence, but to an inability to effect the proper innervations for language or to reinstate the proper KINAESTHETIC EQUIVALENTS (q.v.) of the muscular order.
It is used in contrast with sensory aphasia, and is the form of aphasia most
frequently associated with the general term. Its relations to other forms of
speech defect are considered under SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS (q.v.). (J.J.
Aphasia (sensory): Ger. sensorische Aphasie; Fr. aphasie sensorielle, Ital. afasia sensoriale, afasia del tipo Wernicke. Loss or impairment of the power to comprehend spoken or written language, either (1) purely sensory, as in PSYCHIC BLINDNESS or DEAFNESS (q.v.) for words, or (2) amnesic, due to impairment or loss of verbal memories other than muscular.
Theoretically, it is independent of any defect of sensation or articulation.
It is contrasted with motor aphasia, and has intimate and important relations
to the other factors of language which are considered under SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS
(q.v.). (J.J. - J.M.B.)
Aphemia [Gr. a + fhmh,
voice]: Ger. Aphemie; Fr. aphémie;
Ital. afemia. Loss or impairment of the power
of vocal speech; practically equivalent to motor aphasia, which term has in
large measure been substituted for aphemia. Aphemia is used in slightly different
senses. (Cf. Trousseau, Leç. cliniques; Tamburini, Disturbi
del linguaggio (1875); Bastian, Aphasia, 62, 180.) The term was (Broca)
and is sometimes used as synonymous with aphasia in general, but this use is
not desirable. For its relations to the various forms of aphasia, see SPEECH
AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J. - J.M.B.)
Aphonia or Aphony [Gr. a + fwnh, voice]: Ger. Stimmlosigkeit, Aphonie; Fr. aphonie; Ital. afonia. Loss of the power of vocal utterance, due not, as in aphasia, to not knowing how to speak, nor, as in anarthria, to inability to articulate, but to the inability to produce the sound, from paralysis or imperfect approximation of the vocal cords. Whispering is usually possible.
Hysterical aphonia or mutism ('mutisme hystérique' -- Janet, Les
Stigmates mentaux des Hystériques) is a term applied to this condition
when occurring as a symptom in cases of HYSTERIA (q.v.). Baldwin has suggested
(Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, chap. xiv. §
1) the term Psychic Dumbness, co-ordinate with psychic blindness and deafness.
Cf. MUTISM, and SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J. - L.M.)
Aphrasia [Gr. a + frasiV, speech]: Ger. Aphrasie; Fr. aphrasie; Ital. afrasia. (1) A disorder of speech in which the patient can speak single words or expressions, but cannot make use of connected phrases; in this sense partially equivalent (Kussmaul) to acataphasia. In French, 'acataphasie' designates incapacity to construe phrases, in opposition to 'autonomasie,' difficulty of associating words.
(2) Most frequently used to denote speechlessness due to lack of intelligence, or the stubborn silence due to voluntary restraint or some insane motive for not speaking (aphasia paranoica). Cf. Séglas, Troubles du langage; Morselli, Semej. malat. ment., ii.
Aphthongia [Gr. a
+ fqoggoV, voice, sound]: Ger. Aphthongie;
Fr. (not used); Ital. aftongia. A term used by Kussmaul. See ALALIA.
Aplasy or Aplasia [Gr. a
+ plasiV, formation]: Ger. Aplasie; Fr. (not
in use); Ital. aplasia. Failure of an organ or tissue to develop by reason
of operative interference or disease. See ATROPHY. (H.H.)
Apocalypse [Gr. apo + kalnptein, to reveal]: Ger. Apokalypse; Fr. Apocalypse; Ital. Apocalisse. In the history of religion, the name given to certain Jewish and Jewish-Christian writings, extending from the 'Book of Enoch' (200 B.C.) to the 'Sibylline Oracles' (350 A.D.)
Apocalyptic literature fills the gap between the prophetic and the Christian writings. It betrays several leading characteristics. (1) Interest centres in a supramundane sphere. (2) A pessimistic view of the world prevails. (3) The future is predetermined by God, i.e. the interpretation is mechanical. (4) Authorship is pseudonymous. The literature was called forth by the difficulty of reconciling present suffering with continued confidence in the divine order of the universe.
Literature: SCHÜRER, Hist. of the Jewish People, Div. II. iii.
44 f. (Eng. trans.); THOMSON, Books that influenced our Lord; DRUMMOND, The
Jewish Messiah; HILGENFELD, Die jüdische Apokalyptik. The best account
of this subject is by CHARLES, art. Apocalyptic Literature, in Cheyne's Encyc.
Apodictic (-tical) (spelt also apodeiktic) [Gr. apodeiktikoV, demonstrative]: Ger. apodictisch; Fr. apodictique; Ital. apodittico. Capable of clear demonstration, hence necessary, as applied to statements, truths, or judgments. Kant distinguishes judgments as problematical, assertorical, and apodictical, the last being judgments expressing necessary truth. So a syllogism in which the conclusion follows with logical certainty is apodictical.
Literature: MANSEL, Prolegom. Logica, vii. 252; CAIRD, Crit. Philos.
of Kant, II. iii. 242. (J.M.B.)
Apogamy [Gr. apo + gamoV, marriage]: Ger. Apogamie; Fr. apogamie; Ital. apogamia. For (1) the foreign equivalents are not in general use. (1) That indiscriminate mode of ISOLATION (q.v.) which gives rise to separate breeding in an isolated group of animals. Cf. HOMOGAMY. The term was suggested by Romanes (Darwin and after Darwin, iii., 1897). (C.LL.M.)
(2) A term also used by botanists to denote the substitutions of a vegetative,
asexual, mode of reproduction for the usual sexual mode. (E.S.G.)
Apokatastasis [Gr. apo + kata, down, + istanai, to set]: Ger. Apokatastase; Fr. rétablissement universel; Ital. apocatastasi. The doctrine which teaches the restitution of all sinful beings to the life of happiness with God (Acts, iii. 21).
Origen is the originator of this teaching, but he regarded it as esoteric only. Gregory of Nazianzen and other Eastern theologians also advocated it. Erigena was its first supporter in the West. He was followed by certain of the Mystics, such as the Brethren of the Free Spirit; by some of the Anabaptists; by F. C. Oetinger, the Pietist; and by Schleiermacher. Rothe and Martensen are its most formidable modern critics. It is closely connected with UNIVERSALISM (q.v.).
Literature: the article in Herzog's Real-Encyc.; HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma
(Eng. trans.), ii. 275, iii. 186 f., vii. 128 f. (R.M.W.)
Apolar Cell: Ger. apolare Zelle: Fr.
cellule apolaire; Ital. cella apolare. A cell without processes.
Such are the youngest NEUROBLASTS (q.v.). Probably no functional nerve-cells
are apolar. See NERVOUS SYSTEM (Histology). (H.H.)
Apollinarianism: Ger. Apollinarismus; Fr. Apollinarisme; Ital. Appolinarismo. The name given to one of the many attempted solutions of the difficulties incident to the union of two natures, a divine and a human, in one person -- Christ. So called after its originator, Apollinarius the Younger, bishop of Laodicea (d. 390).
From being an orthodox upholder of Athanasianism, Apollinarius promulgated the heretical theory that two natures, one altogether divine and one altogether human, could not be unified in a single personality. To get over this problem, Apollinarius reduced the human element to a body and an animal (or irrational) soul, while he held that the Logos took the place of the human (or rational) soul. Hence the heretical conclusion, that Christ was no more than a man to whom God has given inspiration. The doctrine met with universal opposition and soon gave way before the NESTORIAN CONTROVERSY (q.v.).
Literature: DRÄSCHKE, Apollinarius v Laodicea (in Gebhardt and
Harnack, Texte u. Untersuchungen); HARNACK, Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), chaps.
iii, iv, especially chap. iii. (R.M.W.)
Apollonius Tyanaeus. A Neo-Pythagorean
philosopher, native of Cappadocia, who lived in the time of Christ. He
has been compared by enemies of Christianity to Christ, for his miracles.
Probably a moral reformer in Greece and Rome. He was accorded divine honours
for four centuries.
Apologetics [Gr. apologhtikh]: Ger. Apologetik; Fr. apologétique; Ital. apologetica. One of the three main divisions of systematic theology. It is used in two senses -- a wider and a narrower. (1) In the wider signification it includes any consideration that may be adduced in support of the particular system for which apology is being made. (2) In the narrower and usual acceptation it includes all pleas for the divine origin and authority of Christianity.
Apologetics naturally takes a prominent position when Christianity is the object of attack. Hence the main periods of its history are: -- (1) the Early Church, with Origen's Against Celsus as the typical work; (2) the 18th century, with the Deists and Butler as conspicuous actors; (3) the 19th century, especially since 1835 -- the year of Strauss's Leben Jesu -- from which time may also be dated the scientific movement in its Positivist aspects. It should be noted that, till the time of Strauss, apologetics occupies a very small plane in German religious literature.
Literature: A. B. BRUCE, Apologetics; FLINT, Sermons and Addresses,
299 f.; ORR, Christ. View of God and the World; WENLEY, Preparation for Christianity;
the relative art. in Herzog's Real-Encyc., where the literature is given at
Apoplexy [Gr. apo, off, + plhssein, to strike]: Ger. Schlag, Apoplexie; Fr. ictus, apoplexie; Ital. colpo, apoplessia. A sudden seizure, or 'stroke,' involving loss of consciousness, sensation, and the power of movement, due to the effusion of blood in the brain (cerebral haemorrhage). The term is also used to describe a similar group of symptoms due to other causes, particularly stoppage of a blood-vessel -- thrombus or embolism.
During the apoplectic attack there is usually profound coma; the face is flushed, the lips livid, the head and neck in perspiration, the pulse full and slow; the muscles are relaxed, the limbs dropping when raised, as if inert. A further characteristic symptom is the conjugate deviation of the eyes with rotation of the head and neck. While the typical apoplectic attack comes without warning, other forms of it are preceded by such premonitory symptoms as headaches, dizziness, numbness, twitching, &c. The seriousness of the attack depends largely upon the place and size of the lesion; and it is frequently fatal. When recovery takes place mental symptoms may ensue similar to those of senile dementia, or mental weakness not amounting in degree and kind to a condition properly termed insanity in the legal sense. Conditions of depression or excitement with delusions may supervene with progressive dementia and emotional weakness. Paralysis, particularly on one side of the body (hemiplegia), is quite constantly present, and some form of aphasic disorder is equally likely to occur. A considerable number of cases of disorders of speech (see SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS) are those in which the aphasia was sequential to apoplexy.
Literature: ROSS, Nervous Dis.; GRASSET, Traité du système
nerveux (with bibliography); ROBERTSON, art. Post-apoplectic Insanity, in Tuke's
Dict. of Psychol. Med.; LEVOFF, Étude sur les troubles intellectuels
liés aux lésions circonscrites du cerveau; MINGAZZINI, Riv. di
Freniat. (1897). (J.J.)
Apostolics [Gr. apo,
away, + stellein, to send forth]: Ger. Pastoraltheologie;
Fr. théologie pastorale; Ital. teologia pastorale. The
division of Practical Theology devoted to questions concerning the propagation
of religion -- to missions, in short. Other names for the same subject are Halieutics
and Keryktics. (R.M.W.)
The most familiar case is that of Augustus Caesar. For this there were precedents in the East, in Egypt, in Greece, and even in Rome. The general sentiment is best set forth in Virgil and Horace (especially Carm, iii. 5; iv. 5, 14).
Literature: FUSTEL DE COULANGES, La Cité Antique, 21 f.; FRIEDLÄNDER,
Darstellung a. d. Sittengesch. Roms, iii; HAUSRATH, Hist. of New Test. Times,
and the Times of the Apostles, ii. 31 f.; BOISSIER, La Religion Romaine d'Auguste
aux Antonis, i. 109 f.; BACK, De Graecorum caeremoniis in quibus deorum homines
vice fungebantur; NITZSCH, De apotheosis apud Graecos vulgatae caussis dissert.;
DEL MAR, The Worship of Augustus Caesar. (R.M.W.)
Apparition [Lat. apparere, to appear]:
Ger. Geistererscheinung, Gespenst; Fr. apparition; Ital. apparizione.
An unusual, marvellous, or preternatural appearance or phenomenon. See HALLUCINATION,
and ILLUSION. (J.J.)
Apperception [Lat. ad + percipere, to perceive]: Ger. Apperception; Fr. apperception; Ital. appercezione. The process of attention in so far as it involves interaction between the presentation of the object attended to, on the one hand, and the total preceding conscious content, together with preformed mental dispositions, on the other hand. (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
Leibnitz, who introduced the concept of apperception into philosophy, understood by it the apprehension of an object as distinguished from and related to the self. His actual meaning is practically coincident with that of attention in modern psychology.
Kant's view resembles that of Leibnitz. He distinguishes transcendental and empirical apperception. Transcendental apperception is awareness of an object as involving self-consciousness. But the self of transcendental apperception is not the concrete self as constituted by a flow of specific states and processes; it is the pure subject implied in the base possibility of an object's being presented. Empirical apperception, on the other hand, is a cognition which has for its special object the concrete self with its states and processes. Cf. KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY, and KANTIANISM.
The treatment of apperception by Herbart forms a turning-point in the history of the subject. Apperception, for him, is the process by which a mass of presentations (Apperceptions-masse) assimilates relatively new elements, the whole forming a system (Apperceptions-system). The new material assimilated may be either given in sensation, or reproduced by the internal working of the psychological mechanism; and attention, in the broad sense of noticing an object, coincides in the main, but not altogether, with the apperceptive process. Relation to the self is, on this view, involved in apperception because, according to Herbart, the self is a product constituted by the mental modifications left behind by previous experience. Wundt's theory of apperception emphasizes the formal or functional side of the attention-process and gives a definition largely in terms of conation. It seems to include both the Leibnitzian and Herbartian views. According to Pillsbury (Amer. J. of Psychol., viii. No. 3), Wundt's apperception consists of four elements. '(1) Increase of clearness in the idea directly before the mind, accompanied by the immediate feeling of activity (Thätigkeitsgefühl); (2) inhibition of other ideas; (3) muscular strain sensations, with the feelings connected with them, intensifying the primary feeling of activity; (4) the reflex effect of these strain sensations, intensifying the idea apperceived.' Our definition follows Herbartian lines in giving prominent place to the 'mechanism of presentations,' i.e. the psychical interactions involved in the process of attention.
Literature: LEIBNITZ, Princ. de la Nat. (Erdmann), 4 Opp., 715a,
and Monadologie, 23-30 (Erdmann, 707); KANT, Krit. d. reinen Vernunft; HERBART,
Psychol. als Wiss., zweiter Theil, erster Absch., cap. 5; VOLKMANN, Lehrb. d.
Psychol., ii. 175-211; STEINTHAL, Einleitung in die Psychol. u. Sprachwiss.,
164-263; ERDMANN, Vtljsch. f. wiss. Philos., x. 320; WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol.
(successive editions); LIPPS, Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens, 390-410; BALDWIN,
Handb. of Psychol., Senses and Intellect, 65-6, and Ment. Devel. in the Child
and the Race, 308 ff.; STOUT, Analytic Psychol., ii. chap. viii; PILLSBURY,
Amer. J. of Psychol., viii. 3; STAUDE, Philos. Stud., i. 149 ff.; HEINRICH,
Mod. Theorien d. Aufmerksamkeit; VILLA, Psicol. Contemp. (1899); EISLER, Wörterb.
d. philos. Begriffe, sub verbo (with many quotations). (G.F.S.
The term is largely used by educational writers to characterize the synthesis of new with old experiences. New acquisitions of knowledge become significant only to the extent of the interpreting power of our former acquisitions. This being the case, the apperceptive power of the mind is a constantly developing capacity as the child increases in years, knowledge and mental alertness. Modern child-study emphasizes the fact that the subject-matter of instruction, together with the sequence of its topics, and the time of its presentation, should be governed by the child's power to apperceive. Furthermore, methods of teaching and of moral training should take their cue from the same changeable power. See METHOD (in education).
Literature: works in modern psychology; LANGE, Apperception; DE GARMO,
Essentials of Meth., 24-44; McMURRY, Gen. Meth., 106-21; HARRIS. Herbart and
Pestalozzi compared, Educ. Rev. (May, 1893). (C.DE
Appetence [Lat. appetentia]: Ger. Streben
(nach Erlangung eines lustbetonten Zustandes), Begierde (Eisler);
Fr. appétition; Ital. appetenza (appetite), desiderio
(desire). Conations which find satisfaction in some positive state or result
are called appetences. An appetence may be either innate or acquired. It is
contrasted with aversion, which has for its terminus the avoidance or removal
of some disturbing condition. Cf. CONATION, IMPULSE, and APPETITE; also TERMINOLOGY
(German). (G.F.S. - J.M.B.)
Appetite [Lat. ad + petere, to seek]: Ger. sinnliches Begehren, Verlangen; Fr. appétit, besoin physique; Ital. appetito. (1) An organic need represented in consciousness by certain sensations described below. (2) Applied to conative tendencies of all sorts, for which the terms appetence (or appetency) and impulse are better. (3) 'Acquired appetite' is used for tendencies either physical or mental which have arisen in the individual's experience. This usage is not good; it should be limited to the physical.
Appetite is distinguished from instinct, in that it shows itself at first in connection with the life of the organism itself, and does not wait for an external stimulus, but appears and craves satisfaction. The movements, however, by which an appetite is gratified are mostly reflex and instinctive. For example, the child has the imperfect instinct of sucking to satisfy the appetite for food. Appetite is not equivalent to impulse, in that the organic process is well defined and deep-seated, and is only to a very limited degree subject to voluntary control or modification. The appetites generally recognized are those of hunger, thirst, and sex; yet the need of air, the need of exercise, and the need of sleep come under the definition.
Psychologically the progress of an appetite is about as follows: (1) A state of vague unrest involving, when extreme and when satisfaction is deferred, painful sensations of definite quality and location (largely in the organs by which the gratification is to be secured). (2) Pleasant sensations coming from the organs securing the appropriate stimulation, together with sensations from the reflex motor processes which are involved in the organic reaction. (3) Presentations or ideas of the objects or events which afford the stimulation; these modify consciousness on future occurrences of the appetite. (4) A complex state of tension of all the motor and other elements whenever the appetite is aroused either (a) by the direct organic condition of need, or (b) indirectly through the presence or memory of the object.
The gratification of an appetite is pleasurable both in immediate, more local, and generally in its remote, more systemic, effects; thus, in the case of hunger, both the taste and the general digestion effects are pleasant.
Literature: REID, Active Powers, Essay III, Pt. II. chap. i; STEWART,
Active Powers, Bk. I. chap. i; BAIN, Senses and Intellect (4th ed.), 360 f.;
BEAUNIS, Les Sensations Internes, chap. ii ff. (Besoins); LADD, Psychol. Descrip.
and Explan., 576. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
Appreciation (and Description) [Lat. ad + pretium, price]: Ger. Bewerthung, Würdigung; Fr. appréciation; Ital. apprezzamento. A way of formulating the distinction between judgments involving value and those of science, which latter pertain to fact.
Terms due to Royce (Religious Aspect of Philos.), who brings under them
the current oppositions between 'ought' and 'is,' 'practical' and 'pure' reason,
ethics and science. The ethics of the matter is discussed à propos of
Huxley's Evolution and Ethics in papers by several writers in the International
Journal of Ethics (1895), and the psychology of it is covered, by the present
writer, under the broader distinction between 'prospective' and 'retrospective'
points of view (Psychol. Rev., Nov. 1895). Cf. ORIGIN vs.
NATURE, and see WORTH (also for Literature). (J.M.B.,
Apprehension [Lat. apprehensio, from ad + prehendere, to seize]: Ger. Auffassung, Apprehension (Kant); Fr. appréhension; Ital. apprendimento. (1) The intellectual act or process by which a relatively simple object is understood, grasped, or brought before the mind. (2) A relatively simple or elementary intellectual act itself (without regard to its object), as opposed to a complex act, such as judgment, or a more finished sort of knowledge, such as comprehension. (3) An act of imagination or of presenting to knowledge the image of an object. (4) A comparatively simple belief, understanding, or opinion, especially one for which no explicit reasons are now forthcoming. If such a belief is later judged false it is called a misapprehension. The second meaning given is that to which good usage tends to confine the word, without allowing closer definition. It is thus almost synonymous, for psychology, with bare consciousness of an object. (J.M.B. - G.F.S.)
In Aristotle's theory of the types of knowledge, stress is laid upon the assertion that only judgments are properly true and false, while thought (nouV), on precisely its highest levels, deals with objects which it is possible either to grasp directly, or to grasp not at all, but which it is impossible any longer to grasp falsely, or to misjudge, when one knows them. This act of attaining direct acquaintance with truth Aristotle metaphorically calls qigein, a touching, or direct contact, with truth. It is equivalent to what has often been later called 'intuitive knowledge.' It is compared by Aristotle himself to seeing. (On this Aristotelian usage see Bonitz, Commentary to Aristotle's Metaphysics, Pars Posterior, 410, of his edition of that work. The Aristotelian passages in question are especially De Anima, iii. 6; Metaph., ii. 10, xii. 7.) The term apprehension, in scholastic usage, is a translation of the Aristotelian qigein. But the term has been from the outset of its usage extended to apply to various sorts of direct or simple knowledge, or knowledge involving acquaintance with objects, as opposed to complex, indirect, or discursive knowledge. The Aristotelian contrast between the knowledge capable of truth or falsity and the simple knowledge or apprehension incapable of truth or falsity has indeed been frequently retained, at least by more technical usage. But apprehension, even in case of such retention, has meant very frequently not higher grades of intuition, but rather sensory knowledge, or presentation, too simple to be a matter of truth or falsity. And other usage has abandoned altogether the contrast to judgment or belief, so that an apprehension becomes merely a comparatively simple cognition (see Hamilton's note to Reid's Inquiry, chap. ii. sect. 3), whether involving judgment or not.
Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, defines apprehension as the synthetic
act whereby the contents of a perception (Anschauung) are given their temporal
and spatial form, and are prepared for the higher activity of the understanding.
This act is more fully called the 'synthesis of apprehension.' (J.R.)
This is the most generic term in use for what is more specifically spoken of
as moral sense, moral judgment, or CONSCIENCE (q.v.). The term is commonly used
so as to convey, less than any other term, any theory as to the specific nature
of the power by which moral value is 'apprehended.' (W.R.S.)
Apprenticeship [Lat. apprehendere, to learn]: Ger. Lehrlingswesen; Fr. apprentissage; Ital. noviziato. The learning of a trade or craft under a contract which gives the teacher the right to avail himself of the services of the pupil for a specified term -- usually a rather long one.
In the middle ages the right to exercise a craft was a valuable legal franchise,
and those who enjoyed that right were jealous of any addition to their numbers,
which would make their monopoly of the craft less valuable. The craft gilds
and other industrial corporations of the middle ages were powerful enough to
secure the passage of laws relating to apprenticeship devised in the interest
of their monopolies rather than of the public at large. Many of these laws survived
the power which had been instrumental in their creation (cf. Adam Smith, Wealth
of Nations, Bk. I. chap. x). The beginning of the 19th century witnessed
the downfall of the obnoxious features of the system. (A.T.H.)
The term is in most frequent use with Hutcheson and succeeding British moralists,
who discuss the questions whether moral approbation is innate or the result
of experience of consequences, and how it is related to sensation, to reasoning,
and to aesthetic appreciation. Adam Smith (Theory of the Moral Sentiments)
discusses the social character of moral approbation. It is commonly distinguished
from aesthetic appreciation by the differentia that the former does, whereas
the latter does not, involve merit or demerit. See CONSCIENCE (also for Literature).
Appropriation [Lat. ad + propriare,
to take to oneself]: Ger. Zueignung; Fr. appropriation; Ital.
appropriazione. A term used technically by Protestant, especially Calvinistic,
theologians with reference to the believer's relations to 'Grace' and to the
'Word of God.' The believer 'appropriates' the 'Grace of the Scriptures' by
faith (West, Shorter Catechism, quest. 90); he 'appropriates' the 'Word
of God' by reading and meditation. Biblical interpretation, conducted in consonance
with principles, and applied practically in life, discovers the ground of the
appropriation. Cf. FAITH, and HERMENEUTICS. (R.M.W.)
It involves no sensory disorder, but a purely psychical one. As aphasia expresses incapacity to handle words correctly, so apraxia expresses a similar incapacity in regard to common objects. The apraxic patient mistakes the use of objects; e.g. he may no longer be able to recognize coins and their use, may mistake a fork for a spoon, or a brush for a cane. The condition is contrasted with ASEMIA (q.v.), in which there is a general receptive defect, and to the condition termed (mental) BLINDNESS (q.v.), the defect in apraxia being primarily motor. Cf. SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS. (J.J. - J.M.B.)
(2) A term used by Morselli for the loss or suspension of psychomotor activity; a variety of dispraxia, or general derangement of conduct. Other pathological varieties are hyperpraxia, parapraxia, and hypopraxia. See Morselli, Semej. malat. ment., ii. (1895). (E.M.)
Literature: E. CLAPARÈDE, Perception stéréo-gnostique
et stéréo-agnosie, Année Psychol., v. 65 f.; the literature
of aphasia given under SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS (q.v.). (J.J.)
A priori and A posteriori (in logic) [Lat.]: Ger., Fr., Ital., the same. A reasoning is a priori when it proceeds to the determination of a proposition from or on the ground of the notion in which the essence of a subject, its constitutive marks, is supposed to be given. It is therefore, independent of experience so far as attainment of the conclusion is concerned, being thus DEDUCTIVE (q.v.), and of experience altogether if the notion be itself held to be due to the mind itself. (R.A.)
A posteriori is contrasted with a priori in both these meanings. It designates reasoning, which is INDUCTIVE (q.v.), as opposed to deductive, and also applies to notions which are due to experience (i.e. making appeal to experience), rather than to the mind itself. Extended citations from literature on the contrast are to be found in Eisler, Wörterb. d. philos. Begriffe. (J.M.B.)
Although the definite use of the contrast a priori and a posteriori
in reference to reasoning goes back only to Albert of Saxony, in the 14th century
(cf. Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, iv. 78), the contrast itself
is as old as Aristotle. Reasoning a priori is that based on insight into
the essence or form of the subject, an insight which might in order of time
be preceded, even necessarily preceded, by the collection of particulars from
sense perception, but which, once attained, constitutes the source of necessary
predications respecting the subject. The Aristotelian doctrine, interpreted
by such Platonizing moderns as Cudworth, who identified the essence with innate
ideas (see Eternal and Immutable Morality, Bk. III. chap. iii. §
5), is evidently closely akin to the later Kantian view, the distinctive mark
of which is its definite statement of what it is that mind contributes from
itself to experience, and how the contributing is to be conceived. In Hume and
Clarke may be seen the more special sense of a priori as that which can
be evolved, without appeal to special experience, by inspection of ideas themselves.
The term is used very sparingly by Hume in the Treatise on Human Nature,
and frequently in the Essays. Cf. KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY. (R.A.)
Aprosexia [Gr. a
+ prosecein, to give heed]: Ger. Aprosexie;
Fr. aprosexie; Ital. aprosessia. Inability to fix the attention.
See ATTENTION (defects of). (J.J.)
Like the words faculty, trait, nisus, bent, the term usually indicates an endowment
of nature strengthened, it may be, by training, experience, or circumstance;
as an aptitude for sports, for games of skill, for music, for business affairs,
&c. In connection with the problems of human faculties -- their nature and
distribution, the parts played by nature and nurture in our intellectual growth
-- the term becomes significant. (J.J.)
Aquinas, Thomas. (1227-74.) Of
royal family, he became a Dominican at the age of sixteen, and was instructed
by Albertus Magnus. Refused ecclesiastical preferment, and spent his life
in teaching and writing. He was canonized in 1323. See ST. THOMAS (philosophy
Arbitrage: Ger. Arbitrage; Fr. arbitrage; Ital. arbitraggio. The profit which can be realized from the difference in market price of the same article in different places at the same time; contrasted with the speculative profit due to the variation in price at different times.
Before the invention of the telegraph the operations of arbitrage required
great skill and involved large possible profit or loss. At present the conditions
of different markets are so far known to buyers and sellers the world over that
the risks and profits of arbitrage have been greatly reduced. But at the same
time, the sphere of operation of arbitrage brokers has extended itself more
widely than ever. (A.T.H.)
Arbitration [Lat. arbitratio]: Ger. schiedsrichterliche Beurteilung und Entscheidung; Fr. arbitrage; Ital. arbitrato. The determination of a matter in dispute by a third person acting by authority voluntarily conferred upon him by the agreement of the parties to the difference.
Its voluntary character distinguishes it from judicial proceedings. Statutes exist in many states by which, if the parties who agree to submit their dispute to arbitration agree further to ask the aid of the Government to enforce the award (or sentence), such aid may be given by judicial process. This is sometimes, though incorrectly, termed Compulsory Arbitration. The arbitration is not compulsory, but at the voluntary request of the parties compulsory force is given to the award.
The actiones arbitrariae in Roman law paved the way for modern arbitration. In those the judex, though appointed by the court, was called an arbiter, and could decide according to his view of justice and equity, and grant specific relief if money damages would not afford adequate redress. He was appointed on the defendant's demand (Instit. of Just., iv. 6, de Actionibus, 31; Gaius, iv. § 163). (S.E.B.)
International Arbitration, or arbitration between nations, does
not differ in principle from that between private individuals, except that
there can be no mode of enforcing the award by law. Their agreement to
a resort to arbitration (submission, compromis) implies, however,
a mutual engagement to submit in good faith to the decision rendered, provided
it be one within the jurisdiction conferred upon the arbitrators. See Title
IV, De l'arbitrage international, of the 'Décisions de la
Conférence de la Paix,' held at the Hague in 1899; Corsi, Arbitrato
Internazionale (Pisa, 1893); Darby, Int. Tribunals (London,
Peace Society, 1899).
Arborization [Lat. arbor, tree]: Ger.
Endbäumchen; Fr. arborisation; Ital. arborisazione.
Terminal ramifications of the processes of a NEUROCYTE (q.v.) or nerve-cell.
See NERVOUS SYSTEM (histology). (H.H.)
Arcana [Lat. arcanus, hidden]: Ger. Arcana; Fr. mystères; Ital. arcani, (l') occulto. Applied generally to anything hidden or unknown, but usually to the esoteric. Used most frequently now by esoteric Buddhists and by theosophists.
The chief historical interest centres in the arcana disciplina
of the early Christian Church. Converts from other systems went through a lengthened
catechumenate. When they were so far instructed as to be ready for baptism,
the arcana disciplina -- consisting of the Creed and the Lord's Prayer
-- were made known to them. The more essential parts of the service were closed
to catechumens. About the 6th century, owing to the altered circumstances of
the Church, this custom seems to have lapsed. Cf. MAGIC. (R.M.W.)
Archaeology and Prehistoric Archaeology [Gr. arcaioV, ancient, + logoV, discourse, lore]: Ger. (prähistorische) Archäologie; Fr. archéologie (préhistorique); Ital. archeologia preistorica. Archaeology is the science which attempts to reconstruct the history of man from the relics and records of the past.
While a generic similarity of purpose characterizes the various departments of archaeology, they differ in method and in the character of their fundamental problems according to the nature of the material relics at command. The most important distinction is that which separates prehistoric (a word due to Sir Daniel Wilson) form historic archaeology; for in spite of the fundamental continuity between the two periods, the presence in the latter period of written records and the endless possibilities of illumination which a civilization capable of written records may reveal, and the total absence of these in the former period, result in significant differences of method, material, and problems. Prehistoric archaeology, considered as a department of ANTHROPOLOGY (q.v.), finds its material in the relics of earth and bone, of stone and metals, of fibre or sinew, which have escaped the ravages of time, and perhaps by their geological location, or internal evidence of conjunction with animal remains and the like, suggest the period of their original construction or deposit. The two more general problems in regard to prehistoric man are the determination of the time of his first appearance, and the division of the periods that elapsed between then and his emergence into historic times. The presence of quaternary man coeval with the mammoth at the opening of the glacial epoch is quite universally admitted; while his presence in still earlier geological periods, though by no means impossible, has not as yet been satisfactorily established. The oldest age indicated by human relics is termed the Stone Age, and is subdivided into the palaeolithic or old stone age (the pleistocene period), and the neolithic or new stone age (the prehistoric period). These names are derived from the character of man's most primitive implements, the palaeolithic (usually chipped) being of a cruder type of workmanship than the neolithic (frequently polished). These, especially when found in situ and in connection with the relics of man himself and his monuments, mounds, graves, kitchen-middens, and the like, serve to fix a more or less definite grade of development, which, however, indefinitely shades into, and may be overlapped by, the neolithic age. Relics of palaeolithic man have been found in almost all portions of the earth where competent investigation has been carried on, and frequently in situations suggestive, if not demonstrative, of a fairly definite location in time.
Yet it should be mentioned that recent discussion has called in question the validity of the criterion between chipped and polished implements as an index of sequence in time; for there is some evidence not only that the two arts may have been carried on together, but that, with certain materials or in certain places, the rubbing may have been more primitive than the chipping. Caution demands that stone implements of a palaeolithic appearance without other corroborative evidence should not be too readily accepted as belonging to the earliest period of man's occupation.
Following the Stone Age was the age of metal, which is usually divided in Europe into the Bronze and Iron ages; the former characterizing the general period of culture concomitant with simple metallurgic processes, while the latter suggests a period of far greater advance. The former undoubtedly overlaps the neolithic period, while the age of metal naturally forms an easy transition to the culture stages of historic times. The problems here discussed as prehistoric archaeology are not infrequently considered under the heads of ETHNOLOGY or ETHNOGRAPHY (q.v.).
Literature: KEANE, Ethnology (1896), 442; SIR DANIEL WILSON, art. Archaeology,
in Encyc. Brit. (9th ed., 1875); and Prehistoric Man (2 vols., 1875); LUBBOCK,
Prehistoric Times (4th ed., 1878), 655; J. C. SOUTHALL, The Epoch of the Mammoth
(1878), 430; W. BOYD DAWKINS, Early Man in Britain (1880), 537; N. JOLY, Man
before Metals (1883), 365; DE BAYE, L'Archéol. Préhistorique;
G. DE MORTILLET, Le Préhistorique (1883); MORSELLI, Antropol. gen. (1890);
SOPHUS MÜLLER, Nordische Alterthumskunde (1898); NADAILLAC, L'Amér.
Préhistorique (1883); RANKE, Der Mensch (2nd ed., 1896); HÖRNES,
Urgesch. des Menschen (1892). For more detailed and special works see the literature
under ANTHROPOLOGY. (J.J.)
Arche [Gr. arch]. Aristotle's
term for first principle or source, in the sense of formal and final CAUSE (q.v.),
in his scheme of causes. (J.M.B.)
Archetype [Gr. arch,
chief, + tnpoV, form]: Ger. Archetyp, Urbild;
Fr. archétype; Ital. archetipo. A Platonic word meaning
the perfect or absolute idea (cf. PLATONISM, and IDEALISM) of each thing after
its kind. See references to Plato (Republic, Jowett's trans., vi. 507,
and ibid. v. 472, and others in Fleming-Calderwood, Vocab. of Philos.,
sub verbo). (J.M.B.)
Archimedes. (cir. 287-12 B.C.) The greatest
geometer of antiquity. He is said to have been a pupil of Canon of Egypt,
and a relative of Hiero II, king of Syracuse. He was profoundly versed
in mechanics and hydrostatics.
Architectonic: see ARCHITECTURE. Applied
to principles of construction and to the science of such principles in all theoretical
work. By a secondary meaning it is applied to what is extremely schematic, formal,
and logical. Kant's usage illustrates the first meaning, and his philosophy
illustrates the second. (J.M.B.)
Archytas. Lived about 350 B.C. Greek philosopher,
mathematician, and general. He belonged to the Pythagorean school; is said
to have been the first to apply geometry to mechanics, and to have saved
Plato from the wrath of Dionysius the tyrant.
Argumentum seems at first with Cicero to have had the more special sense of ground on which a conclusion might be based, and hence was frequently identified with the middle term in a syllogism. But the more general meaning coexisted with the other, and gradually gained wider acceptance. Argumentatio is quite a common equivalent for argumentum among the later Latin logicians. (R.A.)
For the various sorts of argument see DEDUCTION, INDUCTION, A PRIORI,
A FORTIORI, CIRCULUS IN PROBANDO, REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, SORITES, FALLACY,
The Arian doctrine must be traced to the apparently contradictory statements of the Alexandrian theologians, especially Origen, regarding the relation between the Father and the Son. The Alexandrians taught, on the one hand, the eternity of Christ; on the other, his separate 'essence,' and, by consequence, his inferiority to the Father. Arius accepted the latter alternative. This contrast was expressed by the 'full' Arians in the term hetero-ousios. The 'semi-Arians' used the term homo-ousios -- admitting identity of 'essence,' but denying identity of 'substance.' Some of them, like Eunomius, employed the term anomoios, thus emphasizing the differences rather than the identity. The orthodox formula, associated with the Nicene Creed, is expressed in the term homo-ousios, and implies the coequality of Father and Son. The whole subject is intimately bound up with the difficult problems surrounding the Alexandrian theory of the LOGOS (q.v.). The classical period of the controversy is from 318-81. The discussion broke out again in England in 1720, with Samuel Clarke; and in New England, in 1747, with Jonathan Mayhew.
Literature: GIBBON, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chap. xxi;
KÖLLING, Gesch. d. Ar. Häresie; GWATKIN, Stud. of Arianism; HARNACK,
Hist. of Dogma (Eng. trans.), iii, iv; the relative article in Herzog's Real-Encyc.
(with literature). For modern times, see STEPHEN, English Thought in the 18th
Century; PATTISON, Tendencies of Religious Thought in England (1688-1750); M.
STUART, Letters; NORTON, Statement of Reasons. (R.M.W.)
Aristippus. (425-cir. 366 B.C.) Greek
philosopher, founder of the Cyrenaic school. A pupil of Socrates, he differed
from Socrates in philosophic teachings. He passed some years at the court
of Dionysius. See SCHOOLS OF GREECE (Cyrenaics)
Aristobulus. Lived in Egypt between
181 and 117 B.C.; but dates of birth and death are not certain. A Jew who
tried to identify Greek philosophical conceptions with the Jewish religion.
He is the first representative of Hellenic Judaism, or Jewish Alexandrianism.
His reputed Commentaries on the Writings of Moses are quoted
by the patristic Fathers.
Aristocles or Aristokles.
(1) Of Messana or Messina. A Greek Peripatetic of the 2nd century A.D.
Wrote on ethics. (2) Of Pergamus (cir. 100-35 A.D.) A rhetorician and Peripatetic
philosopher; pupil of Herodes Atticus.
Aristocracy: Ger. Aristocratie; Fr. aristocratie; Ital. aristocrazia. (1) A form of government in which the sovereign power is vested in a select number of individuals. (2) Those individuals and the class to which they belong.
By derivation 'government of the best,' either singular or plural. Plato and Aristotle distinguish it from oligarchy (government of the few, in a bad sense), and it has still a better flavour. The commonest sense now is a class superior in birth and breeding to the other classes in a state, whether retaining special political privileges or not. For the difficulty of an exact definition see C. Lewis, Polit. Terms, x. 73.
Literature: MONTESQUIEU, Esprit de Lois, II. iii, cf. III. iii, iv;
ARISTOTLE, Pol., iv. 6; HALLECK, Int. Law, i. chap. vi. § I. (J.B.)
Ariston or Aristo. (1)
An Athenian, son of Aristocles, and father of Plato. (2) Of Alexandria
(cir. 30 B.C.). A philosopher (see PERIPATETICS). (3) Of Ceos (cir. 230
B.C.). Succeeded Lycon as head, or scholarch, of the Peripatetic school.
(4) Of Chios (cir. 275 B.C.). Surnamed the Siren for his eloquence. A Stoic,
disciple of Zeno, who opened a school at Athens and lectured on ethics.
He differed from Zeno. He despised logic, rejected natural philosophy,
and regarded indifference to everything except virtue and vice as the highest
good, and a clear, well-informed, healthy habit of mind as the only virtue.
Aristotle. (384-22 B.C.) In point of
intellect alone, probably the most remarkable of men. His father, Nicomachus,
was a physician. Left an orphan early, he was placed under a guardian,
Proxenus, who had him carefully educated. At seventeen, according to the
best account, he visited Athens, and, when Plato returned from Sicily,
joined the latter's school. He remained in Athens twenty years. He did
not fully agree with his master in opinions. Married Pythias, the daughter
(by adoption) of Hermias, prince of Atarneus in Asia Minor. Upon the assassination
of the prince, he fled with his wife to Mitylene for two years. Became
the tutor of King Philip's son, Alexander. Aristotle opened a school in
Athens called the Lyceum. Accused of impiety he withdrew to Chalcis in
Euboea, where he died. He wrote on all the sciences of his time and created
new ones. The frequent mention of his name in the main articles of this
or of any philosophical or scientific dictionary shows his extraordinary
influence upon human thought. Cf. the topics following.
Aristotle's Dictum: Ger. dictum de omni et nullo (Lat. form); Fr. (Lat. form); Ital. (Lat. form). The so-called Dictum de Omni et Nullo, the general axiom of categorical syllogism: 'Quidquid dicitur universum de aliquo subiecto, affirmatur de quovis contento sub illo, quidquid negatur de aliquo universaliter accepto negatur de omnibus de quibus illud alterum affirmatur,' is rightly assigned to Aristotle, though his enunciation of it (I b, 10-15; 24 b, 26-30) gives less prominence to the aspect of extension than do the ordinary scholastic formulas.
Explicit recognition of the Dictum as the general principle of syllogism occurs first in Boethius (see Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 652, 659).
Literature: On the relation of the Dictum to other axioms of
syllogism, HAMILTON, Logic, ii. App. VI; MILL, Logic, Bk. I. chap. ii; LOTZE,
Logik, § 97 f. (R.A.)
Aristotle's Experiment: Ger. Versuch von Aristotles; Fr. expérience d'Aristote; Ital. experimento d'Aristotile. The second finger of either hand is crossed over the first, in such a way that its tip is brought upon the thumb-side of the latter. A marble or other round object is inserted between the crossed tips: the single marble is 'felt' as two objects. Sometimes, if the subject is eye-minded, only one object is 'felt,' despite the fact that two sensitive surfaces are affected which, under ordinary circumstances, can be affected only by two distinct objects. The illusion is assisted by slight movement of the finger-tips.
Literature: SANFORD, Course in Exper. Psychol., expt. 3; RIVERS, Mind
(1894), 583; HENRI, Raumw. d. Tastsinnes, and Année Psychol., iii. 225
f. (1898); ARISTOTLE, On Dreams (De Insomniis), chap. ii. (E.B.T.)
Arithmomania [Gk. ariqmoV, number, + mania, madness]: Ger. Arithmomanie; Fr. arithmomanie; Ital. aritmomania. A marked or morbid tendency to count or keep tally, or to be anxious about and speculate in numerical relations. Cf. MANIA. (J.J.)
Literature: H. SAURY, Étude clinique sur la folie héréditaire
(1886); V. MAGNAN, Recherches sur les centres nerveux, 2e série;
and Leç. clin. sur les mal. ment. (1893); LEGRAIN, Délire chez
les dégénérés (1886). (L.M.)
Arius. (cir. 250-336 A.D.) The founder of
ARIANISM (q.v.). Ordained deacon by the patriarch Peter, and prompted to
the highest rank among the clergy by Alexander, he was exiled to Illyricum,
after the Council of Nicaea (or Nice), by Constantine. The sentence was
revoked after two or three years, and he would have been restored to communion,
after avowing his submission to the creed adopted by the Council, had he
not suddenly died. Arius left several valuable theological discussions
Arminianism: Ger. Arminianismus; Fr. Arminianisme; Ital. Arminianismo. The most celebrated form of the reaction against the extreme or supralapsarian interpretation of the Calvinistic dogma of predestination. So called from its originator, Jacobus ARMINIUS (q.v.) of Leyden (1560-1609).
The rigid Calvinistic dogma of predestination -- taught by Th. Beza of Geneva, among others, under whom Arminius studied -- inculcates that eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others; and that these are ends which exist for the revelation of God's attributes. Against this view the Arminians drafted the Remonstrance (1610) to the States of Holland; hence their other name, Remonstrants. In its five articles the Remonstrance sets forth: (1) Election conditional upon faith; (2) the death of Christ for all; (3) the dependence of man upon grace, and his insufficiency without it; (4) the indispensableness of grace for goodness, yet its failure in some cases; (5) participation in Christ's Spirit as the means of salvation, although all may not persevere in the use of it as an instrument for the defeat of Satan. Hugo Grotius, the philosopher, was the most eminent adherent of Arminianism. The Calvinistic and Arminian theories represent respectively determinism and indeterminism of the will. The Arminian view is represented to-day by the theologians of the Wesleyan or Methodist Episcopal Church. (R.M.W. - J.M.B.)
Literature: BANGS, Life of Arminius; LIMBORCH, Theol. Christiana; G.
S. FRANCKE, De Hist. Dogmatum Armin.; J. MÜLLER, Lehre v. d. Sünde,
Bk. IV. chap. iii. (also Eng. trans.); DORNER, Hist. of Protestant Theol. (Eng.
trans.), i. 420 f. (R.M.W.)
Arminius, Jacobus. (1560-1609.)
A Dutch theologian who founded ARMINIANISM (q.v.). His Dutch name was Jacob
Harmensen. Educated at Marburg, Leyden, and Geneva, he also visited Rome.
He was ordained minister at Amsterdam. Doubts as to the Calvinistic doctrine
of predestination led to the charge of heterodoxy. The Supreme Court of
the Hague listened to a discussion between Arminius and Gomar. He left
several able theological treatises.
Arnauld, Antoine. (1612-94.) Doctor
of the Sorbonne, a celebrated French theologian and philosopher. He was
always a determined antagonist of the Jesuits, whose enmity finally drove
him into exile, where he died. He became a zealous Jansenist. He wrote
many works on theology, logic (The Port Royal Logic), and philosophy.
He produced a reform in the style of French theologians, Pascal and Bossuet
following his purer taste.
Arnott, Neil. (1788-1874.) Scottish
physician and eminent experimenter in natural philosophy. A pupil of Sir
Everard Home, he practised in London; lectured and wrote on natural philosophy.
Became a Fellow of the Royal Society, and in 1854 received the Rumford
medal for his inventions.
Arrian. An eminent Greek historian who lived
during the 2nd century A.D. The pupil and friend of Epictetus, he published
the master's works. Under Hadrian he was prefect of Cappadocia, and consul
under Antoninus Pius.
Art and Art Theories [Lat. ars]: Ger. Kunst und Kunsttheorien; Fr. (théories de l') art; Ital. (teorie dell') arte. (1) In the broadest sense, any activity or production involving intelligence and skill. In this sense it is opposed to 'nature' on the one hand, and to unskilful production on the other; while it is distinguished from science as doing from knowing. (2) In a narrower sense, equivalent to fine art, an activity or a product of activity, which has aesthetic value or (in the broadest sense of the term) is beautiful. (3) In a still narrower sense it is sometimes restricted to sculpture and painting, but this is liable to objection as the word is needed in the broader sense of (2).
Under this topic there is given a sketch of general theories only, except where a particular art may illustrate a general point of view. For the various classifications of the arts see CLASSIFICATION (of the fine arts); and for closely related problems see AESTHETICS, and BEAUTY.
Theories of art fall, for the most part, under three classes according as they examine (a) the end sought by art, as to imitate nature, to express an ideal, to give delight; or (b) the social or educational value of art, and its relation to morality and religion; or (c) the psychological impulses out of which art has sprung, as the instinct of play, of self-exhibition, of decoration, &c.
I. Ancient Theories. Greek theory regarded imitation as the essential nature of fine art. According to Plato, God creates an 'idea,' of a world after the pattern of 'ideas'; the artisan resembles God in that he makes real things 'in accordance with the idea,' i.e. he has to have a scientific knowledge of his products; but the artist (e.g. the painter or poet) imitates the products of others without necessarily having any scientific knowledge of the thing imitated. He is thrice removed from the truth. He has as his pattern not the eternal 'idea,' the true reality, but the thing of sense. A copy of this is inferior in value to the original. Moreover, the artist is satisfied to present an appearance: he does not necessarily penetrate to the truth. Just for this reason art is dangerous in education. Additional objections are that poets often convey faulty ethical and religious conceptions, and that imitation of undesirable states of mind through music, or of evil passions and characters in acting, must react on the person imitating, and by sympathy, upon the spectator. Art, however charming, should not be admitted unless it can be proved to be for the good of the state. When used to adorn noble sentiments, music and all art may have the highest educational value. For art springs from certain primitive instincts, which in animals find expression in play and cries of various kinds -- an overflowing of activity or surplus of energy -- but which in man have the additional element of order, i.e. of rhythm and harmony, and so find expression in the choral dance and song.
Imitation is for Aristotle both a source of art, at least of poetry and painting, and the means of its enjoyment. It is natural to man to imitate and to delight in imitations. We say this is so-and-so; and this pleasure of learning in the chief element aside from that produced by the colouring or some similar cause. But although art is called imitation, and even music is styled the most imitative of the arts, the term has with Aristotle the significance, not of copying existing things or actions, but of representing more or less idealized (i.e. intensified or modified by imagination) emotions, characters, or situations. Poetry should relate not what has occurred, but what might occur, what is possible in accord with general laws. It is therefore more philosophical and more elevated than history. Tragedy seeks to represent men better than they are, comedy worse; and the same difference appears in the work of different painters.
As regards the end and the educational value of art, Aristotle makes the end of all the fine arts (as contrasted with the useful arts) to give pleasure or to serve 'diagoge' -- that rational enjoyment or ideal employment of leisure which the man of culture and elevation of mind delights in. Art is thus distinguished from play or pastime, which gives merely recreation, though music may indeed serve this latter end also. Only music is treated in detail with respect to its educational value, but painting and tragedy have incidental mention. The especial educational value of music is as a means to rational enjoyment, but is has also moral power by bringing us into sympathy with states of mind like courage, gentleness, &c. It should have a threefold use: the ethical melodies for education, the lax for recreation in old age, the enthusiastic for purging the emotions. For persons specially liable to the emotions of compassion, fear, or enthusiasm, 'after listening to melodies which raise their soul to ecstasy, relapse into their normal condition.' 'They experience a purging and a pleasurable feeling of relief.' A similar catharsis of the passions is effected by tragedy. Cf. CATHARSIS, and TRAGIC.
II. Theories in the 17th and 18th centuries. The same general principle that art is imitation appears as the basis of early French and English theories. The formula received a different emphasis in consequence of the actual tendencies of art (genre and landscape painting), and as Imitation of Nature was given general statement by Batteaux (1746). Another formula emphasized truth as the end of art, 'Rien n'est beau que le vrai'; but 'truth,' which with Boileau (1674) has meant nearly the same as the rational 'clearness and distinctness' of Descartes, came to mean, with the growth of 'Naturalism,' a representation of the variety of nature, or of its life and fullness (Diderot, 1765).
The 'strictest imitation of nature' is also a standard with Shaftesbury (Characteristics, 1711), but his watchword of 'truth' is supplemented by 'unity of design,' and the painter 'knows that he is even then unnatural when he follows nature too close and strictly copies life.' In his further statement that the artist avoids what is peculiar and seeks to form his idea from many objects, we have the suggestion of the theory which holds that art is to express an ideal, and that the ideal is to be found in what is most characteristic, not of the individual, but of the species. So Reynolds (1759), Winckelmann, also, in his History of Ancient Art (1765), held that the Greeks aimed to express ideal beauty by making their works of art general rather than individual. Ideal beauty would be like pure water with no individual characteristics. Expression is detrimental to beauty. On the other hand, he notes, besides the 'beautiful' style (or style of grace), the 'grand' style, which is beautiful as the expression of tranquil soul, and again says, 'Beauty without expression would be colourless, expression without beauty unpleasant.' The antithesis between (formal) beauty and expression, which has been prominent in all subsequent theory, was thus definitely stated. Lessing restricted formative art (sculpture and painting) to beauty, but admitted the representation of the ugly into poetry, as the latter art need not dwell permanently upon the painful impression. Lessing also (in his Laocoön, 1769) defined sharply the provinces of the arts of form, on the one hand, and of poetry on the other, by their respective media. Sculpture and painting, employing coexisting signs (shape and colour), can represent bodies, but only suggest actions; poetry, using successive signs (tones), represents actions, but depicts bodies by suggestion only.
III. Theories growing out of the Romantic movement. Various tendencies, social and political as well as aesthetic, found expression in a revolt from classic forms, in a demand for freedom in art as in life, in Rousseau's enthusiasm for the natural as opposed to the conventional or artificial, and in the appreciation of Shakespeare, of Gothic architecture, and of romantic poetry. What had been called 'wild' or 'unordered' was given aesthetic value under the conception of the sublime or significant. This found theoretic expression in Goethe's essay on German architecture (1773), in which he contrasts 'beautiful' art with 'characteristic' art to the advantage of the latter.
This doctrine was carried further by Hirt (1797), and the essence of art was declared to be the characteristic. Art should aim to present what nature intended to produce in a given species, and to present this by means selected expressly for their fitness for this end. This was in turn criticized by Goethe, who asserted that the characteristic must be modified by beauty (formal) in order to be really individual (as contrasted with the generic or abstract), and to become perfect art (i.e. the beautiful conceived in a narrower sense, not including necessarily the significant).
This same general movement toward freedom and enlargement in art found more systematic expression in Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790). It is the essence of art that while known to be art, and not nature, it yet must seem like nature in being free from all constraint of rules or set purpose. Beautiful art is free; it is the production of genius, and the essence of genius is that it works not according to models imposed, but by originating products which serve as models. Genius embodies in art aesthetic ideas; and an aesthetic idea is a creation of the imagination which, instead of being formed by rule, suggests more than can be exhausted by any definite concept. On the other hand, a 'normal idea,' formed by making a composite of various particulars, is merely correct, not beautiful. The end of all aesthetic art is to give pleasure: if in the mere sensations, it may be called pleasant or entertaining art; if in modes of cognition, beautiful art.
Schiller expressed another aspect of the art consciousness of his time in terming ancient art NAÏVE (q.v.) and modern 'sentimental.' In the former the artist is nature; in the latter he seeks nature, is consciously apart from it, is subjective rather than objective -- a thought which was further developed by Schlegel in his conception of IRONY (q.v.). Schlegel also asserted the essence of modern art to be not the beautiful, but the interesting, including the piquant, the striking, the ugly, &c.; and again later asserted that the beauty of art lies in its significant content, and hence that its essence is the symbolic. Schiller's most important service lay in his treatment of the function of art in the education of the race (Letters on the Aesthetic Educ. of Man, 1793-5).
The aim of education is to bring the individual into harmony with universal law. It is just the characteristic of art and beauty that this is accomplished -- that the individual becomes the ideal -- not by compulsion, but in freedom. For art is play. It is an activity which is autotelic (not controlled by outside ends), and at the same time perfectly harmonious (the expression of an ordering principle). This aesthetic play is indeed not to be identified with physical play, but it may be regarded as an outgrowth, since the freedom which is its prerogative has its analogy in the surplus of energy exhibited in the play of animals. The necessity which calls this out is not external, but lies in their own fullness of life. Schopenhauer gives a similar value to art, as silencing the desires, and enabling the individual to transcend himself, to contemplate or embody the 'Ideas' which are the objectifications of Will, the ultimate reality.
Schelling and Hegel give the thought of Kant and Schiller a more metaphysical turn. Art, according to Schelling, is that complete union of subject and object which philosophy seeks; it is therefore superior to philosophy as expression of the absolute. According to Hegel, art is the revelation of truth in sensuous form, and a more adequate expression of the idea than can be made through nature. It is therefore on the same plane with religion and philosophy; but as embodying the idea in sensuous form, it is fitted to be, as it has been, the first instructness of peoples. It has embodied and shown to them the spiritual values of their lives. The various periods of symbolic, classic, and romantic art are determined by the expression found for the ideal.
IV. Recent art theories. Recent writers have concerned themselves largely with the psychological and anthropological origins of art, or with its social and moral functions. As regards the nature of art, theories may again be related to the actual development of art itself. This has been chiefly in music and landscape painting on the one hand, and in the novel on the other. Of these, the former tend to bring into prominence the pleasures of sensation and form, the latter the representation of a significant content. Impressionism (as a theory of the aim of art, not of the means by which this shall be secured) has its motives in the former. Pater (Fortn. Rev., October, 1877, reprinted in The Renaissance) urges that music is the type of all art, the ideally consummate art. Taine leans, in his definition, to the emphasis of content. 'The end of a work of art is to manifest some essential or salient character. . . . It does this by employing a group of connected parts.' Ruskin emphasizes especially the value of characteristic expression, and by the insistence on sincerity and truth tends often to transform aesthetic into ethical categories. Guyau seeks to combine both sides: 'Art is expression of the highest idea in the language which thrills the senses most deeply, and thus stirs all emotions, higher and lower.' If art is defined as the embodiment of the beautiful, the same antithesis may be repeated according as the beautiful is understood to include or to exclude expression or significance. Cf. FORMALISM.
Finally, there may be noted here the application of Lange's theory (see under BEAUTY, V) to art, by which art is defined to be a capacity to give to others a pleasure free from practical interests and resting on a conscious self-illusion. This conscious illusion, 'make-believe,' or SEMBLANCE (q.v.), whether in imitation of nature or in the production of an emotional state, is the 'constant factor in art.'
As regards the moral and social relations of art, Ruskin has emphasized its earnestness as above noted, Morris (Hopes and Fears for Art, 1881) its dependence on social conditions. Guyau (L'art au point de vue sociologique, 1889) regards artistic emotion as in its nature social and the end of art to be not only the production of agreeable sensations, but the expression of life. This last includes especially the expression of the social sentiments, sympathy, interest, pity, &c. Tolstoi would limit art to the production of simple pleasures shareable by all, or to the representation of sentiments of universal fraternity.
Another set of writers have treated especially the origin of art, and frequently in connection with this its value to the individual or the race. Spencer (Princ. of Psychol., ii) adopts and develops the play and 'surplus-energy' theory of Plato and Schiller. Baldwin Brown emphasizes the festal origin of art. Marshall (Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics, 1894; Aesthetic Princ., 1895) seeks its origin in impulses to attract the attention and good will of others, called by J. Mark Baldwin 'self-exhibiting impulses.' Grosse (The Beginnings of Art, 1897) emphasizes the close relation of primitive art to the activities of the hunter, and shows its values in the struggle for existence. He also maintains that instead of one art-impulse there are several, and as against Spencer's view of the gradual differentiation of the arts maintains that all the main arts exist in distinct though crude form among primitive peoples. Groos (The Play of Animals, 1898, Ger. trans. 1896) attacks the 'surplus-energy' theory, and shows that play (and hence art) is rather in the nature of a necessity than a luxury, as providing exercise of the faculties which have later their serious use. Lange (Zeitsch. f. Psychol., xiv, 1897) point out the social value of art in the employment and cultivation of activities and sentiments which are useful to the society, but which do not always find a field for exhibition in earnest, e.g. the value of music or poetry in kindling patriotism. J. Mark Baldwin (Social and Eth. Interpret., 1897) emphasizes the social value of imitation and self-exhibition and Tarde (Rev. Philos., xxx. I) compares artistic enjoyment with economic consumption.
Lee and Thomson also (Contemp. Rev., 1897) criticize the 'surplus-energy' theory from the experimental standpoint. For these last theories in their relation to the origin of specific arts see CLASSIFICATION (of the fine arts).
Literature: General works dealing incidentally with art theories as well as other aesthetic problems will be found under AESTHETICS, BEAUTY, and CLASSIFICATION (of the fine arts).
(1) Historical: BOSANQUET, Hist. of Aesthetic (1892); SCHASLER, Krit. Gesch. d. Aesthetik (1872); WALTER, Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Alterthum (1893); E. MÜLLER, Gesch. d. Theorie d. Kunst bei den Alten (1834); EGGER, Essai sur l'Hist. de la Critique chez les Grecs (3rd ed., 1887); BUTCHER, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (1895); BÉNARD, L'Esthétique d'Aristote (1887); DÖRING, Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles (1876); SVOBODA, Gesch. d. Ideale mit besonderer Berücksichtigung d. bildenden Kunst (1886); LOTZE, Gesch. d. Aesthetik in Deutschland (1868); HARTMANN, Aesthetik, Historisch-krit. Theorie (1886); BASCH, Essai critique sur l'esthétique de Kant (1896); COHEN, Kant's Begründung d. Aesthetik (1889); CAIRD, Crit. Philos. of Kant (1889); BERGER, Die Entwicklung v. Schiller's Aesthetik (1894); KEDNEY, Hegel's Aesthetics (1885); BOSANQUET, Hegel's Philos. of Fine Art (trans. of the Introd. with pref. essay, 1886); MILSAND, L'Esthétique anglaise (1864, on Ruskin); Kant, Crit. of Judgment (trans. Bernard, 1892); SCHILLER, Essays, Aesthetic and Philos. (Bohn Lib.); HEGEL, Aesthetische Werke (1833-48), x.
(2) Systematic: in addition to those named under IV above and under
AESTHETICS, G. BALDWIN BROWN, The Fine Arts (1891); COLLINGWOOD, Philos. of
Ornament (1883); KER, The Philosophy of Art, in Essays in Philos. Criticism
(ed. by Setch and Haldane, 1883); FIERENS-GEVAERT, Essai sur l'Art contemporain
(1897); GUYAU, Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique contemporaine (4th
ed., 1897); HADDON, Evolution in Art (1895); MORRIS, The Lesser Arts, in Lectures
on Art (1882); PROUDHON, Du Principe de l'Art et de sa Destination sociale (1865);
SÉAILLES, Essai sur le Génie dans l'Art (2nd ed., 1897); RIEGEL,
Die bildenden Künste (4th ed., 1895); VOLKELT, Aesthetische Zeitfragen
(1895); WALLASCHEK, Primitive Music (1893); Aesthetik der Ton-Kunst (1886);
SULLY, Sensation and Intuition (1874); GURNEY, The Power of Sound (1880), and
Tertium Quid (1887); PRUDHOMME, L'espression dans les Beaux-Arts (1883); VISCHER,
Krit. Gänge, esp. Heft vi (1873); CARRIERE, Die Kunst im Zusammenhange
der Kulturentwickelung u. die Ideale d. Menschheit (3rd ed., 1885); ALT, Syst.
d. Künste (1888); SEMPER, Der Stil in den technischen u. techtonischen
Künsten (2nd ed., 1878-9). (J.H.T.)
Like the play impulse, it is generally held to be free and spontaneous, and not directly determined by material needs. It is distinguished from the play impulse in that for its satisfaction it requires expression in a rational, ordered, and significant activity.
For the various theories as to the specific impulses assigned as the origin of art see ART, and CLASSIFICATION (of the fine arts).
Literature: Recent works giving especial attention to the subject are:
SPENCER, Psychology, ii; BROWN, The Fine Arts (1891); GROSSE, Die Anfänge
d. Kunst (1893, Eng. trans. 1897); MARSHALL, Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics
(1894); GROOS, The Play of Animals (1898, Ger. 1896), and the Play of Man (1900,
Ger. 1899); RIBOT, La Psychol. des Sentiments (1896); BALDWIN, Social and Eth.
Interpret. (1897). (J.H.T.)
Artery [Gr. arthria,
the windpipe, a survival of the ancient notion that these vessels contained
air]: Ger. Arterie, Schlagader; Fr. artère; Ital.
arteria. A vessel which carries blood from the heart to a system of capillaries.
See VASO-MOTOR SYSTEM. (C.F.H.)
Articular Sensation [Lat. articularis, pertaining to the joints]: Ger. Gelenkempfindung; Fr. sensation articulaire; Ital. sensazione delle giunture. A sensation, whose adequate stimulus is movement of the one joint-surface upon the other, or pressure and counter-pressure of the two surfaces. The sensation is of great importance, as the basis of the perceptions of movement and position of the limbs, of resistance, &c. It possesses local signature (see LOCAL SIGNS), and seems to show constancy of absolute sense discrimination.
Literature: KÜLPE, Outlines of Psychol., 140 ff., 341 ff.; SANFORD,
Course in Exper. Psychol., expts. 39, 40, 43; GOLDSCHEIDER, Du Bois-Reymond's
Arch. (1889), 369, 540, and Suppl. -Bd. (1889), 141; Centralbl. f. Physiol.
(1887 and 1889); E. CLAPARÈDE, Du Sens musculaire (1897). (E.B.T.)
Articulation (vocal) [Lat. articulatio, a joining together]: Ger. Artikulirung; Fr. articulation; Ital. articolazione. The act of co-operation among the organs of speech in larynx and mouth, whereby, through modification or check of the breath-current, distinct speech-sounds are produced.
The character of speech-sounds is determined by the noises generated as the
breath-current passes the articulated organs, or by the resonance dependent
on the form of the resonance cavity in mouth and nose created in the articulation,
or by both. See Vietor, Elemente d. Phonetik, 2nd ed., §§
1 ff. Whitney's definition (Proc. Amer. Philol. Assoc.,
1881, 22) is: 'Articulation is virtually syllabication -- a breaking of the
stream of utterance into joints, by the intervention of closer utterances or
consonants between the opener utterances or vowels.' This does not represent
with any exactness the present scientific use of the term, though it may be
etymologically more correct. (B.I.W.)
Artificial Selection: Ger. künstliche Auswahl (or Selektion); Fr. sélection artificielle (or méthodique); Ital. selezione artificiale (or metodica). The selection by man of certain animals or plants from which to breed, with a view to securing certain chosen or desirable characters.
It is treated by Darwin under the heads (1) 'Methodical Selection': 'That which guides a man who systematically endeavours to modify a breed according to some predetermined standard.' (2) 'Unconscious Selection': 'That which follows from men naturally preserving the most valued and destroying the less valued individuals without any thought of altering the breed.' The term unconscious is somewhat unfortunate. The distinction is between selecting with conscious intention of improving or altering the breed, and selecting for various other reasons of utility, convenience, &c., with no thought of the breed. See SELECTION, where recommendations regarding various meanings of the English word selection are to be found. (C.LL.M. - J.M.B.)
Darwin's Animals and Plants under Domestication contains a store of facts relating to artificial selection. This process differs in its method from that of natural selection in that man selects the fittest from which to breed, the 'fit' being those individuals which already show the desired character and the process leading to the accumulation of variations along artificially chosen lines, while nature eliminates the unfit in the struggle for existence without the element of conscious choice, which thus constitutes the great difference. The distinction as between the fit, in the one case, and the unfit in the other, is largely a matter of degree. In SOCIAL SUPPRESSION (q.v.) the unfittest, from a distinctly social point of view (e.g. criminals), are isolated or suppressed. (C.LL.M. - J.M.B.)
Literature: DARWIN (as cited); G. J. ROMANES, Darwin and after
Darwin, i. (1892). See also under SELECTION.
Aryan [Sansk. Ârya, noble]: Ger. Arier, arisch; Fr. Aryen; Ital. Ariano. A term used by anthropologists and historians to designate the speech-family commonly called among philologists of England, America, and France the Indo-European, and of German Indogermanisch.
In the stricter usage of present-day philologists the term is limited in its
application to the Indo-Iranian speech-family, i.e. the family whose chief ancient
representatives are the Sanskrit and Avestan (Zend). As the use of the term
Indo-Iranian, however, has now practically displaced it in this value, the value
given it by anthropologists may well be regarded as its standard meaning, in
which sense its brevity commends it to general use. (B.I.W.)